Pahlawan-klucht

Properties2
tagsconcept, dutch, colonial, policy, aceh-war, 19th-century, teuku-umar, auxiliaries-policy
aliasesPahlawan-klucht, Pahlawan farce, Teuku Umar Pahlawan-klucht, Djohan Pahlawan-klucht, Pahlawanklucht

7 min read

The Pahlawan-klucht — the Pahlawan farce — was the satirical name given by Kruijt to the Dutch policy, pursued under the governorship of Deijkerhoff from August 1893 to March 1896, of arming, paying, and styling the Atjehese chieftain Teuku Umar (Toekoe Oemar) as T. Djohan Pahlawan with the rank of Panglima Prang Besar (Great War Commander), and using him and his Atjehese auxiliaries to fight the Atjehese resistance. The policy, in Kruijt’s analysis, was the most striking instance in the Atjeh-oorlog of the Dutch policy of “verdeel en heersch” (divide and rule) turned against the Dutch themselves, and culminated in the defection of 29 March 1896.

The Policy

The Pahlawan-klucht began with the pardon of Toekoe Oemar on 30 September 30 September 1893, under the name of T. Djohan Pahlawan — “Johan the Champion” — and his appointment as Panglima Prang Besar (Great War Commander). Helped by Atjehers from within the line — with people, supplies, rifles, and ammunition (from the Dutch) — Toekoe Oemar’s operations were crowned with brilliant success. With the cooperation of Dutch troops, Dutch artillery, and Dutch rijksdaalders, he successively took various points, and on 10 August 10 August 1893 also the notorious Kaloet, almost without a blow. He received a fine house and dressed henceforth as a chief officer.

Thereafter Toekoe Oemar went on, right and left, with great ease and little loss, fighting and conquering. Many viewed this Pahlawan-klucht in the Atjeh drama with great concern. It had all the appearance as if Toekoe Oemar, by agreement with the enemy, was regulating his operations according to a fixed plan, of which again the occupation of numerous temporary posts outside the line — in effect the creation of a second line — was the consequence. Large and small chiefs outside the line were liberally paid by the Dutch. Naturally, then, within the first, the old line, and even beyond it, it was very safe, and this safety was praised and used to prove how far the Dutch were advancing under this system.

The Suspicions

Had Toekoe Oemar, with his men, for Dutch money, held that whole second line and thereby provided for the safety of the first and the keeping open of the 1,000-metre free strip — as was first the plan — then much could have been said for it. But no: the principal points had to be occupied by the Dutch’s own troops, would have been temporarily assigned to Toekoe Oemar’s operations, leading to dispersal of forces and weakening, and in between, in numerous blockhouses, the Dutch allies (?) were quartered. Dutch posts, patrols, and transports were then again regularly fired upon and harassed, often with the Dutch’s own unexploded grenades and cartridges; even communication between the two lines was repeatedly broken, and reliefs had to take place by stealth.

As Toekoe Oemar became more demanding, his zeal also diminished. His interest, after all, lay in maintaining, for the time being, the status quo on his side. He corresponded with the Sultan and other great gentlemen of the opposition; he even sent them money and gifts; yes, the enemy opposite the Dutch received his share of Dutch rijksdaalders. The Dutch sat on a crater. The situation, should Toekoe Oemar turn against the Dutch again, would simply be terrible, much worse than ever before. Warning voices went up from all sides. For it was universally believed, also among the Atjehers and beyond, that Toekoe Oemar was deceiving the Dutch, that the Dutch were playing a high game, putting everything on one card. But of course, one could not prove it.

The Cost

The cost of the Pahlawan-klucht was substantial. The Java-bode’s figure of “3 ton” (three tons = 300,000 guilders) paid to maintain the status quo during the Lombok affair of August 1894 — when Deijkerhoff was able to guarantee the peace of Atjeh for four months without troop replenishment — is the measure of the cost of the Pahlawan-klucht before its collapse. To this must be added the cost of the rifles, cartridges, and rations supplied to Toekoe Oemar and his auxiliaries, and the cost of the paid friends (?) outside the line — large and small chiefs liberally paid by the Dutch.

The Collapse

The Pahlawan-klucht collapsed on 29 March 29 March 1896, when Toekoe Oemar’s plan — to throw himself on the exposed Kota Radja and Oleh-leh when the Dutch troops had marched out in mass outside the line — was discovered in time, and the marching out of the troops was countermanded. Finding himself discovered, Toekoe Oemar withdrew with his bands into the mountains and fortified himself there mightily; most of the paid friends outside the line joined him. The Dutch posts lying outside the line were surrounded and cut off. Reinforcements had to be telegraphed for immediately to Java. Vetter accompanied the expedition as Regeeringscommissaris, and Deijkerhoff was honourably relieved of his office.

Kruijt’s Judgement

Kruijt’s judgement of the Pahlawan-klucht is severe on the Dutch and admiring of Toekoe Oemar:

“Welnu, wij kunnen, van zijn standpunt beschouwd, zijn slim overleg, zijn diplomatisch talent, zijn groote krijgslist slechts bewonderen, om ons des te meer te ergeren over de verregaande lichtgeloovigheid en blindheid van het bestuur in Atjeh.” (Well, from his standpoint, we can only admire his shrewd deliberation, his diplomatic talent, his great military cunning, the more to be vexed at the extreme credulity and blindness of the administration in Atjeh.)

The Dutch had had Toekoe Oemar against the Atjehese resistance, but Toekoe Oemar had used the Dutch. Above all, the supply of masses of rifles and cartridges had been irresponsible and reckless. “Wij hadden T. Oemar moeten gebruiken op de wijze door van Heutz aangegeven, maar wij hebben ons door hem laten gebruiken.” (The Dutch should have used Toekoe Oemar in the manner indicated by Van Heutsz, but the Dutch had let themselves be used by him.)

Significance

The Pahlawan-klucht is the most striking instance in Kruijt’s brochure of the Dutch policy of using Atjehese auxiliaries against Atjehese enemies — the policy of verdeel en heersch (divide and rule) — turned against the Dutch themselves. The cost of the policy — in money, in rifles and cartridges supplied to a future enemy, in the dispersal of forces to hold the “second line” created by Toekoe Oemar’s posts, in the false optimism of the Dutch reports, and ultimately in the catastrophic defection of 29 March 29 March 1896 — is the principal subject of Kruijt’s Chapter XII. The collapse of the Pahlawan-klucht inaugurated the final phase of the Atjeh-oorlog under Vetter as Regeeringscommissaris and the systematic pacification under Van Heutsz after 1898.

See Also

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter XII, “De politiek en het beleid van generaal Deijkerhoff, van Januari 1892 tot April 1896”; Chapter XIII (Kruijt’s judgement). OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 68–74.

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