The mobiele colonnes were the mobile striking columns that Borel proposed as the alternative to the posten-systeem in Atjeh — strong, always-ready columns of 600–800 men infanterie, with a battery of 4–6 stukken artillerie, a sectie mineurs and some cavalleristen, operating two or three in verbond (concert) toward the same doel (objective) in wigvorm (wedge formation). The proposal is the tactical complement to Borel’s strategic doctrine of the aanvallende tactiek: where the posten-systeem dispersed the force among many small garrisons, the mobiele colonnes concentrated it for repeated tuchtigingen of the enemy’s heartland, especially the XXII Moekims — “de kern van Atjeh’s weerstandsvermogen.”
Composition and Doctrine
Each mobiele colonne was to comprise 600–800 men of infanterie, a battery of 4–6 stukken artillerie (preferably steel achterlaadkanonnen with schokbuis), a sectie of mineurs (engineers) and some cavalleristen for reconnaissance and pursuit. The columns were to operate two or three in verbond — in concert — toward the same doel, advancing in wigvorm (wedge formation) so as to converge on the objective from multiple directions. The doctrine was, in effect, the application to Atjeh of the European principle of marcher au canon — marching to the sound of the guns — that Borel cites from the Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken booklet distributed to officers before the second expedition. The columns were to be always ready to march, supported by kappen en branden (cutting and burning) — the two principal means Borel identifies for overcoming Atjeh’s resistance — and by the omtrekking (flanking and encircling) tactic that Borel calls the “overoude Indische tactiek.” The columns were not to replace the posts of the posten-systeem but to supplement them: the posts would hold the line; the columns would strike the enemy.
The Critique of the Posten-systeem
The mobiele colonnes proposal is, in Borel’s account, the direct consequence of his critique of the posten-systeem. The 36 posts of the stelling-Pel dispersed the bezettingskorps among many small garrisons, leaving no strong reserve for offensive operations. The posts were repeatedly overvallen: the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875, the night attack on Lemboe-N.O. of 23–24 January 1876, and the Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876 all exposed the vulnerability of small garrisons in Atjeh. The enemy breakthrough of June 1878 — when van der Heijden’s absence with most of the mobiele strijdmacht at Gedoeng allowed the enemy to break the line in the IV, VI and IX Moekims — vindicated the critique. The lesson Borel draws is categorical: posts alone cannot prevent a linie-doorbraak; mobile forces must never be reduced.
The Indische Brigade and the Algiers Model
The mobiele colonnes required, in Borel’s argument, a metropolitan reinforcement on the scale of the 1830 French expedition against Algiers (quoted from Camille Rousset’s L’Histoire de la guerre de Crimée). The Indische Brigade of 3 000–4 000 men, raised in the Netherlands from Dutch vrijwilligers, armed with steel achterlaadkanonnen and sent directly to Atjeh, would supply the geoefende manschappen, the kaders and the modern materieel that the Indische leger itself could no longer provide. Two or three mobiele colonnes, operating in verbond, would then conduct repeated tuchtigingen of the XXII Moekims — the densest-populated Sagi, containing the Sultan’s voorraadschuren and the most hostile chiefs. The example of kolonel van der Heijden’s two expeditions against Gedoeng in June 1878 — after the second of which the chief laid down bestuur and his son came to submit — was, Borel argued, proof of the doctrine. The submission of Pasangan after naval bombardment on 15 August 1878 confirmed the pattern. The mobiele colonnes proposal, though never adopted in Borel’s exact form, anticipated the later maréchaussée system associated with van Heutsz that finally brought the Atjeh-oorlog to a close in the early twentieth century.
See Also
- Aanvallende tactiek in Atjeh
- Afwachtende houding
- Posten-systeem in Atjeh
- Omtrekking
- Kappen en branden
- Achterlaadkanonnen van 12 c.M.
- Indische Brigade (proposed)
- Enemy breakthrough in the IV, VI and IX Moekims (June 1878)
- Submission of Pasangan (15 August 1878)
- 1878
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 175, 213–214, 263, 323–325, 336–337, 339, 346, 354–357, 364.