The stormvrijheid (“storm-freedom,” cleared field of fire) was the cleared zone around a Dutch post or bivouak from which the bamboo-doeri thickets, the boschrand and other cover had been removed, so that an Atjehnese charge with the klewang could be broken by salvoes of Beaumont-geweer fire before the warriors could close. The achievement of stormvrijheid was, in Borel’s account, one of the principal labours of the bezettingskorps — the kappen (cutting) that was one of the two principal means (kappen en branden) of overcoming Atjeh’s resistance — and the failure to achieve it was the cause of many of the Dutch casualties of the war.
The Concept
The stormvrijheid was, in Borel’s account, the cleared zone around a Dutch post or bivouak from which the bamboo-doeri thickets, the boschrand and other cover had been removed. The purpose was to deny the Atjehneezen the cover from which they could launch a charge with the klewang, and to give the Dutch salvoes of Beaumont-geweer fire a clear field in which to break the charge before the warriors could close. The stormvrijheid was, in effect, the Dutch counter-measure against the Atjehnese tactic of the charge — the “blanke klewang in de vuist” with which warriors sprang from the boschrand. Without stormvrijheid, a Dutch post or bivouak was at the mercy of a determined Atjehnese charge; with stormvrijheid, the charge could be broken by fire. The achievement of stormvrijheid required the kappen (cutting) of the bamboo-doeri thickets and the boschrand around the post — a laborious and dangerous work, performed by woodcutters under enemy fire, that exposed the Dutch to the very attacks it was intended to prevent.
The Cost of Failure
The failure to achieve stormvrijheid was, in Borel’s account, the cause of many of the Dutch casualties of the war. The attack on Penajoeng bivouak of 13 January 1874 — when a “bende woestelingen” penetrated the legerplaats from the north side near the veekraal at 2 PM on klaarlichten dag — was, Borel notes, the consequence of placing the bivouak against the boschrand without proper clearing. The battle outside the ooster-face of 13 October 1874 — when a strong column under kapitein van der Straate tried to penetrate the wilderness before sunrise, and the woodcutters who began at 6 AM were attacked from all sides — was a typical example of the cost of attempting to clear the boschrand under enemy fire. The night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875 — when a band of ~50 Atjehneezen climbed the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among sleeping manschappen — was, Borel suspected, “hoogst waarschijnlijk” the fault of schildwachten who had neglected their post, but it was also the consequence of the stormvrijheid that had not been fully achieved around the post.
The Achievement
The achievement of stormvrijheid was, in Borel’s account, one of the principal labours of the bezettingskorps. The kappen of the bamboo-doeri thickets and the boschrand around each post was a daily labour, performed by woodcutters under enemy fire. The 150 klapperboomen felled on 18 September 1874 to clear the field of the new ooster-batterij — costing 9 wounded including 1 officer — was a typical example. The stormvrijheid was, however, never fully achieved around all the posts of the stelling-Pel: the boschrand grew back, the bamboo-doeri thickets regenerated, and the Atjehneezen continually reoccupied the cleared zones. The stormvrijheid was thus, in Borel’s account, a continuous labour rather than a fixed achievement — a feature of the kappen en branden that Borel identifies as the two principal means of overcoming Atjeh’s resistance, and a tactical complement to the mobiele colonnes that he advocated. The lesson Borel draws is that the stormvrijheid could only be achieved by sustained and costly labour, and that the posten-systeem — which dispersed the force among many small posts, each requiring its own stormvrijheid — was inherently vulnerable in Atjeh.
See Also
- Bamboe-doeri versperringen
- Kappen en branden
- Klewang
- Beaumont-geweer
- Posten-systeem in Atjeh
- Mobiele colonnes (Borel)
- Acehnese attack on Penajoeng bivouak (13 January 1874)
- Battle outside the ooster-face (13 October 1874)
- Night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit (22 November 1875)
- Destruction of the Lampoe Oek fortification (18 September 1874)
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 31, 37, 117, 168–169, 183–186, 196–206, 238, 287–289.