Kroëng Raba

Note on the shared place-name. Two distinct Achehnese localities are referred to as Kroeng Raba (or Kroëng Raba) in the sources: (i) a kampong in the IV Moekims of Groot-Atjeh on the west coast — designated by General Pel in 1875 as the western terminus of the coast-stretch to be occupied, fortified in July 1876, and attacked by Habib Abdurrahman in June 1878 (treated in the upper sections); and (ii) a river and bay on the east coast of Groot-Atjeh immediately south of Koeta Radja — the principal east-coast anchorage of the Dutch naval squadron, and the scene of the 1896 naval and amphibious operations against Teuku Umar and the landschap of Lepong (treated in the lower sections). The two places share a name but lie on opposite coasts of the Achehnese heartland.

The IV Moekims kampong — west-coast account (1875–1878)

Kroëng Raba (also written Krueng Raba) was a kampong in the IV Moekims of Groot-Atjeh, one of the points designated by General Pel in his note of 30 April 30 April 1875 as the western terminus of the coast-stretch to be occupied, and the object of repeated Dutch operations in January 1876 and July 1876. Its fortification by the Dutch in July 1876 — for the better protection of the population of the IV Moekims — was one of the principal engineering works of the early war, and the post was repeatedly attacked by the enemy, especially under Habib Abdurrahman in June 1878.

The Conquest of the IV Moekims, January 1876

On 15 January 15 January 1876 the advance into the IV Moekims began over the pas of Blang Kala. The path was so narrow that four mules with ammunition cases fell into the ravine; the guns had to be taken apart and carried by coolies. By the afternoon of 17 January 17 January [1876] the troops descended into the plain of the IV Moekims; on 18 January 18 January [1876] Kroëng Raba was reached. On 25 January 25 January [1876] the troops returned to Pakan Badak. In ten days, from 28 January 28 January to 7 February 7 February, the IX Moekims was also reduced.

The Fortification, July 1876

Operations in July 1876 in the IV and VI Moekims and the adjoining mountains were undertaken “with the object of driving the enemy from there, destroying his dwellings and provision-shops, and at the same time establishing a post at Kroëng Raba, for the better protection of the population of the IV Moekims.” The establishment of the post at Kroëng Raba was part of the wider Dutch strategy of securing the IV Moekims after the conquest of the VI and IX Moekims.

The Attack of June 1878

By the spring of 1878 the Habib was once more on the offensive. As soon as Van der Heyden had departed for Gedong, news came of the Habib’s intention to make a great attack with 2,000 men in the IV Moekims on the posts at Kroëng Raba, Boekit Seboen and Pakan Badak. On 22 June 22 June 1878 Kroëng Raba was attacked by a great multitude of Atjehers, who shot at the garrison until 24 June 24 June without venturing a storm. On 23 June 23 June the Habib sent an Atjeher with a white flag and a letter inviting the post-commandant “to leave his position and fight with him in the open field,” and on 24 June 24 June a second letter offering free withdrawal on condition that the Dutch fortification was destroyed. At the same time various posts in other lines were heavily attacked. Van der Heyden decided to return at once; on 23 June 23 June he arrived at Oleh-leh, and on 24 June 24 June a column was sent to force the kloof of Beradin, to supply the garrisons of Boekit Seboen and Kroëng Raba with food and to drive the enemy out. After a difficult march through the sawah plain, in which the column suffered considerable losses from the enemy’s fire, and later through the mountains, the object was attained and both posts were relieved, whereupon the enemy withdrew entirely, only to undertake new attacks at other points.

The Episode of the Fort

According to the testimony gathered by Snouck Hurgronje, the Achehnese came in time to regard Habib Abdurrahman as an ambitious traitor, and even suspected him of having acted as a Dutch spy from the very outset of his career in Acheh. Among the “proofs” they cited in support of this view were precisely those actions which, to the European observer, demonstrated his superiority over the Achehnese in civilisation and political insight. The episode at Krueng Raba was one of the most telling of these. Why, his former followers demanded, when they had surrounded the Gompeuni’s fort at Krueng Raba with a much superior force under his leadership, did he promise a free retreat to the commandant and his men if they surrendered, and forbid the Achehnese, if the offer were accepted, to raise a hand against the unbelievers?

Habib Abdurrahman’s Wider Strategy

To the Achehnese, accustomed to regarding any stratagem against an infidel enemy as legitimate, such forbearance was incomprehensible. They could not understand that the Habib’s closer insight led him to attach great weight to the impression his actions would make upon the enemy — a consideration to which the Achehnese had always been utterly indifferent. The same diplomatic shrewdness was visible in his skilful use of the mupakat (the Achehnese deliberative assembly) as an instrument for centralising power under his own control during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of full-scale hostilities with the Dutch.

Historical Significance (IV Moekims kampong)

The incident at Krueng Raba thus belongs to the formative phase of the national war that began with the Dutch attack and continued after the Habib’s eventual withdrawal from active affairs. Together with other episodes — notably the stoning of a couple for illicit intercourse carried out under his authority — it illustrates the gulf between the Habib’s conception of a disciplined, religiously grounded polity and the irregular, kinship-based warfare actually practised by the Achehnese sagis and uleebalangs. Snouck Hurgronje treats the case as typical of the mutual misunderstanding that pervaded relations between the religious party and the adat-chiefs of Acheh throughout the war.

The east-coast Kroeng Raba — account from ATJEH ‘96 (Kruisheer, 1913)

As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, Kroeng Raba — written in Dutch as also Kroeng-Raba, Kroeng-Ralb, Kroëng Raba — was a river and bay on the east coast of Groot-Atjeh immediately to the south of Koeta Radja, behind which T. Oemar’s warriors retreated on 25 May 1896 and at which Umar dug trenches at the beach. The Kroeng-Raba bay was the site of the naval demonstration of 1–4 May 1896 and of the subsequent bombardments of Lepong of 25 May and 4 June–5 June, 8 June–9 June 1896. The great bridge reconnaissance of 13 June 1896 was conducted at Kroeng Raba. A training march (oefeningsmarsch) of Majoor Mossel — 8 companies infantry, cavalry detachment, mountain battery, ambulance and baggage train — had marched from Koeta Radja to Kroeng Raba on 20 February 1896 and encountered no resistance.

Description and Location (ATJEH ‘96 account)

Kroeng Raba lay on the east coast of Groot-Atjeh immediately to the south of Koeta Radja and to the north of the landschap of Lepong. The Kroeng Raba river ran from the inland gebergte (mountain range) eastward to the sea, and the Kroeng-Raba bay was the bay into which it emptied. The beach at the river’s mouth was the site of T. Oemar’s trenches dug after the retreat of 25 May 1896. The Kroeng Raba bridge was the principal crossing of the river, and was the object of the great bridge reconnaissance of 13 June 1896. The Kroeng-Rababaai (Kroeng-Raba bay) was the anchorage of the Dutch warships that conducted the naval demonstration of 1–4 May 1896 and the subsequent bombardments of Lepong. The Tandjoeng-Kroeng Raba area was a reference for cavalry observation. The training march of Majoor Mossel of 20 February 1896 had marched from Koeta Radja to Kroeng Raba and back without resistance.

Historical Background (ATJEH ‘96 account)

Kroeng Raba had been the principal east-coast anchorage of the Dutch naval squadron operating in Atjeh since 1873. The bay was sheltered by the off-lying features and was close to the Dutch bridgehead at Koeta Radja and Oleh-leh. The Kroeng Raba river marked the boundary between the Dutch bridgehead and the landschap of Lepong — the territory of Teuku Umar — and was therefore the natural line of contact between the two. The training march of Majoor Mossel of 20 February 1896 — 8 companies infantry, cavalry detachment, mountain battery, ambulance and baggage train — had marched from Koeta Radja to Kroeng Raba without resistance, indicating that the area was not yet openly hostile. After the defection of 29 March 1896 the Kroeng Raba became the principal line of contact between the Dutch and Umar’s forces.

Role in the 1896 Operations (ATJEH ‘96 account)

Kroeng Raba was the principal scene of Dutch naval operations throughout the first semester of 1896. On 20 February 1896 the training march of Majoor Mossel marched from Koeta Radja to Kroeng Raba without resistance. From 1 May to 4 May 1896 the naval demonstration in the Kroeng-Rababaai was conducted by Dutch warships from the bay, in support of the diversionary operation to Montassik. On 25 May 1896 T. Oemar’s warriors retreated behind the Kroeng Raba river after the collapse of his stellingen in the IV and VI Moekims, and Umar dug trenches at the beach. The marine bombardment of Lepong was conducted from the Kroeng-Rababaai on 25 May 1896 in conjunction with the three-day Dutch offensive. On 4 June–5 June 1896 and 8 June–9 June 1896 the bombardments were repeated. On 13 June 1896 the great bridge reconnaissance was conducted at the Kroeng Raba bridge. On 20 June 1896 a Dutch column under Okhuizen marched to the Kroeng Raba in the course of the four-column show-of-force. On 22 June 1896 a reconnaissance by Laceulle advanced to the Kroeng Raba in coordination with the Ladoeng landing.

Significance (ATJEH ‘96 account)

Kroeng Raba was the principal Dutch naval and amphibious base for the operations against Teuku Umar and the landschap of Lepong throughout the first semester of 1896. The bay’s sheltered anchorage made it the natural station of the Dutch warships conducting the naval demonstration and the bombardments of Lepong, and the river marked the principal line of contact between the Dutch bridgehead and Umar’s territory. The great bridge reconnaissance of 13 June 1896 was one of the largest cavalry reconnaissances of the period.

Evacuation in the Concentration Strategy (February 1885)

The Dutch post at Kroeng-Raba in the IV Moekims was evacuated on 15 February 1885 by sea as part of the concentration strategy. This sea evacuation was chosen because the terrain of the IV Moekims — characterized by the kloof van Beradin (Beradin ravine) — made overland withdrawal impractical for the most distant posts. Casualties during the evacuation: 2 wounded (lower soldiers). The evacuation marked the end of the Dutch forward presence in the western IV Moekims established during the conquest expeditions of Generaal Pel.

Account from H. F. Meijer (1883) — the founding of the post at the mouth, July 1876

Meijer describes Kroeëng Raba as the small river of the IV Moekims, flowing in a little valley along the foot of the mountains to the bay of the same name: very low and marshy inland, higher near its mouth behind the dunes, where the bed is hard. The river rises in two openings in the rocks of the mountain; near kampong Raba was found, in the reconnaissance of 11 July 1876 by captains F. C. E. Meijer and J. J. Staat, an easy raft crossing — 47 metres wide, 3.7 metres deep at mid flood, with no steep banks; near Loeknga the river bends broad (147 metres) and impassable, with an old one-metre foot-bridge standing then, tested by Captain Staat himself with some soldiers before the first shots of Atjehers warned the party home.

The mouth had been chosen by General Pel as the western point of his projected closing of the XXII Moekims from the sea — the columns of the July operation of 1876 reached it after two weeks of sweeps through the IV and VI Moekims, resting there on 13 July after the encircling march in pursuit of Toekoe Tjihiq Lamngga, and on 14 July the fortification work began under Captain of Engineers Staat at kampong Moesang, whose materials built the post after the hired steamer Marion could land nothing through the surf of the bay. The post lay on the left bank, where its fire commanded in full the new bridge thrown by the Dutch over the river; one company of the left half of the 6th Infantry Battalion moved in as garrison on 26 July. With it the population of the district began to sell fish, fruit and poultry beside the work; and the post was first armed with two 8 cM. mountain guns and then, on 21 July, with two 8 cM. field pieces.

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege names Kroeng Raba the southwestern point from which the Dutch line of 1885 was shortened inward to Lamdjame (with Toengkoep to Lamjong eastwards and Djerir to Lambaroe southwards), at the execution of the concentration; the post was evacuated between 12 and 28 February 1885 (see Completion of the concentrated position (March 1885)).

Sources

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 72-73, 76-77, 99-100.

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 30, 138, 142, 145, 148, 167, 213, 235, 267, 319, 321, 601.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

The Kroeng Raba (Krueng Raba) is the river on the west coast of Groot-Atjeh, whose mouth at the Baai van Kroeng Raba formed the western end of the great afsluitingslinie that generaal Pel planned between the mouth of the Kroeng Raba on the west coast and the mouth of the Kroeng Raya on the north coast, with the aim of isolating Atjeh from the sea. The river and its mouth were conquered by Pel’s colonne in January 1876 in the opening phase of the great winter offensive.

The western end of the afsluitingslinie

Pel’s plan, as he explained it at his Buitenzorg planning session in July 1875 to gouverneur-generaal van Lansberge and the commandant van het leger, called for the eventual extension of the Dutch linie from the mouth of the Kroeng Raba on the west coast to the mouth of the Kroeng Raya on the north coast, isolating Atjeh from the sea and reducing it to a binnenstaat (inland state). The Kroeng Raba was therefore not merely a tactical objective but the western anchor of a strategic conception. The post at the river’s mouth would, with the post at the Kroeng Raya mouth on the north coast, complete the isolation of Groot-Atjeh from foreign supply and seal the fate of the resistance. Borel stresses that Pel’s plan was never communicated officially, not even to his chef van den staf — nothing about it was found in his archive after his death.

The conquest of January 1876

The Kroeng Raba was reached on 15 January 1876 by a colonne marching from Lampagger through the Blang Kalla kloof southward over bergachtig terrein (mountainous terrain) into the IV Moekims, reaching Loenga on the right bank of the Kroeng Raba mouth, which would become the westelijke grens (western limit) of the new afsluitingslinie. The hoofden there submitted. The colonne returned via the noordoostelijke weg, left a post at Boekit Seboen on 24 January 1876, and reached Pakan Badak; it then made a tocht through the eastern part of the IV Moekims. With the Kroeng Raba mouth in Dutch hands, the IV Moekims were opened to Dutch operations, and the way was prepared for the IX Moekims invasion of 28 January 1876 through the Glitaroem pass. The death of Pel at Lamjoeng on 24 February 1876 interrupted the completion of the afsluitingslinie, but the Kroeng Raba anchor held.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Kroeng Raba — the coastal village at the south-west of Groot-Atjeh — is the southern anchor of Generaal Pel’s 1875 coastal-line plan, the western anchor of the Gleh Loedah pass route from the Westkust, and the territorial limit of the Van der Heijden conquest’s confirmation.

Kroeng Raba as the southern anchor of Pel’s 1875 coastal line

The first Dutch policy that named Kroeng Raba as an operational anchor was Generaal Pel’s plan of 30 April 1875, submitted by letter to the Gouverneur-Generaal Van Lansberge and reproduced by Van Heutsz in the 1893 tract. The plan prescribed the occupation of de kuststrook van de vallei van Groot-Atjeh begrepen tusschen Kroeng Raja en Kroeng Raba en van de VI Moekims — the coastal strip of the valley of Groot-Atjeh bounded between Kroeng Raja and Kroeng Raba, together with the VI Moekims. Van Heutsz quotes the plan on page 9 of the 1893 tract:

“Het plan toch dat ook, wat Groot-Atjeh betreft, uitgevoerd is, kwam neer op het bezetten van de kuststrook van de vallei van Groot-Atjeh begrepen tusschen Kroeng Raja en Kroeng Raba en van de VI Moekims. ‘Door het bezetten van die kuststreek’ zeide de Generaal o. a. ‘inzonderheid van de vijf toegangen naar zee de kwala’s Loé, Gighen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel en Pantjoer wordt Atjeh proper geheel van zee afgescheiden en dus uit een handelsoogpunt handelslijk van ons’” (The plan, which was also carried out as far as Groot-Atjeh was concerned, came down to occupying the coastal strip of the valley of Groot-Atjeh bounded between Kroeng Raja and Kroeng Raba, and the VI Moekims. “By occupying that coastal region,” said the Generaal among other things, “in particular the five sea-approaches, the kwala’s Loé, Gighen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel and Pantjoer, Atjeh proper is wholly cut off from the sea and thus commercially placed in our hands.”).

The Kroeng Raba anchor was, in Pel’s plan, the southern limit of the coastal occupation that was to seal Groot-Atjeh from the sea — the same anchor that Borel describes (above) as the western end of the afsluitingslinie. The Kroeng Raja–Kroeng Raba line was, in this prescription, the operational form of Pel’s strategic argument: that the seal of Groot-Atjeh from the sea would reduce the interior to eene verzameling van binnenlandsche negorijen (a collection of inland villages) and so produce the onderwerping (submission) the war was fought to obtain.

The September 1879 reconnaissance

The September 1879 reconnaissance of the conquered Kroeng Raba was the operational complement to the XXVI Moekims campaign that had culminated in the tocht naar Selimoen. The Commandant van het Indische leger visited Atjeh in the same month of September 1879 — the month that produced the dagorder of 5 September 1879 — and confirmed, in his report to the Regeering, that the entire Groot-Atjeh had been brought under Dutch authority. Van Heutsz quotes the Commandant’s report on pages 19–20 of the 1893 tract:

“Een feit toch is het, dat ik geheel Groot-Atjeh, voor zoover het door ons bezet is, heb doorkruist; in de XXII Moekims tot onzen uitersten wachtpost Djerir, in de XXVI Moekims tot Kroeng Kali in het Noorden, tot Tjot Lepong in het Oosten, en in de XXV Moekims tot Kroeng Raba” (It is indeed a fact that I have traversed all of Groot-Atjeh, as far as it is occupied by us; in the XXII Moekims as far as our outermost sentry-post Djerir, in the XXVI Moekims as far as Kroeng Kali in the north, as far as Tjot Lepong in the east, and in the XXV Moekims as far as Kroeng Raba).

The reconnaissance into the XXV Moekims tot Kroeng Raba was thus the southern limit of the Commandant’s inspection of the conquered Groot-Atjeh — the operational completion of the Van der Heijden conquest’s territorial reach, and the empirical proof that the south-western anchor of the Pel line had been substantively incorporated into the conquered territory.

Kroeng Raba as the western anchor of the Gleh Loedah pass

Kroeng Raba was, in Van Heutsz’s later diagnosis of the routes from the Westkust into Groot-Atjeh, the western anchor of the Gleh Loedah pass — the pass through which the Westkust route from Kemala entered the IV Moekims Kroeng Raba of Groot-Atjeh. Van Heutsz records the route on page 84 of the 1893 tract, in his critique of Resident Scherer’s claim that Groot-Atjeh could be sealed from the Westkust by closing the Gleh Loedah pass: Scherer argued that men nog over den Barisan naar de Westkust kunnen trekken en dan zoo door den Gleh Loedah pas de IV Moekims Kroeng Raba in Groot-Atjeh kunnen bereiken (one could still cross the Barisan to the Westkust and then so through the Gleh Loedah pass reach the IV Moekims Kroeng Raba in Groot-Atjeh), but that die weg is lang en nagenoeg onbegaanbaar (that road is long and practically impassable), and that by following the same policy on the Westkust as on the Noordkust, one would also be able to find someone willing and able to close the Gleh Loedah pass to all access. Van Heutsz’s response — Ook deze weg naar Groot-Atjeh is te volgen en ook niet zoo bijzonder moeilijk, want men kan hem b. v. geheel te paard afleggen (This road too to Groot-Atjeh is practicable and also not particularly difficult, for one can traverse it entirely on horseback) — fixed Kroeng Raba as the western anchor of a route whose closure was, in Scherer’s diagnosis, the operational prerequisite of the seal of Groot-Atjeh from the Westkust, and whose begaanbaarheid (passability) Van Heutsz’s diagnosis exposes.

The IV Moekims Kroeng Raba — the sub-federation named for the village — was thus, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the south-western territorial form whose closure was the operational complement of the Kroeng Raja seal on the north-east. The IV Moekims Kroeng Raba was the territory the 1884 Concentratie would abandon to the geconcentreerde stelling of Kota-Radja — the territory whose abandonment exposed the policy oscillation the 1893 tract diagnoses.

Kroeng Raba and the peper of Loong and the Zuidelijke nederzettingen

Kroeng Raba was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis of the peper-export of Groot-Atjeh, the export-harbour of the peper the IV Moekims Loong and the Zuidelijke nederzettingen produced. Van Heutsz records the export on page 94 of the 1893 tract, in the prescription for the scheepvaartregeling on the Groot-Atjeh coast: Oleh-leh wordt voorts de uitvoerhaven van de peper, die Groot-Atjeh oplevert, ook van die van Loong en een deel der Zuidelijke nederzettingen (Oleh-leh further becomes the export-harbour of the pepper that Groot-Atjeh produces, also of that of Loong and a part of the Southern settlements). The Kroeng Raba–Loong–Zuidelijke nederzettingen continuum was thus, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the south-western peper-export continuum whose closure at Oleh-leh (after the 1888–1890 closure) gave the scheepvaartregeling system its fiscal leverage over the hoofden (chiefs) of the IV Moekims Kroeng Raba.

Significance (Van Heutsz account)

Kroeng Raba’s significance in Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract rests on its being the southern hinge of the Pel plan and the territorial limit of the Van der Heijden conquest’s confirmation — the southern anchor of Pel’s 1875 coastal-line plan; the furthest extent of the September 1879 reconnaissance through the XXV Moekims; the western anchor of the Gleh Loedah pass route from the Westkust; and the export-harbour of the peper the IV Moekims Loong and the Zuidelijke nederzettingen produced.

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 323–325, 336–342.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 9, 18, 19, 20, 84, 94. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

De Geconcentreerde Stelling in Groot-Atjeh, ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef, 1885, pp. 17, 28.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 80, 82. OCR: DLP-158.

tags	place, kampong, acehnese, aceh-war, fort, west-coast, dutch, colonial, military, iv-moekims, east-coast, 19th-century, south-coast-of-groot-atjeh, scheepvaartregeling
aliases	Krueng Raba, Kroeng Raba, Kroëng Raba Atjeh, Krueng-Raba, Krueng Raba fort, Kroeng-Raba, Kroeng-Ralb, Kroeng-Rababaai, Kroeng-Raba-baai, Krung Raba, IV Moekims Kroeng Raba

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