The strategische driehoek (Atjeh) (strategic triangle) was the geographic framework of the Dutch vestiging in Atjeh — a triangle whose three corners were Kwala Atjeh at the mouth of the Atjeh-rivier, K. Radja (the captured Kraton) at the inland apex, and Oeleh Leh on the west coast. The triangle defined the line of communication between the Dutch hoofdplaats and the sea, and its three corners constituted the strategic points that the Dutch had to hold to maintain the vestiging. Borel clarifies that the triangle — sometimes called “de zoogenaamde strategische driehoek van den generaal van Swieten” — was in fact Pel’s work, not van Swieten’s: it was Pel who, in early May 1874, decided to bezet the three corners and to construct the posts that made the triangle a working defensive system.
The Three Corners
The three corners of the strategic triangle were: Kwala Atjeh at the mouth of the Atjeh-rivier — the point at which the river communication from the sea reached the Dutch vestiging; K. Radja (the captured Kraton) at the inland apex — the Dutch hoofdplaats and the central reduit of the stelling-Pel; and Oeleh Leh on the west coast — the main Dutch debarkeerplaats and the site of the projected zeehoofd (sea-pier). The base of the triangle ran along the sea-strand from Kwala Atjeh to Oeleh Leh; the two inland sides ran from Kwala Atjeh to K. Radja along the Atjeh-rivier, and from K. Radja to Oeleh Leh along the line of posts that Pel constructed in May 1874. The triangle enclosed the entire Dutch vestiging and the line of communication between the hoofdplaats and the sea; if any of the three corners had been lost, the vestiging would have been untenable. The Marine-benteng on the right bank of the Atjeh-rivier halfway between the mouth and Penajoeng served as an intermediate point on the eastern side; the posts at Pakan Atjeh, Penajoeng and the Pedir-dijk served as further intermediate points.
Pel’s Work, Not Van Swieten’s
Borel’s central clarification is that the strategic triangle was Pel’s work, not van Swieten’s. The “zoogenaamde strategische driehoek van den generaal van Swieten” — the so-called strategic triangle of generaal van Swieten — was, Borel insists, a misnomer. Van Swieten had not bezet the three corners; he had declared the war ended in his afscheidsrede of 23 April 1874 and had departed on 26 April 1874 without securing the western side of the triangle. It was Pel who, on 4 May 1874 — accompanied by the commandanten of artillerie and genie, the adsistent-resident Kroesen and the controleur Tadema — met Toekoe Nek at his home in Marassa and decided to bezet Merdoewatie, Lampasej, Blang Oe (headquarters) and Oeleh Leh, with a batterij at Oedjoeng Planggan. The conference “liep zeer bevredigend af”: the Dutch could erect as many posts as they wanted in Marassa. The establishment of the Oeleh Leh post in early May 1874 — when two compagnieën were immediately sent to Oeleh Leh — completed the western side of the triangle. The strategic triangle was thus the geographic foundation of the stelling-Pel that Pel completed in May 1875.
Significance and Vulnerability
The strategic triangle was the geographic foundation of the Dutch vestiging in Atjeh, but it was also its vulnerability. The triangle’s western side — the line of posts from K. Radja to Oeleh Leh through Marassa, Blang Oe, Soerian and the VI Moekims — was the weakest point of the stelling-Pel. The gebied of Toekoe Nanta of the VI Moekims dominated the Kwala Tjangkoel and the lagune of Gigieng; Toekoe Nanta had built versterkingen at Lampanti, Lamti and Sabang so that no vessel could pass without being under artillery fire. The occupation of Sinangri in July 1875 and the great offensive of December 1875 – February 1876 were undertaken partly to secure the western side of the triangle. The kwade moesson that broke on 31 May 1874 rendered the Atjeh-rivier onbevaarbaar and proved the fout of never building a zeehoofd at Oeleh Leh — a fout that exposed the entire triangle to the risk of being cut off from the sea. The enemy breakthrough of June 1878 in the IV, VI and IX Moekims was, in Borel’s account, the consequence of stripping the triangle of its mobile forces during van der Heijden’s absence at Gedoeng.
See Also
- Stelling-Pel
- Generaal Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Kwala Atjeh
- Kota Radja
- Oeleh Leh
- Marine-benteng
- Pakan Atjeh
- Toekoe Nek
- Toekoe Nanta
- Zeehoofd
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 85, 94–95, 103–104, 112–113, 121, 125, 132, 135, 175, 214, 288.