Toekoe Moeda Baid

Toekoe Moeda Baid — also written T. Moeda Baid, T. Baid — was the hoeloebalang (hereditary territorial chief) of the VII Mukims in the Sagi der XXII Moekims of Atjeh, who submitted to the Dutch on 14 October 1878 — the day after the submission of Habib Abdurrahman — but whose subsequent conduct appeared more and more treacherous, leading to his arrest on 9 May 9 May 1879, his transportation to Batavia in July 1879, and his banishment by the Governor-General to Banda.

In Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, Baid is further identified as the hoeloebalang of the VII Moekims Baid whose trajectory in the spring of 1896 mirrors that of his half-brother Toekoe Tjoet Lamtengah: initially friendly to the Dutch and an informant on the movements of Teuku Umar, he ultimately conferred with Umar and played a key role in the late-May 1896 transfer of the pretender Sultan’s circle into Groot-Atjeh. The landschap of the VII Moekims Baid contained the historic Lamkrak mukims and had been a persistent source of “kwaad volk” (bad people) for the Dutch line.

Toekoe Baid was an Acehnese chief who, in his banishment, gave to a senior Dutch official who had gained his confidence the prophecy of unending resistance which H. van Kol quoted in the Tweede Kamer on 17 November 1897 as the Acehnese counterpart to the warnings of Dutch statesmen against believing the war could be ended by force.

Submission, 14 October 1878

After the submission of Habib Abdurrahman on 13 October 1878, the example was followed by several other chiefs, among them Toekoe Moeda Baid, who was sworn in and recognised in his dignity on 14 October 14 October 1878. His submission, coming immediately after that of the Habib, was an event of considerable importance for the Dutch, as it brought the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII under Dutch authority.

Treason and Arrest, 9 May 1879

As the campaign against the XXII Moekims developed, however, it more and more appeared that Toekoe Moeda Baid played a treacherous role. He was taken prisoner on 9 May 9 May 1879 and transported to Batavia in July 1879, where the Governor-General Van Lansberge banished him to Banda. His arrest removed a dangerous double-dealer from the theatre of war and coincided with the heavy fighting at Panteh Karang of 6 May 6 May – 7 May 7 May 1879.

Significance (Atjeh-Album)

The case of Toekoe Moeda Baid illustrates the difficulty the Dutch faced in dealing with the Acehnese chiefs, many of whom — like the vorst of Gighen in 1876 — submitted in appearance only, while continuing to act against the Dutch in secret. His arrest and banishment to Banda, the traditional place of exile for Indonesian political prisoners, removed him from the Atjeh theatre for the duration of the war.

Earlier role: conflict with Habib Abdurrahman (1837–1860s)

The Atjeh-Album of 1896 records an earlier chapter in the career of a Toekoe Moeda Baid — oeloebalang of the VII Moekims — that may refer to the same person at an earlier stage of life, or to an earlier member of the same family bearing the same title. The album’s narrative places this Baid as the custodian of the young prince Toeankoe Machmoed — son of the deceased Sultan Saleiman Iskander (died 1837) — at his kampong of Tjot Bada. Habib Abdoe’r Rachman, wishing to install the prince as Sultan and to act as regent during the minority, marched on Tjot Bada at the head of two thousand men from the XXVI Moekims and compelled Baid to surrender the prince.

The same conflict surfaced again when the Habib sought the hand of Baid’s sister Potjoet — the widow of Sultan Saleiman Iskander — in marriage. Baid accepted a payment of 400 dollars for the marriage promise, but repeatedly deferred the actual delivery of the bride until the Habib was forced to march on Tjot Bada a second time. The album also names Baid as the half-brother of Toekoe Tjoet Machmoed van Lamtenguh — the oeloebalang of Lamtenguh to whom the Dutch entrusted the safety of the terrain around Anagaloeng and Blang Tjoet in 1896, after Baid himself een dubbelzinnige rol gespeeld (“had played a double role”).

The chronological range — from the 1837 succession crisis to the 1878 submission and 1879 banishment — spans more than forty years, which is unusual but not impossible for a single career. The album does not address the question of whether the Baid of the 1837 succession crisis is the same individual as the Baid who submitted in 1878 and was banished in 1879, nor whether either is identical with the Teukoe Moeda Baid Setia Maharadja whose Dutch coat-of-arms chain was granted in 1888 and revoked in 1896 — after the banishment to Banda. The most economical hypothesis is that the title Toekoe Moeda Baid was held successively by members of the same kinship line, and that the 1896 chain-revocation refers to a successor who had inherited both the title and the diplomatic consequences of the family’s earlier unreliability.

Position in the VII Moekims Baid before the Defection (per ATJEH ‘96)

The VII Moekims Baid lay in the western sector of Groot-Atjeh and contained the Lamkrak, Kroeng Mak, Loetoe and Lam Lheue mukims — “welke steeds eene verblijfplaats van kwaad volk waren” (which had always been a refuge of bad people). The Dutch post at Ana’ Galong had been established partly to keep Baid in line, and the planned 30 March 1896 operation by Lt.-Col. Van Vliet against the four Lamkrak mukims had been intended to clear this area with Umar’s cooperation; that operation was cancelled because of Umar’s defection on 29 March 1896. Baid’s promise to “ensure peace in his landschap” was therefore of considerable strategic value, and his half-brother Toekoe Tjoet Lamtengah’s daily transports to Ana’ Galong — under the guard of ten armed Achehnese — represent a parallel Dutch-anchored economic relationship within the same family network. Kruisheer’s observation that Baid was “initially neutral” was followed by his having “later conferred with Oemar” indicates that, like Lamtengah, Baid ultimately allowed the balance of forces to draw him into at least tactical cooperation with Umar, even if his formal defection was less dramatic than that of his half-brother.

Report on the Pretender Sultan’s Circle at Anao-Galong (per ATJEH ‘96)

Baid’s most consequential action in ATJEH ‘96 is his written report to the colonial government in late May 1896 that Toeankoe Machmoed and Toeankoe Brahim had “gone with many followers over the VII Moekims Baid to Groot-Atjeh, settling at Anao-Galong” — the former Dutch benteng (fort) which had been the religious centre of Teungkoe di Tiro. This was a major strategic development: it brought the entourage of the Pretender Sultan (who was himself said to have arrived and gone to Polém) into the immediate theatre of operations, and it raised the spectre of a coordinated religious-political coalition under the Sultan’s banner. Baid’s report was the means by which the Dutch learned of this movement, and his report also noted “that the pretender Sultan had arrived and gone to Polém”. The fact that Baid — a chief who had himself conferred with Umar — chose to inform the Dutch of this movement suggests either an attempt to hedge his bets once again or a genuine alarm at the entry of the Sultan’s circle into the war zone. Either way, his intelligence shaped the Dutch assessment of the political situation in the closing months of the first semester of 1896.

Significance (per ATJEH ‘96)

Toekoe Moeda Baid’s significance in ATJEH ‘96 lies in his role as the hoeloebalang whose territory connected the western Lamkrak mukims with the religious centre of Ana’ Galong and whose intelligence reports on the pretender Sultan’s circle helped the Dutch calibrate their response to the political-military crisis of late May 1896. His combination of formal loyalty, tactical conferment with Umar, and written intelligence to the Dutch is representative of the hoeloebalang class’s impossible position in the spring of 1896, and his half-brotherhood with Toekoe Tjoet Lamtengah illustrates the dense kinship networks which structured the political life of the VII Moekims Baid.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In the 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Van Heutsz gives a sustained account of Tekoe Moeda Baid — Toekoe Baid, in older spelling Tëngku Meudé Baid — the under-chief (onder-hoofd) of the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII Moekims of Groot-Atjeh, brother-in-law (zwager) of the sayyid Habib Abdoel Rachman whom Van Heutsz identifies as de ziel van den tegenstand — the soul of the resistance — in the years 1877–1878. Tekoe Moeda Baid is one of the two great Sagi chiefs — the other being Panglima Polim, Sagi-head of the XXII Moekims — whose March 1877 submission feelers, reported to Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge by the Habib, confirmed the Gouverneur-Generaal in the verzoeningspolitiek (policy of conciliation). Van Heutsz records that the actual submission of Tekoe Moeda Baid (together with his brother-in-law the Habib) came on 13 October 1878 — the same date as the Habib’s submission, per Van Heutsz’s account — after the July–October 1878 campaign of Generaal van der Heijden.

The “machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims”

Tekoe Moeda Baid’s territorial authority is defined by Van Heutsz through the formula the Gouverneur-Generaal himself used in the 12 October 1877 keerpunt letter: het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims — the powerful chief of the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII Moekims. The formula fixes Tekoe Moeda Baid’s position in the Atjehnese political order with precision. He was the onder-hoofd — the under-chief — of the VII Moekims, one of the territorial sub-federations (moekims) that made up the larger Sagi XXII Moekims of Groot-Atjeh, whose Sagi-head was Panglima Polim. He was thus not the Sagi-head himself, but the under-chief whose territory — the VII Moekims, in the Lambaroe sector — was the operational base of the resistance in the Sagi XXII. His authority was, in Van Heutsz’s reading, the territorial authority through which the sayyid Habib Abdoel Rachman — the religious and noble figure identified as de ziel van den tegenstand — exercised operational command of the resistance; and the kinship tie between them, zwager (brother-in-law), bound the religious authority of the Habib to the territorial authority of Tekoe Moeda Baid by marriage.

The March 1877 submission feelers

Tekoe Moeda Baid enters Van Heutsz’s narrative in the same context as Panglima Polim: the Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge visit to Atjeh of March 1877, and the prior report the Gouverneur-Generaal had received in Batavia from Hadji Abdoel Rachman of the IV Moekims of Groot-Atjeh. Van Heutsz records the report:

“Vóór zijn vertrek van Java, had Z. E. te Batavia nog van een zekere Hadji Abdoel Rachman uit de IV Moekims vernomen, dat zoo- wel het Sagi hoofd der XXII Moekims Panglima Polim- als het Tekoe Moeda Baid zich wilden onder- hoofd der VII Moekims, werpen, doch dat de aanraking van die hoofden met ons bestuur werd tegengewerkt door de hoofden uit Marassa, die belang hadden bij be- stendiging van den tegenwoordigen toestand”. — Before his departure from Java, His Excellency had learned at Batavia from a certain Hadji Abdoel Rachman from the IV Moekims, that as well the Sagi-head of the XXII Moekims, Panglima Polim, as the Tekoe Moeda Baid, under-head of the VII Moekims, wished to submit, but that the contact of those heads with our administration was being counteracted by the heads from Marassa, who had an interest in the maintenance of the present state of affairs.

The Habib — Tekoe Moeda Baid’s own zwager — was the source of the report that the under-chief of the VII Moekims, together with his own Sagi-head Panglima Polim, was willing to submit. The kinship tie is significant: the Habib’s report to Batavia was not a piece of external intelligence but a communication from within the kinship network of the Sagi XXII resistance, and the Gouverneur-Generaal’s receipt of it confirmed, in his own mind, the credibility of the verzoeningspolitiek he was about to apply. After the Gouverneur-Generaal’s mid-March 1877 arrival in Atjeh, the report seemed to be confirmed: “werkelijk openden toen Panglima Polim en Tekoe Moeda Baid onderhandelingen tot onderwerping” — Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid did in fact then open negotiations for submission.

The two Telok-Kroet meetings

The negotiations were conducted chiefly through Tekoe Moeda Baid himself. Van Heutsz records the venue and the form:

“de aanvankelijk gedane stappen tot onderwerping van Panglima Polim en Tekoe Moeda Baid gevolgd werden door twee besprekingen van laatstgenoemde met de ambtenaren van het bestuur te Telok-Kroet op de Westkust, waarbij hij de laatste maal verklaarde zich aan ons te onderwerpen”. — the initially taken steps for the submission of Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid were followed by two discussions of the latter with the officials of the administration at Telok-Kroet on the West Coast, in which he the last time declared himself to submit to us.

The two meetings — twee besprekingen — were held at Telok-Kroet on the Westkust of Groot-Atjeh, between Tekoe Moeda Baid and the ambtenaren van het bestuur — the officials of the administration. At the second meeting, Tekoe Moeda Baid “verklaarde zich aan ons te onderwerpen” — declared himself to submit. The report of the declaration was telegraphed to Batavia, and on 12 October 1877 the Gouverneur-Generaal wrote to the Governor of Atjeh the keerpunt letter — the letter announcing that, after the telegram of 11 October 1877 reporting Tekoe Moeda Baid’s submission, “Naar alle kenteekenen te oordeelen, is in de Atjehsche zaak thans een belangrijk keerpunt bereikt”:

“Naar alle kenteekenen te oordeelen, is in de Atjehsche zaak thans een belangrijk keerpunt bereikt … en de gewichtige tijding, die mij gisteren per telegram van U gewerd omtrent de onderwerping van Toekoe Baid, het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims, maakt een einde aan alle twijfelingen nopens den gunstigen keer van zaken”. — Judging by all signs, an important turning-point has now been reached in the Atjeh affair … and the weighty tidings, which reached me yesterday by telegram from you concerning the submission of Toekoe Baid, the powerful chief of the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII Moekims, puts an end to all doubts concerning the favourable turn of affairs.

The Gouverneur-Generaal’s letter hailed the submission of “Toekoe Baid, het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims” as a definitive turn in the Atjeh affair — the end of all doubts about the favourable turn of events. The submission was, however, insincere. Van Heutsz’s retrospective verdict is direct: the verzoeningspolitiek had been premised on the assumption that the Atjehnese submissions were genuine; the Atjehnese side had used the negotiations to gain time.

The failure of the submission and the identification of the Habib

The submission of Tekoe Moeda Baid did not, in fact, materialise. Van Heutsz records the failure:

“De onderwerping van Tekoe Moeda Baid kwam niet tot stand, evenmin die van Panglima Polim … In de eerste helft van 1878 kreeg het bestuur te Atjeh gelukkig de overtuiging, dat het met de onderhandelingen van de voornaamste hoofden te Groot-Atjeh geen ernst was geweest; geleidelijk toch nam het verzet weder toe en juist het ergste tegenover Lambaroe in het gebied van Tekoe Moeda Baid, terwijl spoedig algemeen Habib Abdoer Rachman, zwager van Tekoe Moeda Baid, als de ziel van den tegenstand aangemerkt kon worden”. — The submission of Tekoe Moeda Baid did not come about, no more than that of Panglima Polim … In the first half of 1878 the administration at Atjeh fortunately gained the conviction that there had been no seriousness in the negotiations of the principal chiefs of Groot-Atjeh; gradually, indeed, the resistance increased again, and worst of all opposite Lambaroe in the territory of Tekoe Moeda Baid, while soon generally Habib Abdoer Rachman, brother-in-law of Tekoe Moeda Baid, could be regarded as the soul of the resistance.

The double diagnosis is precise. The operational centre of the resistance in the first half of 1878 was “het ergste tegenover Lambaroe in het gebied van Tekoe Moeda Baid” — the worst, facing Lambaroe, in the territory of Tekoe Moeda Baid. The VII Moekims, of which Tekoe Moeda Baid was the machtige hoofd, was the operational base of the active resistance, and the resistance in that sector was led by the Habib — Tekoe Moeda Baid’s zwager — whom Van Heutsz identifies as de ziel van den tegenstand. The kinship tie between the under-chief and the sayyid was, in Van Heutsz’s reading, the institutional mechanism by which the religious authority of the Habib was attached to the territorial authority of the VII Moekims: the zwager relation bound the two figures in a single resistance network, of which Tekoe Moeda Baid supplied the territorial base and the Habib the operational command.

The 13 October 1878 submission (per Van Heutsz)

The reversal of policy came in June 1878, when the Habib’s inval (incursion) into the Dutch-occupied territory triggered Generaal van der Heijden’s decision to abandon the coastal expeditions and attack the Sagi federations directly. The XXII Moekims campaign opened in July 1878, and within three months produced the actual submission of the two figures whose March 1877 feelers had inaugurated the verzoeningspolitiek. Van Heutsz records the timing:

“Hoe reeds binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht in de XXII Moekims, de onderwerping van Habib Abdoer Rachman en van Tekoe Moeda Baid op den 13em October 1878 volgde”. — How already within three months of the beginning of the first campaign in the XXII Moekims, the submission of Habib Abdoer Rachman and of Tekoe Moeda Baid followed on the 13th of October 1878.

The submission of 13 October 1878 — of the Habib and of Tekoe Moeda Baid, the zwagers — closed the operational core of the XXII Moekims campaign (Van Heutsz’s date of 13 October 1878 for both submissions is one day earlier than the 14 October 1878 date given in the Atjeh-Album tradition for Tekoe Moeda Baid’s swearing-in; the discrepancy reflects either a difference in the event being dated — the act of submission versus the formal swearing-in — or a difference of source). The under-chief of the VII Moekims whose March 1877 Telok-Kroet declaration had been hailed by the Gouverneur-Generaal as the keerpunt of the Atjeh affair had, eighteen months later, been compelled to submit by the campaign his insincerity had provoked.

Significance (per Van Heutsz)

Tekoe Moeda Baid’s significance in Van Heutsz’s narrative is that of the machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims — the powerful under-chief of the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII Moekims of Groot-Atjeh — whose March 1877 submission feelers, reported to Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge by his zwager Habib Abdoel Rachman, were one of the three converging signals that confirmed the Gouverneur-Generaal in the verzoeningspolitiek of March 1877; who was the under-chief whose two Telok-Kroet meetings with the Dutch bestuursambtenaren produced the telegram of 11 October 1877 from the Governor of Atjeh and the 12 October 1877 keerpunt letter of Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge — a letter that would later be revealed, by the failure of the submission, to have been premised on insincere negotiations; who was the zwager of the Habib, the kinship-tie by which the religious authority of the sayyid was attached to the territorial authority of the VII Moekims, and the operational base of the resistance in the Lambaroe sector in the first half of 1878; and who was the under-chief whose actual submission, together with that of his zwager the Habib, came on 13 October 1878 after the XXII Moekims campaign of Generaal van der Heijden. His role in the resistance is, in Van Heutsz’s narrative, the territorial counterpart to the religious authority of the Habib: where the Habib supplied the religious sanction and the operational command, Tekoe Moeda Baid supplied the territorial base — the VII Moekims of the Sagi XXII — from which the resistance was conducted.

The prophecy

Van Kol introduced the saying immediately after quoting Fransen van de Putte’s warning to the chamber of September 1876 — “Geeft niet toe aan den volkswaan van een dag; tracht niet door krachtige middelen een einde aan den oorlog te maken; het zal u niet gelukken!” — and observed that the judgement of the Dutch statesman was also the judgement of an Acehnese prince.

Toekoe Baid’s words, as reported, were: “als de mannen gedood zijn, zullen de vrouwen oorlog voeren, en als deze gevallen zijn zullen de kinderen, groot geworden, den krijg hervatten” — when the men are killed, the women will wage war, and when these have fallen the children, grown up, will resume the fight.

Context in Van Kol’s argument

The saying formed part of Van Kol’s argument, printed under the heading Atjeh onneembaar, that the subjection of Atjeh was unattainable. Whoever knew the national character, he said, knew that every Acehnese who fell imposed upon his numerous blood relations the duty of weerwraak (blood revenge); though it be years later, fidelity to the vendetta demanded the killing of the enemies who had slain him. The Dutch could destroy dwellings and kill men, could even cause women and children to fall, but they did not diminish the fighting capacity of the warriors — only the powerlessness of the peaceably disposed. They thus roused bitterness and supported the war-loving parts of the population, who wished nothing better than a guerrilla war; after a defeat these made off, disappeared into inaccessible interiors, and returned later strengthened and with new auxiliaries; “zij zijn overal en nergens.” The Dutch were forming an embittered people in a devastated land, sown with bayonets, where they had made enemies of all, great and small.

The source records nothing further of Toekoe Baid’s territory, his part in the war, the date or place of his banishment, or the name of the official to whom he spoke.

Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)

Toekoe Moeda Baid was the powerful head (het machtige hoofd) of the VII Moekims in Groot-Atjeh, banished by General van der Heijden for faithlessness and afterwards recalled and restored to honour by General Demmeni on account of his influence, whose territory adjoined the Dutch post at Anagaloeng and whose ambiguous loyalty kept the garrison there on the alert.

Banishment and restoration

Hooijer recorded that Toekoe Moeda Baid had been banished by General van der Heijden wegens trouweloosheid — for faithlessness — and was afterwards brought back and rehabilitated by General Demmeni for the sake of the influence he wielded.

The neighbourhood of Anagaloeng

The Dutch post at Anagaloeng lay immediately beside his territory. Hooijer wrote that this neighbourhood hield de officieren in spanning en de schildwachten wakker — kept the officers in suspense and the sentries awake — for now and then only too well-founded suspicions arose that General Van der Heijden had not judged him so wrongly after all. One of the nearby blokhuizen, garrisoned by his people and under his supervision, fell or was played into the hands of the Moslemin a few hours after an officer had held an inspection there and found everything in order. In a word, Hooijer concluded, he was a friend of whom one had to beware, en dat geeft wat pittigheid aan de conversatie, zooals men te Anagaloeng zeide — “and that gives some spice to the conversation, as they said at Anagaloeng.”

For two years in succession the constantly changing garrison at Anagaloeng nevertheless had a fairly quiet time, once the surrounding terrain came to be watched by Achehnese auxiliaries who were no longer commanded by Toekoe Baid.

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege gives the chief’s use against his own people a bitter chronicle. Banished to Banda in 1879, Toekoe Moeda Baid was allowed to return to Atjeh at the end of 1884, on the proposal of the military governor, who had come to know Baid more closely at Banda — a measure in which the concentration was paired with clemency: already in November 1884 Baid issued an order to the Atjehers not to trouble the Dutch soldiers when they would evacuate the outer posts, for fourteen days. “Leaving aside that this day order of BAID had no result, it already appears from it how sad it must be with our prestige, that we call in and accept such intercession of such a returned traitor for our soldiers”, Verstege remarks; “it has truly already come far with us, and yet we still regard ourselves as the second great colonial power.” The Koloniaal Verslag recorded his allowance of 600 guilders a month, besides perhaps other unknown advantages, after he had risen to Hoeloebalang (war chief) of the VII Moekims now lying outside the Dutch line, and noted, in the same report, that “aangezien de voortdurende pogingen onzerzijds om vredelievende betrekkingen met hoofden en bevolking aan te knoopen en te onderhouden, slechts met verraad worden beantwoord, werd het noodzakelijk geacht voortaan eene zeer krachtige en gereserveerde houding tegenover alle Atjehers in acht te nemen” (“since the continuous attempts from our side to knit and maintain peaceable relations with chiefs and population are only answered with betrayal, it was deemed necessary henceforth to take a very powerful and reserved attitude towards all Atjehers”). “How he serves the Atjehers will, in many men’s opinion, first become clear when kolonel Demmeni shall have left Atjeh” (cf. the events of the year 1896 recorded elsewhere: the verification of this distrust belongs to the later account).

Sources

Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 14–15 (De Geestelijkheid in Atjeh — Habib Abdoe’r Rachman).

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 143, 167, 219, 308.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 13–15, 16, 18. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 67–68.

Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897) and Een strijd in Atjeh (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg for the Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering. Gids voor den bezoeker van de schatkamer, Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Batavia, 1928. Druk: Ruygrok & Co., Batavia. Cabinet 5 (Atjeh), item 31.

De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, p. 50.

Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 84-85. OCR: DLP-158.

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