Noordkust — the North Coast of Atjeh, in Van Heutsz’s text also Noord- en Oostkust when combined with the Oostkust for administrative purposes — was the coastal region of the Atjehnese Onderhoorigheden (Dependencies) that comprised, in Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, the statelets of Pedir and Gighen (the gewichtigste / weightiest stretch), Samalanga, Telok Semawe and Segli, and that served — with the Oostkust and the Westkust — as one of the three coastal divisions on which the war’s outcome turned. The Noordkust was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the sleutel van dit systeem — the linchpin of the entire ring of coastal statelets — by virtue of its being the rice-lifeline of the interior and the home of the federatie XII (federation of twelve) and federatie VI (federation of six); the seat of the assistent-resident ter Noord- en Oostkust (standplaats Telok Semawé) (assistant resident for the North- and East Coast, with seat at Telok Semawé) under Scherer’s administration; and the operational field of the postcommandant te Segli (post-commander at Segli) under Van Teijn’s 1890 rigorous closure.
Composition: the statelets of the Noordkust
The Noordkust fell, in Van Heutsz’s classification, into a ring of statelets whose hoeloebalangs (territorial chiefs) and federaties (federations) gave the region its constitutional shape. The gewichtigste stretch was the Pedir-Gighen complex — the two statelets whose Radja’s (rulers) together headed the federatie XII (federation of twelve), the twelve-hoeloebalang federation of the Pedir-region. Van Heutsz records the constitutional arrangement in his catalogue of the federatie XII politics:
“De invloed, dien de Radja’s van Pedir en Gighen op de leden der federatie hebben, hangt geheel af van de persoonlijkheid dier Radja’s. … Lieten de hoofden van Gighen en Pedir zich krachtig gelden, dan was hun wil in de federatie wet”.
The other statelets of the Noordkust included Samalanga — the coastal state where Soetan Maharadja was murdered and the test-case for Scherer’s kruisboot-bangoen method; Telok Semawe — the seat of the assistent-resident ter Noord- en Oostkust; and Segli — the seat of the postcommandant te Segli who enforced the 1890 closure. The Noordkust was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the sleutel van dit systeem — Scherer’s own formula — by virtue of its being the rice-lifeline of the interior and the home of the federatie XII and federatie VI.
The rice-lifeline of the interior
The strategic significance of the Noordkust was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, that it was the rice-lifeline of the interior. After the February 1877 completion of the Pel plan — “in Februari 1877 toen, na de gelukkige beeindiging van de excursie naar Koeala Loé en Kroeng Raja, de laatste hand aan Pel’s plan was gelegd” — Groot-Atjeh was nominally sealed from the sea. But the seal was incomplete because Pedir, having recognised Dutch sovereignty, was left open, and the interior continued to draw its rice-supply through the Noordkust. Van Heutsz records the klassieke (classical) 1876 irony:
“dat in 1876, (wie van hen, die destijds te Atjeh waren, herinnert het zich niet?) groote hoeveelheden rijst met en zonder passen van het civiele bestuur van Oleh-leh door de VI en IV Moekims naar de XXII en XXVI Moekims gingen, zoodat zelfs gezegd werd, dat de vijand zijne rijstschuren bij ons te Oleh-leh had”.
The Noordkust’s medewerking — its co-operation — kept the inland resistance supplied with rice, salt, and opium, and its coercion by closure was therefore the operational prerequisite of the war’s end. The lesson was operationalised only in the Van Teijn governorship of 1886–1891 and codified in Van Heutsz’s 1893 prescription.
The assistant-resident ter Noord- en Oostkust
The institutional form by which the Noordkust was administered under Scherer was the assistent-resident ter Noord- en Oostkust (standplaats Telok Semawé) — the assistant-resident for the North- and East Coast, with his seat at Telok Semawe. Scherer himself arrived on the Noordkust in 1877 as waarnemend assistent-resident (acting assistant resident) — “op dit tijdstip was juist, als wd. assistent-resident, op de Noordkust gekomen de man — de tegenwoordige resident Scherer — uit wiens helder brein het eerst het denkbeeld van eene rationeele regeling voor handel en scheepvaart in verband met onze vestigingen op de kusten, is gesproten” — and from his seat at Telok Semawé originated the scheepvaartregeling (shipping regulation) idea that grew into the systematic scheepvaartregeling of May 1883. The post was abolished under the Concentratiebesluit of 19 August 1884, re-established under the Van Teijn governorship in 1887 — “eene goed ingerichte schespraartregeling met wederoprichting van den post te Telok Semawé noodzakelijk achtte” — and abolished one month after Scherer’s departure: “de post Telok Semawé, die een maand nå Scherer’s vertrek werd ingerukt”.
The 1884 partial closure: three of the Noordkust’s ports retained
The Demmeni besluit (decree) of 13 October 1884 established the three call-ports through which all foreign trade with the Noord- en Oostkust had to pass. Van Heutsz records the arrangement:
“deze waren, toen de posten Telok Semawé en Samalanga waren ingetrokken, alleen Edi, Segli en Oleh-leh voor de geheele Noord- en Oostkust”.
Of the three call-ports — Edi, Segli and Olehleh — two were on the Noordkust itself: Segli and Oleh-leh. The third — Edi — was on the Oostkust. The Noordkust thus retained two of the three open call-ports of the entire Noord- en Oostkust — the operational core of Demmeni’s hybrid scheme that combined a partieele blokkade (partial blockade) with a soort scheepvaartregeling (a kind of shipping regulation). The arrangement was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the worst of both worlds — “geen rigoureuse blokkade” (no rigorous blockade) but also “geen echte scheepvaartregeling” (no genuine shipping regulation) — but the Noordkust’s two open call-ports survived, and their survival fixed the Noordkust as the operational focus of the partial-closure régime.
The 1890 closure under Van Teijn
The high-water mark of Dutch closure-policy on the Noordkust was reached in the beginning of 1890, when Van Teijn’s progressive closure of the Noord- en Westkust — begun in January 1888 and extended in stages — was “in ‘t begin van 1890 eindelijk was uitgestrekt over de geheele Noord- en Westkust” (at the beginning of 1890 finally extended over the whole North- and West Coast). The closure was enforced, on the Pedir-Gighen stretch of the coast, by the postcommandant te Segli — the military post-commander charged with the civil administration of the stretch. Van Heutsz records the arrangement:
“zij toegepast werd door een Gouverneur als Generaal van Teijn, die met veel beleid en energie te werk ging en daarbij krachtig en vol toewijding gesteund werd, in de eerste plaats door H. M. marine en verder op het gewichtigste deel der kust het gebied van Pedir en Gighen door den met het civiel bestuur belasten postcommandant te Segli, die evenzeer van het groote nut van eene rigoureuse sluiting overtuigd tot herstel van ons gezag en door onttrekking van middelen aan de Atjehers … met veel energie te werk ging”.
The 1890 closure, enforced by H. M. marine on the seaward side and by the postcommandant te Segli on the landward side, reduced the Noordkust to starvation: by 1891 “de rijke passar te Pedir door de sluiting geheel verarmd en zoo goed als verloopen was” — the rich passar (market) of Pedir had been impoverished by the closure and was as good as ruined. The crushed Tengkoe Pakeh Pedir submitted verbally: “Mijnheer, repliceerde Tengkoe Pakeh, Uwe hand drukt zwaar, maar ik onderwerp mij aan Uwen wil” — Sir, replied Tengkoe Pakeh, your hand presses heavily, but I submit to your will. The Noordkust chiefs’ dringende voorstellen en smeekbeden — their urgent proposals and supplications — to deliver their accumulated produce at Olehleh followed.
The 1893 prescription: the Noordkust’s open ports
In Van Heutsz’s own 1893 prescription, the Noordkust retained its position as the operational focus of the scheepvaartregeling. Scherer’s 20 January 1891 lezing (lecture) before the Indisch Genootschap (Netherlands Indies Society) had named four Noordkust ports — “Op de Noordkust: 1 Edi. 2 Telok Semawé 3 Samalanga 4 Segli” — and Van Teijn had endorsed the reduced list of three: “De Generaal van Teijn achtte op de Oost- en Noordkust: Edi, Telok Semawé en Segli, althans vooreerst, voldoenge” — General van Teijn considered Edi, Telok Semawé and Segli sufficient, at least for the present, on the East- and North Coast. Van Heutsz concurred, and the prescription that closed the 1893 tract retained the Noordkust as the operational focus of the scheepvaartregeling Van Heutsz would himself implement as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward. The Noordkust’s pepper — “Ook voor de Noordkust is niet meer juist wat men vroeger zeide, dat zij geen peper oplevert” — was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, a second economic stake that gave the closure-and-scheepvaartregeling system its fiscal as well as its coercive capacity on the Noordkust.
Significance
The Noordkust’s significance in the Aceh Wiki History record rests on four things: it was one of the three coastal divisions of the Onderhoorigheden — with the Oostkust and the Westkust — and the home of the federatie XII and federatie VI whose hoeloebalangs and Radja’s gave the region its constitutional shape; it was the rice-lifeline of the interior — the sleutel van dit systeem Scherer identified and Van Heutsz endorsed — whose medewerking kept the inland resistance supplied, and whose coercion by closure was the operational prerequisite of the war’s end; it was the seat of the assistent-resident ter Noord- en Oostkust (standplaats Telok Semawé) under Scherer — the institutional seat from which Scherer conceived the scheepvaartregeling and from which the 1884 Concentratiebesluit abolished the post and the 1887 Van Teijn governorship re-established it; and it was the operational field of the 1890 closure under Van Teijn — the postcommandant te Segli’s rigorous sluiting (closure) of the Pedir-Gighen stretch that reduced the rijke passar te Pedir (rich market of Pedir) to ruin, produced the Noordkust chiefs’ supplications to deliver their produce at Olehleh, and became the empirical proof of the closure’s coercive capacity that Van Heutsz made emblematic of the 1893 prescription.
Sources
Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen ter bespreking van de verdere voorbereiding eener hervorming van het bestuurswezen in Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1914), pp. 118–130.
Een strijd in Atjeh (Een oogarts op het oorlogspad), door Mr. C. Graadt van Roggen, met een voorrede van den heer H. Wanting, redacteur Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg, uitgave van de Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934), pp. 3–4, 6–7, 10.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897) and Een strijd in Atjeh (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg for the Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.
Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter XI, XIII, XVII.
See Also
- Oostkust
- Westkust
- Onderhoorigheden
- Pedir
- Gighen
- Samalanga
- Telok Semawe
- Segli
- Olehleh
- Van Teijn
- Scherer
- Demmeni
- Pel
- Scheepvaartregeling
- Blokkade
- Concentratiebesluit (19 Augustus 1884)
- 1877
- 1884
- 1890
- 1893
- M. C. Roos van Raadshoven
- Pidië
- Th. J. Veltman
- Oostkust van Atjeh
- Tamiang
- Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden
- Bestuursreorganisatie Sumatra (1913-1914)
- Groot-Atjeh
- Noord-Sumatra (proposed gewest)
- J. Tijssen
- Cataract campaign on the North Coast of Atjeh (1932)
- Bernoen
- Long Poetoe
- Idi
- Atjeh’s Westkust
- Een strijd in Atjeh (1934)
- 1923
- 1931
- 1932
- H. N. A. Swart
- General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh (1943)
- Pacificatie van Atjeh
- Atjeh
Source
De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 10, 17, 22, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35, 37, 50, 56, 60, 67, 77, 91. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.