The Battle of Longbatta (31 December 1874) was the two-column operation planned by kolonel Pel to carry the kampong of Longbatta — long the residence of Panglima Polim, the Imam of Longbatta, and other hostile chiefs — which began with the bloodless seizure of the stone Mesigit at dawn, was spoiled by the disastrous retreat of van der Meer’s left column across an open sawah, and was saved from utter destruction only by the heroic counter-attack of van Zijll de Jong at the head of some sixty infantry and a four-gun battery.
Pel’s plan
Pel’s plan called for two converging columns. The left column — the 10th battalion under Majoor van der Meer, with a four-gun battery and a mineur detachment — was to march from Pakan Atjeh along the left bank of the Atjeh-rivier directly on Longbatta. The right column — the 5th battalion under Romswinckel, under the overall command of overste Wiegand — was to make a feint attack east of K. Radja to draw the enemy’s attention.
Morning success and van der Meer’s disaster
At five in the morning of 31 December 1874 the 5th battalion attacked the bosch-rand east of K. Radja. The 10th battalion on the left bank met almost no resistance, because the enemy had streamed east to face Romswinckel. The strong stelling at Pendetti opposite Lemboe was abandoned; the left column reached Blang Tjoet, left the river, and marched on Longbatta. The fortified Mesigit (stone mosque) was taken without a shot. Longbatta itself was the meeting-point of the XXII and XXVI Moekims.
While van der Meer held a benteng by the Mesigit, Pel sent him an order to investigate the nearest kampong-rand to the south-east. Van der Meer misinterpreted it. He abandoned the captured Mesigit benteng without leaving a garrison, and marched his whole force southward over open, marshy sawah. The Atjehneezen, who had streamed back in, occupied the abandoned benteng and cut off the column’s retreat. Van der Meer, marching calmly across the sawah, did not notice. Heavy firing broke out on the far side. Pel’s staff tried in vain to recall him by signals. By sunset the firing grew heavier and the column did not appear. The men, exhausted by the march over the sticky sawah, were attacked from all sides in thick brush. The retreat across the marshy ground, under furious pursuit and klewang attacks, became a rout. The battalion lost cohesion; orders could not be given. The rear guard, pursued on foot, wandered into very marshy ground, was cut to pieces, and some men threw away their weapons. The wounded and exhausted who fell behind were mercilessly killed by the Atjehneezen.
Van Zijll de Jong’s counter-attack
In the critical moment Majoor van Zijll de Jong — artillery major at the staff of the supreme commander — made the bold proposal to recapture the lost benteng with the only available force: about sixty infantry and a four-gun battery. With so much at stake, Pel did not hesitate. By a well-planned and well-executed attack van Zijll de Jong and his handful retook the benteng, and so covered the retreat of the colonne-van der Meer, saving it from certain destruction. Borel calls him “the hero of the day.”
Wiegand’s failure
The right column under Wiegand should have linked up with Pel. After driving back the enemy and taking the works east of K. Radja, Wiegand tried to push eastward. They met very marshy, nipa-planted terrain, very difficult especially for artillery. Rather than push through, they tried to go around to the south, lost their way, marched west, and ended up before the zuider-face of K. Radja — facing away from their objective. The distance from Lampoe Oek to Longbatta-Mesigit was only about twenty minutes’ walk in a straight line. Wiegand’s men heard the heavy firing and trumpet signals at Longbatta, but took them for Wilhelmus victory fanfares, never guessing that the other column was in trouble. Instead of marcher au canon, Wiegand wandered until too late. When the enemy east of K. Radja noticed Wiegand pulling south, he slipped away to Longbatta and threw his whole weight on van der Meer.
Aftermath
At six in the evening the retreat to K. Radja began; two companies were left as garrison of the fortified Mesigit. The column reached K. Radja at nine o’clock. Van der Meer marched the rest of his battalion on to Oeleh Leh that same evening. The 5th battalion under Romswinckel had already returned and bivouacked on the plain before the Kraton. Only on the day after could the losses be established: more than fifty severely wounded — many with dreadful klewang cuts — were taken into the K. Radja ambulances. One administration officer, one mineur sergeant, and about twenty men were missing, probably killed on the spot by the furious Atjehneezen. Some forty Beaumont rifles, much ammunition, and ambulance materials were captured by the enemy. Borel acknowledges that orienting oneself without a guide in tropical forest is extremely hard, but concludes that the day’s success was largely spoiled.
See Also
- Generaal Pel
- Majoor van der Meer
- Majoor van Zijll de Jong
- Majoor Romswinckel
- Kolonel Wiegand
- Longbatta
- Longbatta-Mesigit
- Pendetti
- Blang Tjoet
- Panglima Polim
- Imam of Longbatta
- XXII Moekims
- XXVI Moekims
- Klewang
- Sawah
- Beaumont-geweer
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 226–237.