Teungku Um — also Teungku Umar — was the Atjehnese war-leader who, after several years of co-operation with the Dutch — during which he was officially granted clemency, permitted to maintain a legion of 250 men at Dutch expense, and given a further 1,000 rifles, much ammunition and money — threw off the mask in 1896 and turned his modern-Dutch arms against his former patrons. The 1896 defection is the type-specimen, in the source’s narrative, of the Dutch misreading of Atjehnese warlord politics.
The Deykerhoff-Pijnacker Hordijk trust
The source records that the governor of Atjeh, Deykerhoff, and the governor-general Pijnacker Hordijk “meenden de raadgevingen van Snouck Hurgronje niet te moeten volgen. Tegen diens waarschuwing in schonken zij hun vertrouwen aan Teungku Um, die officieel begenadigd werd, een legioen van 250 man op onze kosten mocht onderhouden en later nog 1000 geweren kreeg, veel ammunitie en geld” (believed they should not follow Snouck Hurgronje’s advice. Against his warning they placed their trust in Teungku Um, who was officially granted clemency, permitted to maintain a legion of 250 men at our expense, and later received a further 1,000 rifles, much ammunition and money). The Snouck Hurgronje warning that Deykerhoff and Pijnacker Hordijk overrode is the 1892 advice to ignore the sultan’s party and to strike the enemy sensibly rather than to negotiate with him.
The 1896 defection
The source records: “Korte tijd daarna (1896) wierp Teungku Um het masker af en hadden onze soldaten te vechten tegen met modern geweren bewapende Atjehers” (A short time later (1896) Teungku Um threw off the mask, and our soldiers had to fight against Atjehnese armed with modern rifles). The 1896 defection is, in the source’s narrative, the consequence of the Deykerhoff-Pijnacker Hordijk decision to arm and subsidise a warlord against the explicit advice of Snouck Hurgronje.
The 1880 antecedent
Teungku Um had first appeared in the source’s narrative in the 1880 context as one of several bandit-chiefs whose attacks resumed after the false dawn of that year: “Het duurde niet lang, of de aanvallen van bendehoofden, o.a. van de later bekend geworden Teungku Um begonnen weer” (It did not take long before the attacks of bandit-chiefs, among others the later-famous Teungku Um, began again). The 1880 antecedent — a decade and a half before the 1896 defection — establishes that Teungku Um was a known quantity to the Dutch when Deykerhoff and Pijnacker Hordijk chose to arm and subsidise him.
The Van der Wijck reversal
The governor-general Van der Wijck (1893-99) “begreep, dat Snouck Hurgronje’s adviezen gevolgd moesten worden” (understood that Snouck Hurgronje’s advice had to be followed). The overste Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz “had dit begrepen” (had understood this) too. In 1896 — the year of the Teungku Um defection — Van Heutsz was charged with the direction of military operations in Groot-Atjeh. The Teungku Um defection and the Van Heutsz appointment together mark the 1896 turning-point of the war.
Significance
Teungku Um’s 1896 defection is, in the source’s narrative, the consequence of the Dutch decision to arm and subsidise an Atjehnese warlord against the explicit advice of Snouck Hurgronje. The defection — together with the contemporaneous Van Heutsz appointment — marks the 1896 turning-point of the Atjehoorlog.
See Also
- Atjehoorlog
- Deykerhoff
- Pijnacker Hordijk
- Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Van der Wijck (governor-general)
- J. B. van Heutsz
- Groot-Atjeh
- 1880
- 1892
- 1896
Source
Nederlanders over de Zeeën: 350 Jaar geschiedenis van Nederland buitengaats, onder redactie van Dr. H. J. de Graaf, met medewerking van Prof. G. Gonggrijp, W. R. Menkman en Prof. Jhr Dr P. J. van Winter, 2e geheel herziene druk (Utrecht: W. de Haan N.V., MCMLV), pp. 217-218.