The Enemy breakthrough in the IV, VI and IX Moekims (June 1878) was the crisis that broke upon the Dutch establishment in the second half of June 1878 — barely had the gouverneur van Atjeh, kolonel van der Heijden, left Groot-Atjeh with most of the mobile strijdmacht to tuchtigen the vassal coastal state of Gedoeng — when the Atjehneezen attacked the Dutch linie, broke through at several places, fell into the IV, VI and IX Sagis, drove out the pro-Dutch population, plundered and burned, cut communication between K. Radja and several posts, and produced what Borel calls the “gruwelijke moordtooneel in een van onze hospitalen.”

Background

In January 1878 the toestand in Atjeh had been bevredigend; several hoofden had submitted. In the second half of June 1878 van der Heijden marched with most of the mobile strijdmacht to tuchtigen Gedoeng — a vassal coastal state outside Groot-Atjeh — for the support it had given the enemy with hulpbenden, weapons and levensmiddelen. Gedoeng was tuchtiged twice; after the second, the chief laid down his bestuur and his son came in to submit. But the absence of the mobile force from Groot-Atjeh opened the door.

The breakthrough

The enemy attacked the Dutch linie, broke through at several places, fell into the IV, VI and IX Moekims, verjoeg the pro-Dutch bevolking, plundered and burned, sneed the gemeenschap between K. Radja and several posts, and produced schrik and verwarring. In the course of the crisis an atrocity was committed in one of the Dutch hospitals — the “gruwelijke moordtooneel” Borel cites as one of the wrange vruchten of the passive stelsel. Van der Heijden had to rush back in aller ijl and met geweld restore communication with the posts in the IV Moekims. New battalions were sent from Java.

Borel’s verdict

The Dutch eventually drove the enemy out everywhere and even made a successful inval in the XXII Moekims to punish them — but, Borel insists, the verloopen of the friendly population could not be undone: they had lost vertrouwen in Dutch protection. The episode proves, for Borel, that posts alone cannot prevent a linie-doorbraak; the mobile force must never be reduced. It is the same lesson he had drawn from the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit and from the Atoeh catastrophe, and it is the practical argument behind his Indische Brigade proposal of March 1878.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 339, 355–357, 365.