The VI Moekims — the “Six Mukims” — were one of the smaller mukim-clusters of Groot-Atjeh — the northernmost triangle of Sumatra that formed the heartland of the Atjehnese sultanate. The VI Moekims formed the western segment of the territory enclosed by the Dutch geconcentreerde linie after the Dutch retreat from the interior of Groot-Atjeh in 1884, and they were — together with the XXII, XXV and XXVI Moekims — one of the principal administrative subdivisions of the late sultanate and of the Dutch colonial order that succeeded it. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the VI Moekims were also the western power-base of Teuku Umar (Toekoe Oemar) in the Atjeh-oorlog, including the kampongs of Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, Lam-Baroe, Lam-Tengah, and Lam-Isi, and together with the neighbouring IV Moekims formed the principal theatre of Umar’s defensive stellingen against the Dutch counter-offensive of May 1896.

The political structure

The Atjeh-Album of 1896 records that the VI Moekims — like the other mukim-clusters of Groot-Atjeh — were governed by an oeloebalang who exercised temporal authority over the mukim’s imam and teungku religious officials. The VI Moekims were, in the late concentratie period, governed by Toekoe Nja Din — the wife of Toekoe Oemar who bestuurde feitelijk de VI Moekims (“actually governed the VI Moekims”) while her husband pursued his military and political career along the Westkust and in the upper valley of the Atjeh-rivier. The governance of the VI Moekims by a woman — the wife of the principal Dutch auxiliary of the late concentratie period — is one of the principal documented instances of the way in which adat-based Atjehnese authority could place a woman at the head of a strategically critical district.

The strategic position

The Atjeh-Album records that the VI Moekims formed the western segment of the territory enclosed by the Dutch geconcentreerde linie — and that they were the territory immediately adjacent to the western side of the Dutch perimeter. The VI Moekims were thus the principal contact zone between the Dutch-held coast and the Atjehnese interior, and the principal line of communication between the geconcentreerde linie and the upper valley where the religious resistance was organised. The VI Moekims were, in the album’s narrative of the 1896 crisis, the territory of Nja Din that was first invaded by the bandit Habib Long — the incursion that gave Toekoe Oemar the gelegenheid (opportunity) to orde en rust te handhaven en de Moslemin te verdrijven (maintain order and peace and drive out the Moslemin), and that was the immediate occasion of his appointment as Dutch auxiliary.

The 1896 crisis

The Atjeh-Album records that, when Toekoe Oemar defected from the Dutch alliance in March 1896, the VI Moekims — under Nja Din’s day-to-day rule — became one of the principal theatres of the ensuing crisis. The Moslemin (religious-warrior bands) who had been driven out of the VI Moekims by Oemar’s earlier purges now returned, and Oemar’s defection placed the entire Dutch outer line in jeopardy. The VI Moekims were thus the western anchor of the crisis, and the territory whose loss would have unhinged the entire Dutch perimeter.

Description and Location (ATJEH ‘96 account)

The VI Moekims lay on the west coast of Groot-Atjeh immediately to the north-west of the IV Moekims, adjoining the landschap of Lepong on the west coast. The six mukims contained the kampongs of Lam-Pagar (whose population was known as bijsonder krijgshaftig — “particularly warlike”), Lam-Badak, Lam-Baroe (where the versterking Balei Lam Baroe stood in the Noordrand), Lam-Tengah (with its versterking and lilla — small swivel cannon), and Lam-Isi (strongly defended by volk uit Daja with Beaumontgeweren). The region was bounded on the south by the IV Moekims and the heights of Boekit Seboen and Lam-Poelau, and on the west by the sea-coast of Lepong and the Kroeng Raba bay. The Belang Kala-pas gave access south-westward to the pepper gardens of Monbroeh where the women of the VI Moekims also refuge.

Historical Background (ATJEH ‘96 account)

The VI Moekims had been the western heartland of Teuku Umar’s authority throughout the period 18931896 when he served the Dutch as Panglima Prang Besar. From these mukims Umar drew his most reliable warriors, and after his appointment he kept his dwelling at Lam-Pisang in the adjoining IV Moekims but maintained his strategic centre of gravity in the VI. The volk uit Daja (people from Daja) of Lam-Isi, armed with Dutch breech-loading rifles, were among the best-equipped of Umar’s warriors. After his defection the VI Moekims declared themselves afgevallen (defected) with Umar and prepared stellingen — the versterkingen (fortifications) of Lam-Isi, Lam-Tengah, and Lam-Baroe together with the trenches at Lam-Pagar and the boschranden (forest edges) of Lam-Awi — to resist the expected Dutch attack.

Role in the 1896 Operations (ATJEH ‘96 account)

The VI Moekims were the principal target of the three-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896. On 23 May 1896 a colonne under Majoor Van Bloemen Waanders attacked Lam-Isi, which was taken at 2:40 NM by the 12e and 14e Bataljons after heavy fighting; on the same day the 5e compagnie of the 12e Bataljon fought through the Kloof van Beradin and the 6e Bataljon moved up against Lam-Tengah-Oost. On 24 May 1896 the 5e Bataljon captured Lam-Pisang and Umar’s dwelling; on 25 May 1896 the 6e Bataljon’s 3e compagnie stormed the stelling Daman–Lam-TjroengLam-Poelau. The women of the VI Moekims, including Tjoet Nja Din, fled during the bombardment to Monbroeh in the Belang Kala-pas. On 4 June5 June 1896 a two-colonne operation under Van Heutsz re-entered the VI Moekims, occupying Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, Lam-Goeroen, Lam-Manjang, Lam-Tengah-Oost, Lam-Toetoe, Lam-Njoeng, and Lam-Awi. On 5 June 1896 Toekoe Hoesin Long Bata was killed in the valley of Beradin by a maréchaussée patrol.

Significance

The VI Moekims’ significance in the documentary record of the Atjeh-oorlog is as the western anchor of the Dutch geconcentreerde linie — the territory whose governance by Toekoe Nja Din placed a woman at the head of a strategically critical district, and whose invasion by Habib Long was the immediate occasion of Toekoe Oemar’s appointment as Dutch auxiliary. The VI Moekims’ role in the 1896 crisis — as the territory first invaded by the Moslemin after Oemar’s defection — places them as the western anchor of the spring 1896 crisis. Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 adds that the VI Moekims were the centre of gravity of Teuku Umar’s military power and the principal geographic object of the 1896 Dutch counter-offensive. The collapse of his stellingen there in May 1896 compelled Umar to withdraw eastward into Lepong and the Belang Kala-pas, and opened the way for the marine bombardments of Lepong of 25 May and 4 June5 June, 8 June9 June 1896. The VI Moekims remained, however, the symbolic core of Umar’s legitimacy: his chandoeri (council) of approximately 20 June 1896 at Lepong appointed new panglima’s drawn principally from the VI.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

The VI Moekims (Zes Moekims, “Six Mukims”) was the sagi (confederation) of six mukim (parish) units adjacent to Marassa on the west coast of Groot-Atjeh, led by the hostile chief Toekoe Nanta. The VI Moekims was the weak point of the stelling-Pel between Oeleh Leh and Soerian, and the principal target of Pel’s great winter offensive of 1875–1876, which conquered the sagi in January 1876. Some re-population had occurred by 1878.

Toekoe Nanta and the war

The VI Moekims under Toekoe Nanta was from the outset of the war hostile both to the Dutch and to Toekoe Nek of Marassa, the only early pro-Dutch chief. Its geographical position — between the seaward corner at Oeleh Leh and the western arc of the Dutch perimeter at Soerian — made it the natural line of advance for any Atjehnees attack on the K. Radja–Oeleh Leh communication, and the natural weak point of any Dutch defensive line. Toekoe Nanta had built fortified places along the lagune of Gigieng — Lampanti, Lamti, Sabang — whose artillery commanded the Kwala Tjangkoel waterway into the lagune. The reduction of these fortified places was a precondition of any closure of the Gigieng lagune supply channel. Pel’s Buitenzorg plan of July 1875 therefore included the invasion of the VI Moekims and the sweeping of the western bank of the Kwala Tjangkoel as the first operation of the resumed offensive.

The January 1876 conquest

The conquest of the VI Moekims began on 26 December 1875 with the launch of Pel’s three-colonne offensive under his personal leiding. majoor Vetter bezette Mibouw ten zuiden van K. Radja; majoor F. J. E. Mekern took stelling between Mibouw and the Kroeng Daroe but was doodelijk gewond; lt.-kol. Engel advanced along the right bank of the Kroeng Daroe. Ketapang Doewa fell on 27 December 1875, Djempit and Pakan Badak on 28 December 1875, Lamtengah on 8 January 1876. The VI Moekims kern was attacked. On 10 January 1876 the opperhoofd of Lampagger submitted and a post was opgericht. The march through the Blang Kalla kloof on 15 January 1876 reached Loenga on the right bank of the Kroeng Raba mouth, opening the IV Moekims for invasion. The VI Moekims was conquered, and the way was prepared for the IX Moekims invasion of 28 January 1876 through the Glitaroem pass.

Sources

De Karbouw — Zijn betekenis voor de volken van de Indonesische Archipel, by J. Kreemer (‘s-Gravenhage / Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve, 1956), p. 246.

De Atjehers, by C. Snouck Hurgronje, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1893-94), vol. II, p. 315.

See Also


The VI Moekim’s of Groot-Atjeh (the Six Mukims of Greater Aceh) were a federation of six mukim — the Islamic administrative unit (from Arabic muqīm, literally “settled” or “resident”) used in Atjeh to organise the territorial-administrative structure of the sultanate — that formed one of the principal territorial federations of the Groot-Atjeh heartland around Koetaradja. The VI Moekim’s are mentioned in Kreemer’s *De Karbouw* ([[1956)]] (p. 246) as the inhabitants who, in the period documented by Snouck Hurgronje, held the annual seven-day beach feast at Rabò — the seventh day of which culminated in the ritual sacrifice of a buffalo that was first stabbed and then led bleeding over all the rice-fields.

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 57, 65, 93, 103, 176, 200, 228, 245–246, 263, 323–329, 336–337, 350.

Nineteenth-Century Historiography & Campaign Analysis

Political Leadership and Resistance

The district was governed by hereditary Acehnese nobility (hulubalangs), including Teuku Nanta Setia (Teuku Nanta of the VI Moekims), father of Cut Nyak Dhien. Following the Capture of the Aceh Kraton on 24 January 1874, Teuku Nanta Setia and leaders of the VI Moekims rejected Dutch calls for capitulation, converting their agricultural villages and sawahs (Sawah Cultivation and Supply in Aceh) into fortified resistance centers.

Target of General Pel’s Campaign

In late December 1875 and early 1876, General J. L. J. H. Pel initiated General Pel’s Campaign in Aceh by directing offensive operations against the VI Moekims.

On 26 December 1875, Dutch columns numbering over 7,000 troops stormed border bentengs around Pekan Badak and advanced through the district, systematically dismantling earthworks and occupying agricultural lands.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 138, 141, 142, 145, 148, 165, 175, 176, 179, 181, 213, 232–242, 344, 348.

Atjeh gedurende de tweede expeditie en later, Een Oud Officier, Batavia: Ogilvie & Co., 1876, pp. 11-15, 60-65.

Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 4, 7 (Toekoe Oemar — Zijn Verraad; De Poeassa — Atjehers en Kafirs).