Aceh War

Properties3
descriptionThe protracted Dutch colonial war against the Sultanate of Atjeh, begun in 1873 with the First Atjeh Expedition and concluded in the early 20th century by the pacification policies of Van Heutsz as Governor (1898-1904) and Governor-General (1904-1908).
tagsevent, war, dutch-colonial, military, political, political-history, military-history, colonial, dutch, religious, acheh, atjeh, aceh-war, 19th-century, 20th-century, concept, aceh
aliasesAtjeh-oorlog (1873-1904), Atjeh-oorlog, Acheh War, Atjehoorlog, the Atjeh war, Atjeh War, Achehnese War, Atjeh-krijg, Atjeh-krieg, den oorlog met Atjeh, Atjeh-oorlog (Van Heutsz 1893)

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The Aceh War (Dutch: Atjeh-oorlog) was the military conflict between the Dutch colonial government and the Acehnese people that began in 1873 and continued with varying intensity for decades. It was one of the longest and most costly colonial wars in Dutch history, and the defining catastrophe of the nineteenth century for Acheh.

Origins

C. Snouck Hurgronje arrived in Acheh in 1891 when the war had already been ongoing for eighteen years. His fundamental analysis, completed in 1892, was that the dogmas of Islam on the subject of religious war — so fanatical in their terms — supplied the principal stimulus to the obstinate Acehnese rebellion. No one any longer doubted, by the time of the 1906 English publication of The Achehnese, that the teungkus (religious leaders) came more and more during the war to be the masters of the country, terrorising the hereditary uleebalang chiefs as well as the populace wherever these were disposed to peace.

The Concentration Scheme (1884)

In 1884 the “concentration scheme” was taken up, and a beginning was made by the construction of a “concentrated line” of forts stretching about the old seat of the sultanate. A widespread opinion held that the statesman who inaugurated this scheme was cynical and sceptical and only sought a temporary way of shelving the burden of the Acehnese question. The Acehnese were free, at whatever time and in whatever way suited them best and without heavy expenditure or loss, to harass the line and the coast-stations as often as they pleased; the troops within the line were as little able to prevent them as to punish them when the thing was done.

Diagnosis

Snouck Hurgronje identified that: the resistance in the Coast-states must be overcome by naval coercion alone; developments must be awaited and time would reconcile the Acehnese to their Over-lords; the religious party and the energetic adventurers had a most desirable opportunity of establishing war-chests; and the Acehnese were able to supply their own limited requirements even without the aid of foreign trade.

His key conclusions were:

  • Only a forcible subjugation followed by orderly control over the administration could bring about peace
  • The Dutch government could effect nothing by pressure from outside
  • The control of the country through controlling its harbours was impracticable
  • Tuanku Muhamat Dawot (the child sultan) was a nonentity in a political sense

The Real Conquest (1899 onwards)

The real conquest of Acheh began around 1899, placing C. Snouck Hurgronje — then spending a great deal of time in the country — in an incomparably better position to investigate affairs than he had been in 1891 and 1892. By the time The Achehnese was published in 1906, the whole former kingdom of Acheh with its dependencies was subject to Dutch rule; all districts were administered by hereditary chiefs under the constant supervision of Dutch Civil Servants and officials, and the military force was engaged in hunting down and reducing to impotence the last elements of disorder.

Outcome

By 1906, the whole former kingdom of Acheh with the dependencies connected with it was subject to Dutch rule. All districts were administered by hereditary chiefs under the constant supervision of Dutch Civil Servants and officials. The surviving bands no longer deluded themselves with the hope of baffling the Dutch for long. The very reciprocal dissensions of the Acehnese — their efforts to impede the subjection of their opponents among their fellow-countrymen — made the work laborious and slow, but no one had any doubt about the ultimate issue.

Expanded account from The Achehnese, Vol. I — Acheh War

The Acheh War was the armed conflict between the Sultanate of Acheh and the Dutch colonial government that began with the Dutch expedition of 1873 and continued, with periods of suspension, for more than three decades. Snouck Hurgronje, writing in the introduction to The Achehnese, notes that foreigners had constructed for themselves a legend of the Acheh War which, though completely refuted by Dutch writings, continued outside Holland to be accepted as history; one object of his treatise was to lay before the reader the alteration in the state of affairs since the war’s commencement and the real nature of the obstacles that had impeded its conclusion.

The war’s origins lay in the guarantee of Achehnese independence that the Dutch Government had, with great lack of foresight, given to Great Britain in the treaty of 1824. When, in the second decennial period of the nineteenth century, Holland was compelled to take measures to ensure the safety of foreign trade in Acheh, the responsibilities of that guarantee could no longer be ignored. The first Dutch attack of 1873 ended in failure and the death of General Köhler; a second expedition later in the same year took the kraton but did not subdue the country. Thereafter the war was allowed to be suspended since 1881 without any real resultant gain, the Dutch holding only a fortified “concentratie-linie” around Kuta Raja while the interior remained in Achehnese hands.

The war was resumed in 1896 after the failure of the policy of concentration had been exposed. Above all since Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz in 1898 took the direction of affairs, everything was methodically done to bring about the necessary end, once and for all, of the insurrection. In less than six years Van Heutsz made such progress that even the most sceptical had to admit that the beginning of the end had been reached. The young pretender to the sultanate, Tuanku Muhamat Dawot, submitted to the Dutch Government in January 1903, and with him numbers of adventurers, fanatical leaders, and uleebalangs tendered their submission in the years that followed.

The conduct of the Achehnese side is treated by Snouck Hurgronje under two related headings. The military resistance of the early period — sultan, uleebalangs, and irregular chiefs such as the imeum of Lueng Bata — is described under Achehnese War. The religiously organised resistance of the period of concentration — the jihad led by the ulamas and financed by the sabil share of the jakeuet — is described under Holy War (Jihad) against the Dutch. Together these phases form the single conflict that the Achehnese call prang Gompeuni, “the war with the Dutch,” and that the Dutch call the Atjeh-oorlog. Its progress is recorded in the Hikayat Prang Gompeuni and produced many of Acheh’s most celebrated religious-military leaders, including Teungku Tiro, Teungku Kutakarang, Habib Abdurrahman Zahir, Habib Samalanga, and Teuku Uma.

Expanded account from The Achehnese, Vol. I — Achehnese War

The Achehnese War was the long armed conflict between the Sultanate of Acheh and the Dutch colonial government, opened by the Dutch declaration of war and first attack in 1873 and continuing — with periods of quiescence — for more than three decades as a guerrilla resistance carried on by uleebalangs, ulamas, and irregular bands across the country. By the time Snouck Hurgronje was writing in 1891–1892 the war had been formally suspended since 1881, but it remained the dominant fact of Achehnese public life and coloured every institution he described.

Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly notes that the commencement of the war in 1873 had been preceded by a great intemperate use of strong drink in the neighbourhood of the royal stronghold, the Dalam at Banda Acheh. The use of spirituous liquors, though forbidden by Islam, was not uncommon among the lowland upper classes and those who came much into contact with Europeans; the moral relaxation which it betokened was, in popular Achehnese interpretation, one of the reasons why Allah did not at once give victory to the believers. The same period saw the last contests for royal honours before the war, in which figures such as the imeum of Chade’ took a leading part as supporters of defeated candidates.

The military leadership of the Achehnese side was not supplied by the sultan’s officials alone. Local chiefs and religious teachers came to the fore, among them the imeum of Lueng Bata, who played a distinguished part as a military leader, and the hereditary uleebalangs of the three sagis such as Teuku Lamreueng, who fled to Keumala at the commencement of the war and later tendered his submission to the Dutch. The religious impetus to resistance was supplied by the ulama party, whose jihad against the infidel Dutch was organised after the period of concentration and financed by sabil contributions drawn from the jakeuet or zakat.

The war was resumed in 1896 after its long suspension, and from 1898 Governor Van Heutsz directed a methodical offensive that within six years brought the country to what Snouck Hurgronje called “the beginning of the end.” The young pretender to the sultanate, Tuanku Muhamat Dawot, submitted to the Dutch Government in January 1903. The struggle produced many celebrated Achehnese leaders and is recorded in the Hikayat Prang Gompeuni; it is treated, in its wider chronological frame, under the separate heading Acheh War.

Expanded account from The Achehnese, Vol. I — Dutch War in Acheh

The Dutch War in Acheh (also called the Aceh War) was the protracted conflict between the Sultanate of Acheh and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, beginning in 1873 and continuing, with varying intensity, for decades. C. Snouck Hurgronje, in The Achehnese, treats the war as the indispensable background to the political and religious condition of the country in his own time. He devotes particular attention to its beginning — the upheaval by which the highlanders were driven back to their mountain fastnesses, the Sultan fled to Keumala, and Banda Acheh became the capital of the territory seized by the Dutch and the base of their operations.

Causes

The causes of the continuance of the war, with but slight change, lay partly in the political constitution of Acheh — a country of virtually independent chiefs held loosely under a port-king whose actual domain was small — and partly in the religious sentiment of the population, which was concentrated more than ever against the Dutch, who had for years past been the kafirs most detested in Acheh. The first attempts of the Dutch to assert sovereignty over Acheh, by treaty and by negotiation with the Sultan, had foundered on the fact that the Sultan could not speak for his uleebalangs; military intervention followed.

The Beginning

When the war began, the highlanders were driven back to their mountain fastnesses, the Sultan fled to Keumala, and Banda Acheh became the capital of the territory seized by the Dutch and the base of their operations. The Sultan Ibrahim Mansur Shah had been recognised by the Dutch in 1857 and again in 1868, but the question of Achehnese sovereignty over the dependencies on the East and West Coasts, and the refusal of the Achehnese court to submit to Dutch demands, precipitated the conflict. The Dutch attack was first repulsed in 1873 (an episode still remembered with pride in Achehnese tradition), but a second expedition in the same year carried the Dalam, and the Sultan fled.

Reorganisation of Achehnese Resistance

At the commencement of the war, the chiefs of the three sagis fled with the Sultan to Keumala, and the Sultanate continued a shadowy existence at that place. The panglima of the XXVI Mukims, Teuku Lamreueng, in the end re-established himself in his territory and tendered his submission to the Dutch Government — for which he was murdered in Pidie by the adherents of his rival Teuku Muda Lampaseh. His infant son, afterwards Teuku Nya’ Banta, was recognised by the Government as Panglima of the XXVI Mukims. The crisis of the war thus coincided with — and was in some measure prolonged by — internal disputes over the succession to the panglimaship.

The Period of Concentration

After the first Dutch campaigns, the government adopted the policy of “concentration”, by which its forces were withdrawn behind a fortified line — the so-called linie — enclosing Kuta Raja, and active operations in the interior were abandoned. This period saw the rise of the ulamas as the real leaders of the resistance. Teungku Tiro was par excellence a leader from the time of the “concentration” till the day of his death. He was succeeded in his influence over the resistance by his sons Teungku Beb and Teungku Mahidin, and by his kinsman Teungku Chot Plieng. The sayyid Habib Samalanga played a parallel role in the XXVI Mukims, distinguishing himself from Teungku Tiro by his practice of tapa (religious seclusion) in a cave at the source of the Krueng Daroy.

Course and Outcome

The war dragged on with little prospect of Dutch victory as long as the policy of concentration was maintained. Hurgronje, as adviser to the Netherlands-Indian government, advocated a different course: co-operation with the uleebalangs, the systematic undermining of the prestige of the ulamas, and the substitution of a civil for a military administration in the occupied territory. These counsels prevailed under Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz, under whom the line was broken and the country progressively brought under Dutch control. Hurgronje’s own account in The Achehnese (1906) marks a stage in this final phase of the conflict.

Account from De Buitenbezittingen (1917) — Aceh War

The Aceh War — known in Dutch as the Atjeh-krijg — was the protracted armed conflict between the Netherlands-Indies Government and the Acehnese that began with the first Dutch expedition against the Sultan of Atjeh in 1873 and smouldered, with intermittent truces, for some thirty years until the pacification of the Gajoland and Alaslanden in 1904–1905 and the final extinction of organised resistance under Governor Swart after 1908. De Buitenbezittingen characterises it as a “hardnekkige godsdienst-oorlog” — a stubborn religious war — that, “met enkele rustiger tusschenpoozen, gedurende de laatste dertig jaren der negentiende eeuw woedde,” repeatedly flared up thanks to “een telkens te snel de overhand krijgend pacifisme der moederlandsche Regeering” — the all-too-often prevailing pacifism of the metropolitan government in The Hague.

A religious war, repeatedly rekindled

The Encyclopaedisch Bureau frames the conflict as fundamentally ideological. The Acehnese, rallied by their oelèëbalangs and religious leaders, fought under the banner of Islam against an infidel invader; Dutch strategic indecision in the 1870s–1890s allowed the war to be rekindled each time a more conciliatory cabinet in the Netherlands curtailed operations. The “corruptie van het Sultans-bestuur” had already pushed the country to the edge of dissolution, and the war “drukte nog dieper den stempel van verval en verwildering op het ongelukkige land.” Across the entire Netherlands Indies the “groote kosten van dezen strijd” exerted a “verlammenden invloed” — a paralysing influence — on colonial finances.

The system of the flying columns, 1896–1904

The accession of van Heutsz to the governorship in 1898 “beteekende het begin van eene geheel nieuwe periode.” The “onverzoenlijke benden” that had hitherto found safe haven beyond the Dutch postenlinie were “attacked and pursued everywhere since 1896 by small, flying columns” under what the handbook calls the “systeem Graafland, van Daalen en van Heutsz” — the combined doctrine of column warfare pioneered by Graafland, van Daalen and van Heutsz. The campaigns culminated in the colonne van Daalen of 1904 and its sequel in 1905, which brought the “bolwerken der onverzoenlijken” — the strongholds of the irreconcilables — in the interior within Dutch influence. A “vrij hevige opflikkering van het verzet” still flared in 1907 and 1908, provoked by van Daalen’s “al te hard doorgevoerde represaille-maatregelen” and by the “scherpe besnoeiing der adat-inkomsten,” before Swart’s conciliatory policy from 1908 drew the coerced chiefs “steeds meer ook uit overtuiging aan onze zijde.”

Human cost

Bijlage IV of the handbook is a chronological map showing the extension of Dutch authority across Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden between 1896 and the present. Bijlage V tabulates the losses of the Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger: in the heaviest year, 1904, 56 European and 1 native soldier were killed in the field, with 434 wounded; on the Acehnese side the same year yielded 4,726 dead, 502 wounded, 2,443 captured and 538 who submitted. Across the entire conflict the Acehnese losses, “voor zoover ons bekend geworden,” ran into the tens of thousands — the handbook speaks of “ongeveer veertig duizenden slachtoffers.”

Significance

The Atjeh-krijg was the longest and costliest colonial war in Dutch East Indies history. Its resolution enabled the economic reconstruction, administrative consolidation and civilising mission that the rest of De Buitenbezittingen describes; but it also entrenched in the Acehnese character “een diep geworteld gevoel van wantrouwen en haat jegens den overheerscher” — a deep-rooted sense of distrust and hatred toward the overlords — that, the handbook warns, would only slowly die out through “tact en toewijding onzerzijds.”

Account from Dispereert Niet Vol. XI (1946) — Aceh War

Aceh War (also known as the Atjeh Oorlog) was a protracted colonial military conflict fought between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Sultanate of Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra, lasting from 1873 to approximately 1904, with sporadic resistance continuing into the 1910s. The war was one of the longest and most costly colonial campaigns in Dutch history, involving multiple expeditions, a disastrous early defeat, the rise of guerrilla warfare, and eventual pacification through a combination of military pressure and administrative reform.

Background

The origins of the Aceh War lie in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824), which divided the Malay world into British and Dutch spheres of influence. Under the treaty, the Netherlands was assigned a role as “police agent” over Aceh, but was constrained from exercising direct control. This ambiguous arrangement allowed Aceh to maintain de facto independence while Dutch authority remained nominal.

By the mid-19th century, Aceh’s strategic position astride the Strait of Malacca—one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes—made it increasingly important to colonial powers. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 heightened the strategic value of the strait. Meanwhile, Acehnese piracy and the practice of kliprecht (shipwreck rights) continued to provoke complaints from foreign powers, including the United States, Britain, and Italy.

The First Expedition (1873)

The immediate trigger for war was a series of diplomatic incidents involving Acehnese attempts to secure foreign protection. In 1872, a mission from Aceh traveled to Constantinople to seek Ottoman protection, and in 1873, efforts were made to negotiate treaties with American and Italian consuls in Singapore. These actions convinced the Dutch government that military action was necessary.

The first Dutch expedition, under General Köhler, landed on Aceh’s north coast on 26 March 1873. Despite initial successes—including the capture of the Great Mosque—the expedition ended in disaster. Köhler was killed when he paused to rest under a waringin (banyan) tree, and the Dutch forces were forced to retreat. This defeat boosted Acehnese morale and gave the conflict a religious dimension as a Holy War against the Christian “kafirs.”

The Second Expedition and the Capture of Kutaradja

A second, larger expedition under General Van Swieten landed in November 1873 with approximately 13,000 troops. This force captured the kraton (royal palace), and the sultan fled into the interior, dying soon after of cholera. The sultanate was declared directly governed territory, and Kutaradja (now Banda Aceh) was established as the capital.

The Guerrilla Phase

Despite the capture of the capital, the war entered a prolonged guerrilla phase. Acehnese resistance was organized by local chiefs (uleëbalang) and religious leaders (ulama), who led scattered but persistent attacks. The Dutch responded with the “benteng system” (fortification system), building a network of posts connected by tramways.

The Concencrated Line Period (1884–1896)

From 1884, the Dutch adopted a defensive strategy, withdrawing to the “Geconcentreerde Linie” (Concentrated Line)—a fortified perimeter around Kutaradja. This period was one of stagnation, with Dutch troops confined to a small area while Acehnese resistance continued in the hinterland.

The War of Pacification (1896–1904)

The turning point came with the arrival of J. B. van Heutsz as Governor of Aceh in 1898, advised by the scholar C. Snouck Hurgronje. Van Heutsz abandoned defensive tactics and adopted the “doorzetten” (push through) strategy, using small, mobile units called marechaussees to pursue guerrilla bands relentlessly.

Key campaigns included:

  • The conquest of Pidië (1898–1899)
  • The Battle of Batêê Iliê (1901)
  • The submission of Panglima Polem (15 May 1903)
  • The Gajo and Alas expeditions under Van Daalen (1904)

Account from Als officier van gezondheid naar Nederlandsch-Indië (Wøller) — a doctor’s memory of the war

Dr. Johan Wøller, a Danish physician who served as an officer of health in the Netherlands-Indies army and reached Atjeh around 1905, recalled the war as the land “where since 1873, during more than thirty years, war had been waged, that they with all means, war on land, blockade at sea, promises and bribery, attempts at fragmentation and sincere approaches, had tried to suppress, — everything equally in vain.”

Wøller records that “in 1873 the first, large expeditions were sent there, which however were both poorly equipped and badly led; they had after a few engagements to embark and sail home again with significant losses.” A second expeditionary army of 8,000 men and the entire available fleet arrived that December; “now Kota Radja was conquered, and with that the war first began, that would last so long and be so bloody.”

He attributes the war’s long duration less to Atjehnese arms than to “the unbelievably wavering and changing policy, that the Dutch pursued”: the “capable, ‘one-eyed’ general van der Heyden” had, in the late 1870s, conquered Groot-Atjeh and subjected many chiefs, only for the Dutch to withdraw into a defensive posture and a disastrous reconciliation policy — allowing “the fanatical Imams and the few irreconcilable chiefs” to regain influence, and, in the 1890s, the defection of the erstwhile ally Toekoe Oemar to bring the whole effort to the brink of collapse.

The turn came with General Van Heutz, “a man, who was at the same time a military leader and a statesman,” appointed civil and military governor in March 1898 on the strength of his 1892 brochure Atjehs onderwerping. Wøller describes his brilliantly organised mobile columns — adopting the Atjehnese’s own tactics and weapons — and a war fought “without quarter: no pardon was given, prisoners were not made… an endless series of forced, nerve-wracking marches, nightly surprises and ambushes, espionage and betrayal, acts of violence of every kind from both sides.” For Wøller’s own generation of Dutch officers, met at the garrison of Kotta Loempoer where he served, the word “Atjeh” meant precisely this three-decade war of attrition.

Account from the Topografische Dienst catalogue (1933) — the chronological overview map

The Aceh War’s status as a formally periodised episode of Dutch colonial history is confirmed by the Topografische Dienst’s issue of a “Historisch-Chronologische overzichtskaart van den Atjeh-oorlog (1873 t/m 1896)” (Historical-Chronological Overview Map of the Aceh War, 1873 to 1896). This map, at a scale of 1:1,000,000, was printed in colour and sold for f0.50. Its existence — listed in the 1933 catalogue of the Topografische Dienst as a single sheet, with no year of original issue or reprint given, but still available for purchase at that time — confirms that the Dutch colonial administration considered the war a defined period running from 1873 to 1896, and that a specialized cartographic product was created to document its events chronologically and geographically. The map’s terminal date of 1896 corresponds to the resumption of the war under Van Heutsz described above; the existence of a dedicated historical-chronological map underscores the war’s importance to the colonial state as a subject of official documentation and commemoration, and its timeline of 1873–1896 remains a key reference point for understanding the period of Dutch intervention in northern Sumatra.

Account from In Memoriam Maurice Henri du Croo (1951) — Aceh War (1920s patrolling)

The Aceh War (also known as the Atjeh-oorlog) was a prolonged armed conflict between the Dutch colonial power and the Sultanate of Aceh and its successors, beginning in 1873 and continuing into the early 20th century. The war was characterised by stubborn Acehnese resistance, guerrilla warfare, and the Dutch deployment of the Korps Marechaussee te voet as a counter-insurgency force. Even after the formal subjugation of Aceh, unrest persisted well into the 1920s, when officers like Maurice Henri du Croo patrolled the rimboe (jungle) of Atjeh at their own request — du Croo arriving in 1925 and being decorated with the Ridder O.N.O. met de Zwaarden (Knight of the Orde van Oranje-Nassau with Swords) in 1927 for his service in the ongoing conflict.

In Colonial Memory

The Dutch journalist Johan Luger, writing in the memorial for du Croo, called Aceh “het lastige kindje dat Atjeh heette” — the troublesome child called Atjeh. Du Croo’s book Marechaussée in Atjeh (co-authored with Kolonel Schmidt) aimed to convey “het beeld van Atjeh en de Atjehoorlog, zoals dat in die officieren heeft geleefd” — the image of Aceh and the war as it lived in the officers who fought there. Together with the same authors’ Generaal Swart — a biography of the Swart administration under which the war was brought to its formal conclusion — Marechaussée in Atjeh forms part of the interwar literary commemoration of the conflict by the K.N.I.L. officer corps.

Source: In Memoriam Maurice Henri du Croo (1951), pp. 5, 6, 10, 20 (Meyer Ranneft, Luger).

Account from Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1891) — the popular narrative

Dr. W. A. Terwogt’s Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen — a popular thirteen-chapter history of the Dutch in the East Indies, published by P. Geerts at Hoorn at the end of 1891 — treats the Atjeh-oorlog in the closing pages of its thirteenth chapter. The account is a continuous narrative from the 1857 treaty of Jan van Swieten through the first and second expeditions of 1873–1874 to the protracted guerrilla of the 1880s, and it is notable for its frank acknowledgment of the Dutch defeat in the first expedition and for its judgment that the war continued “onverzwakt” (unabated) at the time of writing. The full account is treated in Terwogt’s account of the Atjeh-oorlog (1891).

Terwogt’s key judgments: the first expedition was begun “met te geringe macht, overmoedig, met volkomen miskenning van de dapperheid en doodsverachting der Atjehers” (with too small a force, overconfident, with complete misappreciation of the bravery and death-defiance of the Atjehnese); the death of Generaal-Majoor Köhler and the failed assault on the Kraton by Gotfried Coenraad Ernst van Daalen led to the withdrawal of 25 April 1873 — “Zoo eindigde deze expeditie op treurige wijze. Wij hadden de nederlaag geleden” (Thus ended this expedition in a sad manner. We had suffered the defeat). The second expedition under Jan van Swieten — over 6,000 strong, landed under Verspijck on 9 December 1873 — occupied the Kraton on 24 January 1874 (found deserted), named it Kota-Radja, and entrusted the command to J. L. J. H. Pel. The war continued, however, “onverzwakt” (unabated) to the end of 1891, thanks to the “wisselende houding” (wavering attitude) of the Dutch government. The account closes with the hope placed in the new Minister of Colonies, W. K. Baron van Dedem, who declared that he expected no good from “toegeven en zachtheid” (yielding and softness) toward the “fanatieken Atjeher” (fanatical Atjehnese).

Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)

The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.

The Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904) — the Atjeh War — was the thirty-one-year military conflict between the Netherlands and the Atjeh sultanate, opened by the Dutch declaration of war of 1873 on the sultan of Atjeh and concluded, in its principal military phase, by the Gajo-Alas-Batak expedition of Van Daalen of 1904 and the subsequent pacificatie. The war is the central colonial episode of the Vermeulen-period Oost-Indië in het Nederlandse Parlement 1891-1918; every major colonial debate of the period — the ethical-policy proclamation of 1901, the adat-law revision, the Mijnwet and the Atjeh oil contracts, the Volksraad instalment — refers back to it.

Origins

The diplomatic prelude to the Atjeh-oorlog was the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] of 1871 between the Netherlands and England, which placed the whole of Sumatra — including the independent Atjeh sultanate — within the Dutch sphere of influence. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had increased the strategic and economic value of Straat Malakka as the shipping lane between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea; the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] was, the Dutch government later said, “welbewust om deze reden” — for this very reason — concluded. Minister Van Bosse delivered to the Tweede Kamer “zeer geruststellende verklaringen” — very reassuring statements — on the consequences of the treaty.

The declaration of war of 1873 was justified to the Tweede Kamer on three grounds: alleged piracy emanating from Atjehese waters; the alleged prevalence of internal warfare within the sultanate; and — pre-eminent in the government’s view — fear of foreign interference, especially after it became known that the sultan had been in contact with the Italian and American consuls in Singapore during the abortive Dutch-Atjehnese negotiations. Kuyper (a.r.) was so little convinced by the official motivering that, when cholera broke out among the Dutch troops the following year, he called it a “straf des hemels” — a punishment from heaven.

The concentratie period (1884-1896)

After more than a decade of inconclusive fighting, the Dutch expeditionary force in 1884 withdrew into a concentratie-stelling — concentrated position — centred on Koeta Radja and limited its activity to holding this reconcentrated line. The Concentratie-stelsel ([[1884-1896)|concentratie-stelsel]] thus begun would last, with growing parliamentary criticism, until 1896. Idenburg later defended the measure retrospectively: “In Atjeh is geduld geoefend in de tijd van de concentratie” — patience was exercised in Atjeh in the time of the concentration — but the result, he conceded, was that “het verzet zich des te sterker heeft kunnen organiseren”.

The Oemar crisis and the post-1896 recovery

In 1896 Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|Toekoe Oemar turned against the Dutch]]. The concentratie-stelling around Koeta Radja was “niet meer geheel zeker” — no longer wholly secure. The parliamentary debate that followed produced the canonical liberal and anti-revolutionary speeches of Fransen van de Putte, Van Kol and Kuyper. Kuyper’s verdict was that the government had laid out “een volledige staalkaart van alle denkbare methoden om Atjeh te bestrijden” — a complete sample-card of every conceivable method of combating Atjeh.

The post-1896 recovery under Van Heutsz — the Van der Heyden-Van Heutsz system of pursuit into the remotest hiding-places — restored Groot-Atjeh outside the perimeter. The resistance chiefs withdrew, first to Pedir, and were pursued: first to Pedir, then to the coasts, and finally — in 1904 — to the Gajoe- and Alaslanden.

The 1904 expedition and its parliamentary aftermath

The expedition of Van Daalen of 1904 was, formally, intended to begin “bespreking van wederzijdse belangen” — discussion of mutual interests. In practice it became a campaign of annihilation: according to the official figures, 2,922 inlanders — among them 1,149 women and children — were killed “in weinige dagen”. Van Kol declared it “erger dan de dagen van Alva’s schrikbewind”; the Catholic De Stuers compared it to the campaigns of Timoer Lenk and Djengis Khan: “Het is of men op de inlanders een bende bloedhonden heeft losgelaten, het is beulenwerk”. Lohman (c.h.) replied with the “doel heiligt de middelen” — the end sanctifies the means — defence; Rutgers van Rozenburg (lib.) went further and justified even the cutting-in-two of slain Atjehnese as a means to disarm the prang sabil preaching of the Atjehnese priests.

The Van Daalen governorship and the Wekeer affair

In 1905 Van Daalen was appointed militair commandant en gouverneur van Atjeh. His tenure was brought to an end by the “Wekeer” articles in De Avondpost in October 1907, which exposed needless cruelties committed against the Atjehnese population under his command. The inspection tour of December 1907 and the June 1908 report of governor-general Van Heutsz confirmed the fall of Van Daalen and installed the new course of the pacificatie.

The human cost

The last nine years of the war — by the official figures cited by De Stuers — had killed 20,000 of an Atjehnese population of about half a million. The post-1904 pacification continued to take a smaller annual toll: in 1910 the number of dead was 678. De Stuers’ comment — “De voorraad wild begint te dunnen” — the stock of game is beginning to thin — is the bitterest single line in the parliamentary record of the war.

Significance

The Atjeh-oorlog is, in the Vermeulen retrospective, the central colonial episode of the 1891-1918 period. Its conduct and conclusion defined the political-military frame within which the ethical-policy state was constructed; its parliamentary record is the spine of the Vermeulen section of the 1955 Schets.

Account from DLP-84-Atjeh

The summary entry in DLP-84-Atjeh frames the Aceh War (Indonesian: Perang Aceh; Dutch: Atjeh-oorlog) as a protracted conflict between the Sultanate of Atjeh and the Dutch colonial forces of the Dutch East Indies Government, lasting from 1873 until the formal cessation of hostilities in 1903. The DLP-84 sketch records that the war devastated the region’s economy, agriculture, and demography, leaving the Acehnese population “terribly impoverished” (Dutch: schrikbaar verarmd). Although the actual war (Dutch: feitelijke oorlog) was declared over in 1903, sporadic resistance (Dutch: sporadisch verzet) continued thereafter, and the conflict is often extended in historiography to 1904.

The DLP-84 entry documents the course of the war as a combination of sustained military campaigns, the construction of forts (Dutch: forten), and the building of infrastructure such as the Atjehspoorweg and the Gajoweg to secure Dutch control over the region. Under General Van Heutsz, Dutch troops of the Indische Leger conducted continuous expeditions, establishing forts like Peunajong and engaging in daily combat. The intensified military actions under Van Heutsz resulted in heavy casualties, which in turn required extensive pastoral care for the troops.

The DLP-84 sketch also records the religious dimension of the war: Christian soldiers, many of them Ambonese, were ministered to by chaplains described as soldier-pastors (Dutch: soldaten-pastoors), including Ds. Thenu and Pastoor Verbraak. This practice illustrates the intertwining of military and missionary activities during the campaigns — a complement to the Marechaussée system and the vliegende colonnes that has left its traces in the colonial-era chaplaincy literature preserved in the wiki.

The war’s conclusion in 1903 enabled the Dutch to implement the Agrarische Wet 1870 and to open Aceh to plantation agriculture (Dutch: ondernemingen), altering the social and economic fabric of the region. The conflict thus stands as a turning-point between the era of Acehnese sovereignty and the full integration of the region into the Dutch colonial economic system.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh — written from the perspective of a former Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden who had served under successive Governors and had personally witnessed every policy reversal since 1874 — provides the single most sustained retrospective on the war from the side of its future executor. The tract opens with the warning that “De Atjeh-oorlog knaagt aan ons Koloniaal bezit, hij moet eindigen” — the Atjeh-war gnaws at our Colonial possession, it must end — and frames the war, twenty years in, as the chronic ulcer of Dutch colonial policy.

The 1873 opening

The war opened in 1873 with the Dutch expedition against the Sultanate of Atjeh. The immediate occasion was the Sumatra-tractaat of 1871 — the Anglo-Dutch treaty by which Britain recognised Dutch supremacy over Sumatra — and the subsequent Dutch ultimatum to the Sultan of Atjeh; the first military operation, the First Atjeh Expedition of April–May 1873, ended in the death of generaal-majoor Köhler beneath the mesdjid at Kota-Radja and the withdrawal of the expedition. The second expedition of late 1873–early 1874 succeeded in taking the kraton and in driving the Sultan from his capital; by 1874 the Dutch were in military occupation of the geconcentreerde stelling of Groot-Atjeh, and the war had entered its protracted phase. Van Heutsz’s 1893 retrospective on the opening fixes the war’s date and the policy-frame within which the original decision was taken: “Het zal nu weldra 20 jaren zijn, dat Nederland den oorlog met Atjeh begon” — it will now soon be twenty years since the Netherlands began the war with Atjeh. The retrospective is the rhetorical opening of the entire tract. The original instrument of the war had been the rigoureuse blokkade — the rigorous blockade of the entire Atjehnese coast — that Van Heutsz would, in 1893, argue had been appropriate in 1873 but obsolete by 1884: “Toen wij in 1873 met Atjeh in oorlog geraakten, lag eene rigoureuse blokkade over het geheele kustgebied van het rijk … voor de hand” — when in 1873 we came into war with Atjeh, a rigorous blockade over the entire coastal region of the kingdom lay close at hand.

The 1874 establishment: Van Swieten’s Instructie

The Dutch rule established in 1874 over the geconcentreerde stelling of Groot-Atjeh was given its constitutional form by Generaal van Swieten’s Instructie voor den militairen, tevens civielen bevelhebber te Atjeh — the Instructie that was approved by the Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië by Besluit of 26 May 1874 No. 1. The Instructie prescribed the geconcentreerde stelling — the concentrated defensive perimeter around Kota-Radja — to be held by a garrison of 2,500 men, and the policy of overreding of blokkade — persuasion or blockade — that was, in art. 5, to bring the Onderhoorigheden to submission. Van Heutsz treats Van Swieten as the lost “stadhouder”-figure of the Atjeh record — the architect of the moderate plan that was prematurely abandoned in 1875 by Generaal Pel and G.-G. van Lansberge in favour of the op grootere schaal aanvallend optreden — the larger-scale offensive — of the Pel Plan of 30 April 1875.

The protracted 1874–1893 phase

The period from 1874 to 1893 — the period Van Heutsz surveys in the first movement of his tract — is the period of the Atjeh-krijg’s transformation from a colonial war on the verge of conclusion to the chronic ulcer of the 1893 diagnosis. Van Heutsz surveys it governor-by-governor: the eleven Governors of Atjeh — Van Swieten, Pel, Wiggers van Kerchem, Diemont, Van der Heijden, Pruijs van der Hoeven, Laging Tobias, Demmeni, Van Teijn, Pompe van Meerdervoort, Deijkerhof — and the five Governors-General — Loudon, van Lansberge, ‘s Jacob, van Rees, Pijnacker Hordijk — together with thirteen Ministers of Koloniën. The point of the catalogue is the diagnosis: that “de Regeering den juisten weg nog niet weet aan te geven” — the Regeering does not yet know how to indicate the right path — because every landvoogd and every minister undoes the policy of his predecessor.

The catalogue turns on three principal reversals. The first was the abandonment, in 1875, of Van Swieten’s geconcentreerde stelling in favour of Pel’s coastal-occupation plan of 30 April 1875 — the plan that completed the occupation of the coastal strip of Groot-Atjeh under Generaal Diemont in February 1877. The second was the verzoeningspolitiek of G.-G. van Lansberge of March 1877 — conciliation in Groot-Atjeh combined with armed coercion in the Onderhoorigheden — that gave the Acehnese the year they needed to re-arm, and that was, in June 1878, reversed by the XXII Moekims campaign opened by Van der Heijden on the advice of majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius. The campaign produced, by September 1879, the day-order declaring “geheel Groot-Atjeh ten onder gebragt” — and Van der Heijden’s onverantwoordelijke dismissal in early 1881 was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the original sin of the chronic ulcer: “ware hij niet in het begin van 1881 op onverantwoordelijke wijze ontslagen, dan behoorde de Atjeh-krijg thans reeds lang tot het verledene” — had he not been dismissed in the beginning of 1881 in an irresponsible manner, then the Atjeh-war would by now long belong to the past.

The third reversal was the Concentratiebesluit of 19 August 1884 — the groote politieke fout that reversed the Van der Heijden conquest of Groot-Atjeh, withdrew the outlying Dutch posts to the geconcentreerde stelling of Groot-Atjeh, and prescribed the rigoureuse blokkade of the entire coast from Tamiang to Troemon by Staatsblad No. 105 of 1884. The Concentratie was authorised by the secret sessions of the Staten-Generaal of 16–17 June 1884 over the head of the colonial Atjeh authorities — “zonder dat aan de autoriteiten te Atjeh om eenig nader advies was gevraagd” — and was reluctantly executed by Generaal Demmeni, whose besluit of 13 October 1884 introduced the hybrid half sluiting / half scheepvaartregeling that Van Heutsz would denounce as the worst of both worlds. The rigoureuse blokkade was, within a year, repealed by Staatsblad No. 85 of 1885, and the scheepvaartregeling Scherer had introduced under Laging Tobias in May 1883 was finally abolished in December 1885.

The 1884–1891 period that followed — the cajoleering-decade of Demmeni, the politiek van cajoleeren of 1886–1891, and the herstel van het sultanaat revived at ministerial level by Minister Sprenger van Eijk in 1886 — was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the political expression of the 1884 fout and ramp. The war had, by 1891, produced the cajoleering-policy of paying the chiefs “traktement” — about f 8000 a month, much of which flowed onward to Kemala and to the priest — and the war party at Kemala under Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed and Toeankoe Haschim still issued orders as if from a sovereign court. The religious leader Tengkoe di Tirou still rallied the faithful “met den koran in de hand” to continue the struggle against the “ongeloovige indringer”.

The 1893 diagnosis and prescription

The diagnosis was that the war had become chronic because “telkens veranderen van politiek; dat gebrek aan eene vaste consequent doorgezette richting” — the constant changing of policy, the lack of a fixed consistently pursued direction — had prevented any of the eleven Governors from consolidating the gains of his predecessor. The warning was the retired Generaal van Teijn’s, in his letter of 23 November 1891 from Utrecht to the Minister of Koloniën, that Van Heutsz makes the rhetorical starting point of the entire tract. The prescription has three pillars: the marine-enforced closure of the entire coast, extended across the entire perimeter from Tamiang on the Oostkust to Troemon on the Westkust; the rigorous scheepvaartregeling on the ports retained under Dutch control — the scheme Scherer had first conceived in 1879–1880 and that Laging Tobias had actually introduced in May 1883; and the assumption of the hatsil and the abrogation of the sultanaat-idea. The closing condition of the prescription was, Van Heutsz records, the submission of the Kemala war-party itself: “Ook, dat het stelsel van sluiting van den Generaal van Teijn, die vóór herstel van het sultanaat was, hiermede verband hield en hij het tijdstip voor de invoering van de scheepvaartregeling eerst gekomen achtte, nadat Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed met de hoofden van verzet te Kemala, zich zouden onderworpen hebben” — also, that the system of closure of General van Teijn, which preceded the restoration of the sultanate, was connected with this and he considered the moment for the introduction of the scheepvaartregeling to have come only after Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed with the resistance chiefs at Kemala would have submitted.

The post-1893 implementation: Van Heutsz’s pacification (1898-1904)

The prescription Van Heutsz set out in 1893 was, after a five-year interval, implemented by Van Heutsz himself as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward. The concentratiestelsel — the defensive perimeter around Kota-Radja from which Van Heutsz in the 1890s had still been recoiling — was, in his Governorship, transformed into a forward base; the scheepvaartregeling he had prescribed in 1893 became the fiscal instrument of his pacification; and the marine-enforced closure he had demanded in 1893 became the blokkade of the 1898–1903 campaigns. The hatsil was assumed, the sultanaat-idea was abandoned, and the Mohamad Daoed candidacy was, in practice, set aside as the chiefs of the Onderhoorigheden were brought, one by one, under Dutch administration. The religious leader Tengkoe di Tirou — the Sjech Saman who had, under Van Teijn, twice been driven from the linie with bloody heads — was killed in action on 25 February 1899 in the battle of Aneuk Galong n. Glé, and the religious backbone of the resistance was broken. The Kemala war-party under Toeankoe Haschim and Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed was progressively isolated by the closure of the coast; the Polim-line of the Sagi XXII was progressively co-opted; and by 1904 the pacification was sufficiently advanced for Van Heutsz to be promoted to Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies (1904–1908) and for the Atjeh-oorlog to be, in the official reckoning, declared closed.

The declaration of closure was, however, a political formality: irregular resistance continued in parts of the highlands for years afterward, and the figure Van Heutsz himself, in the 1893 tract, had singled out as the onverzoenlijke tegenstander — Toeankoe Haschim — was, at the time of the official closure, still at Kemala. The Atjeh-oorlog was, in this sense, both concluded by the 1904 declaration and continued, in irregular form, into the early twentieth century.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 1, 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 28, 29, 36, 40, 50, 95. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Account from Atjeh by H.C. Zentgraff (1938)

Zentgraff’s Atjeh (1938) provides the most vivid eyewitness synthesis of the war as a whole. Several details from his account are not found in earlier sources.

The Köhler-boom

Köhler was killed on 8 April 1873 beside a tree at the edge of the mesdjid at Koetaradja. The Köhler-boom stood for more than sixty years as a landmark; it was felled only in 1936. A table was made from its lower trunk for the Atjeh-museum; two bullets were found in the bark at a man’s height. Each divisie that passed through Koetaradja provided wine for visitors to drink at the spot: een glaasje wijn gedronken op den man, die op dezen plek is gevallen.

The geconcentreerde-linie period

The geconcentreerde linie period was bounded by the bentengs of Tjot Mantiang, Biloel, and Bivak Glé Nanggroë. Tengkoe Koetakarang’s Tadkirat arrakidin — the Vermaning der stilzittenden — sneered at the Dutch for sending vergiftigde geschenken and geneesheeren die als spionnen dienstdoen. Snouck Hurgronje had warned against the domme politiek of giving Teukoe Oemar Dutch pay and Dutch weapons; the overloopen of 1896 proved him right.

The Gajoetocht: specific numbers

The Gajoetocht ran from 18 March to 3 June 1904. Van Daalen’s colonne took the bentengs of Klah, Pepareq (308 dead), Penampakan, Koeto Lintang (561 dead), Koeto Reh, Reket-Goip, Bambel, killing meer dan vier duizend Gajoes in total. De Gajoes laten hunne tijdrekening beginnen met de komst van Van Daalen’s colonne — the Gajoes date their modern era from Van Daalen’s coming.

The Tiro-oelama deaths

The deaths of the Tiro-oelama’s fell on specific dates: Tengkoe di Boekit and Habib Tjoet on 21 May 1910; Tgk. Majet on 5 September 1910, the last Tiro-oelama; Tgk. Tjhi Maät on 9 December 1910, closing het epos der Tiro-oelama’s.

The Westkust

The Westkust continued to resist long after the highland campaign was over. Tjoet Ali was killed on 25 May 1927 near the marschbivak Kandang, buried as a sjahid with his face toward Mekka by Gosenson, who knew wat een eerlijk en dapper tegenstander toekomt.

The toll

Naar eene uiteraard zeer globale schatting zijn, nà Van der Heyden’s aftreden, noor ruim 30.000 Atjehers gesneuveld. On the Dutch side: alleen in de periode van 1890 tot en met 1914 de verliezen van ons Leger, aan dooden en gewonden, 7707 officieren en minderen hebben bedragen. Responsibility, Zentgraff writes, wanneer zij in menschenlevens en in bloed kan worden afgewogen, is zeer zwaar.

Atjeh, door H.C. Zentgraff. Gedrukt bij Drukkerij “De Unie”, 1938, Batavia.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

Van Heutsz’s brochure of 1892 took as its motto: “The Atjeh war gnaws at our colonial possession. It must end; let us at last show the civilised world that we are capable of ending it!” Naarding characterised the war as “not just an ordinary war between two peoples, which could be ended in the ordinary way by a peace, but a new period in the world-historical drama: the Holy War between believers and unbelievers.” Its cost was enormous: sixty million guilders to the beginning of 1877, 115 million by 1880, 150 million by 1884, 210 million by 1893. I. Feenstra wrote in 1918: “Forty-five years, not yet half a century — it seems so short for the great work that has been done here.”

See Also

Source

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906. Introduction, pp. v–xxi; Chapter I, §§ 7–9, pp. 120–193. De Buitenbezittingen, Deel II, Aflevering 2: Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedisch Bureau, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1917), pp. 33–36, Bijlage IV–V. “Dispereert Niet: Twintig Eeuwen Historie van de Nederlanden”, Deel XI, by A. Algra and H. Algra (Franeker: T. Wever, 1946). Opgave van Kaarten, Legenda, Verslagen, enz. verkrijgbaar bij den Beheerder der Kaarten van den Topografischen dienst te Weltevreden. Bijgewerkt tot 1 Januari 1933. (Bijlage LLL). Geologisch Instituut der Universiteit van Amsterdam. LB 08841, pp. 827*-828*. Als officier van gezondheid naar Nederlandsch-Indië, by Dr. Johan Wøller, trans. Greta Baars-Jelgersma (Utrecht: Erven J. Bijleveld), pp. 143-146, 167. In Memoriam Maurice Henri du Croo (1951), pp. 5, 6, 10, 20 (Meyer Ranneft, Luger). Het Land van Jan Pieterszoon Coen, door Dr. W. A. Terwogt (Hoorn: P. Geerts, [1891]). Hoofdstuk XIII: the Atjeh-oorlog 1857–1891, including the first expedition (March–April 1873), the second expedition (December 1873–January 1874), and the protracted guerrilla to the end of 1891.

Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 267-275.

DLP-84-Atjeh.pdf, pp. 6, 10.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 1, 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 28, 29, 36, 40, 50, 95. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter III, V, XVI.

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