Bestorming van de Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau (25 May 1896)

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tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliasesBestorming van de Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau, Storming of the Daman-Lam Tjroeng-Lam Poelau Stelling, 25 May 1896, Bestorming Daman

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The Bestorming van de Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau (25 May 1896) — the storming of the Achehnese defensive position running from Daman through Lam-Tjroeng to Lam-Poelau — was the final engagement of the three-day Dutch offensive against Teungkoe Oemar’s fortified stelling around Lam-Pisang, executed on the third day by a force under the overall command of Kol. Stemfoort with the 6e Bataljon under Maj. Okhuizen outflanking and attacking the enemy position at Daman and Lam-Tjroeng. The 3e compagnie (kapitein Janssen) approached Lam-Tjroeng over the hills covered; the 1e peloton under 1e Luit. Keetell stormed; the 12-man garrison fled toward Lam-Tjroeng; 2e luit. Lamster was first into the Lam-Tjroeng versterking. By 11:45 a.m. the entire stelling Daman–Lam-Tjroeng–Lam-Poelau was ontruimd by the enemy. The storming was followed by the burning of Anak-Paja, Djirat, Lho-Nga, Lam-Caboes, Lam-Paja, Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, Lamlon, and Noesa.

Background

By the morning of 25 May 1896 the three-day Dutch offensive had accomplished its two principal objectives: the storming of Tjot Tjako on 23 May 1896 and the capture of Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s house on 24 May 1896. The remaining objective was the enemy stelling on the ridge running from Boekit Seboen through Lam-Poelau and Lam-Tjroeng to Daman — the southern anchor of the Achehnese defensive position. So long as this stelling remained in Achehnese hands, Oemar’s warriors could threaten the captured positions at Lam-Pisang and could stage a counter-offensive from the south.

Kol. Stemfoort planned to drive the enemy from the heuvelstelling Boekit Seboen–Lam-Poelau–Lam-Tjroeng–Daman. Three battalions with auxiliary weapons participated. The plan called for the enemy stelling to be threatened by artillery fire in front and on the left flank, plus feint attacks, with the main attack to be a flanking movement on the right flank. The reinforcements brought up for the day’s operations were substantial: the 12e Bataljon, 1½ compagnieën of the 7e Bataljon, two compagnieën maréchaussée, two cavalry platoons, one engineer peloton, two sections of mountain artillery, and three ambulances.

The Morning Reconnaissance and the Storming of Beradin

At 6:30 a.m. the cavalry under de Lannoy marched from Lam-Djamoe to reconnoitre toward Boekit Seboen. The 9e Bataljon talso stelling along the foot of the gebergte near Lam-Pisang. At 7:55 a.m. the enemy fired from a top approximately 70 m high; the 9e Bataljon occupied it. At 9:30 a.m. 2½ compagnieën of the 7e Bataljon under Maj. Jacobs were placed at Maj. Veeren’s disposal. At 10:45 a.m. optical signal communication with Ketapan Doea was established.

The cavalry found Lam-Goe-Oe-Zuid (Lam Oekoe) onbezet; the northern rand of Beradin was weakly held; about 6 enemies left the southern rand versterking and fled to Lam-Poelau; a band of about 25–30 men on Boekit Seboen fired on luit. Happé’s patrol. Beradin was assigned to the 5de compagnie of the 12e Bataljon under Kapt. Drijber. The cavalry’s initial report was wrong — Drijber’s compagnie was met by maintained crossfire from kampong, versterking, and western hills. Thomson led a storm-action on the versterking with about 10 men; the hoornblazer Karel, Beekman, and van den Wollenberg distinguished themselves. Drijber was wounded, with 12 minderen. Five artillery sections opened fire on enemy positions. The storming of Beradin was, in tactical terms, a hard fight for a small work — a foretaste of the resistance that the main stelling would offer.

The Flanking Movement: 6e Bataljon at Daman and Lam Tjroeng

The 6e Bataljon under Maj. Okhuizen was ordered to outflank and attack the enemy position at Daman and Lam-Tjroeng. The 3e compagnie under kapitein Janssen was to approach Lam-Tjroeng over the hills covered, the 1e compagnie along the foot of the gebergte. Janssen marched through scorching cogon grass — the tall, sharp-edged grass that covers the abandoned sawah of Atjeh and that, in the heat of the day, is a particular torment to troops in heavy marching order — to a small versterking at Daman. After a few salvoes, the 1e peloton under 1e Luit. Keetell stormed. The 12-man garrison fled toward Lam-Tjroeng. The fall of Daman opened the way to Lam-Tjroeng itself.

2e luit. Lamster was first into the Lam-Tjroeng versterking when it was attacked next. The capture of Lam-Tjroeng — the central element of the stelling — was the decisive moment of the day. By 11:45 a.m. the entire stelling Daman–Lam-Tjroeng–Lam-Poelau was ontruimd by the enemy. The Achehnese, their flank turned and their position overlapped, retreated in disorder. The Dutch troops talso possession of the stelling. The heuvelrug from Boekit Seboen through Lam-Poelau to Daman — the southern anchor of Oemar’s defensive position — was in Dutch hands.

The Verbranding of the Kampongs

The afternoon of 25 May 1896 was devoted to the destruction of the enemy’s kampongs. The cavalry was ordered to continue reconnaissance to Lama-Paja, Lam-Caboes, and Anak-Paja, and, if onbezet, to burn them. The 12e Bataljon under Lt.-Col. Soeters marched to Djirat, with orders to burn all kampongs on the return. Soeters also had the 5e compagnie burn Lam-Caboes and the 2e compagnie burn Lam-Paja. The maréchaussée under Graafland reached Anak-Paja and burned the houses.

At Djirat, de Lannoy decided to also investigate Lam-Kroet and Lho-Nga. About 10 enemies posted on the right bank of the Kroeng-Raja fired on the cavalry, preventing closer reconnaissance of the bridge. Soeters sent the order: “Keer terug, en steek so molike Lho-Nga on fire” (Return, and, if possible, set Lho-Nga on fire). After burning about 10 houses, de Lannoy halted the burning — considering the battle-readiness of his troops — and returned to Boekit Seboen. On the return, some enemies in a small versterking on a western helling fired without causing losses.

To make the punishment as complete as possible, the bevelhebber at 1 p.m. sent a compagnie of the 5e Bataljon from Lam-Poelau to Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, and Lamlon; at 1:50 p.m. a peloton of the 6e Bataljon to Noesa — all to destroy those kampongs. By the evening of 25 May 1896 the kampongs of Anak-Paja, Djirat, Lho-Nga, Lam-Caboes, Lam-Paja, Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, Lamlon, and Noesa had been burned.

The Withdrawal and the Bivak at Lam-Pisang

The cavalry rested until 5:30 p.m. at Oemar’s house, then returned to Koeta-Radja by 8 p.m. The infantry started the return march at 4 p.m.; some fire from Tandjong forced the rearguard under Weustmann to retire by sections to Lam-Poelau. By 5 p.m. all were at Lam-Poelau. Peloton Sandberg held Boekit Seboen overnight; the 12e Bataljon marched to Lam-Pisang, then to Lam-Djamoe for transport to the Kraton by 8 p.m. Stemfoort decided to hold the captured positions overnight and to retire under cover of darkness from Lam-Poelau and neighbouring hills to Lam-Pisang, where they would stay until the next morning. The 9e Bataljon was to retire to Lam-Pisang at 5:30 p.m.; the 6e Bataljon with a compagnie of the 14e and the sectie Vrijdag would leave at a suitable moment in the night; Sandberg’s peloton at 9 p.m. The compagnie of the 5e Bataljon that had burned the western kampongs returned at 6 p.m. without meeting an enemy.

The engineers prepared the demolition of Oemar’s house for the next day. The task for 25 May 1896 — driving the enemy further from the vallei van Beradin — was accomplished; Oemar’s warriors had retreated behind the Kroeng-Raba; the kampongs were chastised.

Significance

The Bestorming van de Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau on 25 May 1896 was the closing engagement of the three-day Dutch offensive and the operational completion of the strategic reversal of the defection of 29 March 1896. With the stelling in Dutch hands and Oemar’s warriors driven behind the Kroeng-Raba, the immediate military objective of the offensive had been achieved. The verbranding of the kampongs — Anak-Paja, Djirat, Lho-Nga, Lam-Caboes, Lam-Paja, Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, Lamlon, and Noesa — was a deliberate act of chastisement intended to deny the enemy the means of subsistence and to demonstrate the cost of continued resistance. The day also marked the operational debut of Maj. Okhuizen’s 6e Bataljon as a flanking force — a role it would repeat, with distinction, in the subsequent operations of June 1896. The Bestorming of 25 May 1896 was, in this sense, both the close of one chapter of the spring campaign and the prelude to the next.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 225–235.

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