Deykerhoff (also spelled Deijkerhoff) served as Gouverneur of Atjeh from January 1892 until the strategic reversal of 1896. His administration is defined by the alliance-policy centred on T. Oema—a policy that relied on arming Atjeh proxies to suppress resistance, and which ended catastrophically with Oema’s defection.
The alliance policy and T. Oema
Upon his appointment in January 1892, Deykerhoff rejected the conclusions of Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje’s 1892 report, Verslag omtrent den religieus-politieken toestand in Atjeh, in favour of his own approach. The government—fearing the costs of direct military aggression and mindful of recent failed expeditions to Flores—preferred Deykerhoff’s alliance strategy to direct military action with Dutch troops.
Under this policy, Deykerhoff placed unlimited trust in T. Oema (also known as Toekoe Oemar), who was granted official clemency, permitted to maintain a legion of 250 men at Dutch expense, and later received 1,000 rifles, much ammunition, and substantial sums of money. This arming and subsidising was undertaken against the explicit warnings of Snouck Hurgronje.
The rejection of Snouck Hurgronje
Deykerhoff’s confidence in Oema extended to active obstruction of Snouck Hurgronje’s work. When Snouck Hurgronje—after completing his Mecca journey—requested permission from Minister Keuchenius to investigate Atjeh affairs in the interior (either under an Arabic name or as an unofficial European), he received a favourable response. However, upon arriving in Penang (Pinang), he received notice from the Indische Regeering that the Gouverneur of Atjeh—Van Teyn—had raised objections to the arrival of a new adviser, arguing that this could damage the expected submission of the so-called Keumala party.
Although it was actually Deykerhoff who had replaced an assistant resident with the more prominent Ass. Resident Ruys-Senaers—who apparently saw no competitor in Snouck Hurgronje—the effect was the same: Snouck Hurgronje’s recommendations were ignored, and his services were not utilised during Deykerhoff’s administration.
The 1896 catastrophe
The history of events that followed from Deykerhoff’s programme demonstrates clearly that too much honour and too great trust had been given to the lunglima-peran (the chief of Leupung?). In 1896, T. Oema threw off his co-operative mask and turned his modern Dutch weapons against the government. The immediate result was that Dutch soldiers found themselves fighting Atjeh opponents armed with rifles supplied by the Dutch themselves.
Only after this catastrophe did it become clear that Snouck Hurgronje’s ideas could not be dismissed without consequence. The Indisch Besluit of 14 September 1896 No. 2—issued after Deykerhoff’s policy had collapsed—adopted many of Snouck Hurgronje’s recommendations. The strategic reversal that followed—culminating in the appointment of Van Heutsz in March 1898—was a direct repudiation of Deykerhoff’s alliance-based approach.
Assessment
In the analysis of Dr. J. M. Somer, Deykerhoff’s administration exemplifies the dangers of political interference in military affairs. By arming an unreliable ally and ignoring ethnographic intelligence, the government achieved only temporary and deceptive calm—followed by a more serious crisis. The episode confirmed Snouck Hurgronje’s central argument: that no treaty with a sultan or alliance with a powerful chief could pacify Atjeh, and that only sustained direct action based on accurate knowledge of the country and its people could succeed.
See Also
Source
Somer, Dr. J. M. Het Atjeh-probleem van 1890-1900 (Overprint uit Journal / Organ van de Netherlands-Indies Officers Association, [1935], pp. 4-7); Het einde van den Atjeh Oorlog (Overprintken uit de Evening Post van 25, 26 en 27 Augustus 1903, pp. 10-12); Damste, H. T. “Atjeh-historie,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1916.