East Coast of Aceh

The East Coast of Aceh — the Oostkust van Atjeh, in Van Heutsz’s spelling also de Oostkust, sometimes joined to the Noordkust for administrative purposes as the Noord- en Oostkust — was the low-lying coastal strip along the eastern side of Atjeh facing the Strait of Malacca, characterised in the source DLP-84-Atjeh by extensive mangrove swamps whose stilt roots were clearly visible from passing vessels, and whose mangrove bark (Dutch: bakaubast) had been historically considered worthless but by the early twentieth century had become a commercial product exported through the harbours of the residency (Dutch: gewest). The coastline was later traversed by the Atjeh-tram and the Great Atjeh Road (Dutch: *Groote Atjehweg*), which facilitated the trade and settlement that transformed the Oostkust from a frontier of military operations during the Atjeh-oorlog of 1873–1904 into one of the principal plantation districts of Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. In Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, the Oostkust is also the coastal region of the Atjehnese Onderhoorigheden comprising the statelets of Edi (the long-standing Dutch post), Simpang Olim and Tandjong Semantoh (the November 1876 co-belligerents subdued by Generaal Diemont), Kerti (the friendly statelet the Diemont expedition was sent to support), Gedong and Pasangan (the 1877 expedition targets of the verzoeningspolitiek-cum-gewapend optreden), the Pasei-streek cluster (Bajoe, Tjoenda, Nizam, Sawang, Blangmeh, Samakoeroeh, Kloempang doea), and Tamiang (the eastern extremity of the entire Atjehnese coast).

Environment and the Mangrove Swamp

The mangrove vegetation of the East Coast dominated the landscape of the littoral, providing a natural barrier against tidal forces and serving as the source of the bakau bark (Dutch: bakaubast) that became a significant smallholder export of the residency. The mangrove swamps, with their exposed stilt roots and their dense canopy of salt-tolerant trees, were characteristic of the muddy shoreline that extended, in uninterrupted stretches, from the delta of the Krueng Raya in the north to the borders of the Sumatra’s Oostkust residency in the south. The contrast with the steep, rugged shoreline of the West Coast of Aceh was marked: where the Westkust presented difficult terrain that required extensive engineering for road construction, the Oostkust presented a flat, waterlogged plain that was poorly drained but readily traversed by rail and road. The mangrove swamp was therefore both an environmental feature and a commercial resource of the East Coast, and its exploitation for bakau bark contributed to the early colonial economy of the residency even before the plantation boom of the 1910s and 1920s.

Economic Role and the Plantation District

The exploitation of mangrove bark for bakau products — principally as a source of tannin for the leather industry — contributed to the early colonial economy of the East Coast, while the construction of transport infrastructure — the Atjeh-tram, the Great Atjeh Road, and the Atjeh railway — opened the region to the broader commercial exchange that transformed it into one of the principal plantation districts of the gewest. The east-coast lowlands, with their deep alluvial soils and their accessibility by water, were well suited to the plantation crops — rubber, palm oil, sisal, and copra — that the European estates opened under the Agrarian Law of 1870 (Dutch: *Agrarische Wet*) after the formal close of the Atjeh-oorlog in 1904. The towns of Langsa, Koeala Simpang, and Besitang grew up as the commercial centres of the new plantation district, and the Atjeh railway was extended to Besitang to connect the Oostkust of Atjeh with the Deli Spoorweg Maatschappij network and the port of Belawan. The East Coast thus became, by the 1920s, the most economically developed part of the residency, and the principal point of contact between Atjeh and the wider Sumatran economy.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, the Oostkust served — with the Noordkust and the Westkust — as one of the three coastal divisions on which the war’s outcome turned; the Oostkust’s comparative tranquility under Dutch posts — Edi, Simpang Olim and Gedong — was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the empirical proof of the scheepvaartregeling’s capacity, and the eastern anchor of the 1884 Concentratie’s rigoureuse blokkade from Tamiang to Troemon.

The 1876–1877 gewapend optreden on the Oostkust

The first systematic Dutch policy on the Oostkust was the gewapend optreden (armed intervention) of 1876–1877 — the militaire expeditie that subdued the hostile statelets by force and installed Dutch controleurs and military garrisons to back them. The immediate context was the conflict on the Oostkust between Simpang Olim and Kerti, in which Tandjong Semantoh aligned with Simpang Olim against Kerti. Van Heutsz records the conflict on page 11 of the 1893 tract:

“In den strijd op de Oostkust destijds tusschen Simpang Olim en Kerti uitgebroken en waarbij het ons, evenals Simpang Olim, vijandige Tandjong Semantoh aan de zijde van Simpang Olim stond, was de Generaal [Wiggers van Kerchem] dan ook tegen het zenden van troepen tot steun van Kerti zooals de Gouv. Gen. wenschte en bepaalde hij er zich toe om aan het vroeger verdreven hoofd van Merbou, Tekoe Moeda Augkasa, die Kerti met 500 man wilde helpen, 150 achterlaadgeweren met munitie en 3000 dollars te zenden, teneinde Simpang Olim en Tandjong Semantoh afbreuk te doen” (In the struggle on the Oostkust then broken out between Simpang Olim and Kerti, in which Tandjong Semantoh — hostile to us as well as to Simpang Olim — stood on the side of Simpang Olim, the Generaal [Wiggers van Kerchem] was therefore against sending troops in support of Kerti as the Gouv. Gen. wished, and confined himself to sending to the formerly expelled chief of Merbou, Tekoe Moeda Augkasa, who wanted to help Kerti with 500 men, 150 breech-loading rifles with ammunition and 3000 dollars, in order to do damage to Simpang Olim and Tandjong Semantoh).

The Wiggers van Kerchem proxy-approach was overruled by G.-G. van Lansberge, who replaced Wiggers van Kerchem with Diemont. Diemont onmiddellijk na zijn optreden in November 1876, door het zenden van eene militaire expeditie, Simpang Olim en Tandjong Semantoh, tot erkenning van onze souvereiniteit dwong en tot regeling van de desbetreffende aangelegenheden daar een controleur plaatste, gedekt en gesteund door een militaire bezetting (immediately on taking office in November 1876, by sending a military expedition, forced Simpang Olim and Tandjong Semantoh to recognise our sovereignty and, to regulate the relevant affairs, placed a controleur there, covered and supported by a military garrison). The November 1876 submission was the first act of Diemont’s governorship — the militaire expeditie that brought the two hostile east-coast statelets into the formal category of Onderhoorigheden that had recognised Dutch sovereignty under art. 5 of Van Swieten’s Instructie. The 1877 follow-up expeditions targeted Gedong and Pasangan, bringing the gewapend optreden to the full Pasei-streek.

The 1883 scheepvaartregeling and the Oostkust’s tranquility

The Oostkust was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the empirical proof of the scheepvaartregeling’s capacity. The May 1883 scheepvaartregeling introduced by Gouverneur Laging Tobias — Reeds in Mei 1883 toch, zoo verhaalt ons Scherer, vaardigde hij, onder nadere goedkeuring der Regeering, een besluit uit, waarbij, volgens zijn (Scherer’s) denkbeelden, eene contrôle op handel en scheepvaart werd ingevoerd, die alles wat in- en uitgevoerd werd door onze handen deed gaan en aan ons toezicht onderwierp (Already in May 1883, Scherer tells us, he issued, under further approval of the Regeering, a besluit by which, according to his (Scherer’s) ideas, a control on commerce and shipping was introduced that caused everything that was imported and exported to go through our hands and be subject to our supervision) — covered the Oostkust from earlier still. Van Heutsz records the Oostkust’s comparative tranquility under the scheepvaartregeling on page 22 of the 1893 tract: op laatstgenoemde kust was daardoor als vanzelf, te Edi, een handelscentrum ontstaan, waren hoofden en bevolking tot welvaart geraakt (on the latter coast a trade-centre had thereby arisen of itself, at Edi, and chiefs and population had come to prosperity). The handelscentrum that emerged at Edi under the scheepvaartregeling was the operational proof the scheepvaartregeling’s proponents invoked: a Dutch-administered open port, with controle on the in- and out-going trade, producing welvaart — prosperity — for hoofden en bevolking — chiefs and population — and so producing the vertrouwen — confidence — on which a settled bestuur could rest.

Van Heutsz records Scherer’s empirical argument on page 61 of the 1893 tract: Scherer zegt dat in 1883 en 1884 in Edi de militaire commandant, dokter, controleur en postcommies op 500 M. van de benting woonden en de dames er even gerust als te Batavia met hare kinderen gingen wandelen, en haalt hij dit aan als een bewijs van veiligheid door de scheepvaartregeling verkregen (Scherer says that in 1883 and 1884 in Edi the military commander, doctor, controleur and post-clerk lived 500 M. from the fort, and the ladies went walking there with their children as carefree as in Batavia, and he cites this as a proof of the security obtained by the scheepvaartregeling). The Edi benting — the Dutch fort at Edi — was, in Scherer’s diagnosis, the empirical proof that the scheepvaartregeling produced the veiligheid — security — that the blokkade could not.

The 1884 Concentratie and the three Oostkust call-ports

The General Demmeni besluit of 13 October 1884 established the three call-ports through which all foreign trade with the Noord- en Oostkust had to pass. Van Heutsz records the arrangement on page 31 of the 1893 tract:

“deze waren, toen de posten Telok Semawé en Samalanga waren ingetrokken, alleen Edi, Segli en Oleh-leh voor de geheele Noord- en Oostkust” (these were, when the posts Telok Semawé and Samalanga had been withdrawn, only Edi, Segli and Oleh-leh for the entire Noord- en Oostkust).

Of the three call-ports — Edi, Segli and Oleh-leh — one was on the Oostkust itself: Edi. The other two — Segli and Oleh-leh — were on the Noordkust. The Oostkust thus retained one of the three open call-ports of the entire Noord- en Oostkust — the operational focus of Demmeni’s hybrid scheme that combined a partieele blokkade (partial blockade) with a soort scheepvaartregeling (a kind of shipping-regulation). The arrangement was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the worst of both worlds — geen rigoureuse blokkade (no rigorous blockade) but also geen echte scheepvaartregeling (no true shipping-regulation) — but the Oostkust’s open call-port at Edi survived, and its survival fixed the Oostkust as the operational locus of the partial-closure régime on the east coast.

The Van Teijn closure and the Oostkust’s open status

The Oostkust was, in the Van Teijn governorship of 1886–1891, the open coast against which the Noord- and Westkust closures were defined. The 1888–1890 closure of the Noord- en Westkust — in ‘t begin van 1890 eindelijk was uitgestrekt over de geheele Noord- en Westkust — left the Oostkust open, and so made the Oostkust the channel through which the closed Noord- en Westkust statelets drew their supplies. Van Heutsz records the Oostkust’s open status on page 56 of the 1893 tract: niettegenstaande zij niet zoo afdoende was, als die in 1884 door de Regeering gewenscht, omdat de Oostkust open bleef en door bijzondere omstandigheden, ook voor Telok Semawé en Kerti op de Noord- en voor Telok Kroet op de Westkust een beperkte invoer van levensmiddelen door middel van licenties was toegestaan, trof zij, in weerwil hiervan, toch nog boven verwachting doel (notwithstanding that it was not so effective as that wished by the Regeering in 1884, because the Oostkust remained open and through special circumstances, also for Telok Semawé and Kerti on the Noordkust and for Telok Kroet on the Westkust, a limited import of foodstuffs by means of licences was permitted, it struck, despite this, beyond expectation).

The Oostkust’s open status was administered by the assistent-resident ter Oostkust, whose licenties — limited permits for the import of levensmiddelen at Telok Semawé and Kerti on the Noordkust, and at Telok Kroet on the Westkust — were, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the moeilijkheid (difficulty) of the closure. Van Heutsz records the difficulty on page 56: Slechts eene zaak leverde moeilijkheden op en dat waren de licenties van invoer voor Telok Semawé en Kerti; het beleid hiervan moest worden overgelaten aan den assistent-resident ter Oostkust en deze, hoewel een flink, bekwaam en doortastend ambtenaar, liet zich zoo menigmaal verleiden tot te groote verstrekkingen, dat de Generaal meermalen beperkend moest ingrijpen (Only one thing caused difficulties and that was the import licences for Telok Semawé and Kerti; the management of this had to be left to the assistant-resident on the Oostkust, and this one, though a sound, capable and energetic official, allowed himself so often to be tempted into too-large grants that the Generaal had to intervene restrictively several times).

The 1893 prescription: the Oostkust’s open ports

In Van Heutsz’s own 1893 prescription, the Oostkust retained its position as the operational focus of the scheepvaartregeling. The prescription retained Edi as the open call-port of the Oostkust — together with Segli and Olehleh on the Noordkust, and Telok-Kroet, Melaboeh and Tampat Toean on the Westkust — and the prescription closed the entire coast between these ports: van Tamiang op de Oostkust tot Troemon op de Westkust (from Tamiang on the Oostkust to Troemon on the Westkust). The Oostkust’s pepper — the principal uitvoer (export) of the east-coast statelets — was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the fiscal stake that gave the closure-and-scheepvaartregeling system its leverage over the hoofden of the Oostkust, and the handelscentrum of Edi was, in Van Heutsz’s prescription, the centrum through which the Oostkust’s pepper-export was to be routed. The Oostkust’s role is, in Van Heutsz’s 1893 prescription, the operational focus of the scheepvaartregeling Van Heutsz would himself implement as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward.

Significance (Van Heutsz account)

The Oostkust’s significance in Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract rests on its being one of the three coastal divisions of the Onderhoorigheden — with the Noordkust and the Westkust; the operational focus of the 1876–1877 gewapend optreden that brought the hostile east-coast statelets into the formal category of Onderhoorigheden that had recognised Dutch sovereignty under art. 5 of Van Swieten’s Instructie; the empirical proof of the scheepvaartregeling’s capacity — the Oostkust’s comparative tranquility under the May 1883 scheepvaartregeling, the handelscentrum that emerged at Edi, and the veiligheid Scherer invoked as the proof of the scheepvaartregeling’s capacity — and so the operational locus of the partial-closure régime of the 1884 Concentratie’s three call-ports (Edi, Segli, Oleh-leh); and the open coast against which the Van Teijn closure of 1888–1890 was defined — the channel through which the closed Noord- en Westkust statelets drew their supplies, and the bijzondere omstandigheid whose management by the assistent-resident ter Oostkust was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the moeilijkheid of the closure.

Sources

DLP-84-Atjeh.pdf, p. 8.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 10, 11, 17, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 50, 56, 61, 67. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt. Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen ter bespreking van de verdere voorbereiding eener hervorming van het bestuurswezen in Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1914), pp. 118, 358. Over eene collectie vogelhuiden van Oost-Atjeh, door Ir. Jhr. F. C. van Heurn en Mr. Dr. Baron R. C. E. G. J. Snouckaert van Schauburg, in Jaarberichten (Koloniaal Instituut). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br N 95-1210 Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Over eene collectie vogelhuiden van Oost-Atjeh by Ir. Jhr. F. C. van Heurn and Mr. Dr. Baron R. C. E. G. J. Snouckaert van Schauburg (Koloniaal Instituut, Jaarberichten). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering. Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter II, III, XIII.

tags	place, coast, aceh, environment, mangrove, colonial, atjeh, aceh-war, 19th-century, east-coast, onderhoorigheden, scheepvaartregeling, afdeeling, oostkust, coastal, border-region, administrative-division, region, tamiang, geography, plantation, economy
aliases	Oostkust van Atjeh, East Aceh Coast, Oostkust, Aceh East Coast, the East Coast of Atjeh, de Oostkust, Pasei-streek, East Coast of Atjeh, Atjeh's Oostkust, Aceh Timur, Oostkust Atjeh, Oost-Atjeh, East Atjeh, eastern Atjeh

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