Concentratie-stelsel (1884-1896)

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tagsconcept, colonial, dutch, acheh, military, strategy
aliasesConcentratie-stelsel (1884-1896), concentratie-stelsel, the concentration system of Atjeh, Atjeh concentratie, reconcentratie, the concentration system

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The concentratie-stelsel (1884-1896) — the “concentration system” — was the Dutch military strategy in Atjeh between 1884 and 1896, by which the Dutch expeditionary force withdrew from the interior of Groot-Atjeh into a concentratie-stelling — concentrated position — around Koeta Radja and limited its activity to holding this reconcentrated perimeter. The system is the middle-phase military policy of the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]] and the strategic fact against which every subsequent parliamentary critique of pre-Van Heutsz Atjeh policy was measured.

The retreat to Koeta Radja

After more than a decade of inconclusive fighting in the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]], the Dutch expeditionary force in 1884 withdrew into a perimeter centred on Koeta Radja and limited its activity to holding this reconcentrated line. The position was, in the contemporary Dutch comparison, a “Noordoostpolder”-sized area: a small reclaimed-polder perimeter around the town, surrounded by the unconquered interior of Groot-Atjeh. The retreat of 1884 became a parliamentary byword for the futility of half-measures in Atjeh.

The parliamentary critique

Critics in the Tweede Kamer — especially Van Kol, Kuyper and Fransen van de Putte — repeatedly used the Concentratie-stelsel ([[1884-1896)|concentratie]] period to argue that the Netherlands should either subjugate Atjeh outright or withdraw entirely. Kuyper’s verdict of 1896 — that the government had laid out “een volledige staalkaart van alle denkbare methoden om Atjeh te bestrijden” — a complete sample-card of every conceivable method of combating Atjeh — is the canonical anti-revolutionary indictment of the concentratie interlude.

The ministerial defence

Idenburg — later minister of Colonies — defended the measure retrospectively in the Tweede Kamer: “In Atjeh is geduld geoefend in de tijd van de concentratie” — patience was exercised in Atjeh in the time of the concentration — and the result was that “het verzet zich des te sterker heeft kunnen organiseren” — the resistance had been able to organise itself all the stronger. The rebuttal became the standard ministerial reply to liberal criticism of the concentratie interlude: patience in the absence of pressure was not a policy but an abdication.

The 1896 collapse

The concentratie-stelsel depended, in part, on alliances with indigenous auxiliaries such as Toekoe Oemar (Teuku Umar). When Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|Toekoe Oemar defected in 1896]], the concentratie-stelling was “niet meer geheel zeker” — no longer wholly secure. The post-1896 campaigns of Van Heutsz — the Van der Heyden-Van Heutsz system of pursuit into the remotest hiding-places — restored Groot-Atjeh outside the perimeter, but the resistance chiefs withdrew to Pedir, and thence, in 1904, to the Gajoe- and Alaslanden.

Significance

The Concentratie-stelsel ([[1884-1896)|concentratie-stelsel]] is the strategic fact that defines the middle period of the Atjehnese war. Its collapse in 1896 is the political-military hinge of the war’s concluding phase; the Van Heutsz-Van Daalen conquest of Groot-Atjeh outside the perimeter is the direct consequence of that collapse.

Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)

The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.

The Concentratie-stelsel (1884-1896) — the “concentration system” — was the Dutch military strategy in Atjeh between the early 1880s and 1896, by which the Dutch expeditionary force withdrew from the interior of Groot-Atjeh into a concentratie achter een versterkte linie (concentration behind a fortified line) around Kota-Radja and limited its activity to holding this reconcentrated perimeter. The system was chosen by the States-General in 1880 over the civil governor’s own strongest recommendation against it.

The 1880 concentration decision

The source records that a newly-appointed civil governor — the source does not name him — submitted an advice to the government offering three options: concentration behind a fortified line, new aggression, or restoration of the sultanate. Although the governor himself “het eerste ten sterkste ontried” (most strongly advised against the first), the States-General chose concentration.

The Kuta-Radja imprisonment

The source’s verdict on the concentration period is direct: “Jaren lang zaten onze troepen in Kuta-Radja gevangen achter een kring van posten, lijdende van ziekten en geplaagd door de vijand. Men trachtte de goede gezindheid der hoofden met geld en geschenken te kopen en onopvallend tot herstel van het sultanaat te komen” (For years our troops sat in Kuta-Radja imprisoned behind a ring of posts, suffering from diseases and plagued by the enemy. One tried to buy the good will of the chiefs with money and gifts, and inconspicuously to bring about the restoration of the sultanate).

The 1892 blockade

The source records that “In 1892 beproeefde men het met een blokkade, die niets uitrichtte omdat Atjeh heel weinig van buiten nodig had” (In 1892 one tried it with a blockade, which accomplished nothing because Atjeh had very little need of anything from outside). The 1892 blockade’s failure confirmed that the concentration system could not be supplemented by the standard Dutch coercive instrument of maritime blockade.

The Snouck Hurgronje advice

The same year 1892 saw the Snouck Hurgronje advice that “de methode aangaf tot onderwerping en pacificatie” (indicated the method for subjugation and pacification). The advice — ignore the sultan’s party, strike the enemy sensibly, then win the population by welfare policy — was the intellectual basis of the post-1896 reversal of the concentration system.

The 1896 defection

The 1896 defection of Teungku Um — whom the governor of Atjeh Deykerhoff and the governor-general Pijnacker Hordijk had armed and subsidised against Snouck Hurgronje’s explicit warning — ended the concentration period. The Van Heutsz appointment of 1896 was the operational consequence: the Snouck Hurgronje advice was now to be implemented, and the concentration system was abandoned in favour of the mobile-column offensive.

Significance

The concentratie-stelsel is, in the source’s narrative, the type-specimen of the Dutch misreading of Atjehnese resistance. The States-General’s 1880 concentration decision — against the civil governor’s own strongest recommendation — produced sixteen years of Dutch imprisonment in Kuta-Radja and the 1896 defection of Teungku Um.

See Also

Account from De Atjeh-Oorlog by J.A. Kruijt (1896)

In Kruijt’s De Atjeh-Oorlog (1896), the Concentratie-stelsel was “een wijzen maatregel, waartoe meer moed en vaderlandsliefde behoorde, dan tot het hardnekkig voortgaan op eenen kostbaren, gevaarlijken en onzekeren weg” (a wise measure, requiring more courage and love of fatherland than the stubborn prosecution of a costly, dangerous, and uncertain path) — but it was fatally compromised by its failure to be accompanied by a vigorous scheepvaartregeling on the coasts.

By 1884, after three years of civil government, the Dutch position in Groot-Atjeh had collapsed. The Gouverneur-Generaal ‘s Jacob visited Atjeh in August 1883 and found the situation highly unfavourable; Van Rees came in March 1884 to see and discuss affairs. In two secret sessions of the united Chambers of the Staten-Generaal on 16 June and 17 June 1884, it was decided to adopt the concentration system. Laging Tobias, strongly opposed, who according to him it “de kroon zette op de Nederlandsche fouten in Atjeh” (set the crown on the Dutch mistakes in Atjeh), retired in September 1884. Colonel Demmeni became Civiel en Militair Gouvernur.

The concentration itself was carried out by Demmeni “met veel beleid en groote energie” (with much discretion and great energy), and by July 1886 everything was ready. The new stelling was a continuous line of fortifications around Kota Radja, forming a kind of isosceles triangle with the post Lambaroe as apex and the sea coast from Oleh-leh to Kota Pohama as base. A 1,000-metre open strip surrounded it; a ceintuursporbaan (belt railway) and telephone connected the posts. The blokkade was to be strict and cover the whole coast, but before Bogaert even took command, he heard at Batavia that its early abolition had been decided. The blockade was wholly withdrawn in March 1885; trade was almost wholly free; and by December 1885 even the least restriction on the trade of the coastal statelets with Penang was forbidden. “Dat was nu de rigoureuse blokkade der geheele kust geweest” (That was the rigorous blockade of the whole coast that had been).

The consequences were progressive deterioration. The enemy, abundantly supplied from the unblockaded coasts, prosecuted the war in his own way. Toeankoe Hasschim proclaimed the youthful pretender as Sultan at Indrapoeri; Tengkoe di Tirou became the soul of the resistance; Toekoe Oemar became master of the West Coast. The open strip was largely overgrown again; the Muslemin made the line unsafe; the railway and bridges were damaged; the telephone line was destroyed. “Dat was en bleef de fout” (That was and remained the mistake).

Sources

Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 270-272.

Nederlanders over de Zeeën: 350 Jaar geschiedenis van Nederland buitengaats, onder redactie van Dr. H. J. de Graaf, met medewerking van Prof. G. Gonggrijp, W. R. Menkman en Prof. Jhr Dr P. J. van Winter, 2e geheel herziene druk (Utrecht: W. de Haan N.V., MCMLV), p. 217.

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapters VIII–IX, XIII, pp. 44–52, 79.

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