General van der Heijden

General van der Heijden was a Dutch military officer who served as Governor of Acheh from 1877 to 1881, and whose vigorous offensive campaigns through the Achehnese highlands first broke the spell of Dutch invincibility that had settled over the country after the disasters of 1873–1876. He is one of the principal colonial figures of Snouck Hurgronje’s Introduction to The Achehnese, where his governorship is treated as the decisive turn that ended the early defensive phase of the Achehnese War and prepared the way for the systematic subjugation carried through under Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz.

Snouck introduces van der Heijden as the man who finally taught the Dutch by experience “that while a defensive policy in no way advanced Dutch dominion, a vigorous offensive would make the enemy come to his senses. All Great-Acheh was conquered in this way”. The earlier policy had been to occupy a few strong points — the former Sultan’s residence and certain harbours in the dependencies — in the hope that the submission of certain principal chiefs would bring the rest of the country under Dutch authority. Van der Heijden’s governorship revealed the fallacy of this reasoning: so long as the war-party could draw supplies and recruits from the un-subdued interior, the holding of fixed posts was a work of the Danaides.

The most famous fruits of the new policy were the excursions through the highlands — long marches of armed columns through the mountainous interior of Great Acheh, which demonstrated to the Achehnese that no district was any longer beyond the reach of Dutch arms. Snouck records that “the marches of the Dutch troops through the highlands established the conviction that further resistance was impossible. The ‘sons of the upper reaches of the river’ bragged no more but took to flight; the most determined opponents of the invaders retired to distant hiding-places”. Even the redoubtable Habib Abdurrahman — the Hadrami sayyid who had assumed the leadership of the resistance — “was only too glad to bargain for a handsome yearly allowance in consideration of his submission”. The “feeling towards” the peacefully inclined Achehnese, which had been poisoned by their attitude during the first and second Dutch expeditions, “began to amend” after the excursions of van der Heijden.

Yet the very success of the new policy bred a fresh error. In 1881 the colonial government, “thinking that now that the war seemed virtually at an end they could fall back upon a more defensive attitude and introduce a purely civil government”, discontinued the offensive. The years 1881–1884 were needed to demonstrate that the establishment of widely extended military posts in Great Acheh and the introduction of a settled administration could never lead to the breaking down of the opposition in the dependencies; and in 1884 the disastrous concentration-scheme was inaugurated instead. Snouck also notes that the Achehnese “constantly express their conviction that they were wrong in ever vacillating for a moment (as they did in the time of General van der Heijden), that Allah is manifestly on their side, and that the Dutch, infidels worn out by defeat after defeat and beset by sickness and other such troubles, must give in at last”. This vacillation — the alternation of vigorous offensive with quiescent defence — was the chief cause of the protraction of the war, and van der Heijden’s governorship marked the first clear demonstration of what the consistent application of the offensive could achieve.

Account from Boon, Van Lansberge (1943) — K. van der Heijden

K. van der Heijden was a Dutch military officer who served as Governor and Military Commander of Aceh from January 1878 to March 1881, playing a pivotal role in the later stages of the Aceh War. Born in 1826, he rose to prominence through his successful campaigns in Aceh, particularly the victory at Samalangan, which earned him prestige with both Dutch forces and Acehnese chiefs.

Early Career

Van der Heijden entered military service in the Dutch East Indies in 1841. He rose through the ranks and was promoted to Colonel in 1876. His decisive action in the 1877 campaign against Samalangan, where he was wounded in the left eye, and his subsequent operations in the XXII Mukims, earned him a reputation as a capable and energetic commander.

Appointment as Governor of Aceh (1878)

Van Lansberge appointed Van der Heijden as Governor and Military Commander of Aceh in January 1878, a role that made him “even more independent of the army command” and “established the state of peace.” Van der Heijden was given a governor’s salary while retaining his military status, though this later created complications.

Military Campaigns

The XXII and XXVI Mukims Campaigns (1878–1879)

Van der Heijden conducted aggressive operations in the interior:

Capture of Indrapoeri (24 March 1879): His forces captured the mosque at Indrapoeri.
Capture of Glé Jeuëng (9 June 1879): This operation proved costly but ultimately successful.
Arrest of T. Moeda Baet (9 May 1879): The recalcitrant chief was arrested and exiled to Banda.

The Habib Affair (1878–1879)

Van der Heijden was instrumental in negotiating the “buying off” of Habib Abdul Rahman, the influential religious leader who had been a major source of resistance. Van der Heijden proposed a yearly allowance of 12,000 dollars for Habib’s departure from Aceh — a method Van Lansberge supported but Van Bosse found distasteful.

Samalangan (1880)

Van der Heijden led an expedition to Samalangan that proved controversial. The operation was criticized by Van Goltstein for its lack of decisive results, though Van der Heijden defended it as necessary for Dutch prestige.

Relationship with Van Lansberge

The relationship between Van der Heijden and Van Lansberge was complex. Van Lansberge initially praised Van der Heijden’s energy and initiative; growing tensions arose as Van Lansberge became frustrated with Van der Heijden’s tendency to ignore capable subordinates. By 1879 Van Lansberge wrote: “With regard to this, I have complete distrust, which is not diminished by the fact that he systematically turns the influence of capable advisers.” Van Lansberge wanted to replace Van der Heijden with a civil governor; Van der Heijden resisted.

Replacement

Van der Heijden was replaced in March 1881 by A. Pruys van der Hoeven, the first civil Governor of Aceh. Van der Heijden was informed of his replacement only after the decision was made; he was promoted to Lieutenant-General as a consolation. The King was displeased with the manner of the replacement.

Account from De Atjeh-Oorlog by J.A. Kruijt (1896)

Kruijt’s De Atjeh-Oorlog contains the most sustained and laudatory assessment of Van der Heijden in all the contemporary literature — and the most severe indictment of the decision to remove him.

Van der Heijden inherited the policy of verzoening in Groot-Atjeh (conciliation in Groot-Atjeh) and krachtig optreden tegen de nog vijandige kuststaten (vigorous action against the still-hostile coastal statelets). In January 1878 he was definitively appointed Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. In June 1878 Habib Abdul Rachman openly invaded the stelling with a great force, took the mountain passes, and besieged Kroeng Raba; Van der Heijden had to return in haste with his troops from the coast. Reinforcements arrived; by mid-August 1878 there were again over 10,000 troops in Atjeh. After Habib was driven out, the campaign in the 22 and 26 Moekims was undertaken.

The conquest of the 22 Moekims began in March 1879 and was completed by half June 1879. The conquest of the 26 Moekims began on 1 July 1879 and was completed with full success in four days. Then there was still an expedition to Selimoen, far in the interior. Remote chiefs submitted. All of Groot-Atjeh was Dutch. “De schrik was er in” (the terror was in them). The return march from Selimoen was a true triumph.

Towards the end of 1878 Van der Heijden ordered all trading vessels to call first at Oleh-leh before departing for the coasts, to be strictly searched and provided with passes — the beginning of the scheepvaartregeling. The Netherlands Indies government refused to accept this and ordered it withdrawn in February 1879; Van der Heijden reintroduced it in July 1879 on his own responsibility. It was abolished in 1881 — greatly to be regretted, Kruijt writes, for it contained the principle of the scheepvaartregeling that ought to have been applied from the start.

The Gouverneur-Generaal Van Lansberge now judged the war ended and the time come for civil government. Against Van der Heijden’s opinion, in April 1881 Pruijs van der Hoeven was appointed civil Governor. Kruijt’s judgement is the most severe in the entire brochure: Van der Heijden’s governorship was “de éénige glans-periode in den ongelukkigen Atjeh-oorlog” (the only period of glory in the unhappy Atjeh-oorlog). His displacement was “de grootste fout, die wij hebben begaan” (the greatest mistake we have made) — “een ramp, waarvan wij de gevolgen nog thans te dragen hebben” (a disaster whose consequences we are still bearing today). “Zij sloopte in korten tijd het door van der Heijden opgetrokken gebouw en deed alle behaalde voordeelen weer verloren gaan” (it demolished in a short time the building Van der Heijden had raised and caused all the advantages gained to be lost again).

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In the 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Van Heutsz places Van der Heijden as the hero of his narrative — the conqueror of the Sagi XXII and Sagi XXVI of Groot-Atjeh in the campaigns of 1878–1879, the issuer of the dagorder of 5 September 1879 declaring that “geheel Groot-Atjeh ten onder gebragt” (all of Groot-Atjeh has been subdued), the General who twice closed the havens of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden on his own personal responsibility (in 1878 and again on 5 July 1879), and the author of the masterly Nota of 19 April 1880 on the proper form of government for Atjeh. He is the principal “what if” of Van Heutsz’s narrative of the war’s first twenty years — “ware hij niet in het begin van 1881 op onverantwoordelijke wijze ontslagen, dan behoorde de Atjeh-krijg thans reeds lang tot het verledene” — had he not been dismissed, in irresponsible fashion, in the beginning of 1881, the Atjeh-war would by now long belong to the past.

Succession of Diemont (June 1877)

Van der Heijden succeeded Generaal Diemont as Governor of Atjeh in June 1877. Diemont had himself taken over from Wiggers van Kerchem in November 1876 and had completed the Pel plan’s coastal line in February 1877, but was evacuated sick on 30 June 1877 — “de Generaal Diemont, die 30 Juni 1877 wegens ziekte geevacueerd werd” — leaving the governorship to be filled, “eerst tijdelijk en later definitief in het bestuur vervangen door kolonel K. v. d. Heijden” (first temporarily and later definitively replaced in the administration by colonel K. v. d. Heijden). Van der Heijden inherited a situation in which G.-G. Van Lansberge’s verzoeningspolitiek of March 1877 had given the Acehnese a year to re-arm, and in which the onderhandelingen of Panglima Polem and Toekoe Moeda Baid had proven insincere. His response, once the inval of Habib Abdoel Rachman in June 1878 had exposed the failure of the conciliation policy, was to abandon the coastal expeditions and attack the Sagi federations directly.

The June 1878 strategic reversal

The decisive moment of Van der Heijden’s governorship came in June 1878, when the inval of Habib Abdoel Rachman into the Dutch-occupied territory triggered a complete change of system in Groot-Atjeh. Van Heutsz dates it precisely: “de bekende inval in het door ons bezette gebied van Habib Abdoel Rachman voorviel, welke inval de aanleiding was tot het op Groot-Atjeh geheel veranderen van stelsel” — the well-known raid, by Habib Abdoel Rachman, into the territory occupied by us, which raid gave occasion to a complete change of system in Groot-Atjeh. The intellectual author of the reversal was Van der Heijden’s Chief of Staff, Major A. R. W. Geij van Pittius — “Het waren vooral de vertoogen van den pas opgetreden chef van den staf, den majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, die den bevelhebber tot dit besluit brachten” — the representations of the newly-appointed chief of staff, Major A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, that brought the commander to this decision — who had argued since 1877 for the Zuidoosterlinie along the Atjeh river to be shifted into the XXII Moekims. Geij van Pittius “overtuigde den chef van den staf hem, dat men door expedities naar de kuststaten het doel — het einde van den oorlog — niet kon bereiken, en dat alleen eene beslissing kon worden verkregen door in Groot-Atjeh zelf den vijand aan te tasten” — convinced the chief of staff that the goal — the end of the war — could not be attained by expeditions to the coastal states, and that a decision could only be obtained by attacking the enemy in Groot-Atjeh itself.

Van der Heijden accepted the argument and abandoned the planned Pasangan expedition: “toen besloot de Generaal van der Heijden voorloopig van de expeditie naar Pasangan af te zien en met geheel zijne beschikbare macht voor goed te Groot-Atjeh aan het verzet een einde te maken” — then Generaal van der Heijden decided to refrain for the time being from the expedition to Pasangan, and to make an end, with all his available force, to the resistance in Groot-Atjeh for good. The full strength of the Atjeh garrison was concentrated against the Sagi federations, beginning with the XXII Moekims in July 1878.

The XXII and XXVI Moekims campaigns

The campaign against the XXII Moekims opened in July 1878 — “de krijgsoperatiën in de XXII en XXVI Moekims, die in Juli van het vorige jaar zijn aangevangen” (the military operations in the XXII and XXVI Moekims, which began in July of the previous year) — and within three months had produced the submission of Habib Abdoel Rachman and Toekoe Moeda Baid: “binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht in de XXII Moekims, de onderwerping van Habib Abdoel Rachman en van Tekoe Moeda Baid op den 13en October 1878 volgde” — within three months of the beginning of the first campaign in the XXII Moekims, the submission of Habib Abdoel Rachman and of Toekoe Moeda Baid followed on 13 October 1878. The campaign against the XXVI Moekims followed in 1879, culminating in the tocht naar Selimoen of September 1879. Van Heutsz’s verdict is sweeping: “In September 1879, nog geen 14 maanden na het begin van zijne zegerijke veldtochten, had Generaal v. d. Heijden aan alle verzet een einde gemaakt, was hij de door den vijand gevreesde overwinnaar van het aloude manfeliklijke Atjehsche rijk” — in September 1879, barely fourteen months after the start of his victorious campaigns, General Van der Heijden had made an end to all resistance and had become the conqueror, feared by the enemy, of the ancient manly Atjehnese kingdom.

The day-order of 5 September 1879

Van der Heijden marked the completion of the conquest with a dagorder issued from Kota-Radja on 5 September 1879, the text of which Van Heutsz reproduces in full in the 1893 tract. The dagorder opens: “Dagorder. Officieren, Ambtenaren, Onderofficieren en Soldaten! Met den veldtocht tegen de XXVI Moekims, schitterend besloten door den tocht naar Selimoen; is geheel Groot-Atjeh ten onder gebragt.” — Day-order. Officers, Officials, Non-commissioned officers and Soldiers! With the campaign against the XXVI Moekims, brilliantly concluded by the march to Selimoen, all of Groot-Atjeh has been subdued. It closes with the formula “LEVE DE KONING!” (LONG LIVE THE KING!) and the signature: “KOTA-RADJA, 5 September 1879. De generaal-majoor, adjudant des Konings in buitengewonen dienst, Gouverneur tevens militair bevelhebber van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. K. VAN DER HEUDEN” (Major-general, adjutant of the King in extraordinary service, Governor at the same time military commander of Atjeh and Dependencies. K. VAN DER HEUDEN). (The “HEUDEN” spelling is the OCR’s reading of the printed “HEUDEN” / “HEIJDEN” signature block.) The dagorder was independently confirmed by the visiting Commandant van het Indische leger, who in the same month of September 1879 visited Atjeh and “bevestigde in zijn aan de Regeering ingediend verslag geheel, dat de Generaal in zijne zoo even aangehaalde dagorder met recht zeggen mocht, dat geheel Groot-Atjeh ten onder was gebracht” (confirmed entirely, in his report submitted to the Government, that the General in his just-quoted day-order was right to say that all of Groot-Atjeh had been subdued).

The two haven-sluitingen (1878 and 1879)

Alongside the military campaign, Van der Heijden twice closed the havens of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden — the first sustained Dutch attempt to translate territorial conquest into economic coercion. The first closure came in 1878: “Reeds in 1878, na hervatting van de krijgsoperatiën in de XXII Moekims, liet hij daarom alle havens van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, met uitzondering van Olehleh en Edi, voor den invoerhandel sluiten” — Already in 1878, upon the resumption of the military operations in the XXII Moekims, he therefore had all havens of Atjeh and Dependencies, with the exception of Olehleh and Edi, closed for the import trade. The closure was revoked by G.-G. Van Lansberge by letter of 7 February 1879 — “gelastte daarom bij brief van 7 Februari 1879 dien maatregel onverwijld in te trekken” (therefore ordered, by letter of 7 February 1879, that measure to be withdrawn without delay) — but Van der Heijden, “toen de Generaal opnieuw de vaste overtuiging kreeg dat, wilde men thans den oorlog beëindigd zien, de havens opnieuw moesten gesloten worden” (when the General once more gained the firm conviction that, if the war was now to be seen ended, the havens must again be closed), closed them a second time, “hij sloot ze ten tweedemale en gaf bij telegram d.d. 5 Juli 1879 aan den Gouv. Generaal te kennen … ditmaal op zijne persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid” — he closed them a second time and informed the G.-G. by telegram of 5 July 1879 … this time on his personal responsibility. The second closure, on his own responsibility, was reluctantly tolerated by the G.-G.

The two closures were the operational proof of Van der Heijden’s strategic premise: that the submission of the Sagi federations could only be converted into the submission of the entire Atjehnese resistance if the coast — the channel through which the interior drew its supplies — were closed. The first closure had coincided with the XXII Moekims campaign; the second closure coincided with the XXVI Moekims campaign; the submission of the interior followed both. The episode became, in Van Heutsz’s later tract, the model for the marine-enforced closure Van Heutsz would prescribe in 1893 and implement as Governor after 1898.

The Nota of 19 April 1880

Van der Heijden’s constitutional legacy is the Nota he submitted to the Regeering from Kota-Radja on 19 April 1880 — the memorandum in which he set out the proper form of government for Atjeh after the conquest. Van Heutsz treats the Nota as the canonical Dutch text on Atjeh governance: “zijne, daarover aan de Regeering ingediende zeer belangrijke Nota, gedagteekend: Kota-Radja, 19 April 1880” (his, on that subject, very important Nota submitted to the Government, dated: Kota-Radja, 19 April 1880). The Nota proposed that the controle op handel en scheepvaart (control of trade and shipping) — the scheme Scherer had first conceived and that Van der Heijden had himself twice enforced by the haven-sluitingen — be put on a proper scheepvaartregeling (shipping regulation) footing, with Dutch-administered ports levying duties on all Atjehnese trade. The proposal was, in effect, the first systematic Dutch plan for a scheepvaartregeling, and it became the textual foundation of every later Dutch proposal for the same instrument, including Laging Tobias’s May 1883 scheme and the prescriptions of Van Heutsz’s own 1893 tract. Van der Heijden had himself, as Regeerings-commissaris (Government Commissioner), proposed the controle op handel en scheepvaart to the Regeering — “deze zelf met den Generaal van der Heijden, als Regeerings-commissaris, aan de Regeering eene contrôle op handel en scheepvaart had voorgesteld” — before his Nota of 19 April 1880 reduced the proposal to writing.

The “onverantwoordelijke” dismissal of early 1881

Van der Heijden’s governorship was cut short by his dismissal in early 1881. Van Heutsz’s verdict is one of the most quoted lines in the 1893 tract: “ware hij niet in het begin van 1881 op onverantwoordelijke wijze ontslagen, dan behoorde de Atjeh-krijg thans reeds lang tot het verledene” — had he not been dismissed, in irresponsible fashion, in the beginning of 1881, the Atjeh-war would by now long belong to the past. The dismissal was the act of G.-G. Van Lansberge, against whose policies Van der Heijden had repeatedly closed the havens on his own responsibility; the immediate consequence was the appointment of a Civiel Gouverneur (Civil Governor) — “na het ontslag van den Generaal van der Heijden, en diens vervanging door een Civiel gouverneur” — and the abandonment of Van der Heijden’s scheepvaartregeling programme.

Van Heutsz’s counter-factual is sustained. “De Generaal moest heengaan” (the General had to go), Van Heutsz writes, “en hoe zijn opvolger deed wat hij later niet schreef en weinig deed van hetgeen hij later wel schreef en daardoor het schoone door den Generaal van der Heijden opgetrokken gebouw in korten tijd sloopte” — and how his successor did what he later did not write, and did little of what he later did write, and thereby in short time demolished the fine edifice General Van der Heijden had erected. The conclusion is the tribute of the entire book: “De Generaal van der Heijden had daardoor in werkelijkheid wat niemand vóór hem en tot dusverre nog niemand na hem heeft gehad, te Groot-Atjeh den brand onder den voet” — General Van der Heijden had thereby, in reality, what no one before him and so far no one after him has had: in Groot-Atjeh, the fire under the foot. Van der Heijden had had the war won. The broader verdict: “Atjehers hadden ons leeren kennen in onze kracht, vooral tijdens het bestuur van Generaal van der Heijden” — the Atjehnese had come to know us in our strength, above all during the administration of General Van der Heijden — and the loss of that prestige, after his dismissal, was the loss the next twelve years of Dutch policy could not recover. (Van der Heijden would return to the governorship briefly in 1886–1887.)

Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)

General van der Heijden was the Dutch general whose offensive operations in Groot-Atjeh between 1879 and the early 1880s carried Dutch columns into the XXVI Moekims and up the Atjeh valley as far as Anagaloeng, and whose memory dominated the ground on which the temporary posts of the Oemar alliance were afterwards built, as recorded by G. B. Hooijer in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh.

Operations in the XXVI Moekims

Hooijer described the great encampment the Dutch columns under Van der Heijden had raised at Toengkoeb when they penetrated the XXVI Moekims: two battalions of infantry, a detachment of cavalry, three sections of artillery, sappers, survey personnel and a train of a thousand convict labourers and coolies were united there. By contrast the post of the 1890s held only two officers and fifty men, with not a single gun defending its ramparts and no medical officer present.

An old Ambonese soldier at Toengkoeb was remembered by Hooijer telling the garrison of those earlier days, when Dutch soldiers had done the fighting instead of the Achehnese, and when Generaal Van der Heijden hier in datzelfde Toengkoeb was verschenen met een wolk op zijn voorhoofd — General Van der Heijden had appeared at that same Toengkoeb with a cloud on his forehead, because its capture had not gone as swiftly as he had a right to expect.

The mosque action and the general’s anger

The narrative preserved by the old soldier described the main column being led by an Achehnese guide through narrow kampong (village) paths until it stood directly opposite a strongly held house of prayer, from which a heavy fire was immediately opened that cost the guide and two soldiers their lives and wounded an officer and sixteen men. The artillery pushed out and threw a granaatkartets through the roof and ceiling of the Messigit before the column commander could account for what was happening and order the fight broken off. A second guide, with a pistol held to the back of his head, was made to point out the prescribed direction. Cutting its way through hundreds of paggers (bamboo fences) and capturing a couple of bentengs in passing, the column had covered only half its road by four in the afternoon, and then, for the sake of a quiet night for the tired soldiers, withdrew northwards to the Dutch encampment at Tjadé instead of pressing on or at least remaining where it was. En dat was de reden van des Generaals toorn geweest — that had been the reason for the general’s wrath — for as much as he cared for his men, he demanded much of them.

The Atjeh valley and Anagaloeng

At the crossing of the Atjeh-rivier near Anagaloeng, Hooijer recorded the two bivouacs that Van der Heijden had caused to be pitched on both banks when he was preparing to continue his campaign of conquest through the valley. Scores of officers were quartered in huts; in a great shed they gathered for a game when duty did not call them; and de tegenwoordigheid van den Generaal, die maanden lang huisde in een laag hutje met katjangmatten (bean-straw matting) gedekt en met kiezelsteenen tot vloerkleed, gaf wijding aan het geheel — the presence of the General, who for months lived in a low hut covered with bean-straw matting and with pebbles for a floor-covering, gave consecration to the whole. Long barracks housed several battalions; hundreds of coolies and convicts slept under lean-tos; guns stood in the corners of the palisades; and above all flew the Dutch flag.

At one point the waters of the river rose so high that the encampments were buried two metres deep and the soldiers had to take refuge on the high kampong ground of Anagaloeng. A float-bridge connected the two camps, across which soldiers, Chinese and native women passed continually, while large Chinese barges carried the sick down to the Kraton.

Banishments

Hooijer recorded two chiefs banished by Van der Heijden for faithlessness whose subsequent recall he treated as questionable: Toekoe Moeda Baid, head of the VII Moekims, brought back and restored to honour by General Demmeni for the sake of his influence — of whom Hooijer remarked that suspicions later arose that Van der Heijden had not judged him so wrongly; and, by implication, the wider pattern of rehabilitations under later governors.

Other traces

The single tiger Hooijer reported seeing in the Atjeh valley was an old royal tiger lying in a cage, offered to General van der Heijden as a token of appreciation. The post at Kroeng Kali which Van der Heijden had caused to be erected remained a thorn in the enemy’s eye and so great a point of attraction for the ill-disposed that a later governor resolved to slight its walls and withdraw the garrison from that advanced position — a decision whose consequences were felt again in 1893.

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

Karel van der Heijden was the Dutch officer who from 30 June 1878 to 1881 commanded Atjeh — first as military and civil commandant, then, with the new style created for him, as “Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies, likewise military commandant” — and whose declaration of 1879 that the time of pacification and restoration had arrived prepared the introduction of civil government in 1881. The great mosque (Missigit) of Koeta Radja, of which he laid the first stone in October 1879, was built on his initiative.

Appointment in 1878

On 30 June 1878 Colonel Karel van der Heijden — later so well known in the history of Atjeh as General — took up the post of military and civil commandant of Atjeh in place of Major-General Diemont, who left for Java on account of illness. During his first expedition, which went to Samalanga, Colonel Van der Heijden was wounded. His assumption of office coincided with an innovation: because in the subjected territories the purely military management had more and more to make way for the ordinary civil administration, the post of “military and civil commandant” was replaced by that of “Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, tevens militair bevelhebber”, to which Van der Heijden was accordingly appointed.

Government and economic development

Under his government the immigration of Europeans and Chinese continued: in 1877 no fewer than 4,886 Chinese had come to Atjeh from Singapore and Penang, largely for their own account, and to promote their permanent settlement the government opened agriculture to them in the neighbourhood of Koeta Radja and Peunajoeng, making available in October 1877 an area of 25 bouws by way of trial, while Chinese kongsies willing to take up the reclamation were supported with the necessary working capital by advances. The farming out of the opium-sale and gambling houses yielded in 1878 in Groot-Atjeh f 549,000 — f 358,680 more than in 1877 — and in the same year the native population of the subdued territories began to pay indirect taxes: hacil (export duty, inherited from the sultan’s government) on pepper and rice, and half a dollar per exported picol of coffee. Financial support went to nascent native cultures, as the advance of f 2,500 to the people of Lehong in 1877 for the enlargement of their pepper and coffee gardens, while for some East Coast landscapes the hacil on pepper was lowered from f 50 to f 35 per picol. At the end of 1878 the civil personnel of the new government consisted of 1 provincial secretary, 4 assistant-residents (at Koeta Radja, Sigli, Idi and Meulaboh, charged respectively with the capital and the north, east and west coasts) and 8 controllers (at Koeta Radja, Oelèë Lheue, Kroeëng Raba, Samalanga, Idi and Meulaboh) — a “bestuurs-civilisatie” which favourably influenced the forming of new trade relations.

The turn to pacification, 1879

After the successful military operations of the two preceding years, Van der Heijden expressed himself in 1879 to the effect that the war had ended and that “from that moment the time of pacification and restoration had arrived”, in which the civil administration would have to strive toward subjection with other means than the sword and try to repair what the ravages of war had destroyed. In October 1879 he laid the first stone of the new Missigit (mosque) of Koeta Radja, built at his initiative; the building was opened with great ceremony on 27 December 1882, and at the beginning of that year several clergy were attached to it at government cost.

Honourable dismissal, 1881

Using the authorization granted the year before, the Governor-General determined by resolution of 11 March 1881 that a chief official with the title of Governor should henceforth head the province; Lieutenant-General K. van der Heijden was by the same resolution honourably discharged from his function, and A. Pruijs van der Hoeven was appointed in his place, with Colonel J. F. Haus as military commandant, both taking office on 6 April 1881. Governor-General Van Lansberge closed his letter to Van der Heijden on the introduction of the civil government with the words that thereby the crown was set upon the building “erected by the heroism and devotion of the Indian army under Your Excellency’s vigorous leadership”, offering him the expression of his appreciation and the thanks of the Government. Van der Heijden, handing over, had deemed the political state of the province “without exaggeration favourable”; the sequel, in which his successor’s policy collapsed within three years, was summarized by E. B. Kielstra’s judgement that in Groot-Atjeh what had been won by the sword still had to be kept by the sword — “iets wat diezelfde ambtenaar niet inzag” (“something that the same official did not perceive”) — a remark Langhout quotes in weighing the accusations cast at the first civil governor.

In the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)

the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië opens its historical section with Van der Heijden: “Nadat kort tevoren onder het bestuur van generaal K. van der Heyden de actie zich had uitgestrekt over de vallei van Groot-Atjeh, werd op 19 August 1884 tot de z.g. concentratie besloten en werden onze troepen tot defensieve houding gedwongen” — after the action had shortly before, under the administration of General K. van der Heyden, extended over the valley of Groot-Atjeh, on 19 August 1884 the so-called concentration was decided upon and the Dutch troops were forced into a defensive attitude.

His name recurs in the account of the excursion into the Samalangasche, at which “het uit den tijd van generaal Van der Heyden beruchte Batee Iliek stormenderhand werd genomen” — the Batee Iliek made notorious in the time of General Van der Heyden was taken by storm.

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Given both civil and military authority in the conquered area in 1874. In slightly more than 1.5 years this strong leader effectively subdued Groot-Atjeh, banished unrest, and gave the population confidence. His wiser policy was not continued by the government in the Netherlands, which adopted a defensive posture.

Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 39.

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De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter VI, “Het bestuur van generaal van der Heijden, van Juni 1877 tot April 1881.” pp. 27–33.

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Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.

De Geconcentreerde Stelling in Groot-Atjeh, ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef, 1885, pp. 9–12.

Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 38–43, 47, illustration caption p. 10 (“Meuseugit te Koeta-Radja, gebouwd op initiatief van Gouverneur Karel van der Heyden”).

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.

Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 39.

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