Onderhoorigheden

Onderhoorigheden — literally “Dependencies” or “Subordinate Territories” — is the collective Dutch term used in De Buitenbezittingen for the four afdeelingen of the Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden other than Groot-Atjeh itself: the Westkust, the Noordkust, the Oostkust, and the Alaslanden. The Gouvernement as a whole was named for the union of these dependencies with Atjeh-proper, the Groot-Atjeh heartland of the three Sagi’s, and the distinction between the two was both geographical and institutional: Groot-Atjeh was the territory of the Sultanate’s direct rule, while the Onderhoorigheden were the vassal coast- and interior-lands whose native institutions had only partially been shaped by Atjehsche influence.

The pre-colonial pattern

In the pre-colonial period, De Buitenbezittingen records, the Atjehsche Onderhoorigheden were originally composed of “meerdere halfmythische groote Sultanaten op de Noord- en Oostkust: Pedir, Samoedra-Pasé, Perlak, Aroe (Oostkust van Sumatra) en ter Westkust Daja.” The expansion of the Sultanate of Atjeh in the early sixteenth century brought these coast-states under its loose suzerainty, with the Sultan appointing stedehouders (lieutenants, equivalent to oelèëbalangs) and Sjahbandars (harbour-kings) in the ports. With the decay of the great Sultanate, the vassal states broke away, and the small landschapjes of the colonial period emerged from their fragments. The Sultan’s court at Koeta Radja continued, even so, to issue sarakata’s to chiefs who would pay homage, and these documents remained prized as “ornament,” as tangible proof of legitimacy, long after their practical force had evaporated.

Variations of the bestuursstelsel

The Groot-Atjehsche bestuursstelsel — gampong, moekim, oelèëbalang, sagi — survived most completely in Pedir and, in modified form, in the Atjehsche parts of the Westkust. In the other Onderhoorigheden, the native institutions diverged sharply from the Groot-Atjehsche pattern: the Menangkabausche adat — with its soekoe (clan) organisation and its kamanakan (matrilineal) inheritance — prevailed in the Malay colonies of the Westkust south of Meulabôh; Tamiang showed Malay influences from Langkat and Deli; the Gayo and Alas lands retained their old genealogical kawöm and méréga organisations. Even in the strictly Atjehsche landschapjes of the Onderhoorigheden, the De Buitenbezittingen records, “het reeds geschetste stelsel… kan men… alleen voor het grootste deel van Pedir… geldend verklaren” — the system already sketched can be declared valid only for the greater part of Pedir.

The colonial reorganisation

The Dutch administration, on its arrival, took the existing landschap division — “zooals dat oogenblik bestond” — as the basis for its administrative organisation, modifying it only where political or economic reasons required splits or mergers. Much more substantial modifications were, however, required by the “meestal zeer verbrokkelijke inwendige bestuurs-organisatie der landschapjes” — the usually very fragmented internal administrative organisation of the landschapjes. The Dutch strengthened the position of the landschapshoofden, restored the territorial boundaries where these had been confused by the onbeperkte anarchie (unlimited anarchy) of the pre-colonial period, and gradually moved the genealogical administrations of the Gayo and Alas lands toward a territorial principle more amenable to indirect rule.

Account from De Atjeh-Oorlog by J.A. Kruijt (1896)

In Kruijt’s analysis, the onderhoorigheden — the coastal statelets along the East, North, and West Coasts of Atjeh — were the true centre of gravity of the Atjeh-oorlog. The Dutch failure to master them through a consistent scheepvaartregeling was, in his judgement, the principal cause of the protraction of the war.

The onderhoorigheden comprised the coastal statelets along the three coasts: on the East Coast, Edi, Simpang Olim, Langsar, Pasei, Gedong, Perlak, and Tamiang; on the North Coast, Telok Semawé, Pedir, Giegieng, Segli, Samalanga, Aijer Laboe, Endjong, and Merdoe; on the West Coast, Kroeng Raba, Melaboeh, Troemon, Rigas, Tenom, Kroeng Raija, and Singkel.

The doctrine that the onderhoorigheden were the true centre of gravity was set out most fully by the Assistent-Resident Scherer in his lecture of 20 January 1891 before the Indisch Genootschap at ‘s-Gravenhage:

“Voor ieder die eenigszins over de zaak wilde doordenken moest het duidelijk zijn, dat het verzet niet van Groot-Atjeh maar van de onderhoorigheden uitging, dat dáár het geld verdiend werd, waarmee de kosten van den oorlog werden bestreden, dat dáár het jonge, fanatieke volk werd verzameld om invallen in Groot-Atjeh te doen en dat men zich derwaarts in volkomen veiligheid terugtrok als wij den guerilla’s het vuur te na aan de schenen legden.” (For anyone who would think at all about the matter, it must have been clear that the resistance came not from Groot-Atjeh but from the dependencies, that there the money was earned with which the costs of the war were met, that there the young fanatical people were gathered to make incursions into Groot-Atjeh, and that one withdrew thither in perfect safety when we put the fire too close to the shins of the guerrillas.)

The scheepvaartregeling — the systematic Dutch control of the coastal trade — was first proposed by Scherer in May 1881, first introduced on part of the North Coast in May 1882, first applied throughout Atjeh in May 1883, withdrawn by the concentration system of October 1884 (except on the East Coast), and finally and definitively introduced in October 1893 for the East Coast and April 1894 for the North and West Coasts. The protraction of the war from 1873 to 1896 was, in Kruijt’s analysis, principally the consequence of the Dutch failure to apply the scheepvaartregeling consistently.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, the Onderhoorigheden — Dependencies, in Van Heutsz’s spelling also kuststaten or kuststaatjes, the dependent coastal statelets of the Acehnese kingdom — are the recurring counterpoint to Groot-Atjeh and the territory in which Van Heutsz located the war’s true centre of gravity.

Composition (Van Heutsz account)

The Onderhoorigheden fell, in Van Heutsz’s classification, into three coastal divisions. On the Noordkust lay Pedir (Pidie), the rice-lifeline of the interior, and Gighen (also written Gigchen in OCR), together with Samalanga — each a statelet with its own hoeloebalang (territorial chief) and its own stakes in the war. On the Oostkust lay Edi, the long-standing Dutch post; Simpang Olim and its co-belligerent Tandjong Semantoh; Kerti, Merbou, Gedong, Pasangan and the cluster of Pasei-streek statelets (Bajoe, Tjoenda, Nizam, Sawang, Blangmeh, Samakoeroeh); and, at the eastern extremity, Tamiang and its Langsar-Langkat continuum. On the Westkust lay Melaboeh (also Malaboeh), Telok-Kroet (opposite the island of Poeloe Raja), Tenom, Rigas, Kloewang, Tampat Toean and, at the southern extremity, Troemon. Each was a staatje — a statelet — with its own chief, its own produce (rice on the Noordkust; pepper on the Oostkust; pepper, copra and resins on the Westkust), and its own trading relationship with the Straits settlements of Penang and Singapore.

Strategic role (Van Heutsz account)

The Onderhoorigheden were, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the true centre of gravity of the war. The conclusion was Generaal van der Heijden’s — reached, in Van Heutsz’s narrative, reeds in het eerste jaar van zijn bestuur (already in the first year of his administration):

“Europeesche staatsman Hij toch kwam reeds in het eerste jaar van zijn bestuur tot de vaste overtuiging, dat het de Onderhoorigheden waren, die het verzet tegen ons gezag in Atjeh voedden, die voordeel trokken van den oorlog en daarom, ofschoon zelf onze souvereiniteit erkend hebbende, belang hadden bij de voortduuring van het verzet” (The European statesman — for so we may call him — already in the first year of his administration reached the firm conviction that it was the Onderhoorigheden that fed the resistance to our authority in Atjeh, that drew profit from the war, and that therefore, though themselves having recognised our sovereignty, had an interest in the continuation of the resistance).

The argument was that the coastal statelets, by recognising Dutch sovereignty while continuing to feed the interior’s resistance, drew profit from the war’s continuation. They were the channel through which Groot-Atjeh drew its rice, its arms, and its opium — the toevoer (supply) on which the inland resistance lived. Van Heutsz’s corollary, which became the central prescription of the 1893 tract, was that the Onderhoorigheden — not Groot-Atjeh itself — were the proper object of Dutch pressure, and that the controlled scheepvaartregeling applied to their trade would, by cutting the toevoer, force the interior’s submission.

Article 5 of Van Swieten’s Instructie

The founding Dutch policy for the Onderhoorigheden was art. 5 of Generaal van Swieten’s Instructie of 22 April 1874, approved by Besluit of the Gouverneur-Generaal of 26 May 1874 No. 1. The text of art. 5, as Van Heutsz reproduces it, read:

“In aanzien van de Onderhoorigheden van Atjeh onderhoudt de militaire en civiele bevelhebber met hen, die onze souvereiniteit hebben erkend, zooveel mogelijk de betrekkingen en tracht hen, die nog niet tot ons zijn toegetreden, door overreding of door blokkade te brengen tot het afleggen der verklaring” (As regards the Onderhoorigheden of Atjeh, the military and civil commander maintains, as much as possible, relations with those who have recognised our sovereignty, and seeks to bring those who have not yet come over to us, by persuasion or by blockade, to make the declaration).

The article thus contemplated conciliation of the coastal chiefs who had recognised Dutch sovereignty and a blokkade — blockade — of those who had not. It prescribed the establishment of Dutch posts at well-chosen points on the coast: onze vestiging op enkele goed gelegen punten in de Onderhoorigheden (our establishment on a few well-placed points in the Onderhoorigheden). Van Heutsz would later argue that art. 5 was insufficient — dat in verband hiermede ten opzichte van de Onderhoorigheden niet volstaan kon worden met hetgeen art. 5 zijner instructie aangaf (that in connection with this, with respect to the Onderhoorigheden, one could not rest content with what art. 5 of his instruction indicated) — and that the modification of art. 5 became the central question of the next twenty years: Dit geeft ook de wijziging aan, welke art. 5 van de Instructie van Generaal van Swieten moest ondergaan (This also indicates the modification that art. 5 of Generaal van Swieten’s Instructie had to undergo).

The closure/blokkade question (1878, 1879, 1884)

The Dutch return to art. 5’s blokkade option came in three waves. The first was Van der Heijden’s two haven-sluitingen (harbour-closures) of 1878 and 5 July 1879 — Reeds in 1878, na hervatting van de krijgsoperatiën in de XXII Moekims, liet hij daarom alle havens van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, met uitzondering van Olehleh en Edi, voor den invoerhandel sluiten (Already in 1878, after the resumption of military operations in the XXII Moekims, he therefore closed all havens of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden, with the exception of Olehleh and Edi, to the import trade). The first closure was revoked by G.-G. van Lansberge by letter of 7 February 1879; the second Van der Heijden imposed op zijne persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid (on his personal responsibility) by telegram of 5 July 1879. The second wave was the rigoureuse blokkade (rigorous blockade) of the Concentratie of 1884 — eene rigoureuse sluiting van het geheele kustgebied, d. w. z. van Tamiang op de Oostkust tot Troemon op de Westkust (a rigorous closure of the entire coastal territory, i.e., from Tamiang on the Oostkust to Troemon on the Westkust) — ordered by besluit of 19 August 1884 and authorised by Staatsblad No. 105 van 1884. The third wave was the Generaal van Teijn closure of the Noord- en Westkust, imposed in stages from January 1888 and completed in the beginning of 1890: in ‘t begin van 1890 eindelijk was uitgestrekt over de geheele Noord- en Westkust (in the beginning of 1890 finally [the closure] was extended over the entire Noord- en Westkust). The 1884 closure was abandoned by Staatsblad No. 85 van 1885 and the Demmeni partieele blokkade (partial blockade) substituted; the scheepvaartregeling of May 1883 was finally abolished in December 1885 — tevens voor den vervolge zelfs de geringste beperking van den handel der kuststaten met het buitenland, onder welken vorm ook, verboden (at the same time, for the future, even the slightest restriction on the trade of the coastal states with foreign countries, in whatever form, forbidden).

The scheepvaartregeling alternative

The alternative to the blokkade, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, was the scheepvaartregeling — the controlled routing of all Atjehnese maritime trade through Dutch-administered ports, with duties levied on the in- and out-flow of goods — that Scherer had first conceived from the Noordkust in 1879–1880 and that Gouverneur Laging Tobias had introduced by besluit of May 1883. Van Heutsz distinguishes the two instruments sharply: sluiting (total closure of a statelet’s havens) was appropriate for the Onderhoorigheden, where the produce flowed outward and could be cut at the harbour; boete (fines on in-, out- and through-put at the open Dutch-controlled ports) was appropriate for Groot-Atjeh, where Oleh-leh must remain open. The 1893 tract prescribes the scheepvaartregeling for the entire ring of Onderhoorigheden: open ports on the Noord- en Oostkust at Edi, Telok Semawé, Segli and Oleh-leh, and on the Westkust at Telok-Kroet, Melaboeh and Tampat Toean — with the entire coast between these ports closed to all foreign trade. The measure would, Van Heutsz argued, place the Dutch in den volsten zin des woords op de geldkist van Atjeh — in the fullest sense of the word on the cash-box of Atjeh — and so convert the Onderhoorigheden from the channel of the interior’s supply into the instrument of its coercion. The 1893 prescription was the policy Van Heutsz would himself implement, as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward, to close the war the 1884–1897 cajoleering-decade had failed to end.

Sources

De Buitenbezittingen, Deel II, Aflevering 2: Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedisch Bureau, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1917), pp. 30–31, 46–49.

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter I (geography), Chapter VII (Scherer’s doctrine), Chapter XIII (significance). pp. 14, 35–37, 78.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 1, 8, 11–17, 24, 32, 34, 36, 39. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

tags	concept, achehnese, colonial, administration, place, region, polity, atjeh, 19th-century, dependencies
aliases	De Onderhoorigheden, The Onderhoorigheden, Atjehsche Onderhoorigheden, Onderhoorigheden van Atjeh, Dependencies Atjeh, Coastal dependencies of Atjeh, Dependencies of Atjeh, de Onderhoorigheden, kuststaten, kuststaatjes, Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden

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