Struisvogelpolitiek

Properties2
tagsconcept, dutch, colonial, policy, aceh-war, 19th-century, pruijs-van-der-hoeven, civil-government-period
aliasesStruisvogelpolitiek, Struisvogel-politiek, Ostrich policy, Ostrich politics Atjeh, Ostrich policy Atjeh

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The Struisvogelpolitiek — the ostrich policy — was the satirical name given by Kruijt to the Dutch policy, pursued under the governorship of Pruijs van der Hoeven from April 1881 to December 1882 and to a lesser extent under his successors, of closing the eyes to the actual situation in Groot-Atjeh and the coasts, of giving credence to the optimistic reports of submitted chiefs, and of representing the situation to the government in Batavia as favourable when in fact it was catastrophic. The policy was the principal cause of the collapse of the Dutch position under civil government and of the concentration system of 1884.

The Policy under Pruijs van der Hoeven

The Struisvogelpolitiek was the hallmark of the Pruijs van der Hoeven governorship. Inflexibly, the first civil governor remained blind to the facts, and supported by the government, which naturally went by his reports, he continued in good faith to demolish the laborious and costly work of years. Only in August 1882, when the need grew ever more urgent, was he compelled to take another path. But by then it was too late. The evil was done.

The numerous engagements and ambushes, in which the Dutch sometimes even had to leave their dead with their rifles in enemy hands, continued until Pruijs van der Hoeven’s departure. Yet he claimed that in September 1882 he had the fire underfoot, that the peace was not further disturbed until his departure, and that the situation remained favourable — he telegraphed the government shortly before his departure: “Pacificatie van Atjeh verzekerd” (Pacification of Atjeh secured) — and declared at the handover of the administration that everything pointed to a peaceful solution. Kruijt observes: “Terecht vraagt men zich hierbij af waarom, wanneer naar zijn inzien de toestand zoo gunstig was, hij, met terzijdestelling zijner grieven, toen niet gebleven is om te bewijzen dat zijn inzicht juist was en om zijne grootsche taak te voltooien?” (One rightly asks why, if in his view the situation was so favourable, he did not then, setting aside his grievances, stay to prove that his view was correct and to complete his great task?)

The Continuation under Later Governors

The Struisvogelpolitiek continued, to a lesser extent, under Laging Tobias (1883–1884), Demmeni (1884–1886), and Deijkerhoff (1892–1896). Under Demmeni, “het bestuur geloofde dat alles in den aanvang niet. De Atjehers hadden succes van hun tactiek. Wij liepen er weer in. De struisvogelpolitiek bleef aan ‘t woord.” (The administration did not believe it all in the beginning. The Atjehers had success with their tactic. The Dutch fell for it again. The ostrich policy remained in force.) The administration considered resistance unlikely; the enemy’s power grossly overestimated; most bandit chiefs had nothing bad against the Dutch in mind; most facts stood entirely on their own, but had no mutual connection; it believed again in conciliation.

Under Deijkerhoff, the Struisvogelpolitiek took the form of the Pahlawan-klucht — the false optimism about Toekoe Oemar’s loyalty, the false reports of progress in Groot-Atjeh, the false peace during the Lombok affair of August 1894 — until the defection of 29 March 1896 exposed the failure of the policy.

The Pattern of Optimistic Reporting

Kruijt identifies a structural pattern of “ongeloofelijk optimisme, groote lichtgeloorigheid, overschatting van eigen resultaten en onderschatting van den vijand” (incredible optimism, great credulity, overestimation of one’s own results and underestimation of the enemy) in the Dutch reports from Atjeh throughout the war. From Van Swieten’s Nota to Colonel Pel of April 1874 — “dat ophemelen van kleine of onbeteekenende gebeurtenissen in ons voordeel, dat blindblijven voor verschijnselen in ons nadeel” (that extolling of small or insignificant events in our favour, that blindness to phenomena to our disadvantage) — to the “Pacificatie van Atjeh verzekerd” telegram of Pruijs van der Hoeven, the pattern was the same. The government in the Netherlands and at Batavia, dependent on these reports, was unable to form a true picture of the situation, and so was unable to take the measures that the situation required.

Significance

The Struisvogelpolitiek is, in Kruijt’s analysis, one of the structural causes of the protraction of the Atjeh-oorlog. The pattern of optimistic reporting from Atjeh — “dat ophemelen van kleine of onbeteekenende gebeurtenissen in ons voordeel, dat blindblijven voor verschijnselen in ons nadeel, waaruit eene onzuivere, onware voorstelling van den werkelijken toestand geboren werd, heeft steeds in meest alle rapporten en verslagen voorgezeten. De regeering werd door deze optimistische voorstellingen niet voldoende voorgelicht, de natie bleef onkundig van den waren staat van zaken in Atjeh.” — was the principal means by which the Dutch government and the Dutch nation remained ignorant of the true state of affairs in Atjeh, and so the principal means by which the war was protracted. The Struisvogelpolitiek is, with the failure to apply the scheepvaartregeling consistently, one of the two principal objects of Kruijt’s polemic.

See Also

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter IV (the pattern from Van Swieten), Chapter VIII (Pruijs van der Hoeven), Chapter IX (Demmeni), Chapter XII (Deijkerhoff), Chapter XIII (the structural pattern). OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 17, 42–43, 52, 71–72, 76–77.

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