The posten-systeem in Atjeh was the Indian system of garrisoning many small posts to dominate terrain, applied in Atjeh by the bezettingskorps under generaal Pel and continued under generaal Wiggers van Kerchem. The system had worked on Sumatra’s Westkust and on Borneo, where the enemy was politically divided and could be held in check by small garrisons; but in Atjeh, Borel argues, it was over-applied, leading to machtsversnippering (dispersal of force), to the exposure of small garrisons to overvallen (surprise attacks), and to the enemy breakthrough of June 1878 that proved the system could not hold the line.
The Indian System
The posten-systeem was, in Borel’s account, the standard Dutch colonial method of dominating hostile territory. Small garrisons — typically a company of infanterie, sometimes with a section of artillerie — were posted in fortified posts at strategic points along a line, with the dual purpose of preventing the enemy from penetrating the line and of projecting Dutch authority into the surrounding terrain. The system had been developed in the long colonial wars of the nineteenth century — on Sumatra’s Westkust, on Borneo, in the Celebes — where the enemy was politically divided, lacked central direction, and could be held in check by small garrisons supported by occasional punitive expeditions. The system had the advantage of economy: a relatively small European force could dominate a large territory. It had the disadvantage of machtsversnippering: by dispersing the force among many small posts, it left no strong reserve available for offensive operations, and it exposed each post to the risk of being overvallen by a superior enemy force.
The Atjeh Application
In Atjeh the posten-systeem was applied on a scale unmatched in earlier colonial wars. The stelling-Pel completed in May 1875 comprised 36 posts along a perimeter of some 25 kilometres, enclosing an area of approximately 2 500 hectaren — about three times the area of Amsterdam. Each post was garrisoned by a detachment of infanterie and (where appropriate) artillerie, and was connected to its neighbours by roads, telegraph and (where feasible) the field railway between K. Radja and Oeleh Leh. Borel criticises the stelling-Pel for containing too many redundant posts — a feature of the posten-systeem that he indicts throughout the book. The posts were repeatedly overvallen: the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875, when a band of ~50 Atjehneezen climbed the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among sleeping manschappen, wounding 13 including 2 officers; the night attack on Lemboe-N.O. of 23–24 January 1876, in which the bezetting weerde zich dapper but lost one gesneuveld officier and 22 zwaar gekwetsten; and the Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876, in which kapitein van Swieten’s detachment of 2 officers and 57 men was massacred on the drassige sawah near Lamsajoen — all exposed the vulnerability of the posten-systeem in Atjeh.
The Vindication of the Critique
Borel’s critique of the posten-systeem was vindicated, in his account, by the enemy breakthrough of June 1878. Barely had gouverneur van Atjeh, kolonel van der Heijden, left with most of the mobiele strijdmacht to tuchtigen the vassal coastal state of Gedoeng, when the enemy attacked the Dutch linie, broke through at several places, fell into the IV, VI and IX Moekims, verjoeg the pro-Dutch bevolking, plundered and burned, sneed the gemeenschap between K. Radja and several posts, and committed the “gruwelijke moordtooneel in een van onze hospitalen” — an atrocity in a Dutch hospital that Borel cites as one of the “wrange vruchten van het passieve stelsel.” Van der Heijden had to rush back in aller ijl and with geweld restore communicatie with the posts in the IV Moekims; new battalions were sent from Java. The lesson Borel draws is categorical: posts alone cannot prevent a linie-doorbraak; mobile forces must never be reduced. The posten-systeem could only be made effective if it were supplemented by mobiele colonnes of 600–800 men, always ready to march and to “marcher au canon,” and operating two or three in verbond toward the same doel. The posten-systeem was thus not rejected outright but subordinated to the mobiele colonnes — a strategic judgement that anticipated the later maréchaussée system associated with van Heutsz.
See Also
- Stelling-Pel
- Mobiele colonnes (Borel)
- Afwachtende houding
- Aanvallende tactiek in Atjeh
- Generaal Pel
- Generaal Wiggers van Kerchem
- Night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit (22 November 1875)
- Enemy breakthrough in the IV, VI and IX Moekims (June 1878)
- Klewang
- 1875
- 1878
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 175, 213–214, 238, 263, 287–289, 323–325, 339, 346, 354–357.