Kolonel StemfoortJ. W. Stemfoort, Kolonel der Infanterie — was a Dutch colonel of the Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger who, in 1896, commanded the Dutch expeditionary reinforcements sent to Atjeh in response to Toekoe Oemar’s defection from the Dutch alliance. He is named in the Atjeh-Album of 1896 as the commander of the suppletie-troepen (reinforcement troops) from Padang and two battalions from Batavia, each approximately 20 officers and 500 men strong, who landed at Oleh-leh at the outbreak of the 1896 crisis.

In Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, Stemfoort is further identified as the principal Dutch field commander of the first semester of 1896 — the officer who arrived with Lt.-Gen. Vetter on 7 April 1896 aboard the steamer Carpentier and who was voorloopig belast met het Civiel en Militair Gezag (temporarily charged with the Civil and Military Authority) of Aceh after Vetter’s departure on 28 June 1896. In the second semester of 1896 — the principal subject of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel — Stemfoort served a second tenure as wd. Civiel en Militair Gouverneur, from 11 July 1896 to 17 November 1896, following the death of Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin by sunstroke on 7 July 1896. His combined command record, across both tenures and the field operations of the first semester, is the most extensive of any Dutch officer in either volume of the work.

The 1896 expedition

The Atjeh-Album records that, in response to Toekoe Oemar’s defection, the Dutch government dispatched reinforcements to Atjeh under the command of Kolonel Stemfoort. The reinforcements consisted of suppletie-troepen van Padang en twee Bataljons van Batavia, ieder ongeveer 20 officieren en 500 man sterkreinforcement troops from Padang and two battalions from Batavia, each approximately 20 officers and 500 men strong — which stapten te Oleh-leh aan walstepped ashore at Oleh-leh. Three further battalions stood ready on Java to be sent to that labyrinth of muddy rice-fields and overgrown kampongs with unintelligible names, as the album characterises the theatre of operations.

The arrival of General Vetter

The Atjeh-Album records that, alongside the dispatch of Stemfoort’s reinforcements, the Dutch government dispatched General Vetter to Atjeh as Regeerings-Commissaris (Government Commissioner). The album’s reading of the dual appointment is that men in het paleis van den Gouverneur-Generaal de zaken op Noord-Sumatra ernstig inzietone in the palace of the Governor-General sees the situation in North Sumatra as serious — and that the dual appointment was intended to signal a change of policy from the concentratie-stelsel (concentration system) of General Deykerhoff. The album records that Vetter’s first act was the dismissal of the Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies — a sign that the Dutch intended to follow a different policy from that of Deykerhoff.

The cost of the relief expeditions

The Atjeh-Album records that Stemfoort’s reinforcements, having landed at Oleh-leh, were employed in the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit and the battle of Tjot Rang. The album’s narrative of these engagements notes that the strijd hevig was, dien Kolonel Stemfoort aanvoerde, maar ook, dat de overwinning was aan onsthe battle was fierce that Colonel Stemfoort commanded, but also that the victory was ours — and that the two posts were relieved ten koste van Kapitein Geluk en zeven minderen, die sneuvelden, en van de Luitenants ten Seldam en Hockstein, die met 23 minderen werden gewondat the cost of Captain Geluk and seven subordinates who fell, and of the Lieutenants ten Seldam and Hockstein who, with 23 subordinates, were wounded.

Arrival, Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, and the April Operations (per ATJEH ‘96)

Stemfoort arrived with Vetter on 7 April 1896 aboard the steamer Carpentier (Kruisheer also gives the name Bantam), together with Majoor Breijer and the 9e Bataljon. His immediate task was the relief of the besieged posts of Biloel (under Kapitein Van der Wedden) and Lamkoenjit (under 1e Luit. Creutz Lechleitner), and he commanded the relief column of 8 April 1896 — a multi-column operation with the 3e Bataljon (under Maj. Steinmetz), the 6e Bataljon (under Lt.-Col. Bendien), the 9e Bataljon (under Bendien), the 12e Bataljon (under Maj. Soeters), the 14e Bataljon (under Maj. Van der Noordaa), two bergbatterijen (mountain batteries), a cavalry detachment, engineers and ambulances, with Lt.-Col. Van Vliet as Chef van den Staf (Chief of Staff). The relief operation broke the sieges and prepared the evacuation of both posts on 12 April 1896, and Stemfoort continued with the three-colonne operation of 20 April 1896 which completed the wholesale evacuation of the Dutch buitenlinie (outer line). Through April and May, Stemfoort directed the systematic tuchtigingen (punitive expeditions) against the regions which had joined Umar: the tuchtiging of Lam-Goet on 14 April 1896, the battle of Senelop on 17 April 1896, the night surprise of Benting Batoe on 28–29 April 1896, and the excursie to Moekim Lamtengah on 21 May 1896.

The Three-Day Offensive of 23–25 May 1896 and the June Tuchtigingen (per ATJEH ‘96)

The culminating operation of Stemfoort’s first-semester command was the three-day offensive of 23–25 May 1896 against Umar’s stelling at Lam-Asan, Lam-Pisang, Tjot Tjako, Boekit Seboen, Lam-Tjroeng and Lam-Poelau. The operation involved four colonnes plus reserve, with Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz commanding the bergcolonne which stormed Tjot Tjako on 23 May 1896 (with 2e Luits. Wagener and Vis and the maréchaussée (military police (maréchaussée)) Wongsodikromo and Todikromo the first to reach the summit at 5:43 PM), and with Kapitein Linck’s 4e compagnie storming the versterking (fortification) Belang on 21 May 21 May and entering Lam-Pisang on 24 May 1896 right after 1e Luit. de Jongh. Stemfoort personally inspected the Lam-Asan position on 23 May 1896 and issued the orders for the 25 May 25 May attack on Boekit Seboen/Lam-Tjroeng/Daman/Lam-Poelau. After the three-day offensive, Stemfoort directed the tuchtiging of Lam-Krak Moekims on 9–10 June 1896 (with two colonnes under Bisschoff van Heemskerck and Van Heutsz), the tuchtiging of V Moekims Montassik on 16–17 June 1896 (with three colonnes under Bisschoff van Heemskerck, Van Heutsz and Soeters), and the land column of the Ladoeng landing of 22–23 June 1896 — the operation which culminated in the storming of the Kroeng-Kali benteng (fort) by Kapitein Linck’s compagnie on 23 June 1896, with 2e Luit. Heyligers the first to enter.

First Restoration as Civiel en Militair Gouvernur (28 June 1896)

On 28 June 1896, with the departure of Vetter as Regeeringscommissaris per stoomschip Coen for Batavia, the office of Civiel en Militair Gouvernur was restored, and Stemfoort was appointed (provisionally) to the office. Resident van Langen was simultaneously relieved of his temporary functions as Civiel Bestuurder van het gewest (Civil Administrator of the territory). Stemfoort’s appointment represented the institutional closure of the Vetter mission and the formal transfer of the Aceh command back to the regular colonial military structure. The closure of the first semester of 1896 under Stemfoort’s command confirmed that the Dutch counter-offensive had achieved its principal objectives — the breaking of the sieges, the destruction of Umar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang, the death or dispersion of his principal sub-commanders, the tuchtiging (punitive expedition) of the Lam-Krak and V Moekims Montassik regions, and the storming of the Kroeng-Kali benteng — even as Umar himself remained at large in Lepong.

Stemfoort’s first tenure as wd. Civiel en Militair Gouvernur was, however, exceptionally brief. On 5 July 1896 the newly-appointed governor Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin arrived at Oleh-leh aboard the steamer Reaal and formally assumed the office, and Stemfoort departed for Batavia on the same steamer — his first tenure having lasted just seven days (28 June – 5 July 1896).

Second Tenure as wd. Civiel en Militair Gouverneur (11 July – 17 November 1896)

Stemfoort’s second tenure as wd. Civiel en Militair Gouverneur — the principal subject of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel — began on 11 July 1896, four days after the death of Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin by sunstroke during his first excursie (reconnaissance (excursie)) to the IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba) on 7 July 1896. Stemfoort had been en route to Batavia when De Moulin’s death required his recall, and he aanvaardt kolonel Stemfoort het gezag — assumed the authority — on 11 July 1896. The Governor-General Van der Wijck then sent a telegram of 18 July 1896eene nadere uiteenzetting zijner bedoelingen omtrent de verdere actie — which laid down the beheersching (domination) programme that would govern Dutch operations for the next four months: De XXV Moekims moeten in haar geheel door ons beheerscht worden, wij moeten de woelgeesten en de hen volgende benden onschadelijk maken, minstens verdrijven…

The four months and six days of Stemfoort’s second tenure — covered in detail in Hoofdstuk III (pp. 1–144) and the opening of Hoofdstuk IV (pp. 145–160) of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel — were characterised by the slow, methodical extension of Dutch control from the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) into the XXVI Moekims, XXII Moekims, IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba / Lok-Nga), and the Selimoen highlands. The principal operations and innovations of Stemfoort’s second tenure include:

The second tenure closed on 17 November 1896overgave en overname van het bestuur, Kolonel J. W. Stemfoort keert naar Java terug — when the newly-appointed Kolonel C. P. J. van Vliet arrived at Koeta-Radja and the handover took place. Stemfoort returned to Java, and Van Vliet formally assumed the governorship. A portrait of Kolonel Stemfoort appears in ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel opposite page 83 — the second of the six portraits bound into the volume, and the visual record of the officer whose command defined the second semester of 1896.

Significance

Stemfoort’s significance in the documentary record of the Atjeh-oorlog is as the immediate Dutch military response to Toekoe Oemar’s defection — the commander of the reinforcements that allowed the Dutch to undertake the relief expeditions of April 1896. His appearance in the Atjeh-Album of 1896 is brief, but it establishes the scale of the Dutch reinforcement effort at the outbreak of the 1896 crisis — some 1040 men of the two Batavia battalions, plus the Padang suppletie-troepen, with three further battalions held in reserve on Java.

His significance in ATJEH ‘96 (1e Deel) is that of the principal Dutch field commander of the first semester of 1896 — the officer whose command record covers every major Dutch operation from the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 8 April 1896 to the storming of the Kroeng-Kali benteng (fort) on 23 June 1896. His personal inspection of the Lam Asan position on 23 May 1896 and his receipt of a letter of thanks from the Regeeringscommissaris after the operation confirm his direct involvement in the culminating engagement, and his appointment as provisional Civiel en Militair Gouvernur on 28 June 1896 confirmed the institutional closure of the Vetter mission. His command record, as enumerated in the master article list, is the most extensive of any Dutch officer in the first volume.

His significance in ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel (2c Deel) is that of the wd. Civiel en Militair Gouverneur whose second tenure — from 11 July to 17 November 1896 — characterised the second semester of 1896. Under Stemfoort’s second tenure, the Dutch extended their effective control from the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) into the XXVI Moekims, XXII Moekims, IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba / Lok-Nga), and the Selimoen highlands; introduced the pasenstelsel for the regulation of movement; and undertook the most ambitious operations of the second semester — the first Selimoen expedition, the capture of Kota Ba Teuē, and the second Selimoen expedition. Stemfoort’s second tenure was thus the bridge between the immediate crisis of the Umar defection and the appointment of Van Heutsz as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur in 1898 — the slow, methodical pacificatie (pacification) of the second semester of 1896 which prepared the ground for the decisive korte oorlog phase.

Advisory role on garrison reorganisation (1897)

H. T. Damsté’s Drie Atjeh-Mannen records that Stemfoort, together with Van Vliet, advised on the disposition of Dutch forces in Atjeh during 1897. Stemfoort’s proposed reorganisation of the Atjeh garrison — submitted to Van der Wijck for consideration alongside Van Vliet’s counter-proposal — came down to four points: abolishing the posts at Pakan Kroeng Tjoet, Boekit Karang, Roempit, Sirón, Lamreng, Blang, Lamsih, and Olehleh-Oost and moving Kota Pohama to Kroeëng Raja; keeping a half battalion at Loknga and a battalion at Tjot Mantjang; stationing two battalions at Indrapoeri to secure order there and in the 7 Moekims Baid, plus a battalion at Selimoen to destroy the war party in the upper XXII Moekims; and conducting an expedition to the 7 Moekims Pedir and Peukan BaroePeukan Sot. Van Vliet preferred instead to keep a half battalion at Samahani and one and a half battalions at Indrapoeri until the tramway to Indrapoeri was constructed. Both Van Vliet and Stemfoort agreed that the Lhong expedition was unavoidable to check the growing influence of Teukoe Oemar, though Van der Wijck would have preferred to postpone it.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

Van Heutsz, “Atjeh’s maarschalk Voorwaarts”, stood for the time being under Stemfoort and moreover opposed to him, Stemfoort being “not inclined to seize and pursue T. Oemar immediately and unceasingly.”

See Also

Source

Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 1, 11 (Nederland en Atjeh — Personen en Stelsels; Een Terugblik — Wat Reeds Verkregen Werd).

ATJEH ‘96. 1e Deel, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 14, 37–38, 57–60, 73, 77, 83, 93, 99, 119, 136–137, 178, 203, 222, 232, 234, 241, 245, 258, 266, 292, 295, 299, 301–302, 307, 308, 318, 322–323, 327, 333.

ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 1–145 (Hoofdstuk III + opening of Hoofdstuk IV), 162–172 (Bijlagen I–III), 222 (Dagorders).

H. T. Damsté, “Drie Atjeh-Mannen: Snouck Hurgronje — Van Heutsz — Van Daalen,” Kolonial Tijdschrift, No. 4, 26e Jaargang (1937), overdruck, pp. 358–359.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter III.