Klewang

Properties2
tagsconcept, weapon, knil, marechaussee, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, 19th-century, artillery, aceh-war
aliasesnative sword, cutlass, Granaat, Granaatkartets, Kartets, Rentjong, Bajonet, G.K.T., Rencong, granaatkartetsen, case-shot shell, volkspijs, klewangs, the Achehnese sword

18 min read

The klewang was the native sword — a cutlass — carried by the soldiers of the K.N.I.L., especially the Marechaussee, and the principal melee weapon of the colonial army’s counter-insurgency in Aceh. In Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L. the klewang is the symbolic weapon of the Manisee — paired with the reuntjong (the Acehnese kris) of the resistance — and the tool with which the bivak (camp) and its pagger (fence) were built. “The tool was the klewang and nothing further” — the tool was the klewang and nothing else.

The klewang in action

In the colonne Schmidt, the klewang was the weapon of the close-quarters engagement. When Peutoeha Gam Masén drew his reuntjong and threw himself on the two voorste Marechaussees, “Nussy schoot en Enoch werkte af met de klewang” — Nussy shot and Enoch worked with the klewang. When Baas Molier was ordered to silently kill an Acehnese coming from the ladang along the path, the klewang was the prescribed weapon — a silent kill, with the *karabijn (M. 95)|karabijn]] held in reserve.

In the opening anecdote of the book, the two Marechaussees who followed their kapitein into Hotel de Boer “stood with drawn klewang and carbine at the ready” — stood with drawn klewang and the carbine at the ready. The klewang was therefore both the weapon of the bivak (where it was the only tool) and the weapon of the patrol (where it was the close-quarters complement to the carbine).

The klewang as tool

In the bivak (camp) the klewang was the only tool. “The tool was the klewang and nothing further.” The pagger (fence) — tiangs (palen) at 1½ metre intervals with five blandars (horizontal beams) bound along — was built with the klewang. The ligplaats (sleeping place) of each man was “de lengte van een klewang” — the length of a klewang. The klewang was used to kill snakes: “Uncle accordingly struck such a beast dead with the klewang.”

The klewang and the reuntjong

The klewang of the Manisee is paired in the book with the reuntjong — the Acehnese kris — of the resistance. The two blades meet in the moment of Peutoeha Gam Masén’s death: Gam Masén drew his reuntjong, threw himself on the dardanellen, and was killed by Nussy’s shot and Enoch’s klewang. The pairing is the book’s small symbolic register of the war: the klewang of the colonial soldier against the reuntjong of the Acehnese resister.

The klewang and the plichtsbesef

In the book’s opening anecdote, the two Marechaussees who stood behind their kapitein’s chair at Hotel de Boer with drawn klewang are the book’s first image of the plichtsbesef — the sense of duty — of the Ambonese soldier. The image — drawn swords in the chiquest hotel of Medan — is comic, but the book’s point is that the plichtsbesef it registers was real: “de grenzen van het belachelijke verre konden worden overschreden” — the boundaries of the ridiculous could be far exceeded — and “wij dan lang niet altijd gelijk hadden” — we were not always right.

Significance

The klewang is significant in Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L. as the symbolic weapon of the Manisee and the principal tool of the bivak. The book’s argument is that the klewang — a native sword, not a European weapon — was what made the colonne method possible: the patrouille that built its own camp each night with the klewang as the only tool was the instrument by which the Aceh War was actually finished. The pairing of the klewang with the reuntjong is the book’s small symbolic register of the war itself.

Account from Atjeh by H.C. Zentgraff (1938)

Zentgraff’s Atjeh gives the fullest technical account of the klewang in the war. The young Korps Maréchaussée carried een mixtum van Westersche en Oostersche dingen: the karabijn, a klewang, and an Atjehsche rentjong. Their battle-cry was Potong kepala! — en het gebruik van het vuurwapen zoodanig miskend dat dit dikwijls de situatie voor een vechtende brigade verslechterde.

The Acehnese master-stroke was the houw bovenop: de traditioneele kap in den hals bij den linkerschouder, de coup de maître van den Atjeher als hij ongehinderd de klewang kan zwaaien — hij brengt hem toe met zóóveel élan dat het wapen langs de linkerzijde van den hals tot diep in de borstholte doordringt en de getroffene meestal in een minuut of tien doodbloedt. The sixteen dead of the Meurandeh Paja overval all bore this wound. The maréchaussée, trained in schermoefeningen, could do much more than the single houw bovenop and was thus den Atjeher de baas on the klewang.

The most famous single klewang-blow in the Zentgraff corpus: when a Gajoe murdered the sergeants Van Gent and De Gruiter before the Blang Kedjeren tangsi on 7 December 1926, sloeg den toegeschoten sergeant van den Broek den moordenaar met één houw het hoofd af, waarna de romp, waaruit het bloed spoot, nog enkele passen voortstrompelde. Atjehsche women carried the klewang too: Potjoet Barin went always with the scherpe peudeueng in hand; the wife of a djahat, seeing her husband dying, nam zijn klewang en vloog op de brigade af — met één houw sloeg een maréchaussée haar den pols af, waarop zij met de andere hand het gevest, dat rood was van haar bloed, opraapte en opnieuw aanviel en vocht tot zij stierf.

Atjeh, door H.C. Zentgraff. Gedrukt bij Drukkerij “De Unie”, 1938, Batavia.

Account from Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — Ammunition and Edged Weapons of 1896

Granaat (shell), granaatkartets (shrapnel shell), kartets (canister shot), klewang (cutlass), rentjong (dagger) and bajonet (bayonet) were the principal ammunition types and edged weapons used by both sides in the Atjeh-oorlog as described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96. The granaat and granaatkartets, abbreviated G.K.T., were the standard Dutch artillery projectiles, fired by the thousands in the bombardment of Lampisang (7,996 projectiles of various types). The kartets was the close-range anti-personnel round, used by Sgt. Vermeulen at under 50 m during the Achehnese night attack on Lamkoenjit of 4 April–5 April 1896. The klewang (Dutch/Indies cutlass) was the standard edged weapon of both Dutch troops and Achehnese; Capt. Van Blokland personally fought with sabre on 7 March 1896. The rentjong (rencong) was the characteristic Achehnese dagger. The bajonet was the standard Dutch infantry edged weapon.

Etymology and Meaning

The Dutch ammunition nomenclature is descriptive. Granaat (shell) is from French grenade, originally referring to a pomegranate-shaped projectile. Granaatkartets (shrapnel shell) is a compound of granaat + kartets: literally a “shell-canister”, denoting a shrapnel shell that bursts in the air, scattering lead balls. Kartets (canister shot) is from French cartouche, denoting a tin or canvas canister filled with lead balls, fired at close range against infantry. The Dutch abbreviations Gr. (granaat), G.K.T. (granaatkartets), and K. (kartets) are used throughout the ammunition-expenditure reports. The klewang is a Dutch-Indies cutlass — a curved single-edged blade of approximately 50 cm, developed in the colonial army in the mid-nineteenth century as a response to Achehnese sword tactics. The rentjong (also rencong) is the traditional Achehnese dagger, with a distinctive L-shaped hilt. Bajonet (bayonet) is from French baïonnette.

Historical Context of 1896

In the first semester of 1896 the ammunition and edged weapons of the two sides reflected the asymmetric character of the war. The Dutch, with their artillery, fired granaten and granaatkartetsen by the thousand — the bombardment of Lampisang alone consumed 7,996 projectiles. The kartets was reserved for close-range defensive use, as at Lamkoenjit on 4 April–5 April 1896, when Sgt. Vermeulen fired canister at under 50 m against Achehnese night attackers. The klewang was used by both sides: Dutch colonial troops carried it as a sidearm, and Achehnese fighters used captured klewangs or local equivalents. Capt. Van Blokland’s patrol of 7 March 1896 saw him personally fight with sabre against an Achehnese sword attack. The rentjong was the characteristic Achehnese close-combat weapon, used in the klewangaanval (sword charge) that the Dutch found so difficult to repel. The bajonet was the standard Dutch infantry weapon, used in the storm assault of bentengs; “60 bajonetten” = 60 infantrymen.

Examples in the Source

Kruisheer’s principal references include: the granaat and granaatkartets — counted by the thousand in the bombardment of Lampisang (7,996 projectiles, 27 April–23 May 1896). The kartets — fired by Sgt. Vermeulen at under 50 m during the Achehnese night attack on Lamkoenjit of 4 April–5 April 1896. The incendiary shell — 57 used against Lampisang. The klewang — used by both Dutch and Achehnese; the sword attack on Capt. Van Blokland’s patrol of 7 March 1896; Capt. Van Blokland personally fought with sabre. The rentjong — the characteristic Achehnese dagger. The bajonet — used as a count of infantry strength (“60 bajonetten” = 60 infantrymen). The friction-tubes — about 60 failed at Lamkoenjit, indicating poor artillery ammunition. The ammunition-expenditure reports throughout the text catalogue Gr., G.K.T. and K. counts.

Significance

The ammunition and edged weapons of the Aceh War reflect the dual character of the conflict: an artillery war of shells, shrapnel and mortars on the Dutch side, and a close-combat war of klewang, rentjong and bajonet on both sides. The Dutch reliance on artillery — and the “zeer gering” (very slight) results of the 7,996-projectile bombardment of Lampisang — exposed the limits of firepower against an enemy who could simply evacuate the target zone. The Achehnese reliance on the klewangaanval — massed sword charges that brought the Dutch to close quarters, where their repeteergeweer (repeating rifle) and mitrailleur lost much of their advantage — was a tactical adaptation to the technological asymmetry. The rentjong as the characteristic Achehnese dagger survived the war as a symbol of Achehnese identity, while the klewang became the iconic weapon of the Dutch colonial army.

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

The klewang was the Atjehnese cutting sword — the principal melee weapon of the Atjehneezen in the Atjeh-oorlog, “meesterlijk, bliksemsnel en krachtig gehanteerd” (masterfully, lightning-fast and powerfully wielded), in Borel’s judgement superior in hand-to-hand combat to the European bajonet or sabel. The klewang was the weapon of the Atjehnese charge — the “blanke klewang in de vuist” (naked klewang in the fist) with which the Atjehneezen sprang from the boschrand in the attack on Penajoeng bivouak of 13 January 1874, the massed attack on Penajoeng of 11 April 1874 and the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875. Borel calls the klewang “een vreeslijk wapen” (a fearsome weapon) in man-to-man night combat.

Description and Use

The klewang was a single-edged cutting sword, typically of locally forged or imported steel, with a slightly curved blade and a hilt designed for one-handed use. It was the traditional weapon of the Atjehnese — carried by every adult male, used both as a tool and as a weapon — and its handling was, in Borel’s account, the principal martial skill of the Atjehnese warrior. The klewang was “meesterlijk, bliksemsnel en krachtig gehanteerd” — masterfully, lightning-fast and powerfully wielded — and in hand-to-hand combat it was superior to the European bajonet or sabel. The Atjehnese charge with the klewang — the “blanke klewang in de vuist” with which warriors sprang from the boschrand — was the characteristic Atjehnese tactical formation. Borel compares the Atjehnese charge to “eene woeste onverwachte charge van cavallerie” — a wild, unexpected cavalry charge — in his account of the Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876. The klewang’s effect on the wounded was characteristic: many of van der Meer’s wounded at the Longbatta disaster of 31 December 1874 had dreadful klewang cuts.

The Atjehnese Charge

The klewang was the weapon of the Atjehnese charge — the tactical formation by which the Atjehneezen sought to convert the advantage of surprise and the cover of the boschrand into a melee in which the klewang’s superiority could be exploited. The charge was typically delivered at dawn or at night, from a concealed position within a few hundred paces of the Dutch post or column. The warriors sprang from the boschrand with the “blanke klewang in de vuist,” threw the nearest veldwacht overhoop, and pressed on into the Dutch position. The attack on Penajoeng bivouak of 13 January 1874 — when a “bende woestelingen” penetrated the legerplaats from the north side near the veekraal, threw the nearest veldwacht overhoop, and pushed through to the ambulances and “zelfs tot dicht bij de tent van den opperbevelhebber” — was a typical example. The night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875 — when a band of ~50 Atjehneezen climbed the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among sleeping manschappen — was another. The Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876 — when kapitein van Swieten’s detachment of 2 officers and 57 men was massacred on the drassige sawah near Lamsajoen — was the most damaging single example.

The Lesson for the Dutch

The klewang dictated, in Borel’s account, a set of tactical lessons for the Dutch. First, the Dutch bivouak or post must never be placed against the boschrand without proper clearing — the error of the Penajoeng bivouak of 13 January 1874, when the bivouak had been placed against the boschrand and a “bende woestelingen” had penetrated the legerplaats from the north side. Second, the field of fire must be cleared — the stormvrijheid that Borel advocates throughout the book — so that the Atjehnese charge could be broken by salvoes of Beaumont-geweer fire before the warriors could close. Third, the Dutch must never march in dispersed order over soaked sawah along wooded edges — the lesson of the Atoeh catastrophe — because the Atjehnese charge from the boschrand could massacre a dispersed column before it could verzamelen (assemble). Fourth, the Dutch schildwachten must never sleep on post — the lesson of the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit — because the klewang was “een vreeslijk wapen” in man-to-man night combat, and a small but determined Atjehnese force, exploiting darkness and the cover of the boschrand, could overvallen a Dutch post with devastating effect. The klewang was thus, in Borel’s account, both a weapon and a tactical teacher: the instrument by which the Atjehneezen converted the conditions of their terrain into a series of tactical advantages that the Dutch could only counter by discipline, by stormvrijheid, and by the mobiele colonnes that Borel advocated.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

Du Croo defined the pacificatie as the conversion of Atjeh from a province “governed with sabre and carbine” into a normal part of the Indies. Under van Heutsz “the offensive and the sabre came to the fore.” The klewang attack — the sudden rush with cold steel on a careless bivouac or patrol — remained the characteristic Acehnese tactic to the end: at Nalon in 1911, at Linggö, at Pénding, and finally at Koeala Bhèë on 25 April 1918. “Meulaboh is the country par excellence for sabre charges,” du Croo wrote. It was a klewang blow across the face that disfigured G. F. P. Gosenson for life in 1917, and an Acehnese police servant’s klewang that struck down T. Béntara Titeuë in 1913.

Account in Hooijer’s De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897)

Granaatkartets

The granaatkartets was a shrapnel or case-shot shell used by Dutch artillery in Groot-Atjeh, known to the soldiers by the ironic name volkspijs — “people’s food” — and, when it failed to explode, converted by the Achehnese into ammunition for their own improvised ordnance.

The soldiers’ name

G. B. Hooijer recorded that above the entrance of the benteng of Kroeng Gloempang was posted the notice Welkom in de restauratie van volkspijs — “Welcome to the restaurant of people’s food” — explaining that de soldaat noemt namelijk een granaatkartets een blikje volkspijs, the soldier calls a case-shot shell a tin of people’s food.

Reuse by the Achehnese

At Senelop, which was a target for the enemy, Hooijer recorded that many times unexploded Dutch granaatkartetsen came back at and into the fortification met afgevijlde nokken en een bamboe kokertje met lont, in plaats van de zunderbuis — with filed-off ridges and a small bamboo tube with a fuse in place of the time-fuse — fired from old sawn-off iron cannon or, as it was said, from hollowed-out coconut trunks strongly bound about with stolen telephone wire.

Use in earlier operations

In the tale of the old Ambonese soldier at Toengkoeb, the Dutch artillery in General van der Heijden’s time pushed forward and threw a granaatkartets through the roof and ceiling of the fortified Messigit before the column commander could take stock of what was happening.

Klewang

The klewang was the Achehnese cutting sword, both the characteristic weapon of the Achehnese fighter and, in Dutch usage, the name for the sudden close-quarters attack — klewang aanval — most feared by soldiers on the roads of Groot-Atjeh.

As a weapon of assault

G. B. Hooijer recorded that at the storming of Anagaloeng on 21 December 1893 the defenders did not give way at once: de klewangs moesten worden gezwaaid, de strijdkreet aangeheven, and the champions excited by opium, shrieking and leaping like madmen, had to lead their men in storming the last redoubt of the Moslemin before the field was quitted.

Klewang attacks on transports

Describing the fortnightly vivres transport on the road through the IX Moekims, Hooijer noted that the long train was closed by a rearguard, some of whose men at greater distance den rug beveiligen tegen klewang aanvallen van rondsluipende marodeurs — secured the rear against klewang attacks by prowling marauders.

As a symbol of allegiance

Of Toekoe Tjoet Toengkoeb, who had for years made common cause with the priestly party under Teungkoe di Tiro, Hooijer wrote that only after General‑Major Van Teyn granted him a salary on condition that he cease fighting the Dutch had hij de klewang opgeborgen — had he put away the klewang.

The klewang as Maréchaussée weapon (1930 jubilee account)

the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië records that the Korps Maréchaussée was armed “met een karabijn, eerst de Beaumont-karabijn en later de Mannlicher, en het specifieke wapen van den Atjeher, een klewang, waarmede hij thans zelf werd bestreden” — with a carbine, first the Beaumont and later the Mannlicher, and with the specific weapon of the Atjehnese, a klewang, with which he was now himself fought. See Karabijn der Maréchaussée.

The deliberate adoption of the enemy’s own weapon belongs with the corps’s wider practice of fighting “den tegenstander met zijn eigen tactiek” and of borrowing Acehnese titles for its own ranks — see Maréchaussée-vocabulaire.

In the Westkust engagement of the action of 1925–1927, twenty-six klewangs were captured from the opponents; the fleeing man whom Suwoek pursued and brought down fifty metres away was seen by the wounded Sumangkut to break from the alang-alang with a klewang in his hand.

See Also

Sources

Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L., by G. W. T. Dames, Maj. Inf. K.N.I.L. b.d. (‘s-Gravenhage: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1954), prologue “Bij ons…” and chapters “De colonne Schmidt” and “De patrouille.”

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 33, 68, 70, 71, 75, 88, 92, 104, 110, 112, 142–144, 212, 222.

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 31, 37, 54–56, 117, 162, 168–169, 231, 237, 317–318.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), passim.

De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh, door G. B. Hooijer, Gep. Luit.-Kolonel O. I. Leger, met 24 platen (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn; Batavia: G. Kolff & Co., 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Centrale Boekerij, Amsterdam. OCR-filename: 20260719_140140_DLP-134-De_verlaten_posten_in_Groot_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 24, 51, 53; pp. 10, 24, 40.

Acknowledgement of sources. This article is a single consolidated account combining the material previously held in this entry with the account given in De verlaten posten in Groot-Atjeh (1897) by G. B. Hooijer. Dutch terminology has been rendered in English, the original Dutch being retained only in direct quotations and in bibliographic citations.

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.

Graph View

Backlinks