The XXII Moekims campaign of July–October 1878 — the veldtocht in de XXII Moekims (campaign in the XXII Moekims) opened by Generaal van der Heijden in July 1878 and crowned by the submission of Habib Abdoel Rachman and Tekoe Moeda Baid on 13 October 1878 — was the first of the three Sagi (traditional administrative divisions) campaigns of Groot-Atjeh and the operational turning point of the Atjeh-oorlog. Van Heutsz, who served as Van der Heijden’s chef van den staf (chief of staff) in Atjeh and would later make the campaign the centrepiece of his 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, treats it as the decisive vindication of the strategic reversal engineered in June 1878 by the chief of staff majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius — the abandonment of the coastal expeditions of the Onderhoorigheden (Dependencies) in favour of a direct attack on the Sagi’s of the Atjeh valley itself. The campaign was opened within weeks of Habib Abdoel Rachman’s bekende inval (well-known incursion) of June 1878 — the incursion into the Dutch-occupied area that had triggered the op Groot-Atjeh geheel veranderen van stelsel (complete change of system on Groot-Atjeh) — and concluded, “binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht” (within three months of the beginning of the first campaign), with the submission of the two principal resistance leaders.
The June 1878 strategic reversal
The campaign’s strategic frame was set in June 1878 by majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, Van der Heijden’s pas opgetreden chef van den staf (newly-appointed chief of staff). Van Heutsz’s account, citing Kielstra’s Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog (Description of the Atjeh War) (III, noot, bladz. 249), names Geij van Pittius as the intellectual author of the reversal:
“Het waren vooral de vertoogen van den pas opgetreden chef van den sttff, den majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, die den bevelhebber e -oo dit besluit brachten. Deze had reeds in 1877, tijdens de aan- e weziiheid te Atjeh van den Souverneur-Generaa van Lansberge, er <op aangedrongen, de Zuidoosterlinie langs de Atjeh rivier te ver- <leggen en daartoe de XXII Moekims in te rukken”.
Geij van Pittius had first proposed the inrukken (moving-in) of the XXII Moekims — the moving-in on the Sagi of the XXII Moekims — as early as 1877, during the Atjeh visit of G.-G. van Lansberge, but Van Lansberge had refused to follow the advice, “wellicht dewijl toen, om de vermelde redenen, van een verzoeningspolitiek, die veel goedkooper was, heil voor de toekomst verwacht werd” (perhaps because, at that time, for the reasons mentioned, hope for the future was expected from a politics of conciliation, which was much cheaper). In June 1878 the chief of staff renewed the argument with a more general claim:
“Thans overtuigde dde chef van den staf hem, dat men door expeditien naar de kuststaten het doel het einde van den oorlog niet kon bereiken, en dat alleen eene beslissing kon worden verkregen door in Groot-Atjeh < zelf den vijand aan te tasten en te vervolgen, totdat zijne oorlogs- benden allerwegen verslagen en verdreven waren. Alleen op deze e wiize zou afdoende gevolg kunnen worden gegeven aan den last der Regeering om Habib’s benden te verdrijven niet alleen, maar ook conschadelijk te maken”.
The argument was accepted by Van der Heijden “met het halve veldleger ter beschikking” (with half the field army at his disposal) — with half the field army now at his disposal, after the reinforcements sent in response to Habib’s incursion. The Governor-General’s verzoeningspolitiek (politics of conciliation) of March 1877 was set aside; the coastal expeditions of February–June 1878 (to Melaboeh in February–March, to Gighen in April–May, to Edi and Gedong in May–June) were suspended; “toen besloot de Generaal van der Heijden voorloopig van de expeditie naar Pasangan af te zien en met geheel zijne beschikbare macht voor goed te Groot-Atjeh aan het verzet een einde te maken” (then General Van der Heijden decided for the time being to forgo the expedition to Pasangan and, with his entire available force, to put an end to the resistance in Groot-Atjeh for good).
The trigger: Habib Abdoel Rachman’s incursion (June 1878)
The campaign’s immediate trigger was the bekende inval in het door ons bezette gebied van Habib Abdoer Rachman (well-known incursion into the area occupied by us by Habib Abdoel Rachman) of June 1878 — the incursion of Habib Abdoel Rachman into the Dutch-occupied area, which Van Heutsz identifies as the moment that “de aanleiding was tot het op Groot-Atjeh geheel veranderen van stelsel” (was the occasion for the complete change of system on Groot-Atjeh). Habib Abdoel Rachman — a Habib (sayyid, descendant of the Prophet) from the IV Moekims, brother-in-law of Tekoe Moeda Baid and identified by Van Heutsz as “de ziel van den tegenstand” (the soul of the resistance) — had already, before the incursion, pushed the Gouverneur-Generaal (Governor-General) to a change of policy: “Reeds vóór dat die inval plaats had, was de G. G. door het zooeven gemelde geleidelijk meer actief optreden van den vijand onder algemeene leiding van den Habib, tot de overtuiging gekomen, dat te Groot-Atjeh niet kon volstaan worden met den in Maart 1877 voorgeschreven weg” (Already before that incursion took place, the G. G. had been led, by the just-mentioned gradually more active action of the enemy under the general leadership of the Habib, to the conviction that in Groot-Atjeh one could not be satisfied with the way prescribed in March 1877). The Gouverneur-Generaal had, by telegram of 13 June 1878, ordered the Governor “om, na regeling van de zaken in Gedong en Pasangan … aan het verzet in Groot-Atjeh een einde te maken, door, zonder het maken van nieuwe veroveringen of breken van onderhandelingen met de wettige hoofden, de benden van Habib te verdrijven en dien aanvoerder onschadelijk te maken” (to, after regulating the affairs in Gedong and Pasangan … put an end to the resistance in Groot-Atjeh, by, without making new conquests or breaking off negotiations with the lawful chiefs, driving out Habib’s bands and rendering that leader harmless).
The incursion, “die eene belangrijke vermeerdering van onze strijdmacht ten gevolge had” (which had an important increase of our fighting force as a consequence) — twenty-fourth battalion of infantry and a mountain battery were immediately dispatched to Atjeh, the cavalry brought up to a squadron, “zoodat toen, wat b. v. de Infanterie aangaat, het halve veldleger- 99 Bataljons- in Atjeh gelegerd was” (so that then, what for example the Infantry concerns, half the field army — 99 Battalions — was stationed in Atjeh) — thus coincided with the standing telegram of 13 June 1878 and gave, in Van Heutsz’s phrase, “eene geheele wending aan de zaak” (a complete turn to the matter). The orders to dispose of the Pasangan expedition and concentrate on the interior followed.
The July 1878 attack on the Sagi’s XXII
The campaign opened in July 1878 — “De krijgsoperatiën in de XXII en XXVI Moekims, die in Juli van het vorige jaar zijn aangevangen” (The military operations in the XXII and XXVI Moekims, which began in July of the previous year) — with the inrukken of the Sagi of the XXII Moekims along the Zuidoosterlinie (South-Eastern line) of the Atjeh river that Geij van Pittius had prescribed. Van Heutsz’s account is brief on the operational detail — the veldtochten in de Sagi’s XXII en XXVI (campaigns in the Sagi’s XXII and XXVI) are “met welken schitterenden uitslag onze veldtochten in de Sagi’s XXII en XXVI bekroond werden, wij weten het allen” (with what brilliant success our campaigns in the Sagi’s XXII and XXVI were crowned, we all know it) — but precise on the result. Within three months of the opening of the campaign, the two principal resistance leaders had submitted:
“Hoe reeds binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht in de XXII Moekims, de onderwerping van Habib Abdoer Rachman en van Tekoe Moeda Baid op den 13em October 1878 volgde”.
The 13 October 1878 submission was the political culmination of the campaign. Habib Abdoel Rachman — the zwager van Tekoe Moeda Baid (brother-in-law of Tekoe Moeda Baid), de ziel van den tegenstand (the soul of the resistance) — and Tekoe Moeda Baid — het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims (the powerful chief of the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII Moekims) — had been the two principal figures of the Groot-Atjeh resistance since the failed negotiations of March–October 1877. Their submission, together, in a single act on 13 October 1878, was the operational vindication of the Geij van Pittius reversal.
Significance
The XXII Moekims campaign of July–October 1878 is, in Van Heutsz’s narrative, the keerpunt (turning point) of the Atjeh-oorlog — the moment at which the colony, having spent four years dispersing its forces in coastal expeditions against the Onderhoorigheden, turned its full strength on the Sagi’s of the interior and, “binnen drie maanden na den aanvang” (within three months of the beginning), achieved the submission of the two principal resistance leaders. Its significance in the Aceh Wiki History record lies in four things. First, it was the operational vindication of the strategic reversal engineered in June 1878 by majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius — the abandonment of the coastal expeditions of G.-G. van Lansberge’s verzoeningspolitiek (politics of conciliation) of March 1877 in favour of a direct attack on the Sagi’s of the Atjeh valley itself. Second, it was the first of the three Sagi campaigns that, by September 1879, would complete the conquest of Groot-Atjeh and produce the day-order of 5 September 1879 declaring “geheel Groot-Atjeh ten onder gebragt” (all Groot-Atjeh brought under). Third, it was the campaign that brought Habib Abdoel Rachman and Tekoe Moeda Baid — the zwager (brother-in-law) pair at the head of the resistance — to submission on a single day, 13 October 1878, and thereby decapitated the Groot-Atjeh war effort. Fourth, it was the campaign that established Generaal van der Heijden as, in Van Heutsz’s catalogue, the winnaar van Groot-Atjeh (conqueror of Groot-Atjeh) — the governor whose “krachtige individualiteit … den doorslag heeft gegeven” (forceful individuality … made the decision) and whose subsequent dismissal in early 1881 would, in Van Heutsz’s reading, be the onverantwoordelijke (irresponsible) act that condemned the colony to another fifteen years of war. The campaign also produced the first of Van der Heijden’s two unilateral haven-sluitingen (harbour-closures) — the closure of all the Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden harbours, with the exception of Olehleh and Edi, for the import trade — which he undertook in 1878 “na hervatting van de krijgsoperatiën in de XXII Moekims” (after the resumption of military operations in the XXII Moekims) and on which the scheepvaartregeling (shipping regulation) of Scherer and Laging Tobias would later be modelled.
See Also
- Van der Heijden
- Geij van Pittius
- Habib Abdoel Rachman
- Tekoe Moeda Baid
- Panglima Polim
- XXII Moekims
- VII Moekims
- Groot-Atjeh
- Van Lansberge
- Day-order of 5 September 1879
- XXVI Moekims campaign (1879)
- Concentratiebesluit (19 Augustus 1884)
- Scheepvaartregeling
- 1878
Source
De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 17–22. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.