Pompe van Meerdervoort

Pompe van Meerdervoort — Kolonel Pompe van Meerdervoort — was a Dutch officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (K.N.I.L.) who served as Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies) from May 1891 to January 1892, and whose brief and contentious governorship — characterised by what Kruijt calls the vriendelijke oorlog (friendly war) — was marked by the breakdown of relations between the Dutch government and its own governor, by the arrival of Dr. Snouck Hurgronje in Groot-Atjeh to study the politico-religious situation, and by the governor’s own insistence that there were in fact “geen vijand” (no enemy) in Atjeh but only “kwadwilligen” (malefactors), totalling at most 800 men.

Appointment (May 1891)

Of all the surprises that the Atjeh administration had already produced, Kruijt writes, the appointment of Pompe — known as a capable and competent officer, promoted to colonel by choice — was surely the greatest. It was known that he was by no means in agreement with the policy pursued in Atjeh by General van Teijn, and was not the man to lend himself to the execution of a system he had to condemn. If agreement of views between the government and the administration in Atjeh was always urgently necessary, under these circumstances more than ever it might have been expected that serious consultation would have taken place beforehand, that the government would have assured itself of Pompe’s particular views, and would have investigated to what extent it could therefore consider him suitable for the important office of Governor of Atjeh. Nothing of the sort. Pompe was shortly before his appointment in the Netherlands, and afterwards in Batavia, and had barely met the Minister of Colonies and the Governor-General. Consultation on the policy to be followed in Atjeh therefore did not take place. He departed to continue for the time being the existing direction until he could make new proposals thereon, and for himself in the conviction that the Governor-General was in essentials of his opinion and would therefore seriously consider and accept those proposals.

The Policy of the “Vriendelijke Oorlog” (1891)

The proposals were soon made, but found no favour with the government. Pompe wished to win the Atjehers by gentleness, benevolence, and justice, to make them appreciate the blessings of Dutch administration by bringing trade to flourish, the land to development, and the population to prosperity. He wished to make Poeloe Weh a trading station and coaling station, and to allow extensive application of licences and freedom of shipping. In this the blockade did not fit. He did not see the good results of this instrument of compulsion, so highly valued by Van Teijn and others, and — notwithstanding the government’s persistent insistence on its vigorous maintenance — went on, in anticipation of a scheepvaartregeling of which he was a warm advocate, to damage its effect by numerous licences on the coasts and also to so-called friends within and outside the line. The government saw itself compelled to counteract this.

General van Teijn, then in the Netherlands, considered the abandonment of the blockade so serious that he deemed it his duty to point out to the government the necessity of binding the Governor of Atjeh by an instruction compelling him to follow the direction prescribed by the government. This did not help. Pompe’s peculiar conception, plans, and proposals diverged so much from the views of many of the officials and officers who had served under Van Teijn, that many — having convinced themselves that he was not amenable to reasoning in the matter — sought a safe retreat by requesting transfer or going on leave. Goodness, gentleness, and accommodation, regarded by the Atjehers as cowardice, lameness, and weakness, characterised all actions. It gave the Atjehers more occasion than ever to mislead the Dutch and to speculate on the optimism of the new Governor. “Toean besaar jang bahroe manis sekali, banjak aloes” (the new great Lord is very sweet and very polite), they said — sarcastically, of course.

The Failure of the Kemala Negotiations

The attempts at contact with the Kemala-party continued at first innocently. They led only to new disappointments, and later the administration had to acknowledge that never had any well-meant steps toward conciliation been taken by the Atjehers. Pompe also proposed to give allowances to more members of the Sultan’s family and other chiefs, and to take Toekoe Oemar — who presented himself as a peacemaker — into favour. In short, against the intentions of the government, a wholly new policy was advocated, satirically called the vriendelijke oorlog (the friendly war).

And what stood against this? Many chiefs of the coasts, among them very insignificant or supporting figures, came on various occasions to Kota Radja, principally to plead on high tone for the lifting of the blockade or to request licences. They received fine gifts and beautiful speeches, and made all manner of promises, to return — provided with what they had been able to secure — to their country and then to do as they pleased. In the reports, much was always made of all this, while facts of greater significance — such as the journeys, bringing money and people, from Madjapait to Kemala of Toeankoe Ibrahim, the son of the Dutch hereditary enemy Toeankoe Hasschim, where he had lived for years as it were under Dutch protection; the appearance, with the enemy in Groot-Atjeh, of Toekoe Nja Mamat, a relative of the radja of Perlak; and such like — passed almost unnoticed.

The Succession of Tengkoe Mohamed Amin (January 1892)

In Groot-Atjeh, Tengkoe Mohamed Amin had succeeded his father Tengkoe di Tirou as head of the resistance, and was recognised as such by the Sultan in January 1892. Other bandit chiefs joined him or fought on their own account against the Dutch; the coasts sent their support. The encirclement of the line and the successful ambushes of Dutch traps steadily increased. Dutch posts were repeatedly fired upon; trenches were dug between the posts and in the so-called open strip. The friends within and outside the line smuggled on a large scale. Emissaries of the Sultan travelled the coasts to collect money; the Dutch’s best friends paid. Nevertheless Pompe remained of the opinion that the Dutch in Atjeh in fact had no enemy before them, only malefactors, totalling at most 800 men.

The Arrival of Snouck Hurgronje (July 1891)

Under Pompe, the Dutch outstanding scholar Dr. Snouck Hurgronje came in July 1891 to Groot-Atjeh, with a commission from the government to study the politico-religious situation there and to report on it. Already in 1889 he would have gone incognito from Penang to Atjeh, when the opportunity was so much more favourable and the intrigue over the restoration of the Sultanate was in full swing, but General Van Teijn then saw no use in it. He remained there until February 1892 and saw the disastrous result of so many years of labour, of so many wasted millions and human lives, the quackery that had everywhere prevailed, trying all the little remedies without cooperation, often working against each other, only to fall just short of success and then, condemning and breaking what had gone before, to try something new again. He also saw that the Dutch in all Atjeh did indeed have a fanatical popular party led by the clergy against them, and not merely a few malefactors or robber bands.

Resignation (January 1892)

Finally, after much dithering and correspondence, Pompe — weary of all the shuffling — demanded of the government confidence in his policy, and when this was not granted, he went as a man of character in January 1892, and in his place stepped Colonel Deijkerhoff. Never, Kruijt observes, was the want of consultation and cooperation between the government and the administration in Atjeh so strongly apparent as in this saddest period, and that after almost twenty years of bloody experience.

Significance

Pompe’s governorship is, in Kruijt’s analysis, the most striking instance of the structural defect of the Dutch war effort — the absence of prior consultation between the government and its governor in Atjeh, and the consequent breakdown of cooperation between them. His vriendelijke oorlog — the policy of winning the Atjehers by gentleness rather than by force — was the antithesis of the policy of his predecessor Van Teijn and of his successor Deijkerhoff, and was tried, found wanting, and abandoned within nine months. The arrival of Snouck Hurgronje during his governorship, however, would prove the most consequential event of his tenure: Snouck Hurgronje’s subsequent advice would shape the Dutch conduct of the war for the next decade and ultimately lead to the Van Heutsz pacification after 1898.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

After the retirement of general van Teijn the Government again chose the policy of waiting and negotiating, “and thereby, after a short and feeble administration by General Pompe van Meerdervoort, General Deijckerhoff took office.”

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

F. Pompe van Meerdervoort was a Dutch colonel who was appointed Governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden on 23 April 1891, receiving the province from Major-General Van Teijn at a moment when the situation in the occupied parts of Atjeh was, in author Joh. Langhout’s words, “not unfavourable”.

Government

During the two following years the situation remained stable. Outside the concentrated line the population began to devote itself more to rice-growing, and the satisfactory outcome of the rice harvests even caused prices there to be considerably lower than inside the line; the transport of rice from outside to inside the line was accordingly permitted, which equally benefited the revival of trade. The island We proved increasingly suited to pepper cultivation and the plantations regularly expanded; the pepper export from the East Coast of Atjeh had risen in the years 1889–1891 from 5,742 to 5,853 and 7,620 kojangs, though profits in 1891 were reduced by falling market prices and by wages which had to be nearly doubled for want of experienced labour. It was likewise in this period that, with the improved security, Chinese pedlars could move almost unhindered along the roads and between the several posts, and the pepper-federation Gigiëng devoted itself from 1890 so successfully to rice culture that it became the granary of the federation Pidië and could even spare rice for Groot-Atjeh.

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter XI, “Kortstondig bestuur onder kolonel Pompe van Meerdervoort, van Mei 1891 tot Januari 1892.” OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 58–62.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter III.

Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 64–65.

tags	person, military, dutch, colonial, officer, governor, aceh-war, 19th-century, commander, general, knil, aceh
aliases	Kolonel Pompe van Meerdervoort, Colonel Pompe, Pompe, Pompe van Meerdervoort (Atjeh governor), Pompe van Meerdervoort, Colonel Pompe van Meerdervoort

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