The kappen en branden (cutting and burning) were, in Borel’s account, the “two principal means to overcome Atjeh’s resistance” — the kappen (cutting) of the bamboo-doeri thickets and the boschrand to achieve stormvrijheid (cleared field of fire), and the branden (burning) of kampongs and houses from which the Dutch were fired on. Both means had been prohibited or neglected by van Swieten as a “overdreven zachte en humane” (excessively soft and humane) policy; both were reversed by Pel and advocated by Borel throughout the book.
The Two Principal Means
The kappen en branden were, in Borel’s account, the two principal means to overcome Atjeh’s resistance. The kappen (cutting) was the removal of the bamboo-doeri thickets and the boschrand around Dutch posts and bivouaks — a laborious and dangerous work, performed by woodcutters under enemy fire, that achieved the stormvrijheid (cleared field of fire) from which an Atjehnese charge with the klewang could be broken by salvoes of Beaumont-geweer fire. The branden (burning) was the burning of kampongs and houses from which the Dutch were fired on — a measure that denied the enemy the cover of the kampongs and forced him into the open. Both means had been prohibited or neglected by van Swieten as a “overdreven zachte en humane” policy: van Swieten had refused to burn kampongs, had prohibited the cutting of standing padi, and had issued the padi-snijden concession to Langkroek. Both means were reversed by Pel: from 28 April 1874 he ordered the daily bombardment of kampongs within range; he harvested the padi for Dutch use; he burned kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on.
The Cost of Kappen
The kappen was, in Borel’s account, one of the principal labours of the bezettingskorps, and one of the principal sources of Dutch casualties. The woodcutters who cleared the bamboo-doeri thickets and the boschrand were exposed to Atjehnese fire from behind the very cover they were removing. The battle outside the ooster-face of 13 October 1874 — when a strong column under kapitein van der Straate tried to penetrate the wilderness before sunrise, and the woodcutters who began at 6 AM were attacked from all sides — was a typical example of the cost of kappen. On 12 October the Dutch had again lost ~10 dead and wounded clearing brush. The 150 klapperboomen felled on 18 September 1874 to clear the field of the new ooster-batterij — costing 9 wounded including 1 officer — was another example. The kappen was thus, in Borel’s account, a continuous and costly labour, performed by woodcutters under enemy fire, and a tactical complement to the branden and to the artillery fire that demolished enemy stellingen.
The Necessity of Branden
The branden was, in Borel’s account, the necessary complement to the kappen. The burning of kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on denied the enemy the cover of the kampongs and forced him into the open. Van Swieten’s prohibition on burning — a “overdreven zachte en humane” measure — had, in Borel’s judgement, prolonged the war by allowing the enemy to use the kampongs as cover for his fire. Pel’s reversal of the prohibition — the burning of kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on — was, in Borel’s account, one of the principal means by which the stelling-Pel was eventually secured. The branden was also applied to the houses of kampongs that had been conquered: the expedition to Bital of 12 February 1874 had been undertaken with the “streng gelast” instruction that “geen enkel huis of eenig eigendom te beschadigen” (no house or any property to be damaged) — a measure that Borel treats as a strategic error, since the Atjehneezen, given the kampong, immediately reoccupied it when the Dutch troops returned to Penajoeng at night. “Grootmoedigheid is eene eigenschap waarvan de Atjehnees niet het flauwste begrip heeft” (Generosity is a quality of which the Atjehnese has not the faintest understanding), Borel writes. The kappen en branden were thus, in Borel’s account, the two principal means by which the Dutch could overcome the Atjehnese enemy — a people “woest, dapper, vrijheidlievend, onafhankelijk, fanatiek,” who could be subdued only by the kracht der wapens and never by generosity, proclamations, or passive posts.
See Also
- Bamboe-doeri versperringen
- Stormvrijheid
- Afwachtende houding
- Aanvallende tactiek in Atjeh
- Atjehnees volkskarakter (Borel)
- Generaal Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Padi-snijden
- Battle outside the ooster-face (13 October 1874)
- Destruction of the Lampoe Oek fortification (18 September 1874)
- Expedition to Bital (12 February 1874)
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 44–47, 54, 57, 67, 117, 124–128, 162–163, 168–169, 183–186, 196–206, 213, 270, 286, 294, 304, 339, 346, 354.