Pijnacker Hordijk — governor-general of the Nederlandsch-Indië in the early 1890s — is, in the source’s narrative, the governor-general who, alongside the governor of Atjeh Deykerhoff, declined to follow the 1892 advice of Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje and instead placed his trust in Teungku Um — the warlord who would defect in 1896 and turn his modern-Dutch arms against his former patrons.
The Snouck Hurgronje rejection
The source records that Deykerhoff and Pijnacker Hordijk “meenden de raadgevingen van Snouck Hurgronje niet te moeten volgen” (believed they should not follow Snouck Hurgronje’s advice). The Snouck Hurgronje advice of 1892 had three components: ignore the “sultanspartij” (sultan’s party) at the court as of no significance; do not negotiate with the enemy but strike him sensibly; and thereafter seek to win the confidence of the population by a good welfare policy.
The Teungku Um trust
Against Snouck Hurgronje’s warning, Deykerhoff and Pijnacker Hordijk “schenkten zij hun vertrouwen aan Teungku Um, die officieel begenadigd werd, een legioen van 250 man op onze kosten mocht onderhouden en later nog 1000 geweren kreeg, veel ammunitie en geld” (placed their trust in Teungku Um, who was officially granted clemency, permitted to maintain a legion of 250 men at our expense, and later received a further 1,000 rifles, much ammunition and money). The arming and subsidising of Teungku Um against the explicit advice of Snouck Hurgronje is, in the source’s narrative, the type-specimen of the colonial-administrator-as-gambler.
The Van der Wijck reversal
Pijnacker Hordijk’s successor Van der Wijck (1893-99) “begreep, dat Snouck Hurgronje’s adviezen gevolgd moesten worden” (understood that Snouck Hurgronje’s advice had to be followed). The reversal is, in the source’s narrative, the institutional act by which the Snouck Hurgronje advice was finally implemented — though only after the 1896 defection of Teungku Um had demonstrated the cost of the Pijnacker Hordijk-Deykerhoff gamble.
Significance
Pijnacker Hordijk’s significance for the encyclopedia of Acheh history lies in his role as the governor-general whose rejection of the Snouck Hurgronje advice and whose trust in Teungku Um produced the 1896 defection that ended the policy of co-opting Atjehnese warlords as Dutch allies.
Account from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (1897)
A speaker of this name — the deputy from ‘s-Gravenhage as Cremer addressed him in reply — opened the discussion after H. van Kol in the Atjeh debate of 16 November 1897.
He began by observing that the minister too saw in the million-devouring Atjeh-krijg the great evil for the finances of the Indies, quoting the Memorie van Antwoord: so long as the Atjeh war continued to demand the great sacrifices it then exacted and had exacted in the last twenty-four years, one would probably not be able to go so far in the abolition of personal burdens as would be desirable, many useful expenditures would have to be omitted, and great thrift practised in every field; and that for the sake of the Indies finances one must above all strive for the ending of the state of war in Atjeh, “die reeds zoo lang slepende is.”
That pronouncement, he said, everyone interested in the colonies would heartily endorse. Peace in Atjeh must be striven for not only for the sake of the finances, but also for the sake of the peaceful native population of Java and the Buitenbezittingen, which had not the least interest in the extension of Dutch authority on North Sumatra and yet had for a great part to raise the millions consumed for that purpose; for the sake of the army in the Indies, which of late had a task to fulfil for which in the long run, without important expansion, it was not calculated; and for the sake of humanity.
He then put a series of questions to the minister. Reading on page 5 of the Memorie that the government was convinced of the efficacy of the system now applied in Groot-Atjeh and expected from a consistent perseverance in the direction taken the ending of the state of war, he asked what was meant by “een consequent volhouden in de thans ingeslagen richting.” — a consistent perseverance in the direction now taken. Did it mean that the great force of troops then quartered in Groot-Atjeh would have to be kept there permanently, or at least for years? What conception did the minister form of the ending of the state of war in Groot-Atjeh? Did he consider the pacification of the whole of Atjeh possible without the Dutch having conquered and being able to keep a position like that in Groot-Atjeh in the federations of Gighen and Pedir and in the southern settlements?
Under the heading De toestand niet verbeterd he pressed for a clearer exposition of the actual condition and probable future in Atjeh than the Memorie had given, holding that the answer to the Voorloopig Verslag’s question — that the quiet and steadily improving condition in the districts where the hostile bands no longer dared to penetrate gave a conclusive answer — was not to be found satisfactory. In the report on the principal events in Groot-Atjeh and dependencies of 11–24 September, he pointed out, several incidents were mentioned which did not exactly testify to quiet. He read from it: the incursion of Toekoe Oemar into Lamtih mentioned in the previous report had at first caused a flight of people from Lepong, partly to the mountains and partly to the IV Moekims; but after the troops stationed there had been reinforced and had occupied some points from which Oemar’s position could be commanded, he was obliged to withdraw deeper into the valley and the people returned to their dwelling-places; by the same measures and by the setting of ambushes an end was also made to the firing on the bivouac, which had several times been the target of hostile marksmen; meanwhile it could not be prevented that some small bands continued to move about.
Troelstra cited him the next day, saying that notwithstanding the much-praised tactics now followed and declared permanent, “wij nog niets zijn vooruitgegaan.” — we have as yet advanced nothing. Cremer answered his questions on Pedir and Gighen by reference to what had happened at Segli.
He voted against Van Kol’s motion on 17 November 1897.
See Also
- Atjehoorlog
- Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Deykerhoff
- Teungku Um
- Van der Wijck (governor-general)
- 1892
- 1896
Sources
Nederlanders over de Zeeën: 350 Jaar geschiedenis van Nederland buitengaats, onder redactie van Dr. H. J. de Graaf, met medewerking van Prof. G. Gonggrijp, W. R. Menkman en Prof. Jhr Dr P. J. van Winter, 2e geheel herziene druk (Utrecht: W. de Haan N.V., MCMLV), p. 218.
Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 13–15, 43, 55.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897) and Een strijd in Atjeh (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg for the Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.