1877

Properties3
descriptionThe year of Van Lansberge's March 1877 visit to Atjeh and the verzoeningspolitiek, of the submission-feelers from Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid and the Telok-Kroet meetings, of Diemont's medical evacuation of 30 June 1877 and the succession to kolonel K. van der Heijden, and of the 12 October 1877 'keerpunt' letter.
tagsyear, aceh-war, dutch-colonial, colonial, timeline, material-culture, dutch, achehnese, military, 19th-century, atjeh, acheh, 20th-century, aceh
aliases1877 AD, the year 1877, 1877 (year), het jaar 1877, Dompseler's column over Glé Broeë, Dompseler kolonne 1877, Year 1877, 1877 (Van Heutsz 1893 perspective), 1877 CE

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Figures, places, and events in Acehnese history associated with the year 1877.

1877 was the year of the Maj. Dompseler’s military column over Glé Broeë from Ladoeng to Lam-Baroe Angin — a pre-1896 Dutch reconnaissance of the mountain route that would, in June 1896, become the axis of the sea-borne Ladoeng landing under Lt.-Col. Hansen. As recorded by Kruisheer in p. 324, Dompseler’s column marched from Ladoeng through the mountains via Glé Broeë to Lam-Baroe Angin in six to seven hours; the Major described the way as “een smal en moeilijk begaanbaar voetpad door het kale en weinig begroeide terrein” — a narrow and difficult footpath through bare and little-vegetated terrain. Together with the Halewijn column of 1879 that retraced the route in reverse, Dompseler’s march was the only pre-1896 Dutch military reference for the Ladoeng–Glé Broeë axis, and it furnished Kolonel Stemfoort’s staff with the terrain intelligence that made the 22–23 June 1896 amphibious operation possible.

Events

  • Coast closure (January) — The Dutch colonial authorities enforced a strict closure of the Acehnese coast to foreign shipping, tightening the blockade that had been imposed since the outbreak of the Aceh War in 1873. The measure was intended to cut off the flow of arms and supplies to the resistance and to exert economic pressure on the coastal population. De Bruyne describes how the coast closure affected both the Dutch — who found it difficult to enforce consistently along the extensive Atjeh shoreline — and the Acehnese, whose maritime trade had long been a cornerstone of the sultanate’s economy.
  • Governor-General Van Lansberge’s visit (March–April) — Governor-General J.W. van Lansberge visited Atjeh in person during March and April 1877 to inspect the military situation and review the progress of the coastal campaigns. His visit reflected the concern in Batavia and The Hague that, three years after the fall of the palace at Kutaraja, the war was far from won. Van Lansberge’s tour of the coastal positions gave him a direct impression of the difficulties faced by the Dutch forces — the climate, the terrain, and the elusive nature of the Acehnese resistance. Dames records that the Governor-General’s assessment contributed to the decision to continue and intensify the expeditions against the coastal landschappen.
  • April–May coast expeditions — Following Van Lansberge’s visit, a series of Dutch military expeditions were launched against the coastal districts of Atjeh. These operations targeted the remaining unsubdued coast-states, aiming to compel their rulers to submit and to destroy villages suspected of supporting the guerrilla resistance. The expeditions followed the established pattern: a naval component landed troops on the coast, an infantry column advanced inland, and after an engagement — or the enemy’s withdrawal — the troops burned settlements and withdrew to their coastal bases. De Bruyne notes that these spring 1877 expeditions produced a series of apparent submissions that proved, in many cases, to be temporary.
  • Abandonment of the Simpang Olim residence (1877) — During or after the Dutch operations on the northern coast, the radja of Simpang Olim — who had fled during the 1876 expedition under General Diemont — was found to have permanently abandoned his residence. Dutch forces or their Acehnese allies entered the vacated dwelling and discovered a rich assemblage of personal ornaments: gold and silver jewellery, spinsbek-work rings and ankle rings, a gold enamelled kopiah crown ornament, belly bands, amulets, chased silver boxes, and a remarkable pair of gold spectacles with extendable parts. These objects, catalogued as “sieraden van den gewezen radja van Simpang Olim, aangetroffen in diens verlaten woning in 1877,” subsequently entered the collection of the Batavian Society. The seal of Toekoe Moeda Ia Malim, another notable figure of the district, was also recovered. See Abandonment of Simpang Olim residence (1877) and Simpang Olim.
  • July Simpang Olim expedition — A further Dutch military column operated against the Simpang Olim area in July 1877, part of the continuing effort to secure the northern coastal districts. De Bruyne records that the expedition encountered the now-familiar pattern of Acehnese tactical withdrawal, with the defenders avoiding open battle and melting into the interior. The area had been sufficiently disrupted by the 1876 operations that the July column found the settlements in a state of partial abandonment, consistent with the recovery of the radja’s ornaments from his empty house.
  • August Samalanga expedition — In August 1877, a Dutch expedition was directed against Samalanga, another of the northern coastal landschappen of Atjeh. Samalanga had a reputation as a centre of religious resistance, and the Dutch operation aimed to suppress what they perceived as a particularly intransigent district. De Bruyne describes the expedition’s difficulties: the coastal terrain, the determination of the defenders, and the onset of the rainy season, which made military operations increasingly hazardous. The Samalanga expedition, like those against the other coastal states, produced a temporary submission rather than a lasting pacification.
  • Roots of the Batak War — The year 1877 also saw the first stirrings of what would develop into the protracted Batak War in the interior of Sumatra, as Dutch colonial expansion beyond the coastal enclaves brought them into contact with Batak communities that resisted foreign intrusion. Although the Batak War was geographically and politically distinct from the Aceh War, the two conflicts intersected in Dutch strategic thinking, as the colonial administration sought to bring the entire northern Sumatran coast and hinterland under control. Dames notes that the growing Batak problem complicated Dutch resource allocation and contributed to the sense, in the late 1870s, that the colonial position in northern Sumatra was under pressure on multiple fronts.
  • Dompseler’s column over Glé Broeë (1877) — march from Ladoeng through the mountains via Glé Broeë to Lam-Baroe Angin (6–7 hours), the pre-1896 Dutch reconnaissance of the mountain route later used by Hansen’s amphibious operation in June 1896.
  • Ladoeng Landing and Glé Broeë Attack (22–23 June 1896) — the 1896 operation that used Dompseler’s 1877 column as terrain reference.

People

  • J.W. van Lansberge — Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies; visited Atjeh in March–April to assess the military situation.
  • A.J.E. Diemont — General who had commanded the 1876 expedition against Simpang Olim; the area saw further operations in 1877.
  • Radja of Simpang Olim — His abandoned residence and its contents — a major assemblage of Acehnese gold and silver ornaments — mark this year in the material record.
  • Toekoe Moeda Ia Malim — Acehnese notable of the Simpang Olim district; his personal seal was recovered alongside the radja’s ornaments.
  • Dompseler (Majoor; commanded the 1877 column from Ladoeng over Glé Broeë to Lam-Baroe Angin)
  • Halewijn (Captain; commanded the 1879 reverse-direction column — comparator reference)
  • G. A. Hansen (Lt.-Col.; would command the 1896 Ladoeng landing that used Dompseler’s route as terrain reference)
  • J. W. Stemfoort (Kolonel; overall commander of the 1896 Ladoeng-Glé Broeë operation)
  • van den Broek (Lt. ter zee 1e kl.; led the 1896 Ladoeng landing operations)
  • A. Kruisheer (author of ATJEH ‘96)

Places

  • Simpang Olim — Coast-state on the northern coast of Atjeh; site of the abandoned radja’s house and its treasure.
  • Tandjong Semantoh — Cape near Simpang Olim, scene of military operations.
  • Samalanga — Northern coastal landschap targeted by a Dutch expedition in August.
  • Kutaraja — Dutch-occupied capital; base for coastal expeditions and destination of Van Lansberge’s visit.
  • Ladoeng (Dutch landing beach on the Westkust; starting point of the 1877 column)
  • Glé Broeë (mountain route; axis of the 1877 march)
  • Lam-Baroe Angin (destination of the 1877 column)
  • Lam-Baroe (kampong near the battle area)
  • XXVI Moekims (plain reached by crossing Glé Broeë)
  • Oleh-leh (port of embarkation for the 1896 Ladoeng landing)
  • Kroeng-Angin (bridge crossed by Hansen’s 1896 column — name preserves “Angin” of Lam-Baroe Angin)
  • Kroeng-Kali (Dutch 1896 target; reached after crossing Glé Broeë)
  • Boekit Karang (post reached by 1896 Hansen column)
  • Kraton (final destination of Hansen’s 1896 column)

Organizations

Documents

  • Terrain report of Maj. Dompseler — “een smal en moeilijk begaanbaar voetpad door het kale en weinig begroeide terrein” (p. 324)
  • Landingsbevel issued aboard by Lt. Col. Hansen for the 1896 Ladoeng landing (which referenced the 1877 march as terrain precedent)

Concepts

Account from Een Vaderlandsch Belang by H. Borel (1878)

1877 was, in Borel’s account, a year of stagnation on the ground in Atjeh and of unrelated but instructive events elsewhere — most notably the Russo-Turkish War, which Borel seizes upon as a foreign analogue to the Dutch failure. Under generaal Wiggers van Kerchem the linie from the Kroeng Raba to the Kwala Gigieng remained “nagenoeg onveranderd,” and the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture) once again dominated Dutch operations. The year is sparsely narrated in Onze vestiging in Atjeh but functions as a hinge: it is the year of missed opportunity and of the still-unchanged stalemate that motivates Borel’s 1878 call for an Indische Brigade.

The Russo-Turkish War as Analogue

Borel draws an explicit analogy between the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the Atjeh-oorlog. The Russians, he notes, underestimated the Turks, crossed the Danube with too small a force, suffered an échec, were nearly thrown back, lost time, and had to make great efforts later — most famously before Plevna. “Ook wij hebben te Atjeh dezelfde fout begaan als de Russen in Turkije,” Borel writes: the Dutch, like the Russians, entered the conflict with insufficient force, declared premature victory, and then had to spend years recovering the ground lost. The analogy is doubly pointed because the Turks, like the Atjehneezen, were Muslims fighting in defence of their homeland, and Borel devotes several passages of his Atjehnees volkskarakter to comparing the two peoples favourably. The lessons Borel extracts from the Russo-Turkish War are the same lessons he draws from the first expedition under Köhler and the Longbatta disaster of 31 December 1874: that victories must be pursued with overwhelming force, that a passive defensive posture merely allows the enemy to recover and fortify, and that the war cannot be ended by proclamations or by posts alone.

The Stalemate in Atjeh

Under Wiggers van Kerchem’s long command the linie of posts around K. Radja — the stelling-Pel that generaal Pel had completed in May 1875 and extended to the Kroeng Tjoet in February 1876 — remained essentially unchanged. No new offensives were undertaken; no extension toward the XXII Moekims — the “kern van Atjeh’s weerstandsvermogen” that Borel identifies as the proper target — was attempted. The enemy used the lull to build versterkingen near Dutch posts, to receive hulpbenden, wapens and levensmiddelen from the vassal coastal states (Analaboe, Pedir, Samalangan, Pasangan, Simpang Olim, Edi), and to harass Dutch patrouilles. The continuance of the afwachtende houding was, in Borel’s judgement, the direct cause of the June 1878 enemy breakthrough in the IV, VI and IX Moekims, and of the “gruwelijke moordtooneel in een van onze hospitalen” that shocked Dutch public opinion. The stalemate of 1877 was thus not a peace but an armed truce during which the Atjehneezen reorganised.

A Cautionary Tale from Samalangan

Borel also refers to a “nocturnal overval at Samalangan” in August 1877 as a cautionary tale about the dangers of the passive system. The episode — not narrated in full in the surviving inventories of the book — illustrates the same lesson as the night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875 and the Atoeh catastrophe of 13 February 1876: that a small but determined Atjehnese force, armed chiefly with the klewang and exploiting darkness and the cover of the boschrand, could overvallen a Dutch post with devastating effect. The lesson Borel draws is that the posten-systeem — the garrisoning of many small posts to dominate terrain — was inherently vulnerable in Atjeh; only mobiele colonnes of 600–800 men, always ready to march and to “marcher au canon,” could break the deadlock.

The Conditions That Motivated the Brigade Proposal

By the end of 1877 the Indische leger was, in Borel’s diagnosis, “in geen gunstigen toestand.” Manschappen were onvoldoende geoefend; kaders in treurige staat; many sick or unfit; there was a groot gebrek aan officieren, especially in the artillerie. Officers who had been gedetacheerd in Indië before 1877 had suffered a pensioenstoelage onrecht — a grievance that, combined with the visible stalemate in Atjeh, fuelled the metropolitan debate that Borel would enter in March 1878 with his Een vaderlandsch belang. The conditions of 1877 thus set the stage for the proposal of an Indische Brigade of 3000–4000 men raised in the Netherlands, armed with steel achterlaadkanonnen, and sent directly — not via Java’s “ongezonde garnizoenen” — to Atjeh, to break the deadlock by force.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893) — the verzoeningspolitiek and the keerpunt

Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh identifies 1877 as the year of G.-G. van Lansberge’s March 1877 visit to Atjeh and the verzoeningspolitiek — the policy of conciliation in Groot-Atjeh combined with armed coercion in the still-recalcitrant Onderhoorigheden — that defined the colony’s posture for the next fifteen months. The year opened with the completion of the Pel Plan in February 1877 under Generaal Diemont and the February 1877 excursie naar Koeala Loé en Kroeng Raja that laid “de laatste hand” on the plan, and continued with the submission-feelers from Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid that produced, in the spring and summer, the two besprekingen at Telok-Kroet on the Westkust.

Van Heutsz summarises the hybrid policy Diemont was sent to execute:

“Het stelsel: Verzoenende politiek op Groot-Atjeh en in de Onderhoorigheden, die ons gezag erkend hadden en met ons bevriend waren; door gewapend optreden dwingen tot onderwerping van de nog weerspannige Onderhoorigheden”.

The submission-feelers of Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid and the Telok-Kroet meetings

The submission-feelers of Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid were the political event of the spring and summer of 1877. The two besprekingen at Telok-Kroet on the Westkust — at which Tekoe Moeda Baid met the ambtenaren van het bestuur — were the operational expression of the feelers. Tekoe Moeda Baid — het machtige hoofd der VII Moekims van de Sagi XXII Moekims, in Van Lansberge’s telegram of late 1877 — declared, at the second bespreking, his submission. The submission was, however, never executed: “Nu dit echter niet geschiedde, was het natuurlijk gevolg dat van onderwerping niets kwam” — when this did not happen, the natural consequence was that no submission came. Van Heutsz’s diagnosis is that the onderhandelingen had been insincere throughout: “de door de Atjehsche hoofden aangeknoopte onderhandelingen moesten slechts dienen om tijd te winnen” — the negotiations the Atjehnese chiefs had opened served only to gain time.

The 30 June 1877 medical evacuation of Diemont and the succession to Van der Heijden

Diemont’s governorship ended with his medical evacuation on 30 June 1877. Van Heutsz’s footnote records the succession in a single sentence — the only place in the 1893 tract where Diemont’s departure is dated:

“Hier was intusschen de Generaal Diemont, die 30 Juni 1877 wegens ziekte geevacueerd werd, eerst tijdelijk en later definitief in het bestuur vervangen door kolonel K. v. d. Heijden”.

The new Governor — kolonel K. van der Heijden, the future conqueror of the XXII Moekims and XXVI Moekims — would inherit, with the office, the verzoeningspolitiek that Diemont had been sent to execute and the Pel plan’s coastal line that Diemont had substantially completed.

The 12 October 1877 keerpunt letter

Van Lansberge’s letter of 12 October 1877 to the Governor of Atjeh — addressed to Diemont’s successor Van der Heijden — announced that “Naar alle kenteekenen te oordeelen, is in de Atjehsche zaak thans een belangrijk keerpunt bereikt” — by all indications, an important turning point had been reached in the Atjeh question. The keerpunt Van Lansberge announced rested on the submission-feelers of Tekoe Moeda Baid and the general recognition of Dutch authority along the coast. The keerpunt proved illusory: “de onderwerping van Tekoe Moeda Baid kwam niet tot stand, evenmin die van Panglima Polim” — the submission of Tekoe Moeda Baid did not come about, no more than that of Panglima Polim — and the 1878 inval of Habib Abdoel Rachman would expose the failure of the conciliation policy.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 14, 16–22. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Account from Verkenningen in Atjeh (1923)

1877 was the year of publication of J. A. Kruyt’s Atjeh en de Atjehers — Atjeh and the Atjehers — at Leiden by E. J. Brill, with the sub-title ‘twee jaren blokkade op Sumatra’s Noordoost-kust’ — two years of blockade on Sumatra’s north-east coast. The book is the principal contemporary narrative of the blockade period of the Atjeh-oorlog and the only detailed European source for the east-coast pepper economy immediately before its late-nineteenth-century collapse.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

Up to the beginning of 1877 the Atjeh-oorlog had cost sixty million guilders; in that year Dutch losses were 944 dead.

See Also

Source

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, door J.A. de Bruyne. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij “De Bussy,” 1912.

J.W. van Lansberge en de Atjeh-oorlog, in: C.W.A. van den Berg, Bijdragen tot de kennis der Sumatraansche Bataklanden, door J.H.F. Dames. ‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.

Gids voor den bezoeker van de schatkamer, Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Batavia, 1928. Druk: Ruygrok & Co., Batavia. Cabinet 3 (Atjeh), items 2–42.

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, p. 324.

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 303, 320–322, 332, 354, 360, 364.

Verkenningen in Atjeh, by Dr. R. Broersma (De Locomotief, October 1923); Atjeh Patchouli-Olie, by Ir. W. Spoon (1932), where applicable.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), passim.

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