Colonel Wiegand was a Dutch overste (colonel) of the Indische leger who commanded the right column — a feint — at the conquest of Langkroek on 28 September 1874 and the right column again at the battle of Longbatta on 31 December 1874. In Borel’s account he is the officer whose loss of direction in the nipa-bosch on the second occasion — failing to support van der Meer’s hard-pressed colonne at the critical hour — turned a promising operation into a near-disaster.
The Conquest of Langkroek
Pel’s plan for the conquest of Langkroek of 28 September 1874 was a surprise strike at the kampong that leaned against the middle of the Pedir-dijk — long a thorn in the Dutch side, since van Swieten had tolerated the padi-snijden there in February–March. The north side of the kampong was heavily fortified with a continuous line of works armed with light guns. Wiegand’s execution was neat: the Dutch arrived before the enemy, streaming in from Pinang and the XXVI Moekims, could resist, and the works were captured before they could be manned. The victory was “of great importance” and “cost almost nothing,” Borel records — but he criticises Wiegand for not pressing on to take Lampriet, which lay open. Three new posts were immediately opgericht around Langkroek.
The Longbatta Disaster
Three months later, on 31 December 1874, Wiegand commanded the right column in Pel’s two-colonne operation against Longbatta: the left column under van der Meer (10th battalion) to march from Pakan Atjeh along the left bank directly on Longbatta; the right column under Romswinckel’s 5th battalion (under Wiegand’s overall command) to make a feint attack east of Kota Radja. The 5th battalion’s morning attack on the bosch-rand succeeded so well that the enemy streamed east to face Romswinckel, leaving the left-bank approach open; the Longbatta-Mesigit was taken without a shot. But while van der Meer was being surrounded and routed on the open sawah, Wiegand’s column tried to push eastward to link up with Pel. They met “very marshy, nipa-planted terrain, very difficult especially for artillery.” Rather than push through, Wiegand tried to go around to the south, lost his way, marched west, and ended up before the zuider-face of Kota Radja — facing away from his objective. The distance from Lampoe Oek to Longbatta-Mesigit was only about twenty minutes’ walk in a straight line.
Borel’s Judgement
Borel acknowledges that “orienting oneself without guide in tropical forest is extremely hard,” but concludes that the day’s success was “largely spoiled” by Wiegand’s wandering. His men heard the heavy firing and trumpet signals at Longbatta but took them for “Wilhelmus” victory fanfares, never guessing that the other column was in trouble. Instead of marcher au canon, Wiegand wandered until too late; and when the enemy east of Kota Radja noticed his column pulling south, he slipped away to Longbatta and threw his whole weight on van der Meer. Only van Zijll de Jong’s heroic counter-attack saved the colonne-van der Meer from annihilation. Wiegand’s name recurs in Borel as the example of how an Indische colonne commander could lose a battle he had been winning.
See Also
- Conquest of Langkroek (28 September 1874)
- Battle of Longbatta (31 December 1874)
- Majoor van der Meer
- Majoor van Zijll de Jong
- Majoor Romswinckel
- Generaal Pel
- Langkroek
- Longbatta-Mesigit
- Lampoe Oek
- Pedir-dijk
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 200, 207, 233–235.