Figures, places, and events in Acehnese history associated with the year 1878.

1878 was the year of Generaal van der Heiden’s military operations in the Lam-Krak area — the only recent Dutch activity in that region before the punitive expedition of 9–10 June 1896 under Kolonel Stemfoort — and the year that opened the 18781885 window during which, as Kruisheer records in ATJEH ‘96, many raids originated from the kampongs along the right bank of the Atjehrivier in the III Moekims Kerkoen (around Lamsoet). As described on pp. 22 and 243 of the source, Van der Heiden’s earlier operatiën in Lam-Krak included the construction of a road from Sibreh to Biloel (East to West), a military route that would, eighteen years later, become the assembly axis of Lt.-Col. Bisschoff van Heemskerck’s 1e Colonne at the 1896 tuchtiging. The year is thus doubly significant as a reference point for both Dutch and Achehnese operational patterns in the contested country between Biloel and Ana’ Galong.

People

Events

Account from De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd (1912) — The Aceh War in 1878

1878 was the year of the Batak War of February-May; of the campaigns in the IV and VI Moekims and the capture of Montassik on 28 July 28 July; of the submission of Habib Abdurrahman on 13 October 13 October; of the submission of Pasanga on 20 August 20 August; of the submission of Langsar, Modjopahit and the Temijang-gebied of 1877-1878; of the appointment of Colonel Van der Heyden as governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden on 15 January 15 January; and of the imprisonment and banishment of Toekoe Moeda Baid on 9 May 9 May and July.

January: Van der Heyden’s Governorship

By Indies decree of 15 January 15 January 1878 Colonel K. van der Heyden was appointed governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden, at the same time military commander there, “out of consideration that the ordinary civil administration more and more took the place of the purely military.” In the course of the year a reorganisation of the Dutch troop strength in Atjeh was carried out: a separation was made between garrison- and field-bataljons; by three garrison-bataljons the occupation of the posts was to be provided for; the splitting into right and left halves of bataljons would lapse. In connection with the improved situation the number of troops was also reduced from 348 officers and 9235 rank-and-file to 298 officers and 7730 rank-and-file.

February: The Westkust

In February 1878 Van der Heyden was on the Westkust, where Malaboeh was constantly threatened. The Dutch commander was able in February to deal the enemy a sensitive lesson by the tuchtiging of the kampong Darat. On 19 February 19 February the army landed in the realm of Telok Kroet. On 22 February 22 February the troops advanced northward, reached 28 February Kloewang after a sometimes very difficult march and some hostile encounters, and embarked there for Malaboeh, where Van der Heyden himself arrived on 9 March 9 March.

February-May: The Batak War

On 1 February 1 February 1878 a column under Captain Scheltens advanced from Siboga with orders to protect the missionaries and Christians of Silindoeng and to drive Singa Maharadja from Silindoeng or to take him prisoner. On 22 April 22 April [1878] the column received reinforcements and the order to advance upon Bakhara. On 1 May 1 May [1878] Bakhara, on Lake Toba, was reached, stormed, and burned. On 7 May 7 May [1878] the march was continued to Goergoer. The Batak War culminated in the submission of the chiefs of Silindoeng and Toba, and in the establishment of a controller’s post at Sipoholon.

May-June: Gighen and Gedong

In May 1878 Van der Heyden led an expedition to Gighen and the upper lands of Pedir, where Toekoe di Tiroe remained hostile and the post at Segli had been attacked by a great force. The actual object of the expedition — the kampong Garouw, the headquarters of Toekoe di Tiroe — was not reached, but the taking of Telok Kadjoe, which had been mistaken for Garouw, had the consequence that the radja of Gighen offered his submission and promised the surrender of Toekoe di Tiroe.

In June 1878 Van der Heyden’s presence was again necessary on the Oostkust, where an attack had been made on Edi from Gedong. On 3 June 3 June the troops disembarked at the Paseirivier. On 7 June 7 June a renewed advance was made. On 16 June 16 June the governor himself arrived with a considerable force, and on 19 June 19 June Blang Pria was taken. On 21 June 21 June the radja of Gedong offered his submission; his son, who succeeded him, submitted wholly to the Dutch.

June-July: The Habib’s Offensive

By the spring of 1878 the Habib was once more on the offensive. In the night of 7 June 7 June8 June 8 June a band dared to attack the dwang-arbeiders hospital at Pantej Perak, where it made a real slaughter. On 22 June 22 June Kroëng Raba was attacked by a great multitude of Atjehers. On 23 June 23 June the Habib sent an Atjeher with a white flag and a letter inviting the post-commandant to leave his position and fight with him in the open field.

July-August: The Campaign in the XXII Moekims

On 23 July 23 July [1878] the important campaign in the XXII Moekims began with three columns. On 28 July 28 July [1878] the missigit Montassik was taken. Operations continued from 1 August 1 August [1878] to 23 March 23 March 1879 in a system of “standfast, reconnoitre, punish.”

August-October: Submissions

In August 1878 submissions and negotiations began to come in from various sides — on 25 August 25 August the first by the Habib himself. On 13 October 13 October [1878] the Habib submitted at Kota Radja. The next day Toekoe Moeda Baid was sworn in. On 24 November 24 November [1878] the Habib was embarked for Jeddah. On 20 August 20 August [1878] the blockade of Pasanga was raised after the submission of its new radja.

May-July: The Treason of Toekoe Moeda Baid

Toekoe Moeda Baid, of whom it more and more appeared that he played a treacherous role, was taken prisoner on 9 May 9 May [1878] and transported to Batavia in July, where the Governor-General banished him to Banda. Panglima Tiban Mohammed on the other hand, the former sjabandar of Atjeh, submitted in April [1878], with the intention of joining the Dutch to bring the war to a close as soon as possible.

Account from De Buitenbezittingen (1917) — 1878

1878 was the year in which the Sultan of Langkat formally transferred his rights over the Tamiang landschapjes to the Netherlands-Indies Government, extinguishing the Langkat claim to suzerainty that had been the source of intermittent conflict since the early nineteenth-century intervention of Soetan Moeda Indra Kesoema. The Encyclopaedisch Bureau’s De Buitenbezittingen treats 1878 as the terminus of a long Langkat-Tamiang dispute and the beginning of the formal Dutch administration that would, in 1908, be regularised through the incorporation of Tamiang into the indirect bestuurd gebied of the Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden.

The antecedents of the transfer

The Langkat claim to Tamiang rested on the fact that Tjoet Gát — the warrior who had led the combined Tamiang forces to victory against adventurers from Meureudoe and had died in that battle — had been a subject of the Sultan of Langkat. The grant of the Bandahara territory to Tjoet Gát’s heir, made by the two Keudjeuroeën of Karang and Moeda in gratitude for his service, was thus exploited by Langkat as a voorwendsel — a pretext — for proclaiming its own suzerainty over the new landschapje. The subsequent appointment of Soetan Moeda Indra Kesoema as ruler of part of the Bandahara territory provoked the armed resistance of the next Radja Bandahara, supported by Atjeh and Langsa — a war that remained unresolved for years.

The 1861 appeal and its aftermath

In 1861 the Sultan of Langkat exploited the presence of Dutch warships off Poeloe Kompai to summon the Tamiang princes and induce them to appeal to the Dutch Gouvernement and offer their submission. The Keudjeuroeën Karang and Moeda answered the summons, and at the same occasion recognised Soetan Moeda Indra Kesoema as the legitimate ruler of the Bandahara fragment. In 1865 the Dutch Government issued formal acts of confirmation to the Keudjeuroeën Karang, the Keudjeuroeën Moeda, and Soetan Moeda Indra Kesoema.

The 1878 transfer

The formal transfer of 1878 extinguished the remaining Langkat rights over the Tamiang landschapjes. The Dutch Gouvernement, having acquired a vrije hand in the administration of the territory, placed a bestuursambtenaar — a civil administrator — in the Tamiang lands. The continuous military action required by the presence of vele uit Atjeh verdreven kwaadwilligen en avonturiers — many evildoers and adventurers driven out of Atjeh — in these largely wilderness landschapjes eventually compelled the Dutch to unify the command, and in 1908 Tamiang was formally incorporated into the indirect bestuurd gebied of the Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, though its economic ties remained with the Cultuurgebied of the Oostkust van Sumatra.

Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)

The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.

1878 was the year in which Kuyper published his Ons Program ([[1878)|Ons Program]], the foundational anti-revolutionary party manifesto that first articulated, in political form, the doctrine of a Dutch “zedelijke roeping” — moral vocation — towards the Indies. This doctrine would be carried into the troonrede of 1901 when the ethical policy was officially proclaimed, and it shaped every subsequent Dutch parliamentary debate on Atjeh.

Kuyper’s Ons Program

In Ons Program ([[1878)|Ons Program]] of 1878 Kuyper saw the relation of the Netherlands to its colonies as that of a guardian to his ward (voogd-pupil). The guardian’s first duty was to bring to the Indies the blessings of security and order that the Netherlands had itself received with the Gospel. A second duty was to enable the Indies in the future to assume a more autonomous position. Of these two duties the second proved more acceptable to the non-confessional parties than the first, which carried a Christian-zending subtext.

Kuyper’s later parliamentary intervention on Atjeh

When, in 1896, the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]] had run for nearly a quarter of a century and Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|Toekoe Oemar]] had turned against the Dutch, Kuyper admitted that the patience preached by Fransen van de Putte was exhausted. He still believed the Netherlands bore the guilt for unleashing the war, but held that this injustice had now prescribed, and that the historical situation had to be respected — “gelijk Christus, de Romeinse Keizer, de dwingeland in Rome, erkende met de woorden: geeft de keizer wat des keizers is”. For Kuyper there was no escape from continuing the war.

Significance

1878 is significant for Atjeh history because the Ons Program ([[1878)|Ons Program]] of that year is the seed-bed of the ethical policy that, after the troonrede of 1901, was to govern every Dutch decision on Atjeh — including the conduct of the pacificatie under Van Heutsz and the expedition of Van Daalen.

Places from ATJEH ‘96 (Kruisheer’s Lam-Krak gazetteer)

  • Lam-Krak Moekims (the 7-mukim complex targeted by Van der Heiden’s 1878 operations and again by the 1896 tuchtiging)
  • Sibreh (Lamkrak mukim; eastern terminus of Van der Heiden’s 1878 road)
  • Biloel (Dutch post in the XXV Moekims; western terminus of Van der Heiden’s 1878 road; gathering point for 1e Colonne of the 1896 tuchtiging)
  • Ana’ Galong (Dutch post east of Lam-Krak; “streek tusschen Biloel en Ana Galoeng en benoorden het gebergte gelegen”)
  • Atjehrivier (river whose right-bank kampongs in III Moekims Kerkoen were the source of raids 1878–1885)
  • III Moekims Kerkoen (region whose kampongs along the right bank of the Atjehrivier originated raids 1878–1885)
  • Lamsoet (Dutch post; river crossing between Lambaroe and Ana’ Galong; raider centre 1878–1885)
  • Tjot Goeë (post; communication between Lampeneroet and Biloel)
  • Lamkoenjit (post near Tjot Goeë-Biloel road)
  • Lambarih (post; safeguarded Lambaroe-Ana Galong road)
  • Ana Batee (Lamkrak mukim)
  • Ana Glé (also Ana’ Galé; Lamkrak mukim; eastern boundary)
  • Ateuh (Lamkrak mukim complex — Ateuh Tjoet, Ateuh Raja, Groot Ateuh)
  • Kroeng Mak (Lamkrak mukim)
  • Lam-Lheuë (Lamkrak mukim)
  • Koeta Radja (Dutch seat)
  • Masdjid Dja Oedjoen (fortified mosque near pasar Sibreh)
  • Pasar Sibreh (market near Sibreh)

Organizations from ATJEH ‘96 (Kruisheer’s Lam-Krak order of battle)

Documents from ATJEH ‘96 (Kruisheer’s Lam-Krak sources)

  • Records of Van der Heiden’s 1878 operatiën in Lam-Krak (referenced in ATJEH ‘96 p. 243)
  • Reports on the 1878–1885 roofaanvallen from III Moekims Kerkoen (p. 22)

Concepts from ATJEH ‘96 (Kruisheer’s Lam-Krak glossary)

See Also

Posts Established During the 1878 Campaigns

The campaigns of 1878 resulted in the establishment of a chain of posts extending eastward from Lambaroe through the XXII Moekims, including Anagaloeng, Montasik, Senelop, Panteh-Karang, Lepong-Ara, Samagani, Tjot-Basetoel, Long-Lemoh, Glé-Kamping, and Djerir. These posts created a 121-palen communication line through territory that every transport required fighting to traverse. They would be maintained until the Concentration Decision of August 1884, when all were evacuated on 13 January 1885.

Sources

  • De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I.
  • The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.
  • Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159–239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.
  • De Buitenbezittingen, Deel II, Aflevering 2: Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedisch Bureau, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1917), pp. 77–79.
  • Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 279, 281, 283.
  • ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 22, 243.

Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 60.

Account from Atjeh by H.C. Zentgraff (1938)

Zentgraff records the afkoop of the Habib: on 13 October 1878 he submitted on the condition of settling in Mekka with a yearly pension of no less than ten thousand dollars from the colonial budget; on 24 November 1878 he was transported to Djeddah aboard Hr. Ms. “Curaçao”. Onze regeering achtte den Habib een zóó gevaarlijk tegenstander, dat zij het uiterste deed om hem, langs minnelijken weg, buiten Atjeh te brengen. The garrison celebrated in the Falderaldera-leed, revived by majoor Macleod (the husband of Mata Hari): “Daar ligt een ijzeren zeekasteel, Dat heet de ‘Curaçao’, Waarmee die brave Habib, Naar Mekka varen zou. Nu zingt hij vroolijk ‘falderaldera, Voor dit Gouvernement. Zoo’n duizend dollars in de maand: Ben ik geen knappe vent?”

Atjeh, door H.C. Zentgraff. Gedrukt bij Drukkerij “De Unie”, 1938, Batavia.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

1878 is the year in which Borel writes — the periode van stilstand with which his book closes — and the year of the enemy breakthrough of June 1878 that, in his judgement, vindicated every warning he had raised against the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture). It is also the year of van der Heijden’s two punitive expeditions against Gedoeng, of the submission of Pasangan after naval bombardment on 15 August 1878, and of Borel’s own Een vaderlandsch belang articles in Het Vaderland (13 March 1878) proposing the Indische Brigade. The book is finished at ‘s-Gravenhage on 27 August 1878.

The State of the War at the Year’s Opening

In January 1878 the toestand in Atjeh was, on paper, bevredigend: several hoofden had submitted, and the linie from the Kroeng Raba to the Kwala Gigieng — the stelling-Pel that generaal Pel had completed in May 1875 and extended to the Kroeng Tjoet in February 1876 — remained in Dutch hands. Under generaal Wiggers van Kerchem’s long command, however, no new offensives had been undertaken since Pel’s death, and the afwachtende houding once again dominated Dutch operations. The Indische leger was “in geen gunstigen toestand”: manschappen onvoldoende geoefend, kaders in treurige staat, many sick or unfit, with a groot gebrek aan officieren, especially in the artillerie. The Atjehneezen had used the lull to build versterkingen near Dutch posts and to receive hulpbenden, wapens and levensmiddelen from the vassal coastal states. Borel judged that the apparent quiet was deceptive and that only a major offensive — supported by fresh troops from the Netherlands — could end the war.

Borel’s Brigade Proposal (13 March 1878)

On 1, 2 and 3 March 1878 Borel published in Het Vaderland a three-part article entitled Een vaderlandsch belang, proposing the formation in the Netherlands of an expeditionnaire krijgsmacht of 3 000–4 000 man — later specified as 150 officers and 3 000 men — to be sent directly to Atjeh. The volunteers were to be raised with premies (ƒ 250–300 handgeld, ƒ 1 per day soldij in Atjeh, equal premie on return), bound to a strict two-year maximum verbintenis, and armed with steel achterlaadkanonnen with schokbuis. He amplified the proposal in De Militaire Spectator, No. 7, jaargang 1878. The estimated cost was ƒ 6 000 000 for the first year and ƒ 10–15 million for the whole two years, to be raised as an oorlogsleening and ultimately repaid, he suggested, in Acehnese pepper. Borel closed with the wish that, if his proposal were adopted, the words of Camille Rousset on the 1830 French expedition against Algiers — “rien n’avait été négligé pour le succès de l’expédition” — might apply to the Dutch in Atjeh.

The June Crisis: Gedoeng and the Breakthrough

In the second half of June 1878 the newly appointed gouverneur van Atjeh, kolonel van der Heijden, left with most of the mobiele strijdmacht to tuchtigen the vassal coastal state of Gedoeng. Barely had he departed when the enemy attacked the Dutch linie, broke through at several places, fell into the IV, VI and IX Moekims, verjoeg the pro-Dutch bevolking, plundered and burned, sneed the gemeenschap between K. Radja and several posts, and caused schrik and verwarring. To make the crisis worse, an atrocity was committed in a Dutch hospital — “het gruwelijke moordtooneel in een van onze hospitalen bedreven” — that Borel cites as one of the “wrange vruchten van het passieve stelsel.” Van der Heijden had to rush back in aller ijl and with geweld restore communicatie with the posts in the IV Moekims; new battalions were sent from Java. The Dutch eventually drove the enemy out everywhere and even made a successful inval into the XXII Moekims to punish them — but the verloopen of the friendly bevolking could not be undone: they had lost vertrouwen in Dutch protection. The lesson Borel draws is categorical: posts alone cannot prevent a linie-doorbraak; mobile forces must never be reduced. Gedoeng itself was tuchtiged twice; after the second, the chief laid down bestuur and his son came to submit — a “schitterend succes” that Borel uses as proof of the aanvallende stelsel.

The Submission of Pasangan and the Closing of the Book

While Borel was writing, on 15 August 1878 the telegraph brought news that Pasangan — one of the vassal coastal states that had supported the enemy with hulpbenden, wapens and levensmiddelen — had submitted after a bombardment by the Dutch marine. Borel predicts that the same pattern will work in Groot-Atjeh itself: “eerst moet de vijand getuchtigd worden en wel in die mate dat hem geen andere uitweg overblijft dan het hoofd in den schoot te leggen.” He invokes in jest the words of prins von Bismarck on the “psychologische oogenblik” at which to begin negotiations with Atjehnese chiefs after a few tuchtigingen. The book itself is finished at ‘s-Gravenhage on 27 August 1878, with the wish that, if the Indische Brigade proposal is adopted, the success of the French at Algiers may be repeated in Atjeh. The war, however, was still ongoing — already in its sixth year — and the stalemate that Borel diagnoses would persist for decades more.

See Also

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Court fled the Dalem to Keumala (first time) when forced to flee. Keumala long remained a breeding ground of fanaticism and kafir-haat.

Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 60.

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 336–337, 339, 346, 355–357, 364, 366, 369.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893) — the XXII Moekims campaign and the first harbor closure

Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh identifies 1878 as the operational turning point of the Atjeh-oorlog: the year of the XXII Moekims campaign — the veldtocht in de XXII Moekims opened by Generaal van der Heijden in July 1878 after the June 1878 strategic reversal engineered by his chief of staff majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius — and of the 13 October 1878 submission of Habib Abdoel Rachman and Tekoe Moeda Baid that, “binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht”, decapitated the Groot-Atjeh resistance.

The June 1878 strategic reversal by Geij van Pittius

The strategic frame of the XXII Moekims campaign was set in June 1878 by majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, Van der Heijden’s pas opgetreden chef van den staf. Van Heutsz’s account, citing Kielstra’s Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog (III, noot, bladz. 249), names Geij van Pittius as the intellectual author of the reversal:

“Het waren vooral de vertoogen van den pas opgetreden chef van den staf, den majoor A. R. W. Geij van Pittius, die den bevelhebber tot dit besluit brachten. Deze had reeds in 1877, tijdens de aanwezigheid te Atjeh van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge, er op aangedrongen, de Zuidoosterlinie langs de Atjeh rivier te verleggen en daartoe de XXII Moekims in te rukken”.

The argument that “men door expedities naar de kuststaten het doel — het einde van den oorlog — niet kon bereiken, en dat alleen eene beslissing kon worden verkregen door in Groot-Atjeh zelf den vijand aan te tasten en te vervolgen” was accepted by Van der Heijden “met het halve veldleger ter beschikking”. The Governor-General’s verzoeningspolitiek of March 1877 was set aside.

The July 1878 XXII Moekims campaign and the 13 October 1878 submission

The campaign opened in July 1878 — “De krijgsoperatiën in de XXII en XXVI Moekims, die in Juli van het vorige jaar zijn aangevangen” — with the inrukken of the Sagi of the XXII Moekims along the Zuidoosterlinie of the Atjeh river. Within three months of the opening of the campaign, the two principal resistance leaders had submitted:

“Hoe reeds binnen drie maanden na den aanvang van den eersten veldtocht in de XXII Moekims, de onderwerping van Habib Abdoer Rachman en van Tekoe Moeda Baid op den 13en October 1878 volgde”.

The 13 October 1878 submission was the political culmination of the campaign. Habib Abdoel Rachman — the zwager van Tekoe Moeda Baid, de ziel van den tegenstand — and Tekoe Moeda Baid had been the two principal figures of the Groot-Atjeh resistance since the failed negotiations of March–October 1877. Their submission, together, in a single act on 13 October 1878, was the operational vindication of the Geij van Pittius reversal.

Van der Heijden’s first harbor closure (1878)

Alongside the military campaign, Van der Heijden closed the havens of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden for the first time — the first sustained Dutch attempt to translate territorial conquest into economic coercion:

“Reeds in 1878, na hervatting van de krijgsoperatiën in de XXII Moekims, liet hij daarom alle havens van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, met uitzondering van Olehleh en Edi, voor den invoerhandel sluiten”.

The closure — covering all havens of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with the exception of Olehleh and Edi, for the invoerhandel (import trade) — was revoked by G.-G. van Lansberge by letter of 7 February 1879 — but Van der Heijden, “toen de Generaal opnieuw de vaste overtuiging kreeg dat, wilde men thans den oorlog beëindigd zien, de havens opnieuw moesten gesloten worden”, closed them a second time, “hij sloot ze ten tweedemale en gaf bij telegram d.d. 5 Juli 1879 aan den Gouv. Generaal te kennen … ditmaal op zijne persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid”. The two closures were the operational proof of Van der Heijden’s strategic premise: that the submission of the Sagi federations could only be converted into the submission of the entire Atjehnese resistance if the coast were closed. The episode became, in Van Heutsz’s later tract, the model for the marine-enforced closure Van Heutsz would prescribe in 1893 and implement as Governor after 1898.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 14, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 37, 43, 55, 74. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

De Geconcentreerde Stelling in Groot-Atjeh, ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef, 1885, pp. 9–12.