The stelling-Pel was the defensive line around K. Radja designed by generaal Pel and completed in May 1875 — a nearly gelijkbenige driehoek (isosceles triangle) whose basis was the sea-strand from K. Moesapi to Oeleh Leh, and whose tophoek (apex) was Longbatta Mesigit in the south-east, some 6 000 metres into enemy territory perpendicular to the strand. The line comprised 36 posts and covered approximately 2 500 hectaren — about three times the area of Amsterdam. Borel credits Pel with the design but insists that it came “een jaar te laat”: the same stelling could have been occupied at low cost in the spring of 1874 if van Swieten had not applied the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture) after the fall of the Kraton.

Geometry and Extent

The stelling-Pel was a nearly isosceles triangle. The basis ran along the sea-strand from K. Moesapi at the north-eastern corner to Oeleh Leh at the south-western corner — the line of communication between the Dutch vestiging and the sea. The tophoek was at Longbatta-Mesigit in the south-east, some 6 000 metres into enemy territory perpendicular to the strand. The south side ran from Oedjoeng Planggan via Soerian, Poe Oe, Poengej Blang Tjoet, Lamteboe, Setee Z., Lamara Olejlo, Lohong, Longbatta Z. to Longbatta Mesigit. The east side ran from Blang Tjoet via Kota Alam, Lemboe O. en N.O., Lampriet, Langkroek O., Lamara Z.O. en N.O., Tiban to Moesapi. The total enclosed area was approximately 2 500 hectaren — about three times the area of Amsterdam. The line comprised 36 posts, each garrisoned by a detachment of infanterie and (where appropriate) artillerie, and connected by roads, telegraph and (where feasible) the field railway between K. Radja and Oeleh Leh.

Construction and Completion

The stelling-Pel was the work of two years of exhausting effort by the bezettingskorps under Pel. The conquest of Blang Tjoet on 18 January 1875 and of Mandarsa Poeti on 28 January 1875, the surprise of Lamara Olejlo on the night of 1415 February 1875, the conquest of Lohong, Setee, Lamteboe and Gitjiel in April 1875 — all were stages in the construction. The completion of the continuous line in early May 1875 gave the Dutch an unbroken line from Blang Tjoet on the left bank of the Atjeh-rivier westward over Longbatta Mesigit, Lohong, Lamara, Gitjiel, Setee, Lamteboe, Poengej Blang Tjoet, Poe Oe, Soerian and Blang Oe to the sea-strand at Oeleh Leh. K. Radja now formed the “doelmatige centraal stelling” it should have been from the beginning. The strategische driehoek Kwala Atjeh–Kota Radja–Oeleh Leh — which van Swieten’s defenders had attributed to van Swieten — was, Borel clarifies, Pel’s work, not van Swieten’s.

Critique: A Year Too Late

Borel’s central critique of the stelling-Pel is that it came “een jaar te laat” — a year too late. The same stelling could have been occupied at low cost in the spring of 1874 if van Swieten had not “stak het zwaard voor goed in de scheede” after the expedition to Ketapang Doewa of 15 February 1874. The capture of Kota Goenoengan on 12 January 1874 had shown that the Atjehnese hoofdmacht had already withdrawn from the western face of the Kraton; the omtrekkende beweging had not been pursued. The result was that every post of the stelling-Pel had to be conquered at high cost in 1874 and 1875: Lemboe, taken on 2526 December 1873 and immediately abandoned, had to be reconquered on 7 November 1874; Soerian, briefly in Dutch hands in February 1874, had to be re-fought on 26 July 1874; Lampoe Oek, the scene of the échec of 16 April 1874, was only destroyed by artillery on 18 September 1874. Borel also criticises the stelling-Pel for containing too many redundant posts — a feature of the posten-systeem that he indicts throughout the book.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 95, 112–113, 121, 125, 132, 135, 175, 213–214, 263, 287–289, 323–325.