The aanvallende tactiek in Atjeh (offensive system in Atjeh; also offensieve stelsel or aanvallende stelsel) was the active, aggressive strategy advocated by Borel and embodied in the conduct of generaal Pel — the strategy of mobile colonnes striking the enemy repeatedly, of burning kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on, of cutting standing padi, and of pursuing the enemy after every success. It is the prescriptive alternative to the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture) of van Swieten and Wiggers van Kerchem that Borel indicts throughout Onze vestiging in Atjeh. The two examples Borel cites as proof of the aanvallende stelsel are kolonel van der Heijden’s two expeditions against Gedoeng in June 1878 and the submission of Pasangan after naval bombardment on 15 August 1878.
The Doctrine
The aanvallende tactiek was, in Borel’s account, the application to Atjeh of the European strategic common sense of the mid-nineteenth century — the lesson of the German pursuit after Sédan in 1870, of the French expedition against Algiers in 1830 (quoted from Camille Rousset’s L’Histoire de la guerre de Crimée), and of the Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken booklet distributed to officers before the second expedition, which prescribed the gulden regel that “Slechts eene krachtige vervolging kan de overwinning vruchtbaar maken” (only a vigorous pursuit can make victory fruitful). The doctrine had several elements. First, the enemy must be pursued after every success: the omtrekkende beweging of 23–24 January 1874 that delivered the deserted Kraton to the Dutch should have been pressed forward to break the retreating Atjehnese hoofdmacht. Second, kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on must be burned: the prohibition on burning, imposed by van Swieten as a humane measure, was, in Borel’s judgement, a strategic error. Third, standing padi must be cut: van Swieten’s prohibition on cutting padi — and his padi-snijden concession to Langkroek — fed the enemy; Pel harvested the padi for Dutch use. Fourth, the enemy must be attacked by omtrekking (flanking and encircling) rather than by frontal assault — the “overoude Indische tactiek” that almost always yielded surprising results. Fifth, mobiele colonnes of 600–800 men, always ready to march and to “marcher au canon,” must replace the posten-systeem of small garrisoned posts.
Pel’s Application
Pel’s application of the aanvallende tactiek began on 28 April 1874 — two days after van Swieten’s departure — when he ordered the daily bombardment of kampongs within range. The establishment of the Oeleh Leh post in early May 1874, the battle of Lampoeloe of 20 June 1874 (the first Dutch offensive since the expedition to Ketapang Doewa of 15 February 1874 — “the first step on a new road”), the battle of Garouw of 28 June 1874 (when the enemy was for the first time permanently driven from the right bank below Penajoeng), the battle of Soerian of 26 July 1874, the conquest of Langkroek of 28 September 1874, the conquest of Lemboe of 7 November 1874, the battle of Longbatta of 31 December 1874, the surprise of Lamara Olejlo of 14–15 February 1875, the completion of the stelling-Pel in May 1875 and the great offensive of December 1875 – February 1876 — all were stages in the application of the aanvallende tactiek. Pel’s death on 24 February 1876 interrupted the application; under Wiggers the afwachtende houding returned.
The Vindication of 1878
The aanvallende tactiek was, in Borel’s account, vindicated by the events of June and August 1878. kolonel van der Heijden’s two expeditions against the vassal coastal state of Gedoeng — after the second of which the chief laid down bestuur and his son came to submit — were a “schitterend succes” that Borel cites as proof of the doctrine. The submission of Pasangan after naval bombardment on 15 August 1878 confirmed the pattern: “eerst moet de vijand getuchtigd worden en wel in die mate dat hem geen andere uitweg overblijft dan het hoofd in den schoot te leggen” (first the enemy must be chastised, and to such a degree that no other course remains to him but to lay his head in the lap). Borel predicts that the same pattern will work in Groot-Atjeh itself: repeated tuchtigingen of the XXII Moekims — “de kern van Atjeh’s weerstandsvermogen” — by the proposed Indische Brigade would reduce the enemy and finally end the war. He invokes in jest the words of prins von Bismarck on the “psychologische oogenblik” at which to begin negotiations with Atjehnese chiefs after a few tuchtigingen. The aanvallende tactiek was, in Borel’s argument, the only strategy that could end the Atjeh-oorlog; the Indische Brigade was the means to apply it.
See Also
- Afwachtende houding
- Mobiele colonnes (Borel)
- Omtrekking
- Kappen en branden
- Posten-systeem in Atjeh
- Generaal Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Wiggers van Kerchem
- Indische Brigade (proposed)
- Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken (1873)
- Submission of Pasangan (15 August 1878)
- 1874
- 1878
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 48, 54, 116–118, 124–128, 144–148, 162–163, 176–178, 200–214, 238–256, 263, 277–285, 303, 320–322, 339, 346, 354–357.