Gighen

Gighen (also written Gigien) was a coast-state on the north coast of Atjeh — a kwala (river-mouth) and statelet on the Noordkust of the Atjehnese Onderhoorigheden — whose vorst had fought against the Dutch in Atjeh, but who after the victories of General Pel in 1875-76 signed the act of submission on 29 February 29 February 1876 and hoisted the Dutch flag. The vorst later betook himself to the XXII Moekims to fight against the Dutch there; on 19 August 19 August 1876 the tractaat of friendship was accordingly cancelled, the Dutch flag was taken down, and the country was again closed to trade. The state was the object of an expedition under Van der Heyden in May 1878, after which the radja of Gighen again offered his submission. In Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Gighen is also one of the five kwala’s named in Generaal Pel’s 30 April 1875 plan as the sea-approaches whose occupation would seal Groot-Atjeh from the sea, the statelet where the Dutch failure to establish the prescribed posts in 1875–1877 was empirically exposed, and the place whose bangoen-default and the murder of the Dutch emissary Said Abdellah provoked Scherer’s 1880 kruisboot-deployment — the first proof-of-concept for the kruisboot-bangoen method that grew into the scheepvaartregeling Scherer would later systematise.

The Submission and its Failure, 1876

After the victories of General Pel in 1875-76 the vorst of Gighen, “who had fought against us in Atjeh but now began to give up hope of our expulsion,” decided to negotiate his submission. He signed the act of submission on 29 February 29 February 1876 and hoisted the Dutch flag. The Dutch then decided to set up a fortification at Pedir on the north coast, to better assert their authority there, and to place an official there under the protection of a sufficient military force.

That the submission was rather in the interest of trade than from a real desire to place oneself under Dutch authority appeared in the same year in Gighen, “whose vorst betook himself to the XXII Moekims to fight against us there. Therefore on 19 August 19 August [1876] the tractaat of friendship with the vorst was cancelled by us, the Dutch flag was taken down, and the country was again closed to trade.”

The Expedition of May 1878

In May 1878 the governor Van der Heyden led an expedition to Gighen and the upper lands of Pedir, where Toekoe di Tiroe remained hostile and the post at Segli had been attacked by a great force. The actual object of the expedition — the kampong Garouw, the headquarters of Toekoe di Tiroe — was not reached, but the taking of Telok Kadjoe, which had been mistaken for Garouw, had the consequence that the radja of Gighen offered his submission and promised the surrender of Toekoe di Tiroe.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

One of Pel’s five kwala’s (1875)

The original Dutch design for the coastal line of Groot-Atjeh was Generaal Pel’s plan of 30 April 1875, which prescribed the occupation of the kuststrook (coastal-strip) of the vallei of Groot-Atjeh between Kroeng Raja and Kroeng Raba and of the VI Moekims — and, with it, the closing of the five kwala’s (river-mouths) that gave Groot-Atjeh access to the sea. Pel’s text, as Van Heutsz reproduces it, named the five kwala’s:

“inzonderheid van de vijf toegangen naar zee de kwala’s Loé, Gig-chen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel en Pantjoer wordt Atjeh proper geheel van zee afgescheiden en dus uit een handelsoogpunt handellijk van ons” (in particular through the five sea-approaches, the kwala’s Loé, Gig-chen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel and Pantjoer, Atjeh proper is wholly cut off from the sea and thus commercially placed in our hands).

The five kwala’s — Loé, Gighen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel and Pantjoer — were the five sea-approaches of the vallei of Groot-Atjeh. Pel’s argument was that the occupation of the coastal stretch between Kroeng Raja and Kroeng Raba, combined with the control of the five kwala’s, would separate Atjeh proper entirely from the sea and thus commercially place it in Dutch hands. Gighen was, in this original Pel design, the second of the five kwala’s — the river-mouth whose control would, with the others, complete the seal of the interior.

The 1875–1877 failure to establish posts

The Pel plan was never executed as designed. Pel died during his roemrijke veldtocht (glorious campaign) in the beginning of 1876, and the completion of the Groot-Atjeh coastal line fell to his successor Generaal Diemont in the beginning of 1877. The Onderhoorigheden-side of the plan — the establishment of posts on the Noord- en Westkust — was meanwhile abandoned. Van Heutsz records the failure in his catalogue of the Diemont year:

“terwijl op de kusten geen posten werden opgericht te Gighen en te Melaboeh, zooals in het plan lag, maar alleen in [other statelets]” (while on the coasts no posts were erected at Gighen and at Melaboeh, as the plan had prescribed, but only at [other statelets]).

The failure to erect posts at Gighen and Melaboeh zooals in het plan lag — as the plan had prescribed — was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, the original operational default of the Pel-plan execution. The coastal line of Groot-Atjeh was nominally sealed in February 1877, but the Onderhoorigheden-side of the seal — the posts at the five kwala’s and at Melaboeh — was never established. The result was the 1876–1877 irony of the civiel bestuur van Oleh-leh rice-trade through which de vijand zijne rijstschuren bij ons te Oleh-leh had — the enemy had his rice-bins at our Olehleh — even as the surrounding coast was nominally closed.

The murder of Said Abdellah and the bangoen-default

The consequence of the 1875–1877 default was the breakdown of Dutch authority on the closed coast. The Dutch emissaries sent to the Onderhoorigheden to enforce the bangoen (blood-price) on chiefs who had violated the beëdigde 18 artikelen (sworn eighteen articles) were murdered. Van Heutsz records the murder:

“door het gebeurde te Gighen en te Samalanga, waar onze zendelingen Said Abdellah en Soetan Maharadja vermoord waren, en waar men telkens uitvluchten zocht in het betalen van den opgelegden bangoen” (through what happened at Gighen and at Samalanga, where our emissaries Said Abdellah and Soetan Maharadja were murdered, and where one constantly sought evasions in the payment of the imposed blood-price).

The zendelingen Said Abdellah (at Gighen) and Soetan Maharadja (at Samalanga) — the Dutch civil emissaries, not Christian missionaries — were murdered, and the chiefs of Gighen and Samalanga telkens uitvluchten zocht in het betalen van den opgelegden bangoen — constantly sought evasions in the payment of the imposed blood-price. The Gighen murder was the operational trigger for the Dutch search for an instrument that would coerce the chiefs into compliance without requiring a permanent post at every kwala.

Scherer’s kruisboot-bangoen method (1880)

The instrument was found by Scherer, who arrived on the Noordkust in 1877 as waarnemend assistent-resident (acting assistant-resident) and rose to become the resident whose 20 January 1891 lezing (lecture) before the Indisch Genootschap Van Heutsz engages at length. Scherer’s kruisboot-bangoen method — the deployment of a kruisboot (cruiser) before the harbour of a defaulting chief, with the bangoen to be levied as duties on the in- and out-flow of goods — was first tried at Gighen and Samalanga. Van Heutsz records the deployment and its result:

“Hij verzocht en verkreeg toen van den Generaal van der Heijden vergunning om vóór die havens een kruisboot te leggen en den bangoen te innen door rechten te heffen op de in- en uit te voeren goederen. Dit hielp; te Gighen betaalde men nog vóór dat de kruisboot er lag en te Samalanga, nadat de kruisboot er slechts drie dagen gelegen had. Dat was voor Scherer eene vingerwijzing” (He requested and obtained from Generaal van der Heijden permission to lay a cruiser before those harbours and to collect the blood-price by levying duties on the goods imported and exported. This worked; at Gighen payment was made even before the cruiser was in place, and at Samalanga after the cruiser had been there only three days. That was for Scherer a finger-post).

The kruisboot was not even in place at Gighen before the chief paid the bangoen — te Gighen betaalde men nog vóór dat de kruisboot er lag — and at Samalanga three days of kruisboot-presence sufficed. The Gighen proof-of-concept was, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, de vingerwijziging — the finger-post — that brought Scherer to the scheepvaartregeling idea: als slechts alle in- en uitvoer langs onze vestigingen plaats had onder onze contrôle, wij ook het middel in de hand hadden om de hoofden van de verschillende staatjes in het rechte spoor te houden (if only all imports and exports took place through our establishments under our control, we should also have the means in hand to keep the chiefs of the various statelets on the right track). The Gighen kruisboot was the operational ancestor of the systematic scheepvaartregeling of May 1883 — the first empirical proof that the controlled routing of trade through Dutch-administered ports could coerce the chiefs without permanent posts.

The 1884 partial closure and the 1890 enforcement

Gighen’s role as one of the two gewichtigste (most weighty) Noordkust statelets — the gebied van Pedir en Gighen (territory of Pedir and Gighen) — was confirmed by the Van Teijn closure of 1890. The closure of the Noord- en Westkust, completed in the beginning of 1890, was enforced on the Pedir-Gighen stretch by the postcommandant te Segli — the military post-commander charged with the civil administration of the stretch. Van Heutsz records the arrangement: het gewichtigste deel der kust het gebied van Pedir en Gighen door den met het civiel bestuur belasten postcommandant te Segli (the most weighty part of the coast, the territory of Pedir and Gighen, [is administered by] the post-commander at Segli charged with the civil administration). The Pedir-Gighen stretch was the most strategically weighty of the entire coast — the rice-lifeline of the interior — and the postcommandant te Segli was the operational instrument by which the rigorous closure was enforced on it. By 1891 the rijke passar te Pedir was door de sluiting geheel verarmd en zoo goed als verloopen — impoverished by the closure and as good as ruined — and Gighen with it.

The federation-XII politics

Gighen’s continuing constitutional significance was as the co-head, with Pedir, of the federatie XII — the twelve-hoeloebalang federation of the Pedir-region. Van Heutsz records the constitutional arrangement in his catalogue of the federation-XII politics:

“De invloed, dien de Radja’s van Pedir en Gighen op de leden der federatie hebben, hangt geheel af van de persoonlijkheid dier Radja’s. … Lieten de hoofden van Gighen en Pedir zich krachtig gelden, dan was hun wil in de federatie wet” (The influence that the Radjas of Pedir and Gighen have on the members of the federation depends entirely on the personality of those Radjas. … When the heads of Gighen and Pedir asserted themselves, their will was law in the federation).

The influence of the Radja’s of Pedir and Gighen on the federatie XII depended entirely on the personality of the Radja’s themselves: when the heads of Gighen and Pedir asserted themselves, dan was hun wil in de federatie wet — their will was law in the federation. Gighen’s constitutional weight, in Van Heutsz’s diagnosis, was thus inseparable from Pedir’s: the two statelets together formed the sleutel van dit systeem — the linchpin of the entire ring of Noordkust statelets on which the war’s outcome turned.

Significance (Van Heutsz account)

Gighen’s significance in Van Heutsz’s 1893 tract rests on four things: it was one of the five kwala’s named in Pel’s 30 April 1875 plan as the sea-approaches whose occupation would seal Groot-Atjeh from the sea — the second of the five kwala’s (Loé, Gighen, Atjeh, Tjangkoel and Pantjoer) whose control Pel prescribed; it was the statelet where the Dutch failure to establish the prescribed posts in 1875–1877 was empirically exposed — geen posten werden opgericht te Gighen en te Melaboeh, zooals in het plan lag — the original operational default of the Pel-plan execution; it was the place whose bangoen-default and the murder of Said Abdellah provoked Scherer’s 1880 kruisboot-deployment — the first proof-of-concept of the kruisboot-bangoen method that grew into the scheepvaartregeling of May 1883; and it was, with Pedir, the co-head of the federatie XII — the gewichtigste stretch of the Noordkust, jointly policed from Segli under the Van Teijn closure of 1890, and the constitutional linchpin of the entire ring of Noordkust statelets on which the war’s outcome turned.

Account from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (1897)

Gighen was named twice in the Atjeh debate of 16 November 1897 as one of the coastal federations lying beyond the limit of effective Dutch control.

Pijnacker Hordijk asked the Minister of Colonies Cremer what conception he formed of the ending of the state of war in Groot-Atjeh, and whether he considered “de pacificatie van geheel Atjeh mogelijk, ook zonder dat wij een zelfde positie, als in Groot-Atjeh, in de federaties van Gighen en Pedir en in de zuidelijke nederzettingen hebben veroverd en kunnen behouden.” — the pacification of the whole of Atjeh possible, even without our having conquered and being able to hold a like position, as in Groot-Atjeh, in the federations of Gighen and Pedir and in the southern settlements.

Cremer answered by pointing to what had happened at Segli. There, he said, roughly the same condition prevailed as in the Pedir country: the princes on the coast were not hostile to the Dutch but were not strong enough to drive out the Delama-bands gathered in the Tanawaqt or in the VII Moekims. The Segli expedition had therefore been undertaken not to take the place itself but to expel those bands from the moekims Pakan Baroe and Pokan Soth; after the expulsion the local chief had taken the district under his own management. Should similar clearances become necessary elsewhere, they would be carried out, and the completion of the steam tram to Selimoen would facilitate such action.

Cremer also answered the wider question in the negative: asked whether he wished to conquer the whole of Atjeh, he said no. The interior of Atjeh was unknown; there were no proofs that fighters from there joined the Acehnese bands; it would therefore be perfectly unnecessary to march thither. “Wanneer wij de kust beheerschen zal van zelf het achterland onder onzen invloed komen.” — When we command the coast the hinterland will come under our influence of itself.

Nineteenth-Century Historiography & Campaign Analysis

Submission in December 1873

During the initial phase of the Second Aceh Expedition, the ruler of Gighen (Raja of Gighen) formally drafted and transmitted the Raja of Gighen Letter of Submission on 30 December 1873 (11 Dzoelkangidah 1290 AH) to General J. van Swieten, offering the capitulation of Gighen to the Dutch East Indies Government.

This document was highlighted in official reports in Atjeh gedurende de tweede expeditie en later (1876) as evidence that regional coastal rulers were separating from Sultan Sultan Mahmud Syah of Aceh following the invasion of Kraton of Aceh.

Second expedition context

During the Second Dutch Expedition to Aceh, Jan van Swieten contrasted a coastal route near Gighen with a landing at Krueng Raba. He regarded the ability to remain in contact with the fleet as an important advantage of the Gighen coastal sector and later recorded negotiations there.

Source

Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897) and Een strijd in Atjeh (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg for the Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.

Atjeh gedurende de tweede expeditie en later, Een Oud Officier, Batavia: Ogilvie & Co., 1876, pp. 8-10.

Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 14, 55, 57.

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 80, 96.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. pp. 9, 10, 17, 22, 26, 50, 56, 92, 93. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

De waarheid over onze vestiging in Atjeh: met eene kaart van Atjeh en een plan van den Kraton, by J. van Swieten (Zalt-Bommel: Joh. Noman en Zoon, 1879), pp. 1–465.

tags	place, 19th-century, aceh-war, acehnese, achehnese, atjeh, coast-state, coastal, kwala, noordkust, north-coast, onderhoorigheden, port, scheepvaartregeling, settlement
aliases	Gig-chen, Gigeng, Gighen, Gighën, Gigien, Gigieng, Port of Gighen, the state of Gighen on the Noordkust

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