Panglima Polim—the collective name by which Dutch sources refer to the successive hereditary rulers of the XXII Moekims—was the principal opponent of Dutch authority in Groot-Atjeh from the first expedition of 1873 until his unconditional submission in 1903. The title denotes not a single individual but a family line: Sri Moeda Perkasa (d. 1879), his successor Toekoe Moeda Ibrahim (d. 1891), and the youth Toekoe Radja Daoed (who came of age during the 1900s and was initially under the guardianship of three toekoes). Because the family line persisted regardless of individual deaths, the Dutch referred to the figure collectively as “Panglima Polim”—making the family, in a sense, immortal: “Polim est mort, vive Polim!”
The XXII Moekims and the Polim line
The XXII Moekims—one of the three sagi (bondgenootschappen) that encompassed the territory where the sultan of Atjeh exercised direct authority around Koeta Radja—was ruled by a hereditary chief bearing the title of panglima. At the time of the first Dutch expedition in 1873, the head was Sri Moeda Perkasa, who regarded himself as an equal of the sultan. He died in 1879; his successor Toekoe Moeda Ibrahim died in 1891; the next heir was the young Toekoe Radja Daoed, initially placed under guardianship.
The name “Panglima Polim” therefore refers to the office and family rather than to any one individual. The Dutch followed common usage and treated the line as a single continuous figure from 1873 to the submission of 1903.
The 1873-1874 campaigns
During the first Dutch expedition in 1873—which ended in disaster—the inhabitants of the XXII Moekims played a major role in resisting the “kaffirs” (the Dutch, described as Christian enemies of the Koran), even though Dutch troops had never entered the moekims. When the second expedition under Generaal Van Swieten succeeded and finally captured the kraton (24 January 1874), it was the line of Panglima Polim—manned by 3,000 men from the XXII Moekims—that inspired the greatest respect from Dutch commanders and demanded the most strategic consideration.
After the capture of the kraton and the death of the young sultan two days later, many significant chiefs from the XXV and XXVI Moekims came to pay their respects to Van Swieten, and the population of those sagi’s showed signs of being tired of further struggle. But among the chiefs who refused any approach, Panglima Polim stood at the forefront. He did not submit to Van Swieten’s declaration that the government accepted authority over the three sagi’s and that non-submitting chiefs were considered deposed. Instead, he made his territory a gathering place for all who wished to continue the war, and his influence radiated over all the landscapes of Groot-Atjeh.
The resistance of 1874-1879
Generaal Van Swieten expected that after some reflection the Atjeh people would voluntarily submit, provided the Dutch maintained a strong position around the kraton and the mouth of the Atjeh River. Before his departure, however, he had already discovered that this expectation would not be fulfilled quickly. The Dutch position suffered continuously from the enterprise of those not well-disposed, and in the majority of operations the inhabitants of the XXII Moekims accounted for the lion’s share of the resistance.
The successor to Van Swieten, Generaal Pel (from April 1874), was quickly forced to abandon the waiting attitude and take the offensive. The struggle began with operations against Longbatta, where Panglima Polim himself defended a benteng (fort) against Dutch forces, preventing Pel from making rapid progress. The poor health of Dutch troops contributed to the slow completion of the defensive line that the Dutch wished to maintain with 38 posts around Koeta Radja.
In 1875, after Pel had returned to Batavia, more vigorous action commenced. The resistance of the chiefs who had shown some approach to the Dutch gradually hardened, influenced by the example of more energetic leaders. This struggle cost the life of the brave Generaal Pel before he had completed his task. His successors—Generaal Wiggers van Kerchem (from March 1876) and Generaal Diemont (from 5 November 1876)—fought extensively before Pel’s programme could be executed: to control Groot-Atjeh with such a line of posts that the Dutch would be complete masters of traffic to and from the sea.
By early 1877 the Dutch believed this goal had been achieved. The territory of Panglima Polim could now only communicate with the coast with difficulty, since the Atjeh River and the paths through Groot-Atjeh were the usual routes. But Polim did not yield to these difficulties. He persuaded his people to seek communication with Pedir over the mountains, opening—albeit with great difficulty—a path to the north coast. Meanwhile, in other sagi’s doubt began to arise; the population was inclined to yield to the pressure of the blockade, and reports reached Dutch administration that the measures taken promised to achieve their purpose.
The Van der Heyden campaigns (1877-1879)
When Kolonel K. van der Heyden assumed office as civil and military authority in July 1877, he was instructed not to occupy new points except when absolutely necessary, and to strive for cost reduction—since Atjeh had cost 1.5 million guilders per month in 1876. Yet the end of the war was not yet won. Mainly through the direct influence of Habib Abdoer Rahman and Teungkoe di Tiro, but indirectly through Panglima Polim—who remained the soul of the resistance—the hostile Atjeh people gradually overcame the damage caused by the blockade and demonstrated to “the Company” that its measure had once again failed.
Van der Heyden succeeded in obtaining permission for more active operations, and among the military actions he successfully executed, those in the XXII Moekims occupy a place of honour. His decisive action compelled several of the most energetic resistance leaders to submit—including Toekoe Moeda Baid and the Seruchte leader Habib Abdoer Rahman. Only Polim held out and continued to strive.
In 1878 and 1879 Dutch forces penetrated with great effort into the main place of the XXII Moekims, Misigit Indrapoeri. Yet this did not bring the sagi chief Polim to submission. On the contrary, it was claimed that he became more combative than ever before; he even attempted to recapture the lost Misigit Indrapoeri. When Generaal Van der Heyden established his headquarters at Indrapoeri in May 1879, however, about ten chiefs from the XXII Moekims came to offer their submission. With this and the occupation of the Anak Galoeng-Indrapoeri stage line, the energetic general had to be satisfied, since there were still bands to be fought in the XXVI Moekims.
Although Panglima Polim had not offered submission, and although he was extremely embittered toward the “Company,” the actions of Van der Heyden and the occupation of his main place had struck him hard, and a period of time would elapse before he found the necessary strength to make himself heard again.
The concentrated line and the revival of resistance (1881-1895)
After the success of Van der Heyden, the government concluded incorrectly that the war task was completed. In April 1881 a civil official, Pruys van der Hoeven, was appointed governor of Atjeh, and Kolonel Haus became military commander. The courage of the hostile parties revived quickly, and the pressure for bolder action came mainly from the XXII Moekims. Among the leaders who played an important role, Toekoe Oemar began to secure a place beside Teungkoe di Tiro, though it must be noted that these predecessors also found much support in Polim’s territory but were never able to dominate there as elsewhere. This sagi chief tolerated no undermining of his authority.
In 1882 it became undeniable that the vigorous action of hostile bands in the XXII Moekims gave rise to a closely united priestly party that united for the holy war and made common cause with the fanatical chiefs and the existing war bands. This was the new war that began and expanded rapidly. Disagreement between the governor—who did not wish to abandon his efforts to convert the hostile by persuasion—and Kolonel Haus, who wished more active action, worked in favour of the awakening fighting spirit of the Atjeh people being suppressed in time. Matters improved somewhat when Haus was replaced by his colleague Schäfer in 1882 and the latter received more freedom of action, but decisive measures remained absent.
In 1883 the government appointed Laging Tobias (from March 1883 to December 1884), a civil official who had previously served as an officer. He achieved some improvement, but the hostile party had taken such deep root that the governor himself, seeing that the leadership of military affairs must again come to the fore, proposed uniting civil and military authority in one hand. It must be noted here that during this time the focal point of resistance was also formed by the XXII Moekims; from there action was directed not only against Dutch forts and troops, but also against Atjeh people favourable to the Dutch.
Discouraged by the repeated revival of the struggle and by the many sick among Dutch troops, the government decided to lay a line of forts around Koeta Radja and abandon the territory outside. The new governor, Kolonel Demmeni (later Generaal Demmeni), was entrusted with executing this plan. By mid-1886 the concentrated line was complete; the Dutch considered themselves invulnerable within it. Instead of improvement, however, this line brought only worsening of the problem.
When the pretender-sultan was declared of age, he was proclaimed sultan at the main place of the XXII Moekims, Indrapoeri; the war party hoped thereby to bring unity of leadership to all co-combatants. Generaal Demmeni died in December 1886 and was succeeded by Kolonel Van Teyn (later Generaal Van Teyn). The government now sought to approach the sultan in order to find a solution to the Atjeh question through restoration of the sultanate under Dutch sovereignty, combined with a good shipping regulation that would regulate and suppress import and export by sea.
Perhaps this would have succeeded had certain Atjeh chiefs—notably Panglima Polim—not worked against it. They knew how to take advantage of the government’s efforts to turn politics in their favour; now and then an approach was held out to achieve some goal, and once achieved, they withdrew again. During this period the enemy did in small what Generaal Van Heutsz later did to him on a large scale: through spies and other means he kept himself informed of what Dutch troops planned, and struck with surprise and ambush now here, now there. Especially the bands of Panglima Polim and Teungkoe di Tiro dared to penetrate within the Dutch concentrated line, and in 1887 several fierce battles had to be fought.
The administration of Generaal Van Teyn was further characterised by attempts—through shipping regulations and coast blockades, mainly by the navy—to exert pressure on the disposition of the Atjeh chiefs. Although this measure was not without effect, it could not bring the political party with Panglima Polim and the priestly party under Teungkoe di Tiro to repentance, while the sultan of Keumala also exerted more influence—perhaps precisely because of the greater attention that the government had begun to pay to his personality. Generaal Van Teyn and his successor Kolonel Pompe van Meerdervoort (April 1891–January 1892) failed to find the means to bend Panglima Polim’s neck.
The Deijkerhoff-Oema policy and its consequences (1893-1896)
Under the new governor Generaal Deijkerhoff (from January 1892), the Dutch attempted to catch Atjeh people with Atjeh people, combined with an improved shipping regulation according to the views of Scherer. The role played by Toekoe Oemar—who after crossing to the Dutch side was called Toekoe Djohan or Panglima Prang Besar—is well known. He cleansed the XXV and XXVI Moekims of hostile elements and brought those sagi’s completely to rest. But the XXII Moekims—the land of Panglima Polim—remained.
Although the young Polim was then also under guardianship, the same spirit prevailed as if Polim himself held authority. Toekoe Djohan encountered much resistance in 1893 and 1894 but managed to penetrate to Senelop. Yet precisely during this struggle the change in Toekoe Djohan’s disposition toward the government took place, and he defected to the hostile side—after a plan failed through which he had attempted to strike a treacherous blow, of which a good portion of Dutch troops could have been the victim. It is peculiar that the success and loyalty of Toekoe Djohan should find their end in the land of the Polims, where Dutch authority had always encountered the toughest resistance.
The supreme authority then sent the army commander, Generaal Vetter, as government commissioner to Atjeh, with three battalions of infantry as temporary reinforcement. Toekoe Djohan and his bands were defeated and driven out of Groot-Atjeh; through continued military action the fallen-away XXVI Moekims were again cleansed of enemies, and part of the XXII Moekims was also treated—though these could not be entirely subdued.
It was not without purpose that it should be noted that the young Polim stood under guardianship yet affairs in the XXII Moekims continued on the old footing—precisely therein lies the special significance of Panglima Polim above the majority of other chiefs who made names in the Atjeh War. Unlike Habib Abdoer Rahman, Teungkoe di Tiro, or Toekoe Oemar himself—who disappear when their persons depart from the stage—the family of the Polims remains. “Polim est mort, vive Polim!” makes Panglima Polim immortal. Therefore only the submission of the head of their family can bring the struggle with them to an end.
The Van Heutsz campaign (1898-1903)
After the defection of Toekoe Oemar (T. Djohan), Generaal Vetter temporarily assumed leadership. Once he had taught the defector a sufficient lesson to discourage him from venturing into Groot-Atjeh for the time being, he handed his task over to the newly appointed civil and military governor, Generaal De Moulin (June 1895). The first action of the new dignitary was an operation in the land of Panglima Polim, the XXII Moekims. While Generaal Stemfoort—after the sudden death of Generaal De Moulin—held command (July-November 1896), a powerful thrust was necessary, which brought Dutch troops well forward, to Reung-Reung.
Panglima Polim, who in the meantime had himself resumed control over his ancestral territory, found that he was no match for the weapons of the Company, but the Company also discovered that it had a tenacious opponent to deal with—one who did not retreat further than absolutely necessary and returned as soon and as far as he could from where he had been driven. Although Dutch troops succeeded—under the now-acting governor, Kolonel Van Vliet (later Generaal Van Vliet)—in largely cleansing the XXV and XXVI Moekims of enemies, and although much improvement could be brought about in part of the XXII Moekims, the government itself had to declare: “In the sagi of the XXII Moekims, where, since the Atjeh War began, the core of the resistance was always located, a situation as favourable as in the other two sagi’s could naturally not yet be achieved in so short a time,” followed by the declaration “that it had proven necessary to pursue the bands in that sagi relentlessly and without interruption in their mountains until they had been made completely harmless.”
This prescription would only receive full application under the successor to Generaal Van Vliet, Kolonel J. B. van Heutsz (from May 1898). He applied it not only to the XXII Moekims and to Panglima Polim, but to all of Atjeh and to all Atjeh chiefs. Van Heutsz was the first to expect no benefit from occupying and pacifying a more or less large part of Atjeh, since the remaining part would always serve as a refuge and restoration place for the hostile. All of Atjeh had to become the operational theatre; all of Atjeh had to come directly under Dutch authority.
Shortly before the arrival of this governor, Panglima Polim had just made an attempt to bring the combative in Atjeh to greater unity and effectiveness. He had managed to bring about a gathering of many chiefs in Pedir, at which among others the pretender-sultan and Toekoe Oemar were present. There he had given the example of taking a renewed oath of loyalty to the pretender-sultan and of promising to cooperate vigorously in the holy war against the “kaffirs.” But this could no longer benefit the Atjeh people, for also in Batavia the Dutch government had held a meeting, and there the decision for forceful action had been taken and its execution entrusted to the man who would place Atjeh under Dutch control.
The instructions that Kolonel Van Heutsz brought contained three points, of which two clearly indicated the significance that government and governor attached to Panglima Polim as the principal figure in the Atjeh struggle of those days: (a) the expedition would begin at Segli in Pedir, advancing over the mountains from the north coast toward Polim’s land—since Pedir had become, since Dutch troops and the navy controlled the coast in Groot-Atjeh, the route by which Polim remained in contact with the sea; our supply and reinforcement route had to be taken from him; (b) thereafter Panglima Polim was to be attacked, defeated, and relentlessly pursued until his submission was obtained.
This instruction has only now been fully carried out—after being faithfully observed for more than five years. Van Heutsz, fully supported by his adviser Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, first attacked Pedir and brought this landscape under Dutch authority. The Dutch enemy found strong support from Panglima Polim and his bands, operating from the mountain district of the VII Moekims situated between the XXII Moekims and Pedir. This was reason enough to deal with those VII Moekims next. Panglima Polim defended himself bravely, but repeatedly driven out, threatened by nightly surprises, abandoned by the majority of discouraged comrades, he finally felt compelled to leave this territory and sought a refuge for himself and his family in upper Samalanga. Thus he had become a king without land.
The pretender-sultan had also already fled and sought shelter in the high mountains at Geumpang. With bitter eyes Panglima Polim watched the Company maintain a firm foothold in his territory, where points were occupied and civil authorities soon brought the landscapes under regular Dutch administration. Yet he did not despair. Politics in the Netherlands had repeatedly brought change in the politics of Atjeh; “Allah is great!” Who knew whether he might not yet bring the rulers in Holland to a change of system. He probably did not know that in the Netherlands there had indeed always been writers who, from the desperate blows he struck—now and then with some success—had drawn occasion to preach what he carried as his most fervent wish: cessation of the Van Heutsz system.
For five years Panglima Polim wandered around without a fixed residence—always lying in wait whether a blow could be struck somewhere, constantly seizing every opportunity to harm the Dutch, continuously striving to revive the holy struggle against them, urging all who had not yet submitted to persist in their aversion and resistance. But for five years he was also relentlessly sought and attacked by Dutch columns—regardless of where he fled, whether in the primeval forest, in unknown mountains, or in the inhospitable Gajoelanden. No Atjeh chief had as well as he mastered the art of making himself unfindable for months to the Dutch spy army—something all the more surprising because no figure in Atjeh was as well known as he.
Throughout all this time Panglima Polim had been the principal figure of the resistance; the pretender-sultan was only a puppet, used by the Atjeh chiefs, a puppet of which it was good that it had been taken from the war party—once in Dutch hands, it only had the significance of no longer being able to do harm. Panglima Polim, on the other hand, was the soul of the resistance. Even in the last two years he had caused the Dutch much trouble. The majority of that time he spent in the Pirastreek (north coast), from where he fled to the Gajoelanden when necessary. Successively multiple columns had hunted him without immediate success; in the most recent period Kapitein Colijn and Onderluitenant Christoffel—two commanders who had already earned their spurs in Atjeh—operated against him, and it is probably they who managed to bring the fire so close to his heels that he had to give up the struggle.
Reports had already arrived as precursors of the submission. In the region where Panglima Polim was, many from the mountains returned to their previously abandoned kampong, weary of fighting. His bands had suffered heavy losses. Chiefs who had long remained loyal to his side came to submit. Finally, his mother and one of his wives also fell into the hands of Majoor Van der Maaten—and this is often a reason to give up the struggle, as was recently shown with Toekoe Eh and the pretender-sultan.
Then came the report that Panglima Polim had asked for operations against him to be halted, because he wished to come in submission—a last attempt to try to catch his breath. But the governor did not grant him this: “Continue pursuit,” was the order, “until his unconditional surrender.” Then Panglima Polim had to bow his proud neck; he asked for a warship to bring him to Koeta Radja. There he wished to travel as a grand seigneur to his conqueror. And against this the governor probably had no objection, for Generaal Van Heutsz and Dr. Snouck Hurgronje share in admiration for Panglima Polim’s energy and certainly wish to give honour where honour is due.
The submission (1903) and its significance
Panglima Polim has submitted unconditionally. The Dutch did not know exactly what fate the government would assign him, but it was presumed that he would not have cause to complain. Generaal Van Heutsz considered only those chiefs guilty who had first chosen the Dutch side and then abandoned it again—those who had committed treason. The Polims had always been generous, honourable enemies who had done nothing to forfeit Dutch respect. The treatment that Panglima Polim could expect would be in accordance with this assessment. His unconditional submission was demanded so that a victory would not be bought through weak promises, but so that the right to grant mercy as a powerful victor would be preserved.
With the submission of Panglima Polim in 1903, the thirty-year Atjeh War came to its end. Although some work remained—roads to be built, the Gajoelanden to be brought under administration, a few remaining hostile bands to be pursued—the fundamental resistance had collapsed. The population everywhere, even in the deepest interior and highest mountains, recognised Dutch authority. The war itself was over.
Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)
Verstege’s notes touch the Panglima’s place in three moments. As a figure of the Atjehsche war custom he stands, with other chiefs and a crowd of lesser Atjehers, among those present at the cruel execution of the Dutch truce-bearer Mas Soemo Widjojo in the last days of December 1873 (see Murder of parlementaire Mas Soemo Widjojo (23 December 1873)). In June 1879 his official dwelling-place, Gleieng — “the dwelling-place of the so feared sagie-head Panglima Polim” — was stormed in the morning of the fifth (Verstege’s dating; see Capture of Gleiêng (9 July 1879) for the variant of tradition): he had not dared to await the Dutch attack, and in his positions were found, besides a great stock of gunpowder and bullets, 24 pieces of cannon, most of too great calibre to be carried away, which were made unfit for further use. And it was his brother Toekoe Tjoet Hadjet, known as Toekoe Ajer-Alang, who on 15 August 1879 surrendered with a great following at the Selimoen bivouac and, with Toekoe Moeda Daoed, swore submission before generaal van der Heyden on 20 August 1879.
See Also
- XXII Moekims
- XXV Moekims
- XXVI Moekims
- Sagi
- Moekim
- Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz
- Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Generaal Van der Heyden
- Generaal Van Teyn
- Toekoe Oemar
- Teungkoe di Tiro
- Pedir
- Gajoelanden
- Samalanga
- Keumala
Source
Het einde van den Atjeh Oorlog. De beteekenis der Onderwerping van Panglima Polim (Overprintken uit de Evening Post van 25, 26 en 27 Augustus 1903, Royal Institute for Language, Land, and Ethnology, The Hague, Publishing Company voorheen De Vries & Co., 1903, pp. 3-18); Somer, Dr. J. M. Het Atjeh-probleem van 1890-1900 (Overprint uit Journal / Organ van de Netherlands-Indies Officers Association, [1935], pp. 4-7, 10-11).
Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 18, 60, 61. OCR: DLP-158.