Deijkerhoff

Deijkerhoff — Kolonel (later Generaal) Deijkerhoff — was a Dutch officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (K.N.I.L.) who served as Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies) from January 1892 to his honourable discharge in March 1896, and whose governorship — coinciding with the period of the arming of Teuku Umar as Panglima Prang Besar and culminating in the catastrophic defection of Teuku Umar of March 1896 — was characterised by what Kruijt calls the “Pahlawan-klucht” (the Pahlawan farce), the Dutch policy of using Atjehese auxiliaries against Atjehese enemies that ended in the Dutch themselves being ambushed by their own weapons.

Inheritance (January 1892)

Under Colonel (later General) Deijkerhoff the enemy in the beginning grew ever bolder and more enterprising; the enemy closed the Dutch line ever more tightly, brought his fortifications to within 150 metres of the Dutch belt railway, in the so-called felled open strip, and harassed the Dutch from there continually. Already in March 1892 the Dutch in Kota Radja were anxious about an attack on their main fortification; as a consequence of the permission of trade on passes from outside the line, many enemies came onto Dutch terrain disguised as traders at the markets within the Dutch area, and even in broad daylight an attack took place on Penajoeng, close by the kraton, and robbing, murdering, and smuggling continued without end.

The Kaloet Fortification (1892)

Before the principal of the enemy’s fortifications, the notorious Kaloet — located within the 1,000-metre strip — Dutch troops repeatedly bloodied their heads; they could not take it. The reports then said that the Dutch were clearing, that they had achieved their object, that the taking of Kaloet was unnecessary. From Kaloet the enemy continually fired on Dutch trains, posts, patrols, and transports, even breaking the railway in September 1892 and constructing breastworks and trenches there, so that the train could not run for some time. Then it was said that the line was under repair.

The Nja Makam Expedition (1892–1893)

At the same time Nja Makam, as the Sultan’s authorised agent — provided with the Sultan’s tjap (seal), with much following, and helped and housed by Dutch “friends” (?) — travelled the coastal statelets raising money and people to the East Coast as far as Tamiang, to cause unrest there. He brought the Dutch tobacco and petroleum districts into violent turmoil, and the Dutch had the greatest difficulty and exertion in 1892 and 1893 to drive him from his positions on the Tamiang-rivier.

The Scheepvaartregeling of 1893–1894

How fully Deijkerhoff himself was convinced of the good effect of the blockade and considered its strict and permanent maintenance necessary, he had already from the beginning, with the resident Scherer, arranged the preparation of a scheepvaartregeling. Scherer came over to Atjeh for this purpose, visited the various coastal statelets, had discussions with the chiefs — who, in the prospect of being released from the straitening bands of the blockade, were glad to see him come. Only Pedir refused to accept the conditions set. Scherer found the situation in Atjeh, since his departure in 1884, much deteriorated. He attributed this especially to the blockade. This, he maintained, was what had drawn the Atjehers closer together, had made the Sultan the recognised head of the state, had given him authority and influence. In Kruijt’s judgement, wrongly: not the blockade, but the conciliatory policy since 1881, the Dutch attempts at contact with and therefore recognition of the Sultan, the historical tradition of that Sultanate, the long duration of the war, and the persistent and successful defence, had made Toeankoe Mohamed Daoed stronger and greater.

The scheepvaartregeling replaced the blockade as Scherer’s regulation was gradually introduced: in October 1893 for the East Coast and in April 1894 for the North and West Coasts, with respectively Edi, Telok Semawé, and Poeloe Rajja opened as harbours for general trade. This measure was, alas, also not carried through consistently, not vigorously and forcefully applied. Not only not as intended by Van Teijn (after submission obtained by blockade), but inadequately prepared and therefore prematurely introduced, and again at once weakened by special licences and concessions.

The Arming of Teuku Umar (December 1892 – September 1893)

In December 1892 the capable Assistent-Resident Kroesen came to Groot-Atjeh, and with him the submission and use of Toekoe Oemar was again raised and carried out. Many believe, Kruijt notes, that this was largely his work, because before him Deijkerhoff had always advised a waiting attitude. Against the exactions, extortions, and acts of violence to which the population outside the line was subjected by the religious party — whose head was still Tengkoe Mohamed Amin, in 1894 appointed by the Sultan as Kadhi — the Chalif El Alam first began to resist more and more, and when these also extended to the 4 and 6 Moekims, Toekoe Oemar opposed them and inflicted some painful losses on the Muslemin. He then asked again to be taken into favour by the administration, and the administration put this in prospect, provided he first gave adequate proofs of good disposition by driving out the Muslemin.

Helped by Atjehers from within the line — with people, supplies, rifles, and ammunition (from the Dutch, of course) — Toekoe Oemar’s operations were crowned with brilliant success. With the cooperation of Dutch troops, Dutch artillery, and Dutch rijksdaalders, he successively took various points, and on 10 August 10 August 1893 also the notorious Kaloet, almost without a blow. He blew them away or walked in. On the proposal of Deijkerhoff, he was officially pardoned on 30 September 30 September 1893, under the name of T. Djohan Pahlawan appointed Panglima prang besar (Great War Commander), and he and his auxiliaries were granted allowances, food, weapons, and ammunition. He received a fine house and dressed henceforth as a chief officer.

The “Pahlawan-klucht” (1893–1896)

Thereafter he went on, right and left, with great ease and little loss, fighting and conquering. Many viewed this Pahlawan-klucht in the Atjeh drama with great concern. It had all the appearance as if Toekoe Oemar, by agreement with the enemy, was regulating his operations according to a fixed plan, of which again the occupation of numerous temporary posts outside the line — in effect the creation of a second line — was the consequence. Large and small chiefs outside the line were liberally paid by the Dutch. Naturally, then, within the first, the old line, and even beyond it, it was very safe, and this safety was praised and used to prove how far the Dutch were advancing under this system. Yes, provided Toekoe Oemar was warned in advance and had had the opportunity to prepare the terrain, visitors from outside Atjeh could repeatedly assure themselves of the perfect peace and safety of Kroeng Raija to Kroeng Raba. Often in the company of Toekoe Oemar himself, seated in his vehicle, favourable impressions and descriptions were the result of such excursions. Government and representation came more and more into the sweet delusion that the Dutch were now finally on the right path, and that it would be foolish not to continue with it.

Had Toekoe Oemar, with his men, for Dutch money, held that whole second line and thereby provided for the safety of the first and the keeping open of the 1,000-metre free strip — as was first the plan — then much could have been said for it. But no: the principal points had to be occupied by the Dutch’s own troops, would have been temporarily assigned to Toekoe Oemar’s operations, leading to dispersal of forces and weakening, and in between, in numerous blockhouses, the Dutch allies (?) were quartered. Dutch posts, patrols, and transports were then again regularly fired upon and harassed, often with the Dutch’s own unexploded grenades and cartridges; even communication between the two lines was repeatedly broken, and reliefs had to take place by stealth.

As Toekoe Oemar became more demanding, his zeal also diminished. His interest, after all, lay in maintaining, for the time being, the status quo on his side. He corresponded with the Sultan and other great gentlemen of the opposition; he even sent them money and gifts; yes, the enemy opposite the Dutch received his share of Dutch rijksdaalders. The Dutch sat on a crater. The situation, should Toekoe Oemar turn against the Dutch again, would simply be terrible, much worse than ever before. Warning voices went up from all sides. For it was universally believed, also among the Atjehers and beyond, that Toekoe Oemar was deceiving the Dutch, that the Dutch were playing a high game, putting everything on one card. But of course, one could not prove it.

The Defection of Teuku Umar (March 1896)

While Toekoe Oemar was the Dutch ally, more and more of his friends and associates came to nibble at the state trough, among others the Dutch’s longstanding bitter enemy Nja Makam. Another irreconcilable enemy, T. moeda Joesoef Lamreng, eldest son of the deposed radja of Simpang-Olim, who had recently given asylum to the murderers of the Rajah, had shared the booty with them, had appointed the principal perpetrators as panglima’s, and had refused the Dutch demand for the surrender of the prisoners with brazen pride — was also taken into favour and definitively appointed radja of Simpang-Olim. Toeankoe Abdul Medjid, paid by the Dutch, long held house on the West Coast, robbing and plundering. His brother Pangeran Hoessin sometimes joined in. Finally picked up by the Marine — who should have hanged him directly — he came to Kota Radja and was also taken into favour again.

Deijkerhoff proposed in 1895 to make permanent and equip the hitherto temporary posts outside the line. And indeed he managed to get it through at Batavia. Expansion again. But first, with the help of Toekoe Oemar, the Lamkrah region — a hotbed of fanaticism, where the Dutch had never been master, where Dutch troops had recently suffered very serious losses — had to be cleared of enemies. There Toekoe Oemar seemed to feel little inclination, whether he did not dare, or he could no longer get enough money out and considered the suitable moment now come to throw off the mask for the umpteenth time. Yet he finally promised to march. He received at the end of March the necessary funds, a number of breech-loading rifles, cartridges, rations, and so on. The combined operation of Dutch troops and the Atjehese auxiliaries was to take place on 29 March 29 March 1896.

Fortunately his plan — when the Dutch troops had marched out in mass outside the line, to throw himself on the exposed Kota Radja and Oleh-leh — was discovered in time, at the eleventh hour. It cost effort to convince Deijkerhoff. The marching out of the troops was countermanded, and so a catastrophe was prevented, in which the surprise attack on Lombok in August 1894 would have been child’s play. Finding himself discovered, Toekoe Oemar withdrew with his bands into the mountains and fortified himself there mightily; most of the paid friends (?) outside the line joined him. The Dutch posts lying outside the line were surrounded and cut off.

Discharge (March 1896)

Reinforcements had to be telegraphed for immediately to Java. These came at once. The military commander Vetter accompanied the expedition as government commissioner, and Deijkerhoff was honourably relieved of his office. The reason for discharge, according to the Java-bode, was: the disguising of the truth in the reports. Also in this system — the use of Atjehers against Atjehers — the advice of the Dutch’s best experts had been only half followed. Half-measures, Kruijt concludes, have been the curse of the Dutch policy in Atjeh.

Significance

Deijkerhoff’s governorship culminates in the defection of Teuku Umar of March 1896 — the immediate occasion of Kruijt’s brochure. The Pahlawan-klucht, the arming of an Atjehese auxiliary who used Dutch money, Dutch rifles, and Dutch cartridges to maintain his position and correspond with the Dutch’s enemies, is the most striking instance in the war of the Dutch policy of “verdcel en heersch” (divide and rule) turned against the Dutch themselves. The Java-bode’s figure of “3 ton” (three tons = 300,000 guilders) paid to maintain the status quo during the Lombok affair of 1894 — when Deijkerhoff was able to guarantee the peace of Atjeh for four months without troop replenishment — is the measure of the cost of the Pahlawan-klucht before its collapse. Deijkerhoff’s honourable discharge and the appointment of Vetter as government commissioner opened the final phase of the war, in which the Dutch would revert to the military vigour that Van Heutsz would carry to its conclusion after 1898.

Sources

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 25, 28, 38, 44, 48, 49, 58. ATJEH ‘96. 1e Deel, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L. (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913), p. 25: Generaal Deijkerhoff moet die illusie gewekt hebben; frontispiece portrait opposite p. 24. ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913), Bijlage XXII — Overzicht van onzer vroegere betrekkingen met Atjeh en van den huidigen toestand in dat gewest, p. 157: Wat gebeurde er verder … tijdens het bestuur van Generaal Deijkerhoff.

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter XII, “De politiek en het beleid van generaal Deijkerhoff, van Januari 1892 tot April 1896”; Chapter XIII opening. OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 66–73.

tags	person, military, dutch, colonial, general, governor, aceh-war, 19th-century, commander, diplomacy, knil, 1896, kruisheer, colonial-official, deijkerhoff
aliases	Generaal Deijkerhoff, General Deijkerhoff, Kolonel Deijkerhoff, Colonel Deijkerhoff, Deijkerhoff (Atjeh governor), C. Deykerhoff, C. Deiykerhoff, Generaal-Majoor C. Deykerhoff, Generaal Deykerhoff, Generaal-Majoor Deykerhoff, C. Deykerhoff (Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh 1894-1895), the predecessor of Vetter

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