Demmeni

Demmeni — Kolonel Demmeni, later Generaal Demmeni — was a Dutch officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (K.N.I.L.) who served as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies) from September 1884 to his death in December 1886, and whose governorship oversaw the implementation of the concentration system decreed by the Staten-Generaal in June 1884 and the failed blockade of 1884–1885 under the command of C. H. Bogaert. He died in the Padang highlands in December 1886, having in his last months urged on the government the introduction of a scheepvaartregeling of his own design.

Appointment (September 1884)

When Laging Tobias retired in September 1884, the government — convinced that under the new circumstances there was no longer place for civil government alone — decided to return to the earlier arrangement of civil and military authority in one hand, “doch nu helaas op de puinhoopen van het gesloopte gebouw onzer macht onder van der Heijden” (but now alas on the ruins of the demolished building of our power under Van der Heijden). Colonel Demmeni accordingly took office as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur.

The Concentration System (1884–1886)

The concentratie — the contraction of the Dutch stelling in Groot-Atjeh to a smaller, more defensible perimeter — was carried out by Demmeni “met veel beleid en groote energie” (with much discretion and great energy). The new stelling after the concentration was approximately the same as that taken by Pel in 1876. It still existed at the time of Kruijt’s writing. It was a continuous line of fortifications around Kota Radja, forming a kind of isosceles triangle, with the post Lambaroe as the apex and the sea coast from Oleh-leh to Kota Pohama as the base. It was to ensure complete security within the line and be impregnable from without. A 1,000-metre wide, felled, open strip surrounded it, to prevent the enemy from approaching the posts unobserved or slipping through. A ceintuursporbaan (belt railway) and telephone would connect the posts with one another and by spokes with Kota Radja and Oleh-leh. All this was carried out and arranged as quickly and well as possible — indeed excellently — and by July 1886 everything was ready. Communication between the population inside and outside the line was as good as broken off. Atjehers were forbidden to bear arms; carrying a pass was made compulsory.

The Failed Blockade (1884–1885)

The Blokkade was to be strict and to cover the whole coast. It was to serve, by cutting off all supply to the enemy, to facilitate the retreat in Groot-Atjeh. A large number of warships and other vessels acting as such were assembled in Atjeh and placed under the command of Bogaert. With his old energy Bogaert came out from the Netherlands, animated by the firm will to make the blockade answer its purpose. How bitterly he was disappointed: already before he had taken command, he heard at Batavia that its early abolition had been decided. Numerous exceptions arising from political and other considerations obstructed its whole execution and destroyed its effect. This system, too, was not carried out consistently. Only a small part of the coast was blockaded, and that half-heartedly. A kind of scheepvaartregeling, though officially abolished, remained partially in force. Edi and Segli remained as posts and trading harbours. All ships from outside destined for the North and East Coasts had first to call at one of these two places before being allowed to proceed to one of the unclosed harbours.

Bogaert did what he could under the circumstances, but always regretted that he had been used for what Kruijt calls, with bitter wordplay, a “politioneele (polichinelle) blokkade” — a Punchinello blockade, a farce. In September 1884 only partially applied, the blockade was soon raised for other parts of the coast, and after the concentration had been accomplished by Colonel Demmeni with great discretion and energy — since it could no longer have the effect the government had aimed at — it was wholly withdrawn in March 1885. The ships left Atjeh; only a few remained to guard against the smuggling of contraband, for which they were entirely inadequate. Trade was almost wholly free, and in December 1885 even the least restriction on the trade of the coastal statelets with the outside (Penang) was forbidden.

The Restoration of the Sultanate (1885–1886)

The Dutch, having retired into the concentrated stelling, would now await without coercion and patiently until the enemy should come to submit. The enemy, abundantly supplied, familiar with Dutch capriciousness and fickleness, knowing that the Dutch were never sure of what they really wanted — “Kompanie tidah tentoe; orang blanda bodoh” (the Kompanie is never sure of its case; the Hollanders are stupid), as the Atjehers said — did not sit still. On the contrary, he prosecuted the war in his own way, now more than ever.

Toeankoe Hasschim, guardian and father-in-law of the youthful pretender, had the latter declared of age and proclaimed and hailed as Sultan in the mosque at Indrapoeri. The court was arranged according to ancient usage, and notification of the accession was given to various courts. He further wrote everywhere that the Hollanders had been driven back, that the war would be vigorously continued, and, in concert with the religious leader Tengkoe di Tirou — whose influence ever increased — sent the principal leaders to the coastal statelets to stir up the population, to embroil the well-disposed, to destroy Dutch influence, to call all to the holy war against the Dutch, and to collect money and men. Those who openly took part in this struggle were henceforth called Muslemin. He also sent his son-in-law, the radja of Madjapait, to the Gajoes in the interior — whom the Dutch had helped against Langsar — to induce them to invade Langkat. All the chiefs collected the war contributions. The Sultan’s influence greatly increased.

Death (December 1886)

The Dutch position became increasingly precarious. Toekoe Oemar was master on the West Coast, levied taxes, pressed the population, and murdered, robbed, and burned where resistance was offered. In June 1886 he captured the steamship Hok Canton; for 25,000 dollars the Dutch bought the prisoners free with difficulty; Kemala received its share. Many other acts of piracy occurred elsewhere against English subjects and their property, which provoked claims from the English (Straits) government. Attacks on the islands, on the Willemstoren at Poeloe Bras, occurred. Even the Cedar Passage, the usual sea route to the West Coast, was officially declared unsafe. Ships passing there were repeatedly fired on by the enemy from Koningspunt.

In Groot-Atjeh the 1,000-metre open strip, which could only be kept clear with great difficulty and losses, was soon largely overgrown again with tropical speed. The Muslemin made the line unsafe, damaged the railway and bridges, destroyed the telephone line, fired on the trains, laid grenades under the rails, and so on, and made raids inward. The troop strength, then about 5,000 men, had a heavy service through the occupation and securing of the posts, patrols within the line, and suffered much from beri-beri and other diseases. Tengkoe di Tirou was the soul of the resistance.

Demmeni finally came to see this, and urged on the government the introduction of a scheepvaartregeling of his own proposal. In vain. Long ailing, he sought recovery of health in the Padang highlands and succumbed there in December 1886.

Significance

Demmeni’s governorship is the period of the concentration system in its purest form — the deliberate contraction of the Dutch position to a defensible perimeter around Kota Radja and the abandonment of the coastal administration. The concentration itself, Kruijt argues, was a wise measure — “een wijzen maatregel, waartoe meer moed en vaderlandsliefde behoorde, dan tot het hardnekkig voortgaan op eenen kostbaren, gevaarlijken en onzekeren weg” (a wise measure, requiring more courage and love of fatherland than the stubborn prosecution of a costly, dangerous and uncertain path). But it should have been accompanied by a vigorous scheepvaartregeling on the coasts, with partial transfer of resources thither, while instead, against the advice of all experts, what the Dutch had was given up and the coasts were left to their fate. “Dat was en bleef de fout” (That was and remained the mistake).

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In the 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Van Heutsz places Demmeni as the eighth name in his catalogue of the eleven Governors of Atjeh — van Swieten, Pel, Wiggers van Kerchem, Diemont, van der Heijden, Pruijs van der Hoeven, Laging Tobias, Demmeni, van Teijn, Pompe van Meerdervoort, Deijkerhof — and the predecessor whose death at the end of 1886 opened the governorship to Kolonel van Teijn. Demmeni was appointed to execute the Concentratie ordered by the Staatsblad No. 105 of 1884 — the rigoureuse blokkade (rigorous blockade) of the entire coast from Tamiang on the Oostkust to Troemon on the Westkust — and, wavering under the protests of Scherer and the assistent-resident van Groot-Atjeh van Langen, declined to apply the full blokkade and instead promulgated, by his besluit (decree) of 13 October 1884, the hybrid half sluiting / half scheepvaartregeling (half closure / half shipping-regulation) that Van Heutsz would denounce as the worst of both worlds.

Appointment after Laging Tobias’s resignation

Demmeni’s appointment followed the resignation of Gouverneur Laging Tobias in February 1884. Laging Tobias had asked to resign when the Regeering rejected the scheepvaartregeling — the one remedy from which, in the existing circumstances, he had expected a good outcome — and the Concentratie, decided in the secret Staten-Generaal sessions of 16–17 June 1884, was entrusted instead to the krijgsmacht (army). Van Heutsz records the handover: “Het bestuur weder in handen gegeven aan een militair, den kolonel Demmeni” — The administration was again placed in the hands of a military man, Colonel Demmeni. The expectation was that Demmeni would execute the rigoureuse sluiting (rigorous closure) the Regeering had prescribed without the qualifications Laging Tobias had sought to attach. Van Heutsz’s verdict on the expectation is measured: “de Generaal Demmeni, hoe ook diens denkbeelden omtrent de Atjeh-zaak waren, eenvoudig het hem voorgeschreven stelsel in practijk zou brengen” — General Demmeni, whatever his own views on the Atjeh question, would simply put the system prescribed to him into practice. Scherer’s reading, recorded in his Indisch Genootschap lecture of 20 January 1891, was the same: “toen hij bemerkte, dat de Generaal Demmeni, hoe ook diens denkbeelden omtrent de Atjeh-zaak waren, eenvoudig het hem voorgeschreven stelsel in practijk zou brengen, besloot om heen te gaan” — when he perceived that General Demmeni would simply put the prescribed system into practice, [Scherer] decided to leave.

Wobbling under Scherer’s protests

Demmeni did not, in the event, apply the prescribed system without qualification. Van Heutsz’s diagnosis is that Scherer’s betoogingen (representations) and his nota’s — co-signed by the assistent-resident van Groot-Atjeh van Langen — shook the General’s resolution:

“De Generaal Demmeni werd door Scherer’s betoogingen en zijne nota’s, waarmede de assistent-resident van Groot- Atjeh van Langen instemde, aan het wankelen gebracht in zijn plan om cenvoudig uitte- voeren, wat hem door de Regeering opgedragen was en voerde niet de algemeene rigoureuse blokkade in, maar liet slechts sommige gedeelten van de kust sluiten en blokkeeren en dit niet eens consequent, terwijl hij voor andere gedeelten, reeds bij besluit van 13 October 1884 eene soort scheepraartregelin invoerde”. — General Demmeni was shaken in his plan to carry out simply what the Government had charged him with, by Scherer’s representations and his notes, which the assistant-resident of Groot-Atjeh van Langen endorsed; and he did not introduce the general rigorous blockade, but only closed and blockaded some parts of the coast, and that not even consistently, while for other parts he already introduced, by decree of 13 October 1884, a kind of shipping-regulation.

Demmeni’s compromise was to close some parts of the coast (inconsistently), and, for the remaining parts, to introduce, by his besluit of 13 October 1884, “eene soort scheepraartregelin” — a kind of scheepvaartregeling. The compromise determined that all ships arriving from outside Atjeh were to call first at one of the Dutch-administered places before proceeding to any non-closed point of the coast — and that, after the posts of Telok Semawé and Samalanga were withdrawn, those places were only Edi, Segli and Olehleh for the entire Noord- en Oostkust. Van Heutsz’s verdict on the compromise is severe: “Men kreeg dus in plaats van het voorgeschreven stelsel, dat toch minstens de deugd van kracht en eenheid had, een tweeslachtig ding en wel: 1e. eene soort van scheepvaartregeling, die niet deugde … en 2e. naast die verkeerde scheepvaartregeling eene partieele blokkade, die natuurlijk, in verband met de eerste, evenmin nut kon stichten” — Instead of the prescribed system, which at least had the virtue of force and unity, one got an ambiguous thing, namely: 1. a kind of shipping-regulation that was no good … and 2. next to that wrong shipping-regulation a partial blockade, which naturally, in connection with the first, could do no good either. The one thing the hybrid scheme could achieve, Van Heutsz conceded, was “dat aan den invoer van oorlogscontrabande belemmering werd in den weg gelegd” (that some impediment was placed in the way of the import of war contraband).

Opposition to the full blokkade

Demmeni’s reluctance to apply the full blokkade was not, in Van Heutsz’s account, a momentary wavering but a sustained position, expressed in correspondence with the Regeering and the Opperbestuur (Supreme Authority) in Nederland. The position was that the full blokkade would not bring the submission of Groot-Atjeh, because the interior produced sufficient food to outlast the closure, and that the doel (goal) — the bedwingen van het voortdurend verzet in Groot-Atjeh door het uitoefenen van dwang op de onderhoorige kuststaten (the suppression of the continuing resistance in Groot-Atjeh by exercising coercion on the dependent coastal statelets) — could not be attained by it. Van Heutsz records the correspondence that exposed the General’s position:

“dat uit die briefwisseling, gepaard met voorstellen uit Atjeh, gebleken was, dat de Generaal Demmeni van eene blokkade voor Atjeh in ‘t geheel geen heil verwachtte, omdat, op grond vooral van de vermeende voldoende voedingsmiddelen in het binnenland, naar zijne overtuiging, daarmede het doel dat er door beoogd werd: het bedwingen van het voortdurend verzet in Groot-Atjeh door het uitoefenen van dwang op de onderhoorige kuststaten, niet te bereiken was”. — that from that correspondence, accompanied by proposals from Atjeh, it had appeared that General Demmeni expected no salvation at all from a blockade of Atjeh, because, on the ground especially of the presumed sufficient foodstuffs in the interior, in his conviction the goal that was aimed at by it — the suppression of the continuing resistance in Groot-Atjeh by exercising coercion on the dependent coastal statelets — could not be attained thereby.

The reasons Demmeni gave for applying only a partial closure — sparing the Oostkust, Telok Semawé, Kerti and the other places “waar sedert jaren rust en welvaart heerschten” (where for years peace and prosperity had prevailed) and where under Scherer’s administration “geleidelijk een ordelijken staat van zaken was ingetreden” (a regular state of affairs had gradually come into being) — were “zeer begrijpelijk” (very understandable) in Van Heutsz’s reading; the civil servants whose “macht en invloed … stond of viel met behoud of loslating van de scheepvaartregeling” (power and influence … stood or fell with the preservation or relinquishing of the shipping-regulation) were “zeer tegen de sluiting gekant” (very opposed to the closure). But the Regeering, Van Heutsz argues, ought to have weighed the vóór and tegen (pro and contra) once more, decided on either the one or the other, and then permitted no deviation: “Zij deed echter het tegendeel” — it did the opposite.

The repeal by Staatsblad No. 85 van 1885

The correspondence between the Regeering in Indië, the Opperbestuur in Nederland, and Demmeni in Atjeh ended, in 1885, with the repeal of the blokkade. Van Heutsz records the repeal and the Regeering’s own post-mortem in a single sentence:

“werd bij Staatsblad No 85 van 1885 het Staatsblad No 105 van 1884 ingetrokken, bij welke intrekking de Regeering de zeer juiste opmerking voegde, dat de blokkade algemeen had moeten zijn om het beoogde doel te bereiken, maar slechts teleurstellingen kon baren toen zij slechts partieel werd toegepast en een groot gedeelte van het kustgebied voor den handel openbleef”. — by Staatsblad No 85 of 1885, Staatsblad No 105 of 1884 was withdrawn, with which withdrawal the Government coupled the very correct observation, that the blockade should have been general in order to attain the goal aimed at, but could only produce disappointments when it was only partially applied and a large part of the coastal territory remained open for trade.

The Staatsblad No. 85 of 1885 thus repealed the Staatsblad No. 105 of 1884, and the great naval force sent to Atjeh for the sluiting “werd tegelijkertijd teruggebracht tot enkele schepen” (was at the same time reduced to a few ships). The scheepvaartregeling Demmeni had introduced for some of the coastal states remained, however, in force until approximately the end of 1885: “De door den Generaal voor sommige kuststaten ingevoerde scheepvaartregeling bleef intusschen nog in stand tot ongeveer het einde van het jaar 1885” — The shipping-regulation introduced by the General for some of the coastal states meanwhile remained in force until approximately the end of the year 1885 — and was finally abolished by the Regeering in December 1885, when “voor het vervolg zelfs de geringste beperking van den handel der kuststaten met het buitenland, onder welken vorm ook, verboden” was made — for the future even the slightest restriction on the trade of the coastal statelets with the outside, in whatever form, was forbidden.

The posthumous verdict and succession by Van Teijn

Van Heutsz’s posthumous verdict on Demmeni turns on the absence of Scherer — the man who could have advised the General how to construct the scheepvaartregeling he had begun to introduce, but who had resigned in early October 1884 and left the colony:

“Moet men nu niet beamen, dat Scherer’s onmiddellijk heengaan op verzoek jammer was. Tot einde 1885 werd er van Atjeh uit met de pen gestreden voor het behoud van de scheepvaartregeling, maar de man, die den Generaal het beste had kunnen voorlichten omtrent de wijze, waarop die scheepvaartregeling diende ingericht te zijn en waarom eene andere regeling niet deugde, was heengegaan. Ware hij gebleven en had hij gestreden met zijne argumenten tegen de blokkade en voor de scheepvaartregeling, zeker zou dan geene contrôle op handel en scheepvaart getroffen zijn, zooals thans het geval is geweest, vermoedelijk ook geen tweeslachtige regeling, en de mogelijkheid, dat de Regeering zich had laten overtuigen van de deugdelijkheid van Scherer’s beginselen, ware veel grooter geweest dan thans, nu de Generaal en Scherer’s collega van Langen zich moesten behelpen met Scherer’s nota’s”. — Must one not now agree, that Scherer’s immediate departure on request was a pity? Until the end of 1885 the pen was fought with from Atjeh for the preservation of the shipping-regulation, but the man who could best have advised the General on the way in which that shipping-regulation should be arranged, and why another arrangement was no good, had departed. Had he stayed and fought with his arguments against the blockade and for the shipping-regulation, then certainly no control on trade and shipping would have been adopted as has now been the case, probably also no ambiguous arrangement, and the possibility that the Government would have been convinced of the soundness of Scherer’s principles would have been much greater than now, when the General and Scherer’s colleague van Langen had to make do with Scherer’s notes.

Demmeni died at the end of 1886, and his death opened the governorship to Kolonel van Teijn: “Zoo brak einde 1886 het tijdperk aan, waarin door den dood van den Generaal Demmeni, de Kolonel van Teijn het bestuur in handen kreeg, met de opdracht om consequent door te gaan in de aangegeven richting, en met het beginsel van herstel van het sultanaat tot basis” — So at the end of 1886 the period began, in which, through the death of General Demmeni, Colonel van Teijn took the administration into his hands, with the charge to continue consistently in the indicated direction, and with the principle of restoration of the sultanate as basis. Van Teijn would, in his own governorship (1886–1891), reverse the policies Demmeni had compromised on — restoring the sluiting of the Noord- en Westkust, pioneering the actieve verdediging of the Kota-Radja linie, and becoming the second hero of Van Heutsz’s narrative after Van der Heijden.

Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)

Demmeni was the Dutch general who recalled Toekoe Moeda Baid, the powerful head of the VII Moekims in Groot-Atjeh, from the banishment imposed upon him by General van der Heijden, and restored him to honour on account of his influence.

The rehabilitation of Toekoe Moeda Baid

G. B. Hooijer recorded that Toekoe Moeda Baid, het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims, had been banished by General van der Heijden for faithlessness (wegens trouweloosheid), and was ter wille van zijn invloed door Generaal Demmeni teruggehaald en in eere hersteld — brought back and rehabilitated by General Demmeni for the sake of his influence.

Hooijer’s judgment on the outcome was sceptical. The proximity of Baid’s territory to the Dutch post at Anagaloeng kept the officers in suspense and the sentries awake, for now and then well-founded suspicions arose that Van der Heijden had not judged the chief so wrongly; one of the neighbouring blokhuizen garrisoned by Baid’s people fell or was played into the hands of the Moslemin only hours after a Dutch officer’s inspection had found everything in order.

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

H. Demmeni was a Dutch infantry colonel who commanded the fruitless military expedition to Teunom in the Nisero affair of January 1884 and who, when the experiment of separate civil government ended, was appointed Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden, accepting the administration on 13 September 1884.

The Teunom expedition, January 1884

With the consent of the Government, which wished to avoid every reproach that not everything had been done or suffered to promote the liberation of the crew of the stranded English steamer Nisero, a military expedition was equipped which steamed from Oelèë Lheue to Teunom on 4 January 1884 under the command of Colonel H. Demmeni, while the English warship Pegasus sailed up to Teunom on the English side. When the ultimatum to the Radja of Teunom remained unanswered, hostilities were opened and an exemplary chastisement of the Radja followed: the coast was kept closed to a wide distance for all import and export, the fisheries were impeded, and Dutch warships fired on everything within their reach. The Radja remained indifferent, however, and the prisoners were not delivered up: the captives were freed only on 10 September 1884, after renewed negotiations conducted by Governor P. F. Laging Tobias together with Mr. Maxwell of the Singapore colonial council.

Civil and Military Governor, 1884

After more than three years of civil government the Government understood that a reserved and very forceful attitude toward the Atjehnese left no place for a separate civil administration, and that military and civil authority had again to be united in one hand. Governor Laging Tobias was honourably relieved, and Colonel of Infantry H. Demmeni was appointed Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies, accepting the administration on 13 September 1884. Thus ended, in Langhout’s phrase, “the for our army inglorious and for trade most unfavourable period of the first civil government in Atjeh”. Demmeni’s name thereafter attaches to the carrying out of the Concentration — the withdrawal from outlying posts, the redrawing of the line of posts around Koeta Radja, and the strict blockade of a great part of the Atjehnese coast.

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege records the colonel’s assumption of the double office: on 19 August 1884 kolonel Demmeni entered office as civil and military Governor of Atjeh — the reunification of the two-headed government of 1881 which governor Laging Tobias had proposed (see Normale bestuursinrichting (Atjeh, 1881-1884)). Rumour credited Demmeni, like his predecessor and most members of the Raad van Indië, with advice against the concentration before the secret decision of 16-17 June 1884 (see Concentration decision (16-17 June 1884)). Demmeni it was who, on the proposal of the military governor who had come to know Toekoe Moeda Baid at Banda, promoted the return of that exiled chief to Atjeh (end of 1884); and it is his name that Verstege links with the comment on that chief’s allowance of six hundred guilders a month as Hoeloebalang of the VII Moekims outside the line: “hoe hij de Atjehers echter dient, zal, volgens veler meening, eerst duidelijk aan het licht komen wanneer de Kolonel DEMMENI Atjeh eens zal hebben verlaten” (“but how he serves the Atjehers will, in the opinion of many, first become clear when Kolonel Demmeni shall have left Atjeh”).

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Appointed in August 1884 to restore unified civiel- en militair bestuur. He and his successors were tied down in Groot-Atjeh at the concentrated line until 1893, taking a passive wait-and-see stance. His tenure saw a reduction of administrative divisions from three afdeelingen to two and abolition of controleursposten.

Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 324.

Sources

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter IX, “Blokkade en Concentratie onder den Civiel en Militair Gouverneur Demmeni, van September 1884 tot December 1886.” OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 46–52.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 10, 32, 34–35, 40–42. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, p. 50.

Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.

De Geconcentreerde Stelling in Groot-Atjeh, ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef, 1885, pp. 5–6, 24–29.

Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 55–60.

Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 324.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 79-80, 85. OCR: DLP-158.

tags	person, military, dutch, colonial, officer, governor, aceh-war, atjeh, general, 19th-century, commander
aliases	Kolonel Demmeni, Colonel Demmeni, Generaal Demmeni, Civiel en Militair Gouverneur Demmeni, Demmeni (Atjeh governor), General Demmeni, Demmeni, kolonel Demmeni, H. Demmeni, Civiele en Militaire Gouverneur van Atjeh, Governor Demmeni, Gouverneur Demmeni

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