Longbatta

Longbatta (also written Longbattah) was a kampong near the Kraton of Atjeh, whose imam was one of the most embittered enemies of the Dutch in the Atjeh-oorlog. The kampong was the place of the murder of the Dutch envoy Mas Soemo Widikdjo in December 1873, and was itself the object of the battle of Longbattah on 31 December 31 December 1874 and of repeated Dutch operations through 1875.

The Murder of Mas Soemo Widikdjo

After the second Aceh expedition had landed east of the Atjeh river on 9 December 9 December 1873 and had pushed forward to the mouth of the Atjeh river, Lieutenant-general Van Swieten attempted to negotiate with the sultan, sending two letters offering peace on the model of the Siak-tractaat and proposing to wage war “in the manner of civilised nations.” The bearer, the native Mas Soemo Widikdjo, departed on 26 December 26 December [1873] and never returned: “Later it became known that, after being held prisoner a couple of days, he was murderously killed at Longbatta.”

The Omtrekking of the Kraton, 23-24 January 1874

When on 23 January 23 January 1874 General Verspyck’s column attempted the omtrekking of the Kraton, the column under Lieutenant-colonel Van der Heijden crossed the Krueng Daroe, moved through kampong Moendjing, and “the next day the enterprise was resumed; Van der Heijden moved through kampong Longbatta, when he received the news that the Kraton had already been taken.”

The Battle of Longbattah, 31 December 1874

On 31 December 31 December 1874 a three-column expedition was undertaken to make themselves master of one of the enemy’s most formidable fortifications, from which the Dutch were continually attacked — namely Longbattah. The expedition attained its object and the Longbattah-missigit was taken and occupied by the Dutch, “however not without, as a result of a sad misunderstanding, having cost the lives of many a brave soldier.” The first column, which after taking some bentings tried to come into contact with the others, had almost obtained that contact when it heard from the third clearly the signal Wilhelmus. The commander inferred from this that this corps had already gained the victory and needed no support, and therefore returned. That signal had, however, been given by the troops who were in kampong Loong, to bring about the union with the first column and to make known that one had advanced so far. As now just the first column withdrew while the enemy’s fire continued to grow stronger, and the signal to retire was heard, the retreat was decided upon.

The retreat became a rout. The Atjehers, considerably reinforced by fighters who had been freed by the withdrawal of the first column, began to press in great numbers; the retreat thereby degenerated into a complete flight. Commands were no longer obeyed; with difficulty could the soldier keep on his feet in the deep cuts of the galangan, where the water flowed swiftly and often came up to his neck. At first the dead and severely wounded were carried along by the mineurs, who displayed admirable calm and self-sacrifice. But amid the fire in which the column moved, it was soon completely impossible to carry the dead along, and many a wounded had to be left to his fate. Some made an end to their lives themselves, so as not to fall alive into the hands of the enemy; a couple of persons, among whom the 1st lieutenant-quartermaster J. Muller, drowned in the swamp without its being possible to come to their help. The loss of the column, during the retreat alone, amounted to 42 dead and wounded, among whom besides the already named lieutenant-quartermaster Muller, the 1st lieutenant-adjudant J. van Bennekom who was wounded.

Significance

Longbatta was one of the most bitterly contested kampongs in the immediate neighbourhood of the Kraton. Its imam, the Imam of Longbatta, was named by General Pel in 1875 as one of the principal leaders of the war-party. The Hikajat Prang Kompeuni records that, after the conquest of the XXVI Moekims in 1879, the Imam “sheathed his sword and withdrew from public life,” marking the end of the first phase of the prang Gompeuni.

Account from Snijders (1944) — Longbatta and the Kota Alam Covering Position

Longbatta also enters the Snijders biography as the principal landmark that the Benting Kota Alam was sited to cover. When intelligence in early November 1874 indicated that the Atjehers were preparing to occupy Kota Alam further east — a move that would have threatened Longbatta and the Dutch line of communication — Kolonel PEL dispatched a column under Luitenant-Kolonel Ruempol to forestall them. Majoor van Zijll de Jong (artillery) and Majoor Leers (engineers) sited the new redoubt on a bend of the Atjeh River precisely so as to command both the fortified edge of Pinang to the northeast and Longbatta to the south, while dominating one of the best river-crossing points. The sapper section in the vanguard was commanded by Tweede Luitenant C. J. Snijders of the Bataillon Mineurs en Sappeurs, for whom the action was a baptism of fire. The full operation is described on the dedicated event page; the redoubt, once completed on 13 November 13 November 1874, secured the eastern flank of the Dutch positions and covered the Dutch line of communication with Longbatta and the country further east.

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege names Longbattah twice: as the inland point reached and at once lost by the opperbevelhebber van Swieten in the reconnaissance of 29 January 1874, when his troops, after a considerable display of force in that direction, were attacked by a numerous enemy and put on the retreat; and as the position round Longbatta-Missigit, which in April 1875 was the verst vooruitgeschoven post in het binnenland (most advanced position inland) of the chain that Pel had then held for a year (see Verstege’s folding map of Groot-Atjeh (1886)).

Sources

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 21, 24, 30-37.

Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852–1939): Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk, by D. van den Berg (Voorburg: September 1944), pp. 10–35. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0301 4872.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

Longbatta was a very important Atjehnees kampong east of the Kraton and upstream on the Atjeh-rivier, long the residence of the hostile chiefs Panglima Polim and the Imam of Longbatta, and the meeting point of the XXII Moekims and XXVI Moekims. It was briefly in Dutch hands on 24 January 1874 and immediately abandoned, briefly held again on 31 December 1874 in the disastrous operation of 31 December 1874, and finally incorporated into the stelling-Pel as the eastern anchor of the southern arc.

The residence of the hostile chiefs

Longbatta’s importance in Borel’s account flows from its residential and strategic position. As the long-time residence of Panglima Polim and the Imam of Longbatta — two of the principal hostile chiefs of the war — it functioned as a political and religious centre of the resistance east of the Kraton. As the meeting point of the XXII Moekims and XXVI Moekims it commanded the lines of communication between the two main sagi of inner Groot-Atjeh. Its fortified stone mosque, the Longbatta-Mesigit, could be held against any assault and formed the apex of any defensive line the Atjehneezen chose to draw east of the Kraton. Van Swieten’s abandonment of Longbatta after the fall of the Kraton is one of Borel’s recurring indictments.

The 31 December 1874 operation

Pel’s plan for 31 December 1874 called for two converging columns: a left column (the 10de bataljon under majoor van der Meer, with a four-gun battery and mineur detachment) to march from Pakan Atjeh along the left bank directly on Longbatta; a right column (the 5de bataljon under majoor Romswinckel, under overall command of overste Wiegand) to make a feint attack east of K. Radja. The 5de bataljon attacked the bosch-rand east of K. Radja first; the 10de bataljon on the left bank met almost no resistance, because the enemy had streamed east to face Romswinckel. The strong stelling at Pendetti opposite Lemboe was abandoned; the left column reached Blang Tjoet and the Longbatta-Mesigit, which was taken without a shot. But van der Meer misinterpreted an order from Pel, abandoned the captured Mesigit benteng without leaving a garrison, and marched his whole force over open, marshy sawah — where he was cut to pieces by the Atjehneezen. majoor van Zijll de Jong’s heroic recapture of the lost benteng saved the column from certain destruction; Borel calls him “the hero of the day.”

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 67, 95, 131, 137, 144, 200, 226–238, 248.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 31, 53. OCR: DLP-158.

tags	place, kampong, acehnese, aceh-war
aliases	Longbattah, Longbata, Long Batu, Kampong Longbatta

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