Captain van der Straate was a Dutch kapitein of the Indische leger who commanded the 180-man column that tried to penetrate the wildernis before sunrise on 13 October 1874 in the battle outside the ooster-face, the operation whose repulse proved that the Atjehneezen had become “complete master of the terrain” around the zuider- and ooster-facen of Kota Radja.

The Battle of 13 October 1874

On 12 October 1874 the Dutch had again lost some ten dead and wounded clearing brush. Van Steenveld, commandant of the oosterwacht, had reported on 8 October 1874 that the Atjehneezen were digging approach trenches toward the Dutch works. Pel decided to clear the wildernis before it brought the enemy within storming distance of the ooster-face. On the morning of 13 October 1874 van der Straate’s strong column of 180 men tried to penetrate the wildernis before sunrise, in the hope of finding the far edge of the wood. The hope was disappointed; the wildernis extended so far that the troops had to set up in its midst. At six o’clock the woodcutters began, but the Atjehneezen discovered them and attacked from all sides. The mariniers, in their first real fight, wasted ammunition and had to give up their position.

The Repulse and Its Consequences

The whole covering force had to retire; by eight o’clock the enemy’s fire was overwhelming. Pel ordered retreat to the Kraton. Only when the artillery on the zuider- and ooster-bastions opened fire were the Atjehneezen stopped. The day cost several dead and wounded and proved that the enemy was “complete master of the terrain” near the zuider- and ooster-facen. After this, clearing work was halted. The repulse of van der Straate’s column was, in Borel’s narrative, a strategic reverse: it showed that the Dutch could no longer clear the ground in front of their own walls without a major operation, and that the Atjehneezen — by their nadering under cover of the dense bamboe-doeri — had neutralised the Dutch stormvrijheid (freedom from assault by storming). The lesson Borel draws is that the afwachtende houding had allowed the enemy to creep up to the very walls of the Kraton, and that only the aanvallende tactiek of the conquest of Langkroek and the conquest of Lemboe could restore the Dutch position.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. p. 204.