1875

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tagsyear, 19th-century, 20th-century, aceh, aceh-war, acheh, atjeh, chronology, colonial, dutch-colonial, infrastructure, literature, military, timeline, war, 1875, petroleum
aliases1875 (Van Heutsz 1893 perspective), 1875 (year), 1875 AD, 1875 CE, Year 1875, the year 1875, Year 1875 petroleum, 1875 Rantau Pandjang

21 min read

1875 was a watershed year in the Dutch colonial history of Atjeh, marked by a series of administrative reforms, a severe health crisis, the inauguration of the first railway line in the region, and a decisive shift from punitive raids to a sustained occupation. In the spring, General Pel issued his programmatic note of 30 April 1875 and returned to the field on 8 November 1875 after a brief leave; the Governor‑Generalship passed to Governor‑General Van Lansberge on 26 March 1875; a health commission was created by Indies decree of 12 April 1875; and the regulation of the heerendiensten was confirmed on 1 October 1875. Simultaneously, the Dutch launched a renewed offensive under Colonel M. P. Meyer, landing on 26 December 1875 and beginning a programme of permanent fort construction that would shape the later Aceh War.

Governance and Administrative Reforms

Van Lansberge’s Assumption of Office

On 26 March 1875 Governor‑General Van Lansberge succeeded Mr. J. Loudon following the Royal Decree of 17 December 1874. In January 1875 the vice‑president of the Raad of Nederlandsch‑Indië, Mr. O. van Rees, was removed from the commission for the improvement of Indian taxes after the Opperbestuur, advised by the Raad van State in November 1874, judged that article 36 of the Regeeringsreglement prohibited such a dual role.

Health Commission

An Indies decree of 12 April 1875 appointed a commission to investigate the “many and serious cases of illness” afflicting Dutch positions in Atjeh. Its report of 1 July 1875 prompted partial implementation, notably the ordering of works at the sea‑head on iron screw‑piles at Oleh‑leh (completed in September 1876) and the railway between Oleh‑leh and Kota Radja (completed in November 1876).

Regulation of the Heerendiensten

The decree of 1 October 1875 confirmed the existing regulation of the heerendiensten, while pressure grew to abolish the pantjensdiensten (services owed by native chiefs). The same month saw continued progress toward the abolition of slavery in the buitenbezittingen (outer possessions).

Other Fiscal Measures

By the wet of 6 April 1875 (Stbl. n°. 61) a sum was earmarked for the construction of the Soerabaya—Pasoeroean—Malang railway line, reflecting broader colonial investment in infrastructure.

Military Operations and Campaigns

Pel’s Programme (30 April 1875)

In his note of 30 April 1875 to the Governor‑General, General Pel evaluated the situation after the successful capture of the “hoofd‑stelling” and secured sea communication, but lamented that “all those victories have as yet given few political results.” He identified the war‑party—led by chiefs such as Panglima Polem, Imam Longbatta, and Toekoe Rajoet Lamkapang—as a persistent obstacle. Pel’s programme called for consolidation of the current position, resumption of hostilities when feasible, introduction of direct administration in occupied territories, and avoidance of imposing direct rule on regions that might willingly submit.

Pel’s Leave and Return

Promoted to major‑general by Royal Decree of 18 February 1875, Pel departed for Java on 13 June 1875 to recover his health. He reported that the fortifications at Kota Radja were “on all sides secured by an unbroken chain of fortifications” and that sea communication via the Atjeh‑rivier, the landing‑place at Oleh‑leh, and the newly laid road was fully assured. Pel returned to Atjeh on 8 November 1875 with instructions dated 10 November 1875 to act on his earlier programme and to subjugate the VI, IV and IX Moekims as well as the eastern territory up to Kroëng Raja. During his absence, Colonel G. B. T. Wiggers van Kerchem acted as temporary replacement.

Colonel M. P. Meyer’s Renewed Offensive

In the latter half of 1875 the Dutch shifted to a policy of permanent occupation. Colonel M. P. Meyer was appointed commander of the 1875 offensive. Under his direction the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (the Korps Mariniers) landed on 26 December 1875 at a strategically chosen beachhead, establishing a supply depot and immediately commencing the construction of coastal forts. These fortifications, later documented in Cambier’s monographs, enabled a continuous Dutch military footprint and reduced the reliance on intermittent punitive raids.

The campaign continued through 1876, officially concluding on 4 September 1876, and demonstrated a coordinated use of naval squadrons, marine detachments, and regular army battalions. Contemporary patrol reports by Verhey (continuing from 1874) emphasize Meyer’s focus on a sustained presence rather than isolated actions.

Health Crisis

The year 1875 saw 957 deaths and 5 151 evacuations from cholera and other diseases. Contemporary accounts attributed the “unfavourable situation” to poor drinking water, fallow rice fields, deep‑cutting lagunes, extensive ground‑moving, deforestation, and inadequate shelter against the variable climate. The high morbidity forced healthy soldiers to perform exhausting duties, which in turn accelerated further sickness.

Infrastructure: Railway and Fortifications

First Railway Line

1875 marked the inauguration of the first railway line in Atjeh, a modest track ordered by the Department of War linking the roadstead of Oelèe Lheuë to the principal Dutch military station at Kota Radja. According to the Encyclopaedisch Bureau, this “spoorbaantje” was built “shortly after the beginning of the Atjeh‑expedition” and thus predates the systematic construction of the later Atjeh‑tramway by more than a decade.

The line served as the seed for the extensive Atjeh‑tramway network: in 1882 the Department of Civil Public Works (B.O.W.) took over management, converting it into a tramway; in 1885 a ceintuur‑trambaan (belt line) was added along the celebrated postenlinie (line of forts) surrounding Kota Radja; and in 1891 control reverted to the War Department.

Fort Construction under Meyer

The forts erected after the 26 December 1875 landing formed the backbone of the Dutch permanent presence. They protected supply lines, facilitated inland patrols, and anchored the later expansion of the railway and tramway systems.

Biographical Note: Cornelis Jacobus Snijders

The year 1875 also marked the end of Lieutenant‑Colonel Tweede Luitenant C. J. Snijders’ two‑year detachment in Atjeh. He had arrived at Kota Radja on 8 November 1874 and participated in the Benting Kota Alam operation of 13 November 1874. Throughout 1875 the Mineurs en Sappers of the Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden maintained the sea‑head at Oleh‑leh and the railway between Oleh‑leh and Kota Radja, despite the heavy disease losses. Snijders returned to the Netherlands in 1875 and later served as Chef van de Generale Staf (1910–1918) and Opperbevelhebber van Land‑ en Zeemacht during the First World War.

Significance

1875 encapsulates a turning point in the Dutch conquest of Atjeh: administrative centralisation under Van Lansberge, a concerted health response, the first railway imprint on the Acehnese landscape, and—most critically—the launch of Colonel Meyer’s sustained offensive that transformed Dutch tactics from episodic raids to permanent occupation. The infrastructure projects of 1875 laid the material foundations for the later Atjeh‑tramway, while the military reforms foreshadowed the intensified phase of the Aceh War that would dominate the final decades of the nineteenth century.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

1875 was the year in which generaal Pel, having inherited van Swieten’s “zeer gebrekkige stelling,” completed the defensive ring around Kota Radja and revealed to gouverneur-generaal van Lansberge at Buitenzorg his secret plan to isolate Atjeh from the sea by a line from the Kroeng Raba to the Kroeng Raya. It was also a year of devastating cholera, of Pel’s three months’ leave, and of the Buitenzorg planning session that set the great December offensive in motion. Borel treats 1875 as the year in which the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture) was finally abandoned — yet also as a year whose promising beginning was interrupted by the very human cost of the war.

Completing the Stelling-Pel (January–May 1875)

The year opened with the conquest of Blang Tjoet (18 January 1875) and the conquest of Mandarsa Poeti (28 January 1875). On 1 February 1875 the enemy tried to retaliate with a dawn attack on the nipa-benteng, easily foiled. On 4 February 1875 Romswinckel took Lampriet without resistance. The surprise of Lamara Olejlo on the night of 14–15 February 1875 — kapitein von Ende’s unauthorized coup that seized the abandoned enemy fortification and held it against the dawn return of the Atjehneezen — was the most celebrated minor exploit of the period; von Ende received from Pel both formal praise and a reprimand, “hij had beide ten volle verdiend; het behaalde succes maakte alles goed.” On 17 February 1875 a new fort was built at Kwala Titipandjang to cover the banks of the Kroeng Broek. On the King’s birthday late in February, Pel was promoted to generaal-majoor and invested with the Commander’s cross of the Militaire Willemsorde. The conquest of Lohong, Setee, Lamteboe and Gitjiel in April brought the whole sawah south of Longbatta into Dutch hands “at cost of fresh bloody sacrifices,” and by early May the continuous line around K. Radja was complete — an unbroken line from Blang Tjoet on the left bank of the Atjeh-rivier westward over Longbatta Mesigit, Lohong, Lamara, Gitjiel, Setee, Lamteboe, Poengej Blang Tjoet, Poe Oe, Soerian and Blang Oe to the sea-strand at Oeleh Leh. K. Radja now formed “doelmatige centraal stelling” it should have been from the beginning.

Pel’s Leave and the Buitenzorg Session (June–November 1875)

On 12 June 1875 Pel — exhausted, his health shattered after “ruim een jaar” in command — handed over military and civil command ad interim to generaal Wiggers van Kerchem and left for Buitenzorg to recover. Borel notes that even the strongest constitution would have succumbed in Atjeh. On 20 June 1875 the Poelolo Bras lighthouse was completed and its light could be “ontstoken” to mark the koers for ships at night; a month later it was plechtig ingewijd — “een werk, waarbij de geheele beschaafde wereld belang had.” During the Buitenzorg leave took place the Pel’s Buitenzorg planning session of July 1875, in which Pel explained to the newly appointed gouverneur-generaal van Lansberge and the commandant van het leger his conviction that the afwachtende stelsel was useless. His plan: as soon as the good moesson returned, resume offensives; push the post at Soerian forward; invade Toekoe Nanta’s VI Moekims; occupy Sinangri and sweep the western bank of the Kwala Tjangkoel; later extend the linie from the mouth of the Kroeng Raba on the west coast to the mouth of the Kroeng Raya on the north coast, isolating Atjeh from the sea. The GG agreed to “den oorlog met Atjeh op de meest doortastende wijze te voeren” and promised ruime versterkingen. In July Sinangri was occupied without opposition — considerably improving the stelling at its weakest point between Oeleh Leh and Soerian. An enemy attempt to break the south line on the night of 21–22 June 1875 was “bij tijds verijdeld.”

The Cholera Catastrophe (February 1875)

The cholera catastrophe at Kota Radja raged horribly among troops and coolies in February. “Since landing on Atjeh coast the Dutch had never in so short a time suffered such appalling losses.” In the K. Radja ambulances alone almost 500 people died — 270 of them military — averaging 15–18 per day with peak days of 25 or even 30. The absolute necessity of strong measures was recognised “als de geheele Indische strijdmacht niet ten ondergang moest worden prijsgegeven.” As a first step the ambulances were moved to the grasvlakte of Pantej Perak south of Penajoeng, where engineers urgently began building a camp for a battalion of infantry to cover the new hospitals. The Kraton now resembled “one great hospital”; the dead were constantly carried through the interior, simply wrapped in a sheet, on wheeled stretchers drawn by two kettinggang convicts, to the cemetery at K. Podjoet. Borel strongly criticises this practice as injurious to morale.

Return of Pel and the Launch of the New Offensive (November–December 1875)

In September and October, while Pel was still at Buitenzorg, the Atjehneezen used the relative quiet to build versterkingen near Dutch posts; patrouilles and communications between posts were attacked; in September several detachments south of K. Radja and at Lampriet were “in groot gevaar om afgesneden en in de pan gehakt te worden.” On 9 November 1875 Pel resumed betrekking as militaire and civiele bevelhebber, and found the toestand such that offensive action was needed “zoo spoedig mogelijk.” Skirmishes at Kota Alam and Sinangri in mid-November and the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit on 22 November 1875 — when a band of ~50 Atjehneezen climbed the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among sleeping manschappen, wounding 13 including two officers — cemented Pel’s conviction. On 26 November 1875 the enemy attacked along the entire ooster-linie at Kota Alam, Lemboe-O. and Lampriet. With the arrival of the Barissans bataljon on 10 December 1875 and the 9de bataljon on 21 December 1875, Pel could at last launch the great offensive against the VI, IV and IX Moekims on 26 December 1875 — opening the campaign that would carry the war into 1876.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893) — the groote politieke fout

Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh identifies 1875 as the year of the groote politieke fout — the year in which the Van Swieten programme of 1874 — the geconcentreerde stelling at Kotja-Radja held by a 2500-man garrison — was formally abandoned on the proposal of Generaal Pel and the newly installed Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge, and in which the colony committed itself, by Pel’s letter to the Gouverneur-Generaal of 30 April 1875, to “het op grootere schaal aanvallend optreden met de wapenen in de vallei van Groot-Atjeh” — the large-scale offensive with arms in the valley of Groot-Atjeh.

Pel’s letter of 30 April 1875

The defining act of 1875 was Pel’s letter to G.-G. van Lansberge of 30 April 1875 — the brief van Generaal Pel aan Z. E. den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië, dated Atjeh, 30 April 1875, and reproduced as Bijlage IV in the second volume of Kielstra’s Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog. Van Heutsz’s 1893 verdict on the letter is the highest praise he accords any of the eleven Governors’ programmes:

“Erkend moet worden, dat de brief van Generaal Pel aan Z. E. den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië en gedagteekend Atjeh, 30 April 1875 (opgenomen als bijlage IV in het 2e deel van Kielstra’s Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog) een uitmuntend gesteld stuk is, en onze toenmalige kennis van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden in aanmerking genomen, aan de Regeering werkelijk moest toeschijnen den weg aan te geven, die ons het snelst het einddoel van ons streven, de onderwerping van Atjeh, zou doen bereiken. Wij kunnen de lezing van dien brief aanbevelen”.

The recommendation to read the letter in full — wij kunnen de lezing van dien brief aanbevelen — is Van Heutsz’s only such reader-direction in the entire 1893 tract. The plan proposed the occupation of the entire coastal strip of the valley of Groot-Atjeh from Kroeng Raja to Kroeng Raba and the closing of the five kwala’s — the river-mouths — that gave the interior of Groot-Atjeh access to the sea, in order to sever the interior from its maritime supply. The same letter posed the question that became the central riddle of the next decade: “wat, na voltooiing van zijn plan, moest gedaan worden in ons politiek en handelsbelang” — what, after the completion of his plan, was to be done in our political and commercial interest?

The abandonment of Van Swieten’s concentrated-defence policy

Van Heutsz’s narration of the abandonment is the structural pivot of the 1893 tract’s diagnostic chapter:

“Toen echter reeds dadelijk na van Swieten’s vertrek militaire wapenfeiten tot uitbreiding van de ingenomen stelling, naar het heette noodzakelijk tot beveiliging van deze, ‘s bestuurs aandacht bijna geheel in beslag namen en daarna, in 1875, op voorstel van Generaal Pel, door den nieuw opgetreden landvoogd, Gouv. Gen. van Lansberge, de door van Swieten in overeenstemming met den Gouv. Gen. Loudon en den Minister van Koloniën Fransen van de Putte aangewezen weg geheel verlaten en besloten werd tot het op grootere schaal aanvallend optreden met de wapenen in de vallei van Groot-Atjeh, traden de militaire wapenfeiten geheel op den voorgrond en kwam het civiel beleid eerst in de tweede plaats in aanmerking”.

The reversal had three components. First, the geconcentreerde stelling Kotja-Radja — Van Swieten’s kleine maar sterke positie in the most weighty part of the valley of Groot-Atjeh — was abandoned in favour of the large-scale offensive. Second, the 2500-man concentrated garrison was replaced by a dispersed coastal occupation. Third, the civiel beleid that Van Swieten had placed “op den voorgrond” — at the forefront — was displaced to “de tweede plaats” (the second place), with the militaire wapenfeiten now taking precedence.

The 38 posts in Groot-Atjeh by May 1875

By May 1875, the Pel Plan was already in operation, and the operational figures Van Heutsz cites mark the scale of the reversal from the Van Swieten programme:

“Deze liet 2500 man achter, om daarmede te bezetten en actief te verdedigen de geconcentreerde stelling Kotja-Radja en enkele posten ter verzekering van de veilige gemeenschap naar zee; en nu waren in ‘t einde [Mei 1875] al acht en dertig posten opgericht met eene bezetting [van 2750 man]”.

The May 1875 figure of 38 posts in Groot-Atjeh with a garrison of 2750 infantry alone is the benchmark Van Heutsz uses to mark the operational scale of the colony’s commitment within months of the formal abandonment of the Van Swieten programme: a 2500-man concentrated defence had been replaced by a thirty-eight-post dispersed occupation, with no corresponding advance in the political objective — “zonder dat deze uitbreiding ons ten opzichte van de onderwerping -dus op staatkundig gebied- één schrede had vooruitgebracht” was Van Heutsz’s verdict on the parallel expansion. The reversal was thus both an effect of the Pel Plan and a precondition of its acceptance: “Te meer is ‘s Regeerings toetreden tot ‘s Generaals voorstellen begrijpelijk, omdat op dat tijdstip Mei 1875 feitelijk reeds geheel was afgeweken van het programma van Swieten”.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 8, 12, 17, 22, 26. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Account from Verkenningen in Atjeh (1923)

1875 was the year in which officers of the man-of-war Timor, led thither by Atjehnese chiefs, discovered the petroleum-spring at Rantau Pandjang in the landschap of Peureula (Perlak) — ‘in Mei 1875 eenige officieren van de Timor de petroleumbron’. The yield of the spring had once been 60 gantang; in 1875 it was 40 gantang — about one picol — which at Rantau Pandjang brought nearly six dollars. The chief had a monthly income from it of two hundred dollars. The discovery is recorded by J. A. Kruyt in Atjeh en de Atjehers (1877). Teungkoe habib Moehamat bin Sajet Oesoeih of Peudawa Rajeu received a large silver presentation-tray from the government in 1875.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

In 1875 the Dutch in Atjeh lost 957 dead and evacuated 5,151 men.

Nineteenth-Century Historiography & Campaign Analysis

Historiographical Controversies

In early 1875, General G. G. Booms published his seminal treatise Over de eerste expeditie tegen Atjeh, responding to an April 1875 article in De Gids by General F. V. A. de Stuers. Simultaneously, anonymous pamphlets such as the Open Letter by Brutus to General Knoop appeared, fiercely criticizing General J. van Swieten’s conduct of the Second Aceh Expedition and contrasting it with the aggressive posture of General J. L. J. H. Pel in 1875.

General Pel’s Military Operations

On 26 December 1875, General J. L. J. H. Pel initiated an extensive winter campaign with an army of over 7,000 men. Operating from fortified bases at Pekan Badak and Sinangri, Dutch forces executed the Attack on Mibouw, crossed the Blankala Pass, and drove Acehnese forces from strongholds in the VI Moekims and IV Moekims, despite severe constraints imposed by the Transport and Coolie System in Aceh.

Account from Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf (1925)

1875 was year of petroleum discovery observation at Rantau Pandjang north-west of Peureula.

Events

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege dates the true assertion of Dutch strength over Atjeh to the long debate that was concluded by the position at the end of April of this year: by then the line from Oleh-leh to Kota Moesapie had been fixed (see his map of the positions) — an almost uninterrupted one-year struggle of 2,750 men on thirty-eight posts, won against an enemy who never asked for truce. On 30 April 1875 general Pel addressed to the Governor-General the missive that the champions of the waiting posture had so long misquoted, giving his programme: consolidation and resumption of hostilities (see Pel’s missive to the Governor-General (30 April 1875)). Pel departed for Batavia on 13 June 1875 and his programme was approved by the government there. This is also the year of the first frustrated attempt at a movement of the Sultanaat: on 20 May 1875, at the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, the Dutch agent Lavino met Habib Abdoerrachman el Zahir, who offered to obtain from the chiefs a mandate for negotiations on the basis of the elevation of Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed to Sultan and of his own appointment as regent; the Indian government put the offer aside entirely (see Herstel van het sultanaat). The health statistics of this year were the worst of the war so far: 957 dead and 5,151 evacuated (Kielstra, cited in the pamphlet).

See Also

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Van der Heijden effectively subdued Groot-Atjeh in slightly more than 1.5 years (1874-1875/76), banished unrest, gave population confidence.

Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 39.

Source

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), passim. Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 238–256, 263–289, 296–302. Over de eerste expeditie tegen Atjeh: Een antwoord aan Generaal de Stuers, G. G. Booms, ‘s-Gravenhage: A. van Hoogstraten & Zoon, 1875, pp. 5-22; Atjeh gedurende de tweede expeditie en later, Een Oud Officier, Batavia: Ogilvie & Co., 1876, pp. 11-55. Verkenningen in Atjeh, by Dr. R. Broersma (De Locomotief, October 1923); Atjeh Patchouli-Olie, by Ir. W. Spoon (1932), where applicable.

  • De Buitenbezittingen 1904 tot 1914, Deel I, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedisch Bureau, Mededelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen, Aflevering X (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1917), p. 68 (section “De Atjeh‑tram”).
  • De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872‑1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I.
  • De geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Korps Mariniers van 1665‑1945, OCR edition, pp. 473.
  • Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L., by G. W. T. Dames, Maj. Inf. K.N.I.L. b.d. (‘s‑Gravenhage: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1954).
  • Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852–1939): Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk, by D. van den Berg (Voorburg: September 1944), pp. 10‑35. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0301 4872. Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf, by Dr. R. Broersma, Gebrs. Cohen, Utrecht, 1925, pp. 33-34, 38-39.

Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 39.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 53-58, 97 note, 49 note. OCR: DLP-158.

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