A religious leader of Samalanga who, after Teungku Tiro’s death, obtained a letter under the royal seal authorizing his leadership of the holy war. He imposed strict seclusion penalties on followers who entered Dutch-controlled territory and fought alongside the followers of Mat Amin and Teungku Kuta Karang.
Expanded account from The Achehnese, Vol. I — Habib Samalanga
Habib Samalanga was a sayyid religious leader, born in Acheh and therefore of less consideration than those sayyids who came direct from Arabia, who came to Great Acheh during the Dutch-Achehnese War to take part in the direction of the jihad, especially in the XXVI Mukims. He became the chief rival of Teungku Tiro for the leadership of the religious party, and after Teungku Tiro’s death in January 1891 obtained from the court at Keumala a nine-fold seal (chab sikureung) similar to that which had been in the possession of the deceased ulama. This symbol of authority, however, could not raise the sayyid to the elevation which Teungku Tiro had attained without any such symbol.
Habib Samalanga’s learning must have been below the average and would never have excited remark had it not been for his religious nobility. Just like Teungku Tiro in his sphere of action, he gathered in the ka sabil and other contributions to meet the expenses of the war. In order to appear in the eyes of his followers as at least the equal — and if possible the superior — of “the Teungku,” he had to distinguish himself from the latter in some particular way. This he did by the practice of tapa — seclusion from the world. He would remain isolated (kaleuiit) for from seven to forty successive days in a cave at the source of the Krueng (river) Daroy, a place which had from ancient times been chosen for such devotions. His followers also had occasionally to submit to a similar course of tapa; it was in fact one of the ordinary punishments imposed by him for various offences.
A Javanese whose tomb is now an object of veneration at Ulee Lheue, known by the name of Teungku Lam Guha, had formerly done tapa for successive years in this same cave of the Daroy, so that Habib Samalanga’s choice of the spot placed him in a tradition of hermitical sanctity already established in Achehnese memory.
Habib Samalanga also differed from Teungku Tiro in his opinions respecting those Achehnese who either lived within the Dutch linie or went thither to trade. During the greater portion of the period of his activity Teungku Tiro declared such persons to be little better than unbelievers, and did not raise a hand in protest when his troops robbed them of their property or even of their life — refraining, however, from giving open orders in this spirit, since he would have had in that case to reckon with uleebalangs of distinction who were guilty of the same offence. It was only when Teuku Uma had convinced him that it was in many respects desirable for the chiefs and notables within the linie to keep in touch with the court, that Teungku Tiro at length changed his tactics and received the Keumala pilgrims in a friendly manner. Habib Samalanga, on the other hand, consistently taught that all submission to or intercourse with the infidels was a sin, though not one which made the offender a complete outlaw. Whoever was brought before him convicted of this sin was condemned to isolation in the cave, there to do penance for some days and prepare himself for conversion from his heresy.
After Teungku Tiro’s death the friends of Habib Samalanga succeeded in obtaining for him from the court the nine-fold seal — the chab sikureung — similar to that which had been in the possession of the deceased ulama. But the symbol could not by itself confer the authority: the sayyid never attained the elevation which Teungku Tiro had reached without any such symbol. Habib Samalanga died in December 1901, closing the chapter of sayyid-led resistance in Great Acheh.
Account from Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — Habib Samalanga in the Spring of 1896
In Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, Habib Samalanga is identified as a Habib — a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad — whose trajectory illustrates the pattern by which initially-neutral religious figures were drawn into the Achehnese resistance in the wake of the defection of Teuku Umar of 29 March 1896. Kruisheer records that Samalanga was “initially neutral in early May 1896” — one of a list of chiefs (alongside Toekoe Moeda Baid, Toekoe Tjoet Lamtengah, Toekoe Moesa Anak Baté, Toekoe Kerkoen, Teungkoe Soepi, Teungkoe Lam-Oee and others) whose neutrality was documented in the spring 1896 Dutch intelligence picture — but that by mid-June 1896 he was a bendehoofd (band leader) in the V Moekims Montassik and “one of the hostile chiefs whose fortifications provoked the 16–17 June 1896 punitive expedition”. Kruisheer also records that he “reportedly nested himself in Lamsoet with 50–60 men”, a defensive posture which the Dutch tuchtiging (punitive expedition) of mid-June 1896 was intended to dislodge.
From Neutrality to Bendehoofd in the V Moekims Montassik
The transition from “initially neutral” to “bendehoofd in the V Moekims Montassik” in the space of approximately six weeks (early May to mid-June 1896) reflects the gravitational pull which Umar’s defection exerted on the religious and political elites of Groot-Atjeh. The V Moekims Montassik — the southernmost of the western sagi (territorial quarter) of Groot-Atjeh — was, by mid-June 1896, the principal concentration of hostile band leaders in the Dutch theatre of operations; Kruisheer’s list of these chiefs includes, in addition to Samalanga, Toekoe Brahim, Pang Arab, Panglima Nja Makam, Pang Sech, and the Teungkoes Soepi, Loeboek and Lam-Oee — eight bendehoofden in total. Samalanga’s presence in this list, given his Habib status, indicates that the religious authority of the Prophet’s descendants was actively being mobilised in support of the resistance, and his name’s connection to Samalanga (a coastal landschap on the north coast east of Pedir) suggests that he, like other Habibs (cf. Habib Koeala van Pedir), was a north-coast figure who had come south to participate in the Groot-Atjeh operations.
Nesting at Lamsoet and the Mid-June Tuchtiging
Samalanga’s choice to “nest himself in Lamsoet with 50–60 men” is strategically significant. Lamsoet was a Dutch buitenpost in the III Moekims Kerkoen — one of the posts which the Dutch had originally established to control the river crossing between Lambaroe and Ana’ Galong and which had, from 1878 to 1885, been the origin of many raids. The post had been evacuated as part of the April 1896 outside-line evacuation, and Samalanga’s occupation of the position with 50–60 men was a deliberate re-fortification of a former Dutch strongpoint by a Habib commander. The 50–60 men he had with him represented a significant but not overwhelming force, and their “nesting” in Lamsoet was the kind of fortified presence which the tuchtiging of 16–17 June 1896 — under Kolonel Stemfoort with three colonnes (under Bisschoff van Heemskerck, Van Heutsz and Soeters) — was explicitly designed to dislodge. The tuchtiging burned Lamsoet’s versterkingen (fortifications) on 17 June 1896 and cleared the eastern sector of the V Moekims Montassik, though Samalanga himself is not recorded as killed or captured in the engagement.
Significance
Habib Samalanga’s significance in ATJEH ‘96 lies in his embodiment of the religiously-authoritative Habib who, despite an initially neutral stance, was drawn into the resistance by the gravitational pull of Umar’s defection and the progressive Dutch pressure on the western sagi mukims. His occupation of the former Dutch post at Lamsoet is a particularly evocative detail, because it represents the literal re-fortification of a Dutch strongpoint by a Habib commander — a symbolic reversal of the colonial buitenlinie through the agency of religious authority. His presence among the eight bendehoofden of the V Moekims Montassik confirms the integration of the Habib network into the broader Achehnese military command structure of mid-June 1896.
Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)
Habib Samalanga was an Achehnese religious war-leader associated with Samalanga on the north coast of Atjeh, already dead by March 1894, whose sister commanded the fortified position of Senelop in the XXVI Moekims against the forces of Toekoe Djohan.
The defence of Senelop
Hooijer recorded that at Senelop de zuster van wijlen Habib Samalanga — the sister of the late Habib Samalanga — held the command and had, with fifteen other fanatical women, devoted herself to death. The struggle that Toekoe Djohan had to wage there on 12 March 1894 was accordingly severe, and he succeeded in taking the position only after placing himself at the head of his troops with his sunshade in hand and running in upon the fortification together with Toekoe Hoessin Longbattah. Dutch troops occupied Senelop three days later.
See Also
- Aceh War
- Great Acheh
- Habib Abdurrahman
- Samalanga
- Sayyid Abdurrahman Zahir
- Teuku Uma
- Teungku Kuta Karang
- Teungku Kutakarang
- Teungku Lam Guha
- Teungku Tiro
- Teungku Tiro (Muhamat Amin)
- Ulee Lheue
- XXVI Mukims
- Habib (concept)
- Teuku Umar
- V Moekims Montassik
- Lamsoet
- Habib Lhong
- Habib Koeala van Pedir
- Habib Lengkong
- T. Brahim Montassik
- Panglima Nja Makam
- Teungkoe Soepi
- Teungkoe Loeboek
- Teungkoe Lam-Oee
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Bisschoff van Heemskerck
- J. B. van Heutsz
- G. F. Soeters
- Defection of Teuku Umar (29 March 1896)
- Tuchtiging der V Moekims Montassik (16–17 June 1896)
- Evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, Toengkoeb (20 April 1896)
- III Moekims Kerkoen
- Lambaroe
- Ana’ Galong
- Groot-Atjeh
- Pedir
- 1878
- 1885
- 1891
- 1896
- 1901
- Senelop
- Sister of Habib Samalanga
- Teukoe Oemar
- Toekoe Hoessin Longbattah
Sources
The Achehnese, Vol. II, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.
The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 143, 279, 541.
De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, p. 53.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.