Telok Kroet — Telok-Kroet in Van Heutsz’s hyphenated spelling — was the west-coast anchorage of the Atjehnese Onderhoorigheden (Dependencies) that served, in Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, as the Westkust counterpart to the Noordkust posts — the anchorage opposite the island of Poeloe Raja at which Tekoe Moeda Baid held his two insincere submission-talks with Dutch officials in 1877, the staatje (little state) whose loyal chief was the only Westkust chief to have remained self-reliant through the Van Teijn closure, and the place whose anchorage and loyal chief made it — with Melaboeh and Tampat Toean — one of Van Teijn’s three preferred Westkust vestigings places (establishment sites) under the projected scheepvaartregeling (shipping regulation).
The two 1877 meetings with Tekoe Moeda Baid
The 1877 verzoeningspolitiek (conciliation policy) of Gouverneur-Generaal van Lansberge — the conciliation-policy by which the Dutch sought to bring the still-resistive Atjehnese chiefs to submission by negotiation rather than by arms — opened, in March 1877, with the submission-feelers of Panglima Polim and Tekoe Moeda Baid. Van Heutsz records the progression of the feelers into formal submission-talks at Telok-Kroet:
“de aanvankelijk gedane stappen tot onderwerping van Panglima Polim en Tekoe Moeda Baid gevolgd werden door twee besprekingen van laatstgenoemde met de ambtenaren van het bestuur te Telok-Kroet op de Westkust, waarbij hij de laatste maal verklaarde zich aan ons te onderwerpen”.
The twee besprekingen — two conferences — between Tekoe Moeda Baid and the ambtenaren van het bestuur te Telok-Kroet (officials of the administration at Telok-Kroet) were held on the Westkust, with Tekoe Moeda Baid declaring, on the second occasion, that he submitted to Dutch authority. The declared submission was reported to Batavia by telegram of 11 October 1877, and the Gouverneur-Generaal (Governor-General) responded by letter of 12 October 1877 — the keerpunt letter (turning-point letter) — declaring that “in de Atjehsche zaak thans een belangrijk keerpunt bereikt” — an important turning-point had now been reached in the Atjeh affair. The submission was, however, insincere: Van Heutsz records that the onderhandelingen aangeknoopte door de Atjehsche hoofden moesten slechts dienen om tijd te winnen — the negotiations opened by the Atjehnese chiefs served only to gain time. The Telok-Kroet meetings thus became, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the klassieke (classical) exhibit of the verzoeningspolitiek’s failure — the place where the Dutch misread tactical delay as strategic submission and shaped policy accordingly.
The Westkust counterpart to the Noordkust posts
The choice of Telok-Kroet as the site of the 1877 submission-talks reflected its institutional position as the Westkust counterpart to the Noordkust posts. The anchorage was opposite the island of Poeloe Raja, whose safe roadstead made Telok-Kroet a natural Dutch vestigings place (establishment site), and the staatje itself had a chief whose personal loyalty to the Dutch was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the exception on the Westkust. Van Heutsz records the chief’s loyalty in his catalogue of Van Teijn’s preferred Westkust ports:
“de eerste plaats omdat het daartegenover liggend eiland Raja, waar de Generaal ons etablissement wilde vestigen, ten allen tijde een voor de schepen veilige ankerplaats biedt, het hoofd van Telok Kroet ons altijd trouw was en steeds zelfstandig, zelfs aan aanvallen van Toekoe Oemar en Rigas het hoofd wist te bieden”.
The chief of Telok-Kroet was the only Westkust chief who had steeds zelfstandig — always remained self-reliant — and who, even under attacks from Toekoe Oemar and Rigas, het hoofd wist te bieden — held his own. The loyalty was, in Van Heutsz’s argument, the empirical proof that a Westkust vestiging at Telok-Kroet was operationally possible: the chief’s self-reliance made the post defensible without a heavy garrison, and the safe anchorage of Poeloe Raja made it commercially viable.
The 1890 closure and the licenced-import dispensation
Under the Van Teijn closure of 1890, Telok-Kroet was one of the three statelets — with Telok Semawe and Kerti on the Noordkust — for which a beperkte invoer van levensmiddelen door middel van licenties (a restricted import of foodstuffs by means of licences) was permitted. Van Heutsz records the arrangement:
“ook voor Telok Semawé en Kerti op de Noord- en voor Telok Kroet op de Westkust een beperkte invoer van levensmiddelen door middel van licenties was toegestaan”.
The licenced-import dispensation for Telok-Kroet was the Westkust counterpart of the Telok Semawé-Kerti dispensation on the Noordkust — a controlled invoer (import) of levensmiddelen (foodstuffs) through Dutch-issued licences, alongside the otherwise rigorous sluiting (closure) of the coast. The arrangement was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, an operational compromise that preserved a minimum of trade at the loyal chief’s staatje without breaking the closure’s coercive pressure on the rest of the Westkust. Van Teijn’s Algemeen voorstel (general proposal) of 1891 then formalised the projected vestiging te Telok Kroet (Poeloe Raja) — the establishment at Telok-Kroet (Poeloe Raja) — as the Westkust anchor of the projected scheepvaartregeling.
The 1891 terrain-survey by the chef van den staf
In 1891 the chef van den staf — the Chief of Staff, the office from which Van Heutsz himself signs the title page of the 1893 tract — surveyed the coastal stretch of the closed staatje Telok-Kroet and the opposite island of Poeloe Raja. Van Heutsz records the survey:
“In 1891 is mede de kuststrook opgenomen door den chef van den staf met een opnemer in het eveneens gesloten staatje Telok Kroet op de Westkust en tegelijkertijd het daartegenover liggende Poeloe Raja, waar bij invoering der scheepvaartregeling mede een etablissement moet komen. De assistent-resident van de Westkust was hierbij tegenwoordig en bezochten deze en de chef van den staf in gezelschap van den Radja niet alleen de kuststrook van den vasten wal, maar ook de door het gewapende volk bezette bentings”.
The survey — opgenomen door den chef van den staf met een opnemer (taken by the Chief of Staff with a surveyor) — was the operational preparation for the projected etablissement (establishment) at Poeloe Raja, and the assistent-resident van de Westkust (assistant resident of the West Coast) accompanied the Chief of Staff in gezelschap van den Radja — in the company of the Radja (i.e., the loyal chief of Telok-Kroet). The survey visited not only the kuststrook van den vasten wal — the coastal stretch of the mainland — but also the door het gewapende volk bezette bentings — the armed-people-occupied fortifications (bentings) — of Poeloe Raja. The 1891 survey was, in Van Heutsz’s argument, the empirical proof that the closure, properly enforced, was compatible with the operational preparation of the projected etablissement — the Westkust counterpart of the Telok Semawe survey Van Teijn had prescribed but been forced to leave to his successor.
The 50-rifle incident: a case against arming bondgenooten
Telok-Kroet was also the site of the famous 50-rifle incident — the case Van Heutsz made emblematic of the danger of arming so-called bondgenooten (allies). The incident is recorded at length:
“Het gebeurde met de 50 aan Telok Kroet verstrekte achterlaadgeweren kan tot bewijs hiervan strekken. Ook hier had de assistent-resident de overtuiging van de wederinlevering, te Telok Kroet was de toestand zeker niet minder gunstig dan in eenig staatje ter Noordkust en ook onze verhouding tot dat staatje pleitte voor vertrouwen; toch bracht de verstrekker de geweren niet weder binnen en ook zijn opvolger, de assistent Ruijssenaers, deed bijna anderhalf jaar lang vergeefsche moeite. Eindelijk slaagde hij, onder welke voorwaarden wil ik liever niet vertellen”.
Fifty achterlaadgeweren — breech-loading rifles — were issued to the chief of Telok-Kroet on the assistent-resident’s assurance of their return; the chief nonetheless refused to return them, and the assistant-resident’s successor — the assistent Ruijssenaers (assistant Ruijssenaers) — spent almost a year and a half in vain efforts to recover them, ultimately succeeding under conditions Van Heutsz declines to specify. The Telok-Kroet rifle incident was, in Van Heutsz’s argument, the empirical proof of the Dwaze illusie — foolish illusion — of arming bondgenooten: “Misschien zullen wij ze nog eenmaal bloedig moeten terughalen” — perhaps we shall one day have to take them back bloodily. The incident was the Westkust counterpart to the Augkasa proxy-arrangement on the Oostkust — Van Heutsz’s case against the bondgenoot-policy (ally-policy) of arming friendly chiefs that he opposed throughout the 1893 tract.
The 1893 prescription: Telok-Kroet (Poeloe Raja) as a 75-man post
In Van Heutsz’s own 1893 prescription, Telok-Kroet (Poeloe Raja) was named as one of the nieuwe posten (new posts) to be erected under the scheepvaartregeling. The prescription specifies the garrison:
“Deze besparing reeds voldoende om te voorzien in de opterichten posten Telok Semawó, Samalanga, Poeloe Waij ieder 100, Telok Kroet (Poeloe Raija) en Tampat Toean ieder 75 onderofficieren en minderen”.
Telok-Kroet (Poeloe Raja) and Tampat Toean were each allotted 75 onderofficieren en minderen — non-commissioned officers and men — against the 100-allotment of Telok Semawe, Samalanga and Poeloe Waij. The 75-man garrison was, in Van Heutsz’s argument, sufficient given the loyal chief’s self-reliance and the safe anchorage of Poeloe Raja: the Westkust vestiging did not require the heavier garrison of the Noordkust posts. The prescription codified the institutional form Van Teijn had projected and the operational preparation the 1891 survey had executed — the Westkust anchor of the scheepvaartregeling Van Heutsz would himself implement as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward.
Significance
Telok Kroet’s significance in the Aceh Wiki History record rests on four things: it was the site of the two insincere submission-talks of 1877 between Tekoe Moeda Baid and the Dutch ambtenaren van het bestuur — the twee besprekingen (two conferences) that produced the 12 October 1877 keerpunt letter and that became, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the klassieke exhibit of the verzoeningspolitiek’s failure; it was the Westkust counterpart to the Noordkust posts — the anchorage opposite Poeloe Raja whose safe roadstead and loyal chief made it the natural Dutch vestigings place on the Westkust; it was the staatje whose loyal chief was the only Westkust chief to have remained steeds zelfstandig through the Van Teijn closure — the empirical proof that a Westkust vestiging was operationally possible; and it was, in Van Heutsz’s own 1893 prescription, one of the nieuwe posten of the scheepvaartregeling — Telok-Kroet (Poeloe Raja) with a 75-man garrison, the Westkust anchor of the scheepvaartregeling Van Heutsz would himself implement as Governor of Atjeh from 1898 onward.
See Also
- Tekoe Moeda Baid
- Panglima Polim
- Van Lansberge
- Van Lansberge’s keerpunt letter (12 October 1877)
- Van der Heijden
- Van Teijn
- Westkust
- Poeloe Raja
- Melaboeh
- Tampat Toean
- Toekoe Oemar
- Rigas
- Ruijssenaers
- Scheepvaartregeling
- Blokkade
- Onderhoorigheden
- 1877
- 1891
- 1893
Source
De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. p. 14, also pp. 56, 58, 62, 73, 82, 115. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.