General van Teijn

General van Teijn — Kolonel (later Generaal) van Teijn — was a Dutch officer of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (K.N.I.L.) who served as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies) from December 1886 to April 1891, and whose governorship — lasting nearly four and a half years — was devoted to the persistent attempt to make contact with the Sultan and the Kemala-party and to obtain their submission, while maintaining the concentration system and the coastal blockade as instruments of pressure. His departure in April 1891, owing to increasing ill-health, marked the failure of the policy of negotiated submission; the death of the principal resistance leaders Tengkoe di Tirou and Panglima Polim in January 1891 having already deprived the negotiations of their principal addressees.

Inheritance (December 1886)

Van Teijn took over the administration in Atjeh “onder alles behalve rooskleurige omstandigheden” (under anything but rosy circumstances). He was instructed by the government to continue consistently the prescribed system of waiting within the line, but at the same time to attempt to make contact with the Sultan and the Kemala-party, while avoiding the appearance that the Dutch sought it.

The Encirclement by Tengkoe di Tirou (1887–1890)

The Dutch stelling was regularly surrounded by a ring of fortifications thrown up by Tengkoe di Tirou, whose power and influence ever increased. From these the line itself was bombarded with artillery, the means of communication destroyed, raids made within the line, and harm done where possible. The enemy even entrenched himself there within repeatedly, and had to be driven out with force of arms in April and October 1887 and in July 1888, and a part of the railway had to be moved further inward. Stepping ever more boldly and seriously threatening the communication between several posts, Van Teijn was finally compelled to act outward. In July 1889 the Dutch suffered a painful reverse at Kota Toewankoe; though this fortification was taken shortly afterwards, it was at the cost of 21 dead and 92 wounded, and was then abandoned again. In the beginning of 1890 they took it again by surprise.

The clearing of the Dutch terrain within the line of enemies demanded all available strength, and only after the establishment of a corps maréchaussée in 1890 — chosen from the most suitable volunteers of the army, charged exclusively with the security service within the line, and itself highly meritorious — was safety there gradually obtained.

The Coastal Blockade (1887–1892)

On the coasts the situation was the same. They continued to import everything to the enemy in Groot-Atjeh, to which the extraordinarily high pepper prices enabled them better than ever. Under the leadership of the *perala-party — which was in contact with all the bandit chiefs — Segli was continually bombarded and attacked, and on the East Coast a state of unrest arose through attacks of the Muslemin under known bandit chiefs on Edi, so that the garrison had repeatedly to be reinforced, the traders fled to Penang, and even the radja made preparations to do the same; in 1889 and 1890 important expeditions thither had to take place. On the West Coast Toekoe Oemar virtually controlled the situation, and even succeeded in getting Atjehese bands to cause unrest in Troemon on Dutch territory, which required the intervention of troops from Padang. The bandit chiefs always claimed to act “op last en in naam des Sultans” (on the orders and in the name of the Sultan).

In consequence, Van Teijn — seeing that with the policy of waiting alone the Dutch were getting no further — already at the end of 1887 proposed to the government the introduction of a scheepvaartregeling, with the re-establishment of the post at Telok Semawé and the temporary closure (blockade) of part of the West Coast where Toekoe Oemar had his pepper lying. The first the government rejected; the latter it approved. This leading to good results, and Pedir &c. opposing with all its might the pending submission of the Kemala-party, at the end of 1888 part of the North Coast around Pedir was closed to all import and export, and this was in September 1889 and August 1890 further extended over the whole North Coast and over the West Coast as far as Tenom, and maintained until the end of 1892. “Dit stelsel had een geduchte uitwerking en bleek een geweldig dwangmiddel” (This system had a formidable effect and proved a powerful instrument of compulsion), Kruijt writes. The Marine had a heavy task, but received little cooperation from the administrative officials.

The Pursuit of the Kemala-party (1887–1891)

Van Teijn had to return to the beginning of his governorship and see what, while all the foregoing was taking place, had come of the search for contacts with the Kemala-party. Naturally, the shrewd Atjehers had very quickly realised that the Dutch sought them, and began to speculate on this at once. Panglima Polim and Toeankoe Hasschim &c., who were little pleased with the ever-increasing influence of Tengkoe di Tirou and therewith of the religious party, made themselves heard. Also various chiefs outside the line, who had suffered from Tengkoe di Tirou’s usurpations, came into apparent good understanding with the Dutch, against payment, licences, or to obtain other advantages. Even Toekoe Oemar and Toekoe Nja Makam sought to be taken into favour by the administration and had meetings within the line (in secret, of course) with Dutch emissaries. Toeankoe Hasschim requested a meeting at Telok Semawé, and already in June 1887 the aforementioned pretender Sultan Toeankoe Abdul Medjid submitted, and — besides a gift of ƒ25,000 — enjoyed a monthly allowance of ƒ400.

Meanwhile the Atjehers, with their known acumen, continually put off some decision. Dutch administrative officials on the North Coast and in Groot-Atjeh intrigued, each in their own way, in the direction of conciliation, sent emissaries and gifts to Kemala, and worked against each other. When in August 1888 the Sultan suddenly appeared in Groot-Atjeh and met with Panglima Polim, Imam Longbattah, and Tengkoe di Tirou, Van Teijn cherished a justified hope that it would now come to a conclusion; but after three weeks the Sultan departed again for Kemala, the chiefs, including those from within the line, brought him gifts, but the Dutch heard nothing from him. On that occasion the Sultan appointed Toekoe Oemar as panglima (Emir El Bahr) of the West Coast as far as Singkel.

Given the existing tension between Panglima Polim and Tengkoe di Tirou, the latter — fearful of eventually being caught behind the net, or seeking to be ahead of the others — in 1889 offered to bring the Sultan to the Dutch. Convinced of being on the right path (for the Dutch had long been sending friendly chiefs and emissaries, supposedly at the Sultan’s invitation — for so the adat ran — with gifts to Kemala, to take soundings), they did not accept T. di Tirou’s offer, in which he had of course stipulated certain advantages for himself. More missions to Kemala, very solemn and imposing, followed; presumably the members of the missions received, or rather bought with Dutch money, Sultan’s appointments — but for the Dutch all led to nothing.

The Deaths of January 1891 and the Departure of April 1891

The strong position taken by T. di Tirou opposite the Dutch line, the difficulty the Dutch had in keeping him at bay, together with their sweet, conciliatory attitude toward Kemala and other chiefs, heightened among the Atjehers the hope that it would ultimately succeed to drive the Dutch into the sea. When, moreover, the health of Van Teijn — whose early replacement was foreseen, promising a change of administration and direction — gave the Atjehers reason to adopt, like the Dutch, a policy of waiting and to postpone conciliation for the time being, that was an additional reason. In January 1891 Tengkoe di Tirou and Panglima Polim died suddenly, and this too was an occasion for the Kemala-party in any case to await first the consequences of the impending change of administration. In April 1891 Van Teijn, thus disappointed in his expectations, after years of heavy laborious work, departed owing to increasing indisposition.

Significance

Van Teijn’s governorship is the period of the most sustained Dutch attempt at a negotiated end to the Atjeh-oorlog through conciliation of the Sultan and the Kemala-party, combined with the coastal blockade as a pressure instrument. His diagnosis of the situation — that the policy of waiting alone was insufficient, and that a scheepvaartregeling and selective blockade were necessary — was vindicated by the success of the blockade he enforced on the North and West Coasts; his failure to obtain the Sultan’s submission was the failure of the policy of conciliation itself, which Kruijt identifies as structurally incapable of success against an enemy “die aan groote geslepenheid en volharding, grooten nationalen trots en onverdelgbaren haat tegen den indringer paart” (who combines great cunning and perseverance, great national pride and indestructible hatred of the invader). The death of Tengkoe di Tirou in January 1891 removed the principal religious leader of the resistance; he would be succeeded as head of the resistance by his son Tengkoe Mohamed Amin.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In the 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Van Heutsz treats Van Teijn — after Van der Heijden — as the second hero of his narrative: the Governor who restored Dutch prestige after the cajoleering-decade of 1884–1886, re-imposed the closure of the Noordkust and Westkust in stages from January 1888 to the beginning of 1890, pioneered the actieve verdediging (active defence) of the Kota-Radja linie from the end of September 1889, and — after his departure for health reasons — addressed to the Minister van Koloniën the warning letter of 23 November 1891 from Utrecht that opens the entire 1893 tract. The Governor whose sluiting-stelsel Van Heutsz treats as the operational model the Regeering should have continued, and whose warning that “dat telkens veranderen van politiek; dat gebrek aan eene vaste consequent doorgezette richting” (that constant changing of policy; that lack of a fixed consistently pursued direction) became the rhetorical starting point of the entire 1893 book.

Appointment and inheritance (end-1886)

Van Teijn’s governorship opened with the death of Generaal Demmeni at the end of 1886: “Zoo brak einde 1886 het tijdperk aan, waarin door den dood van den Generaal Demmeni, de Kolonel van Teijn het bestuur in handen kreeg, met de opdracht om consequent door te gaan in de aangegeven richting, en met het beginsel van herstel van het sultanaat tot basis” — So at the end of 1886 the period began, in which, through the death of General Demmeni, Colonel van Teijn took the administration into his hands, with the charge to continue consistently in the indicated direction, and with the principle of restoration of the sultanate as basis. The beginsel van herstel van het sultanaat (principle of restoration of the sultanate) had been revived at ministerial level by Minister Sprenger van Eijk in 1886, on the prompting of Laging Tobias’s December 1886 article in the Indische Gids and of Fransen van de Putte’s Parlementaire Redevoeringen (Parliamentary Speeches) — and Van Teijn, “Onverdeeld was hij in dit opzicht het gevoelen toegedaan van den gewezen Gouverneur Laging Tobias” (He was, undividedly, in this respect of the opinion of the former Governor Laging Tobias), shared Laging Tobias’s view that the restoration of the sultanate under Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed was the right political basis for the closure of the war. He was, in other words, sent to Atjeh to execute the herstel-van-het-sultanaat policy as the political accompaniment to the sluiting he had been ordered to apply.

The first year of his governorship was marked by military success against the religious leader Tengkoe di Tirou: “hoe hij de steeds driester geworden Tengkoe di Tirou en zijne benden reeds in het eerste jaar van zijn bestuur tot tweemaal toe met bebloede koppen uit onze linie sloeg, toen zij zich daar nabij Kota Moesapi genesteld hadden” — how, in the first year of his administration, he twice drove the ever-bolder Tengkoe di Tirou and his bands, with bloody heads, out of our line, when they had entrenched themselves near Kota Moesapi. The prestige recovered in those two repulses became the political capital Van Teijn would spend on the closure of the coast.

The closure of the Noord- en Westkust (January 1888 – beginning 1890)

The central operational measure of Van Teijn’s governorship was the progressive closure of the Noord- en Westkust, begun in January 1888 and completed in the beginning of 1890. The first pilot closure was of a portion of the Westkust, in January 1888: “de in Januari 1888 bevolen sluiting van een gedeelte der Westkust” (the closure, ordered in January 1888, of a part of the West Coast). The quick results — “Het waren vooral de snel bereikte gewichtige resultaten, die hij met de in Januari 1888 bevolen sluiting van een gedeelte der Westkust erlangde, welke hem tot het stelsel van sluiting brachten” (It was especially the quickly attained important results that he obtained with the closure, ordered in January 1888, of a part of the West Coast, which brought him to the system of closure) — converted Van Teijn to the sluiting-stelsel as a general policy. The closure was then progressively extended: “in Januari 1888 toegestaan, van lieverlede tot de sluiting kwam die, zich steeds verder uitbreidende, in het begin van 1890 eindelijk was uitgestrekt over de geheele Noord- en Westkust” — permitted in January 1888, the closure gradually came to extend, ever further, until at the beginning of 1890 it was finally extended over the entire North and West Coast. By the beginning of 1890 the entire Noord- en Westkust was closed — “de door den Generaal van Teijn in ‘t begin van 1890 ingevoerde algemeene sluiting van Noord- en Westkust in verband met de scheepvaartregeling op de Oostkust” (the general closure of North and West Coast introduced by General Van Teijn at the beginning of 1890 in connection with the shipping-regulation on the East Coast).

Van Heutsz’s verdict on the closure is measured. It was applied “door een Gouverneur als Generaal van Teijn, die met veel beleid en energie te werk ging en daarbij krachtig en vol toewijding gesteund werd, in de eerste plaats door H. M. marine” — by a Governor like General Van Teijn, who worked with much circumspection and energy, and who was powerfully and devotedly supported, in the first place, by H. M. Navy. The Oostkust remained open — “niettegenstaande zij niet zoo afdoende was, als die in 1884 door de Regeering gewenscht, omdat de Oostkust open bleef” (notwithstanding that it was not so decisive as that desired in 1884 by the Government, because the East Coast remained open) — and Van Teijn’s sluiting was therefore, Van Heutsz concedes, less rigorous than the rigorous blokkade the Regeering had wanted in 1884. But “toch nog boven verwachting doel” — still it attained its purpose beyond expectation. Van Heutsz even argues that Van Teijn’s “stelsel eigenlijk geen sluiting, maar scheepvaartregeling” was — that Van Teijn’s system was, in substance, not a closure but a scheepvaartregeling, since the open Oostkust ports and the retained Dutch-held outlets on the Noord- en Westkust functioned as the call-ports of a scheepvaartregeling.

The actieve verdediging of the linie (September 1889)

The defensive counterpart to the closure of the coast was the actieve verdediging (active defence) of the Kota-Radja linie, which Van Teijn pioneered from the end of September 1889. Van Heutsz describes the measure as the simple but long-neglected act of making the linie safe at night: “Dat het niet moeilijk is het ei van Columbus zelfs om al dadelijk de veiligheid van onze linie ook gedurende den nacht weder te verzekeren, is, dunkt me, onder het bestuur van Generaal van Teijn afdoende bewezen” — that it is not difficult, even a Columbus-egg, to ensure at once the safety of our line also during the night, is, I think, conclusively proven under the administration of General Van Teijn. The measure was introduced at the end of September 1889: “Tegen het einde van September 1889 liet de Generaal daarmede een aanvang maken en reeds vóór het einde van December van dat jaar was het uit met ‘s vijands overmoed” — towards the end of September 1889 the General made a beginning with it, and already before the end of December of that year the enemy’s insolence was over. The actieve verdediging, combined with the closure of the coast, restored to the linie the security it had lost under the cajoleering-decade, and gave Van Teijn the political room to pursue the closure until the Noordkust chiefs themselves begged to deliver their produce to Olehleh.

Reliance on Ruijssenaers (medio 1890 onwards)

The civil-administrative counterpart to Van Teijn’s military and coast-closure measures was his reliance on den Heer Ruijssenaers, who was appointed assistent-resident of Groot-Atjeh in medio 1890. Van Heutsz describes the appointment as the single administrative stroke of fortune of the Van Teijn governorship: “Gelukkig vond voorts de Generaal van Teijn in den medio 1890 als assistent-resident van Groot-Atjeh optredenden Heer Ruijssenaers een man van helder doorzicht en krachtig initiatief” — fortunately, moreover, General Van Teijn found in Mr Ruijssenaers, who entered office in mid-1890 as assistant-resident of Groot-Atjeh, a man of clear insight and powerful initiative. Ruijssenaers refused the quandmême-bestuur that had characterised the civil administration of the cajoleering-decade — “als ambtenaar een uitzondering maakte op den regel en niet quand même wilde besturen, zelfs daar, waar door het Regeeringsstelsel niet te besturen viel” (as an official made an exception to the rule and did not wish to govern quand même, even there where, by the Government’s system, it was impossible to govern) — and he became the principal defender of the sluiting after Van Teijn’s departure. In 1878 Ruijssenaers had been wounded in the inval (raid) of Habib Abdoel Rachman, when he had accompanied a military transport from Pakan Badak to Boekit Seboen; in 1891 he stood fast for the sluiting — “Telde hij in 1878 zijn leven niet bij den inval van den Habib … in 1891 bleef hij pal staan voor ‘s lands belangen” (In 1878 he did not count his life dear in the raid of the Habib … in 1891 he stood fast for the country’s interests). Van Heutsz credits Ruijssenaers with the Nota defending the sluiting that the sitting Minister held in high regard — “In eene belangrijke Nota heeft hij bovendien zijne denkbeelden ontwikkeld omtrent den toestand te Atjeh tijdens het vertrek van Generaal van Teijn en de verder te volgen gedragslijn” (In an important Nota he has, moreover, developed his ideas on the situation in Atjeh at the time of General Van Teijn’s departure and the course of action further to be followed) — and notes, in the parting shot of the chapter, that Ruijssenaers “tot dusverre nog geen enkele onderscheiding” (had, until now, not received a single distinction) had received.

The November 1891 warning letter

Van Teijn’s governorship closed with his departure for health reasons in 1891 and his return to the Netherlands, where — from Utrecht, on 23 November 1891 — he addressed his warning letter to the Minister van Koloniën. The letter, which Van Heutsz makes the rhetorical starting point of the 1893 tract, contains the central diagnostic sentence of the book: “Nog eenmaal en wel bij brief, gedagteekend: Utreeht, 23 November 1891 achtte de Generaal zich verplicht den Minister van Koloniën te waarschuwen. Hij schreef toen o. a.: «Dat telkens veranderen van politiek; dat gebrek aan eene vaste consequent doorgezette richting»” — once more, by letter dated Utrecht, 23 November 1891, the General felt obliged to warn the Minister of Colonies. He wrote then, among other things: “That constant changing of policy; that lack of a fixed consistently pursued direction”. The warning was Van Teijn’s post-retirement plea that the Regeering bind his successor to the sluiting-stelsel by a binding instruction — “betoogde de Generaal, naar hij mij het vorige jaar uit Holland schreef, in een eigenhandig gesteld schrijven aan de Regeering de noodzakelijkheid van het dwingen van den Gouverneur van Atjeh door eene bindende instructie tot het volgen van de vastgestelde politiek. Het heeft niet gebaat” — the General argued, as he wrote to me the previous year from Holland, in a letter written in his own hand to the Regeering, the necessity of compelling the Governor of Atjeh by a binding instruction to follow the established policy. It did not help. Van Heutsz’s verdict is in one sentence: the Regeering ignored the warning, the new Governor abandoned the sluiting, and the policy oscillation Van Teijn had warned against resumed.

Van Teijn died in 1892, and his levensbeschrijving (biographical notice) appeared in the August 1892 number of the Indisch Militair Tijdschrift — Van Heutsz’s source for the Westkust 1888 events and for the Algemeen voorstel (general proposal) Van Teijn had submitted to the Regeering alongside his warning letter. The Algemeen voorstel held that the sluiting “met energie moest worden volgehouden totdat de partij van verzet te Kemala met Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed het hoofd in den schoot zouden hebben gelegd” — had to be sustained with energy until the party of resistance at Kemala, with Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed, should have laid their heads in their laps (i.e., submitted).

Significance (per Van Heutsz)

Van Teijn’s significance in the Aceh Wiki History record rests on four things: he was the Governor who restored Dutch prestige after the cajoleering-decade of 1884–1886; he was the Governor who re-imposed, in stages from January 1888 to the beginning of 1890, the closure of the Noord- en Westkust, and who thus provided the operational model Van Heutsz would generalise in the 1893 tract; he was the Governor who pioneered the actieve verdediging of the linie from the end of September 1889, restoring the night-safety the linie had lost; and he was the author of the warning letter of 23 November 1891 — “dat telkens veranderen van politiek; dat gebrek aan eene vaste consequent doorgezette richting” — that became the rhetorical opening of Van Heutsz’s 1893 book and the single sentence that fixes the diagnostic frame of the entire tract. The model of Van Teijn’s governorship — closure plus actieve verdediging plus a politically engaged civil assistant in the person of Ruijssenaers — is the immediate operational precedent for the policies Van Heutsz would himself implement as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward.

Sources

Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 1, 10, 24 (Nederland en Atjeh — Personen en Stelsels; Een Terugblik — Wat Reeds Verkregen Werd; De Inwendige Toestand).

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

Van Teijn was a Dutch major-general who as Governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden from the end of 1886 to 23 April 1891 replaced the system of abstention practised under the Concentration by a more vigorous action against the resistance, and under whose administration the general state of the province notably improved.

Government

Van Teijn entered upon office in the last part of 1886 with the instruction to continue the consolidation of the concentration, keeping also in view the restoration of the Sultanate under Dutch protectorate (see also E. B. Kielstra, whose work Het Herstel van het Sultanaat in Atjeh Langhout cites in this connexion). After a year of patient waiting he came to the conviction that the subjection of the province could only be enforced; the ensuing more energetic action, continued under his successor, visibly reduced the enemy’s resistance — damage to telephone lines, railways and bridges had almost ceased to occur by 1891.

In the years of Van Teijn’s government the general condition much improved. Travelling by Atjehnese on the steam tram perceptibly increased; for safety it was decided that in every train a police officer should be present, keeping a watchful eye at the halts upon the Atjehnese travelling along, so that armed men should not take place in the carriages. A marked improvement also came in the state of health. To protect Koeta Radja against inundations the Government built a quay, so that the neighbourhood remained free of superfluous water. Trade in Groot-Atjeh remained of little significance, however: rice-growing was hampered by lack of plough-cattle, and the considerable import of buffaloes from other parts of Atjeh brought no change because cattle-disease claimed numerous victims among the newly arrived animals; the proclaimed closing of the whole north coast since August 1890 had a withering influence on trade, without hastening subjection as intended.

Departure

On 23 April 1891 Major-General Van Teijn handed the government of the province over to the newly appointed Governor, Colonel F. Pompe van Meerdervoort, the state of affairs in the occupied parts of Atjeh being “not unfavourable”.

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter X, “Politiek onder generaal Van Teijn. Blokkade en poging tot herstel van het Sultanaat, van December 1886 tot April 1891.” OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 53–57.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 6, 10, plus the chapters on 1886–1891. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 60–62, 64.

tags	person, military, dutch, colonial, general, governor, aceh-war, atjeh, 19th-century, commander, 1880s, aceh, colonial-administrator, concentratie-stelsel, east-coast
aliases	Generaal van Teijn, Van Teijn, Van Teijen, Van Thijn, Kolonel van Teijn, Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Teijn, Governor Van Teijn of Atjeh, General Van Teijn, Generaal-majoor Van Teijn, Governor Van Teijn, Gouverneur Van Teijn

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