The Defection of Teukoe Oemar in February 1896 — the overloopen van Teukoe Oemar — was the moment at which the Dutch-trained and Dutch-paid oeléëbalang of the Westkust, Teukoe Oemar, abandoned his role as Dutch bondgenoot of the geconcentreerde linie period and rejoined the Acehnese resistance. The defection threw the Dutch military leadership in Groot-Atjeh into de grootste verwarring, produced a wave of wraakoefeningen against the population of the Westkust (of which the Lhong-kwestie of April 1897 was the most shameful), and ended any Dutch policy of pacificatie through local allies. Er is geene periode aan te wijzen uit de tweede helft van den Atjehoorlog waarin op militair gebied zooveel verwarring heerschte als in die, nà het overloopen van Teukoe Oemar.
The domme politiek of the concentrated line
In the geconcentreerde linie — the cordon of bentengs around the Dutch-held Koetaradja area — Teukoe Oemar had been treated as a Dutch ally. Officieel was, in den tijd der geconcentreerde linie met T. Oemar als onzen bondgenoot, ieder vertrouwd geraakt met de gedachte, dat althans in en om het door ons bezette gebied de Atjeher bevriend was. The governor went further: he den “bevrienden” Atjehers geld, wapens en munitie verschafte — he furnished money, weapons and ammunition to the “friendly” Acehnese. Deze domme politiek, ook door Snouck Hurgronje zoo scherp veroordeeld, volkomen faalde.
The overloop and its aftermath
When Teukoe Oemar zich bij den vijand aansloot, the Dutch leadership was vol van de diepste afkeuring. Men sprak van het meest trouwelooze verraad, terwijl alleen de kwalificatie “overloopen” had mogen worden gebruikt — they spoke of the most faithless treason, when only the word overloopen (going over) should have been used. Uit ons dwaas vertrouwen kon moeilijk voor den Atjeher, die ons haatte doch vooral minachtte, de plicht worden geboren, blijvend af te zien van alle goede kansen welke wijzelf hem boden.
The military response was confused. Den 8sten Mei lagen te Koetaradja en Oeleë Lheuë niet minder dan 5000 man, en men wist eigenlijk niet precies wat men er mee moest doen. The bentengs of Senelop and Lamsoet, held forward of the line during the concentrated-line period, had to be retaken on 2 May 1896 and then weer opnieuw verlaten — abandoned again. Beide bentengs, waarop Van Daalen doelde, waren na het overloopen van T. Oemar door groote troepenmachten met veel moeite ontruimd. Vooral Senelop gaf zeer zwaar werk; men moest geschut achterlaten — de sluitstukken werden meegenomen — terwijl de vijand ons op den terugweg voortdurend harceleerde. Van Daalen in his letter of 3 May 1896 described the morning’s work: “Gisteren 2 Mei zijn wij er weer op uit geweest om de bentengs Senelop en Lamsoet, die wij niet lang geleden hadden prijsgegeven, weer te heroveren, om ze daarna weer opnieuw te verlaten. Wij zijn uitgerukt om 2 uur ‘s nachts met drie bataljons, één batterij, een half eskadron cavalerie en met genietroepen, onder commando van overste Van Heutsz, en mij als chef van den staf. Alles ging gelukkig naar wensch, zoodat wij de bentengs genomen hebben en daarop weer verlieten, en tegen [zes] uur ‘s middags weer in den Kraton waren met 3 dooden en 10 gewonden. Erg weinig dus”.
The eight months that followed were dwaze tijden na de groote verwarring — foolish times after the great confusion. The benteng of Aneukgalong was abandoned and immediately seized by Tgk. Mat Amin; the storming of Aneukgalong of 28 March 1896 was the Dutch reply. The Lhong punitive expedition of April 1897 — in which the Westkust landschap of Lhong was fined f 30.000 for heuling with Teukoe Oemar — was the most shameful follow-up.
Significance
Geheel beheerscht door woede en wraakzucht over het overloopen van T. Oemar en de daardoor toegenomen actie van den vijand, deden minder geschikte hooge bevelhebbers iets dat bij juister inzicht in de beteekenis der gebeurtenissen nooit had mogen geschieden — wholly dominated by rage and vindictiveness over Oemar’s defection, less competent high commanders did things that should never have been done. The methods adopted — het verbranden van geheele kampongs, het doodschieten van personen die niet tegen ons streden, het omkappen van vruchtboomen op zeer groote schaal — were condemned even by strenge en harde vechtnaturen in the officer corps, of whom Van Daalen was the most outspoken. Deze domme politiek of pacificatie through Teukoe Oemar was finished; the way was open for the offensive of Van Heutsz.
Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)
The Defection of Teukoe Oemar was the breaking, at the end of March 1896, of the solemnly sworn oath by which Toekoe Oemar — styled Toekoe Djohan Pahalawan and holding the Dutch dignity of Panglima Prang Besar — had bound himself to the Netherlands Indies government, and his passing van vriend in vijand (“from friend into enemy”). It destroyed within weeks the entire system of Dutch temporary posts and blokhuizen erected outside the geconcentreerde linie in Groot-Atjeh since 1893, and forms the central event of De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh.
Background
For three years Oemar had been the man who, if he had not conceived the guiding idea of occupying the terrain around the Dutch line, had at least executed it, after taking up the struggle against Mad Amin. Through the unfitness of the other Dutch allies he had come still further to the fore. At his request the Dutch occupied temporary posts outside their line and spread their military force over a wider area. The twenty-three blokhuizen connecting those posts were garrisoned by his legioen or by friendly Achehnese. With his three subordinate commanders, his forty panglima’s and his two hundred salaried warriors he was responsible for order in those territories, and, in Hooijer’s words, zijn stem klonk daar oppermachtig.
The threatened loss of indispensability
At the beginning of 1896 it seemed that the moment had come when part of that task would be taken from him, once Lamkrak — dat broeinest der Moslemin — had been chastised and cleansed. Dutch patrols had already begun to move outside Anagaloeng. The temporary posts were to be changed into fixed settlements, with all that this implied: clearance of terrain, the building of bridges, the laying of roads, dykes and tramways, vigorous police supervision by the brave Korps Marechaussée, regular administration by acting controleurs — in a word, een feitelijk in bezit nemen van wat tot dusver uit zijn handen in leen was ontvangen en aan zijn beheer was toevertrouwd geweest: an actual taking into possession of what had hitherto been received in fief from his hands and entrusted to his management.
Whether he foresaw that his indispensability would thereby lapse and his influence decline, and whether he found in that a reason to break his word and refuse to march against Lamkrak, Hooijer refused to determine: wie zal het zeggen? He stated flatly that waarom Toekoe Oemar onze zijde verliet, is nog altijd niet uitgemaakt — why Toekoe Oemar left the Dutch side had still not been settled.
29 March 1896
The great preparations at Biloel had been made: a shed roofed with sheet iron erected as magazine and auxiliary hospital, and the post designated for elevation to a permanent fortification. Great bustle was expected, since Toekoe Djohan was to gather there a thousand warriors and a thousand coolies to begin the action against Lamkrak.
Instead, on the morning of 29 March 1896 verscheen er niemand op de passer onder den grooten boom, zelfs de politie-oppasser (orderly) niet — no one at all appeared at the passer under the great tree, not even the police oppasser — and it became apparent that the blokhuizen held by friendly Achehnese in the neighbourhood had been abandoned. Towards half past four that afternoon Kapitein Schadée went out with a patrol of sixty men towards Tjot Goeë and was heavily fired on across the flooded rice-fields; Luitenant Zijdveld was shot through the lower jaw. From that moment Biloel was surrounded. The same day the patrols from Lam Koenjit, always accompanied by their tame black sheep, came to the conviction that their post too was invested and that they would henceforth have to make do with muddy water.
Neelmeyer’s ride
Learning of the going-over of the Panglima Prang Besar, Luitenant Neelmeyer set out in the evening from Pakan Kroeng Tjoet in the concentrated line, in the company of Toekoe Tjoet and some of his followers, to warn the garrisons of Toengkoeb and Tjot Rang, and returned to Tjot Iri before daybreak, just before communication with those posts was cut. Toekoe Tjoet followed Oemar’s example two days later.
The fall of the posts
The population immediately took Oemar’s side. Tjot Goeë and Biloel were beleaguered; Lam Koenjit was stormed in one bastion in the night of 4 April–5 April 1896 and saved only because the gun there was loaded with case-shot; a relief force reached Biloel on 9 April 1896 and turned back on the report that Oemar was approaching. Anagaloeng was left to itself for eighteen days. Tjot Rang was relieved on 16 April 1896 by two columns totalling 2,700 men, whose withdrawal was pursued so closely that their losses rose to forty-five killed and wounded; the post was abandoned and slighted a few days later. On 18 April 1896 the columns came up that relieved and lifted Anagaloeng, Lambarih and Senelop, after the blokhuizen in the neighbourhood had been burnt by the Dutch. Toengkoeb was evacuated without a shot under Luitenant Neelmeyer.
Assessment
Hooijer declined to describe the furious fighting that followed, as lying outside the framework of a narrative written to explain plates. His judgment was that with these posts the work of two years — which had promised so much good, although raised on an unsound foundation — had gone up in flames; that the lives destroyed and the money spent would have proved uselessly wasted had the event not furnished occasion at last to act with force and to make the Achehnese experience dat onze wil zijn wet moet zijn; and that, while deeply regretting the many who fell, he could not regret what had happened, because it swept away the scheeve verhoudingen beginning to arise between Dutch power and Oemar’s own, and allowed the Dutch position in Groot-Atjeh to be purified and strengthened.
Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)
The betrayal of Teukoe Oemar — the news, certain by 29 March 1896, that the chief received into grace in 1893 had “het masker had afgeworpen” (“thrown off the mask”) and would again turn against the Government — was the crisis that cost Governor C. Deykerhoff his office, brought army commander J. A. Vetter to Atjeh as Government Commissioner, and closed the era of the Concentrated Line.
The certainty of 29 March 1896
After rumours had long circulated, on 29 March 1896 the government received certainty that Teukoe Oemar — who at his submission had received the title “Teungkoe Djohan Pahlawan” — had thrown off the mask and would henceforth again turn against the Government. The Governor of Atjeh, Major-General C. Deykerhoff, immediately telegraphed the warning of Teukoe Oemar’s treason to the Governor-General, who at once convened an extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Netherlands Indies. In that assembly the Netherlands Indian Government reached the conclusion that the direction of affairs in Atjeh could no longer remain entrusted to the governor who had been “all too optimistic and incautious” in regard of Teukoe Oemar; Deykerhoff received honourable discharge, and Lieutenant-General J. A. Vetter, the army commander, betook himself once more to Atjeh — this time to take the direction of affairs in hand as Regeerings-Commissaris. Whether Teukoe Oemar’s deed was really “treason” is doubted by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje — “waar Oemar nimmer tot de onzen behoort heeft” (“since Oemar never truly belonged to ours”); for the particulars author Joh. Langhout refers to the Colonial Report over 1896 and the military literature.
Chastisement and the new course
After the chastisement of Teukoe Oemar and of the chiefs who had joined him in resistance had been accomplished, General Vetter returned to Batavia on 28 June 1896, and effect was then given to his insights, which posited as a commanding requirement an unbroken development of power outside the concentrated position. The era of the concentration was thereby closed: the concentrated line became merely the base-point for the operations of three mobile columns, three temporary encampments outside the line were connected with it by steam tramway, and the shipping regulation was applied in all its consequences. Governor-General Van der Wijck made the new course serve the economy as much as the war.
Economic consequences
The political commotions had for result that, in the field of trade, the imports of 1896 were considerably less than in the preceding years; not only Groot-Atjeh but also the North and East Coasts felt the backlash. “Zoo ging de koffiecultuur, toch reeds van geringe beteekenis, in 1896 geheel achteruit; de uitvoer van peper verminderde, mede door de verlaagde peperprijzen, zoodat in genoemd jaar inderdaad over het geheele gebied een economische inzinking te zien gaf” — the coffee culture, already unimportant, declined wholly; the pepper export diminished, partly through the lowered pepper prices, so that in that year an economic collapse was visible over the whole territory. The recovery came with the active control of the three sagi’s of Groot-Atjeh (registration 1897, pasars 1898) that marked the eve of Governors Van Heutsz and Snouck Hurgronje’s tandem.
Account from the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)
the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië states the consequence of the defection in unusually blunt terms. “Het verraad van Teukoe Djohan alias Oemar in 1896 dwong het Bestuur van Atjeh het, in 1884, aangenomen stelsel van concentratie te verlaten; wij stonden tegenover den man, dien wij van wapens en ammunitie hadden voorzien en die ons dwong den in 1884 gestaakten oorlog te hervatten” — the treason of Teukoe Djohan alias Oemar in 1896 compelled the government of Atjeh to abandon the system of concentration adopted in 1884; we stood opposed to the man whom we had provided with weapons and ammunition, and who compelled us to resume the war broken off in 1884.
Consequence for the Maréchaussée
The abandonment of concentratie transformed the role of the Korps Maréchaussée. Raised in 1890 to do police work inside the geconcentreerde stelling of Groot-Atjeh, the corps from 1896 also entered the purely military field, waging a guerrilla against the Atjehnese “die op dezelfde wijze den oorlog tegen ons trachtten vol te houden.” It first took the field in its entire composition at Ana’ Galoeng on 29 June 1896. Among the tasks that followed from the new situation was the prevention of smuggling in foodstuffs and pepper, which had arisen because the coasts of enemy territory were closed by warships.
See Also
- Teukoe Oemar
- Tjoet Nja Din
- Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz
- G.C.E. van Daalen
- C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Van der Heyden
- Fall of Aneukgalong (1896)
- Lhong punitive expedition (1897)
- Tengkoe Mat Amin di Tiro
- Lhong
- Leupoeëng
- Groot-Atjeh
- Koetaradja
- Aceh War
- 1896
- 1897
- Biloel
- Anagaloeng
- Tjot Rang
- Senelop
- Lam Koenjit
- Toengkoeb
- Luitenant Neelmeyer
- Lamkrak
- Geconcentreerde linie
- Pardon of Teukoe Oemar (30 September 1893)
- C. Deykerhoff
- J. A. Vetter
- The Concentration in Atjeh (1884-1898)
- Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh (Jubileum-nummer 1930)
- Korps Maréchaussée te voet in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden
- Concentratiestelsel
Sources
Atjeh, door H.C. Zentgraff. Gedrukt bij Drukkerij “De Unie”, 1938, Batavia. OCR-filename: 20260709_002148_DLP-81-Atjeh_OCR.txt.
De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 12, 14, 16, 18, 34, 36, 50, 52, 54.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.
Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 72–76.
Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.