The sawah (irrigated rice field, rice paddy) was the characteristic terrain of the Atjehnese lowlands — a flooded or marshy field, crossed only by narrow galangs-an (dikes), on which the Atjehneezen cultivated their padi (rice). The sawah was, in Borel’s account, both the economic foundation of the Atjehnese war effort (the padi fed the warriors) and the most dangerous tactical terrain on which the Dutch could operate: a column marching across a sawah lost all order, exposed itself to Atjehnese fire from the boschrand, and could be cut to pieces by a charge of klewang-armed warriors.
Description and Tactical Significance
The sawah was, in Borel’s account, an irrigated rice field — flooded or marshy for much of the year, crossed only by narrow galangs-an (dikes) that served as pathways. The sawah’s tactical significance was double-edged. On the one hand, the sawah was open ground — the Dutch could see and be seen across it, and the salvoes of Beaumont-geweer fire could be brought to bear on an enemy advancing across it. The Acehnese massed attack on Penajoeng of 11 April 1874 — when a band of 400–500 Atjehneezen “zeer net uitgedoste” approached the omheining, intending to spring with the klewang, and were stopped by the Dutch artillerie and a half bataljon that flanked them — was a typical example of an enemy advance across open sawah being broken by Dutch fire. On the other hand, the sawah was marshy — a column marching across it lost all order, its men sank into the mud, and its formations could not be maintained. The battle of Lemboe of 25–26 December 1873 — when Dutch troops were “exposed on the open sawah to moordend vuur” for hours — was a typical example of the danger of advancing across sawah under enemy fire.
The Padi and the War
The sawah was, in Borel’s account, the economic foundation of the Atjehnese war effort. The padi (rice plant) grown on the sawah fed the warriors; the cutting of standing padi was, in Borel’s doctrine, one of the two principal means (kappen en branden) of overcoming Atjeh’s resistance. van Swieten had prohibited the cutting of standing padi as a humane measure, and had driven the gemoedelijkheid so far as to grant the padi-snijden concession to Langkroek — allowing the bevolking to cut their ripe padi provided they “de geweren aflegden.” The result was that “zoolang het padi-snijden duurde, werd werkelijk geen schot op het bivouak gelost” — but as soon as the last bundle was harvested, the Atjehneezen “weder van alle zijden kwamen opdagen, ditmaal behoorlijk met hunne zware geweren gewapend” and opened a “levendig vuur.” Pel reversed the policy: he harvested the padi for Dutch use, cutting the enemy’s food supply and feeding the bezettingskorps. The sawah was thus both the terrain on which the war was fought and the economic resource for which it was fought.
The Sawah and the Longbatta Disaster
The most damaging single tactical episode involving the sawah in Borel’s account is the Longbatta disaster of 31 December 1874. van der Meer’s column, ordered to investigate the nearest kampong-rand to the south-east of the captured Mesigit benteng, misinterpreted the order: he abandoned the captured benteng without leaving a garrison, and marched his whole force southward over open, marshy sawah. The Atjehneezen, who had streamed back in, occupied the abandoned benteng and cut off the column’s retreat. Van der Meer’s column, “marching calmly across sawah, did not notice.” Heavy firing broke out on the far side; Pel’s staff tried in vain to recall van der Meer by signals. The retreat across the marshy sawah, under furious pursuit and cold-steel attacks, became a rout; the battalion lost cohesion; orders could not be given. The wounded and exhausted who fell behind were mercilessly killed by the Atjehneezen. The lesson Borel draws is categorical: marching in dispersed order over soaked sawah along wooded edges exposed a column to massacre — the lesson of the Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876, when kapitein van Swieten’s detachment of 2 officers and 57 men was cut to pieces on the drassige sawah near Lamsajoen.
Account from Verkenningen in Atjeh (1923)
The Sawah was the irrigated rice-field of an Atjehnese landschap, watered by living water from a river or a wadoek (dam), in contrast to the blang or tegal, which was rain-fed. The sawah is the exception in Atjeh rather than the rule, because the nearness of mountain and plain — the rivers have no middle course — makes irrigation difficult. The sawahs of Atjeh are mostly of the people’s own making; the government has had work done on the extension of the sawah-surface, but the great irrigation-works, like that at Panté Lhong in Peusangan, have often failed.
Source
Verkenningen in Atjeh, by Dr. R. Broersma (De Locomotief, October 1923), chapters V, X, XIII, XV, ‘Perlak, land van peper en olie’, ‘In het land van Peusangan’, ‘Het groote rijstland Pidië’ and ‘Groot-Atjeh’, passim.
Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 57, 60, 62, 187, 199, 209, 210.
Account from Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf (1925)
Sawah was irrigated rice field in Atjeh, contrasted with rain-dependent blang, tegal dry fields, ladang slash-burn.
Details per Broersma
Very many blangs in whole Atjeh but like know of real sawahs. In Peureula small waterworks improvement wadoek laid 1906 then little dike now 250 ha irrigated. Population lays ladang piece forest which for as needed digs to obtain one rice harvest reckless padi cultivation Sumatra still desired usual landscape administration Peureula limited determining ladang only allowed old pepper gardens which ladang builders must clean first excellent measure whereby abandoned decayed pepper gardens not perish wilderness.
Landscape Langsa padifields more frequent called sawah’s but rain-dependent on Java called eega. Yet landscape Langsa still rice deficit completable from Idi if harvest not fail partly due root disease.
Pidie etc irrigation water fertile clay whole area many kampongs much bamboo. Without waterworks cannot manage needed only already to limit bandjirs. Population guided heads simple works others created labour B.O.W. From landschapsdienst thus landscape kas majority.
Seulimeum 22 moekims population earlier used living water irrigation sawahs besides many rain-dependent. Government worked expanding sawah surface still necessary irrigation Atjeh-valley expand e.g., Indrapoeri completely finished not. Large valley as padistreek not same as population diligent skilled cultivation far removed ground processing where terribly shortcoming.
Peusangan its real sawahs own construction tegal fields higher terrains also ladangs pepper pinang less important here besides padi djagong oebi katjang tanah little sugarcane tobacco agriculture resembles Java more.
Gajo-land has tegal fields even sawahs padi planter gladly even ladang. Collective etc.
Irrigation attempt Peusangan at Panté Lhong two arms sea damming one arm by BOW no water main line fruitless cost 3 tons.
Koeta Radja? etc.
See Also
- 1874
- 1876
- Atjeh als rijstland
- Atoeh catastrophe (13 February 1876)
- Battle of Lemboe (25–26 December 1873)
- Battle of Longbatta (31 December 1874)
- Blang
- Generaal Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Jan van Swieten (Kapitein)
- Kappen en branden
- Klewang
- Ladang
- Locèng
- Majoor van der Meer
- Padi-snijden
- Panté Lhong
- Tegal
- Verkenningen in Atjeh (1923)
- Wadoek
- Paditeelt
- Peusangan
- Peureula
- Pidie
Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu
Irrigated rice field. Sawah-gebied characterizes the first 40 km of road from Koetaradja to Seulimeum, and the area around Tangsé. Bevloeiingswater (irrigation water) is distributed via a partition system allowing different phases of rice cultivation in close proximity.Irrigated rice field. Lower quartaire terraces used for sawah. Sawah complexes in North-Aceh (e.g., 500 H.A. reclaimed in PeusanganNatte rijstvelden (wet rice fields) for rice cultivation; dependent on irrigation; in1937 areaal ~140,500 HA in Aceh yielding ~207,000 ton (gepelde rijst = husked rice). Subject to braak-liggen (fallow) period when second crops planted.
Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 57, 60, 62, 187, 199, 209, 210.
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 14, 20, 24, 46, 52–54, 64, 73, 117, 121, 124, 162, 200, 211, 228–237, 317–318. Verkenningen in Atjeh, by Dr. R. Broersma (De Locomotief, October 1923); Atjeh Patchouli-Olie, by Ir. W. Spoon (1932), where applicable. Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf, by Dr. R. Broersma, Gebrs. Cohen, Utrecht, 1925, pp. 26-27, 39-47, 60-64, 81, 83-84, 90-91, 97-115.