The Patrol of Captain Van Blokland (7 March 1896) — the celebrated patrouille of Kapitein Van Blokland from the post of Ana’ Galong along the kampong edges of Ana’ Batée, Klieng, and the rice-fields toward Sibreh — was one of the hardest-fought small actions of the Atjeh-oorlog in the opening weeks of 1896. Launched as a routine reconnaissance in force by the garrison of the most exposed post on the western buitenlinie, the patrol ran into a superior Achehnese force of approximately 250 men under T. Mad Amin, Habib Lhong, and Panglima Hassan and was forced into a five-hour firefight from which it was only extricated by the timely arrival of a relief detachment under Kapitein Kronouer — itself composed of forty bayonets from Lamsoet and Lambarih under Lt. Westendorp and Lt. Ketjen. Kruisheer singles out Van Blokland’s personal valour, recording that “het gelukte hem persoonlijk met de sabel twee tegenstanders neer te slaan, of which een nagenoeg in tweeën gedeeld werd” (it was granted him personally, with the sabre, to strike down two opponents, one of whom was cleft nearly in twain).
Background
By March 1896 the post of Ana’ Galong — site of the conquest of November 1893 — had become the most exposed Dutch position on the western buitenlinie. The Lt.-Col. Bisschoff van Heemskerck, liniecommandant of the concentrated line in early 1896, had ordered the post commanders at Ana’ Galong to patrol at least once during their detachment period, partly to gather intelligence and partly to discourage the concentration of hostile bands in the immediately surrounding kampongs. Kapitein Van Blokland, post commander, drew the patrol duty for his rotation. His force comprised 1e Luit. Stakman (commanding the right section), adj. ond. off. Krüger (No. 14477, commanding the left section), off. van gesondh. 2e kl. C. van der Meer (medical officer), one hoornblazer (bugler), 72 bayonets — i.e., infantry, two minderen of the medical service, and nine forced labourers with three stretchers.
The political background was ominous. Although Teuku Umar would not formally defect until late March, Controleur Gisolf had already warned the Governor of Umar’s “more than suspicious attitude.” The enemy forces in the western mukims were larger, better armed, and more aggressive than they had been for months. A patrol moving out from Ana’ Galong into the kampong belt of Ana’ Batée and Klieng would be moving into the heart of the most hostile country on the island.
The Patrol and the Five-Hour Fight
The patrol marched out of Ana’ Galong along the kampong edges of Ana’ Batée and Klieng and across the sawah toward Sibreh. It was almost immediately engaged. A force estimated at 250 men — three times the strength of the patrol — under the joint command of T. Mad Amin, Habib Lhong, and Panglima Hassan opened fire from covered positions and attempted to surround the small Dutch column. Van Blokland deployed his two sections and fought a delaying action for five hours, the sawah dykes and the kampong edges providing such cover as the broken ground afforded.
In the course of the fight Van Blokland — who, as post commander, was expected to direct the engagement from a position of relative safety — repeatedly closed with the enemy at sabre’s length. The most celebrated incident, preserved verbatim in Kruisheer, records that “het gelukte hem persoonlijk met de sabel twee tegenstanders neer te slaan, of which een nagenoeg in tweeën gedeeld werd” — Van Blokland personally cut down two opponents with his sabre, one of them nearly cleft in two. Casualties mounted. Lt. Stakman was shot through the right arm. Adjudant-Onderofficier Krüger was wounded; he had his wounds bandaged and returned to the fight. Dr. van der Meer received a grazing shot to the head but continued to attend the wounded under fire, including the severely wounded fusilier Monden. The patrol was running low on ammunition and beginning to be pinned against the sawah when relief arrived.
The Relief
Lt.-Col. Bisschoff van Heemskerck, the liniecommandant, arrived at Ana’ Galong at approximately 10:30 a.m. on 7 March 1896 to take personal charge. With him was Kapitein Kronouer of the General Staff. Recognising the peril of the patrol, Bisschoff dispatched Kronouer at the head of a relief detachment of forty bayonets drawn from the garrisons of Lamsoet and Lambarih under the command of Lt. Westendorp and Lt. Ketjen. The relief column marched out through the sawah. Lt. Westendorp was severely wounded in the sawah about 150 m in; he was carried back by the European fusilier Elshout (No. 39756), an act of personal courage that Kruisheer records.
Even as the relief was being organised, 1e Luit. J. van Hasselt, commanding the remainder of the Ana’ Galong garrison, marched out at approximately 8 a.m. with such men as he could spare to reinforce Van Blokland in person. Van Hasselt was hit in the left arm and returned to the benteng to be bandaged, whereupon adj. ond. off. Diehl (No. 32486) talso over command of the post. The combined effect of the reinforcements — Van Hasselt’s sortie from the garrison and Kronouer’s relief detachment — was sufficient to enable Van Blokland to break contact and withdraw the patrol to Ana’ Galong.
Aftermath
The patrol’s casualties — Lt. Stakman shot through the right arm, Krüger wounded, Dr. van der Meer with a head wound, and fusilier Monden severely wounded — were testimony to the intensity of the five-hour fight. The enemy casualties were unknown but certainly heavier, given Van Blokland’s three confirmed sabre-kills and the sustained fire of the patrol’s Beaumont rifles. The engagement demonstrated three things: the strength and aggressiveness of the hostile bands in the western mukims; the competence of the Ana’ Galong garrison under pressure; and the growing inadequacy of the buitenlinie as a strategic instrument. Less than three weeks later, Teuku Umar would defect, the siege of blokhuis Aloer Oe would begin, and the entire western buitenlinie — including Ana’ Galong — would be evacuated.
Significance
The patrol of Captain Van Blokland on 7 March 1896 was the last major Dutch action of the pre-defection phase of the Atjeh-oorlog in the western theatre. It is chiefly remembered for Van Blokland’s celebrated sabre-fight and for the selfless conduct of Lt. Westendorp’s relief detachment. Kruisheer uses the engagement as a portrait of the everyday heroism of the buitenlinie garrisons in the months before the storm broke — and as a quiet indictment of the strategic complacency of Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff’s administration, which persisted in believing Teuku Umar loyal even as the hostile bands in the western mukims grew to three times the strength of an ordinary patrol.
Account from Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh (1911)
P. H. R. Beuming narrates the action in the third sketch of Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, under the heading Het begin van de onlusten op Groot Atjeh in 1896 — Patrouille gevecht bij Anak Galoeng, and supplies a full casualty roll with service numbers.
The situation at Anak Galoeng
Beuming records that after a period of quiet under the alliance with Toekoe Oemar, a certain agitation was observed among the population at the beginning of 1896; the shooting at the posts began again and the boldness of the hostile bands grew greater than ever, so that they ventured even into the immediate neighbourhood of Koeta Radja.
The enemy seemed to have marked out the benting Anak Galoeng in particular — a post established at the time as an observation post wegens de verdachte handelingen van Toekoe Baid, on account of the suspicious dealings of Toekoe Baid. This benting, lying westward of the Atjeh river near the kampongs Anak Baté and Glieng, had a hard time of it: scarcely had darkness fallen when shots rang out from every direction.
When the enemy also began to bring under fire the blockhouse Blang Tjoet, lying between Lambarih and Anak Galoeng on the western bank of the Atjeh river, and on one occasion even flung burning rice straw onto its atap roof, the headquarters at Koeta Radja judged the moment come to make an end of this undesirable state of affairs and instructed the commander of the benting Anak Galoeng to clear the surrounding terrain of the enemy.
The patrol and the division into three
In the early morning of 7 March 1896 a patrol of seventy bayonets marched out in complete silence from the benting under the command of Captain H. F. T. van Blokland, with 1st Lieutenant F. Stakman, the adjudant-onderofficier acting as officer Krüger and the officer of health 2nd class C. van der Meer attached. The remaining part of the garrison stayed behind in the benting under the command of 1st Lieutenant J. van Hasselt.
With the necessary precautions the patrol moved cautiously along the dyke in the direction of the benting Lambarih and at the blockhouse Blang Tjoet turned left towards kampong Anak Baté. Just before reaching the kampong the patrol was split into three detachments: the first under Van Blokland was to follow the kampong edge; the detachment under Lieutenant Stakman was to follow parallel to this as left flank guard; while adjudant Krüger with his detachment was to advance through the sawah on Anak Galoeng.
The engagement
Scarcely had the enemy discovered the column in the open sawah when shots fell from the densely overgrown kampong. The Acehnese came up from all sides and overwhelmed the Dutch with their fire; het regende letterlijk kogels — it literally rained bullets.
At this first encounter Lieutenant Stakman and adjudant Krüger were wounded, and only with much difficulty and under a hail of lead could these wounded be carried to the benting. Lieutenant Van Hasselt, who at once left the benting with reinforcement to help the column, had scarcely arrived on the ground when he too was wounded by a shot in the hand, maar dit belette hem niet zijn dapperen te blijven aanvoeren. Dr. Van der Meer, while bandaging the wounded, was struck by a shot in the head and fell unconscious; scarcely returned to consciousness, wijdde deze kranige officier van Gezondheid zich onverwijld weder aan zijn taak en verbond de gewonden, zonder zich over zijn eigen wond te bekommeren. Voorwaar een toonbeeld van opofferende naastenliefde.
Unable to go forward or back, the patrol took what position it could in the terrain. Of the Acehnese, who used every fold of ground, little was to be seen. Under these circumstances the position was very perilous; but thanks to the resolution of den beleidvollen aanvoerder Van Blokland the spirit of the troop was excellent. With great calm he directed the fire and encouraged the soldiers by word and example, and that notwithstanding that he too had already been struck by a shot in the leg.
Exposed to a frightful fire — zelfs ook uit de zoogenaamde bevriende kampong Sibreh — the losses of the little group steadily grew. The enemy evidently wished to surround the patrol, but the resolution of the Dutch frustrated the plan.
The klewang attacks
Beuming records the Acehnese klewang attacks and the Dutch reply. Although the Acehnese had already learned in earlier engagements that their fanatical klewang attack availed little against well-aimed volleys and closed bayonets, the opportunity now seemed too fine not to try it once more, the Dutch having already suffered heavy losses and being exhausted, while the enemy was far superior in numbers.
Onder het uiten van oorverdoovende kreten stortte de vijand zich met de klewang in de vuist, op het kleine troepje, maar het bekwam hem slecht; kalm en vastberaden werden de salvo’s afgegeven en met groote verliezen trok de vijand af. One klewang attack followed another; each time the enemy suffered defeat, carrying off his dead and wounded. The Acehnese were unable to approach the little group within twenty-five metres; snel, als een machine, vuurden onze dapperen hun geweren af en bijna ieder schot trof doel.
The casualty roll
Beuming gives the Dutch losses in detail. Wounded: Captain Van Blokland, shot in the leg; Lieutenant Van Hasselt, shot in the hand; Lieutenant Stakman, shot in the arm; officer of health Van der Meer, grazing shot to the head; adjudant Krüger, shot in the side; Lieutenant Westendorp, severely wounded by a shot in the belly.
Killed: European sergeant Van Oosten, Algemeen Stamboek no. 36662; European corporal Willems no. 40845; European fusiliers Van Manden no. 34176, Laurens no. 19396, Roosjen no. 30288, Van Groenekan no. 36143, Voegeli no. 27330 and Magi no. 45564. Severely wounded: European fusilier Debats no. 27702 and two native fusiliers. Lightly wounded: twenty-one other ranks.
According to intelligence reports the enemy lost six panglima’s and eighty djahats (malcontents) killed and 195 wounded.
Individual conduct
Beuming singles out three men. The European sergeant Hoogeboom, himself struck by no fewer than four bullets, continued firing with a shattered left leg until a bullet in the right shoulder compelled him to have himself carried to the benting. The European sergeant Israëls, though himself struck by several bullets, tried to save the body of his fallen colleague Van Oosten from the enemy’s hands; his efforts were in vain, and the body remained, with those of two European and one native fusilier, in the enemy’s hands. The drummer De Wilde showed great courage, going entirely alone from Anak Galoeng to Lambaroe, a distance of about an hour, to fetch reinforcement.
To sketch all the instances of courage shown in this engagement, Beuming writes, was impracticable: ze waren te talrijk.
The funeral
Lieutenant Westendorp died on 10 March of the consequences of his wound and was buried on 11 March 1896 with the greatest solemnity on the Petjoet cemetery; the passage is given at Kerkhof Petjoet.
Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)
The Patrol of Captain Van Blokland of 7 March 1896 was a Dutch reconnaissance from the post of Anagaloeng in the XXII Moekims of Groot-Atjeh that was severely mauled by the Moslemin within sight of the fortification, and which G. B. Hooijer described as het voorspel van het drama — the prelude to the drama of the defection of Teukoe Oemar three weeks later.
The order
At the beginning of 1896 the post commandant received the instruction that, before his detachment was relieved by another, he should make a patrol through the surroundings and drive off the hostile marksmen who could not refrain from firing at Dutch transports. Hooijer read the order as a sign that an end might be coming to the Dutch passive attitude towards the roving, thieving and murdering Moslemin, and that plans were in the air to transfer the task of maintaining order from the Achehnese back to Dutch soldiers.
The action
Zoo toog dan Kapitein Blokland met 72 man op den 7den Maart 1896 des morgens vroeg uit de benteng, waarin maar 28 soldaten achterbleven — thus Captain Blokland set out with seventy-two men early on the morning of 7 March 1896 from the benteng, in which only twenty-eight soldiers remained. He had been out of sight behind the surrounding trees only a short while when those in the post heard, from every side, the ever-increasing fire of the enemy, answered by Dutch volleys. At length they saw their captain’s party retiring to within 350 paces of the post and there standing fast, because hands were lacking to carry the many dead and wounded further.
Disorder in the post
No officer had been left behind, and everything in the post ran in disorder and the greatest anxiety: soldiers’ wives wailed, children cried, and nobody dared leave the post to help the party hemmed in among the rice-fields under enemy fire.
The relief (Hooijer’s account)
At last the liniecommandant (commander of the line) appeared, who had come from Senelop on hearing the heavy firing and had taken up forty men from Lam Soet and Lambarih on the way. The Captain of the Staff accompanying him succeeded, by taking a position on the flank, in drawing the fire of the Moslemin upon himself, and thereby enabled the wounded Blokland to withdraw into the post with his dead and wounded and his twenty unwounded men.
See Also
- H. F. T. van Blokland
- C. T. J. Stakman
- Krüger
- C. van der Meer
- Ana’ Galong
- Habib Lhong
- Panglima Hassan
- H. C. Kronouer
- K. H. Westendorp
- F. Ketjen
- Buitenlinie
- 1896
- Aceh War
- Van Blokland
- Anagaloeng
- Senelop
- Lam Soet
- Lambarih
- Defection of Teukoe Oemar (1896)
- Kapitein van den Staf
Sources
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 13, 31–37.
Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, met speciaal vervaardigde kaart en toepasselijke photo’s, bewerkt door P. H. R. Beuming, oud-onderofficier van het Ned.-Indische Leger (Amsterdam, December 1911; uitgegeven ten bate van het te stichten Herstellingsoord voor Rijks-Ambtenaren). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br N 82-144
Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh by P. H. R. Beuming (Amsterdam, 1911). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.
De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 50-52.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.