The Atjeh debate in the Tweede Kamer was the two-day parliamentary confrontation over the Atjeh-oorlog held at ‘s-Gravenhage on Tuesday 16 November and Wednesday 17 November 1897, during the general deliberations on the budget of Nederlandsch-Indië for 1898. It was opened by the newly elected social-democratic deputy for Enschedé, H. van Kol, with a comprehensive historical indictment of Dutch policy in Atjeh since 1824, and closed on the second day with the rejection of his motion for an impartial commission of enquiry by seventy-two votes to three. The debate is preserved in full in the pamphlet Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (1897), published by the Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij.
The debate was the first occasion on which the newly formed socialist group put the legitimacy of the twenty-four-year war before the chamber as a whole, and the last major parliamentary discussion of the war before the appointment of Van Heutsz as governor. It ranged over the origins of the war, the conduct of Dutch troops, the mortality of the garrison, the economic interests bound up in the conflict, the reach of Dutch sovereignty on the Acehnese coast, and the question of whether the war could ever be ended at all.
The first sitting: Van Kol’s indictment
Van Kol opened by declaring that no reform in the Indies could come to anything unless “die kanker aan de welvaart van Indië” — see Atjeh-kanker — were cut out with a firm hand. He recalled that the sitting minister had himself conceded on 13 November 1896 that he would rather economise on every point than on Atjeh, and that “voor den Atjeh-oorlog moeten tijdelijk alle belangen zwichten” (for the Atjeh war all interests must temporarily give way). Such words, Van Kol said, must awaken pain in everyone who wished well to the Javaan: the thousands of hectares of arable land of the Solo-vallei were to be left to wither with drought, the plains of Tegal and Bagelen to be ravaged by floods, the seaports to become unusable, and in Bantam the native to wrestle with sickness and disaster, until the Dutch “annexatie-fanatisme” should be satisfied.
He set the war in the context of a general European annexation spirit of the previous thirty years, naming the partition of Africa at Berlin, the quarrels of Russia and Japan over Korea, of the Japanese and Americans over Hawaï, the pressure of England, Germany, France, Austria and Russia on Egypt and the Balkans, the conflicts in Tunis, Achter-Indië and the Niger region, the watch of England and Russia on the Afghan frontier, the overwhelming of Madagaskar, and the rivalries in Soedan, Senegal, Abyssinië and Ethiopië.
He then examined the three alleged causes of the war — piracy, the incessant wars among the Acehnese statelets, and the danger of foreign intervention — and rejected each in turn; the argument is set out in detail at Van Kol’s refutation of the causes of the Atjeh-oorlog (1897). He rehearsed the history of Dutch encroachment on Acehnese territory from the treaty of London to the treaty of Sumatra and the declaration of war of 26 March 1873; recited the passage from Major Kielstra’s Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog, volume I, page 27, conceding that the Acehnese had ample reason to distrust the Dutch; and condemned the mission of the Vice-President of the Council of the Indies, a man antipathetic to the sultan as the author of the Siak treaty, who was required to demand recognition of the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands within twenty-four hours.
Van Kol dwelt at length on the consequences: the unknown numbers of dead on both sides; the wounded dragging out a maimed existence; the multitudes carried off by dysentery, cholera, marsh fever and berri-berri; the widows, sisters and mothers standing in mute grief. He gave the financial estimates — some eleven hundred million spent on army and navy since 1873; extra expenditure of three hundred and fifty million guilders over twenty-five years; the figure of seven to eight hundred million reached by others; and the Java Bode of 13 April 1897 with its estimate of a thousand million guilders and a hundred thousand human lives. He noted that the minister Bergsma had been obliged to declare five months earlier that neither the Ministry of Colonies nor the Indies could state with precision how much had been spent specifically on Atjeh, and that Van Heutsz, then an assistant-resident, had objected in a review in Insulinde to Van Kol’s earlier figure in his brochure Land en Volk van Java on the ground that all extra civil expenditure, leave allowances, search vessels, travel and subsistence costs and part of the pensions must be added.
He recounted the atrocities: the boast about the snaphan setan (“the devil’s rifle”); the phrase of Rutgers van Rozenburg about dividing fallen Acehnese in two to hinder their entry into the Turkish heaven; and the killing of Toekoe Tjoet Machmoed Lam Tenzah with his wife, children and seven followers as they slept on 16 May 1897, reported in De Kroniek. Against this he set his tribute to the Acehnese voorvechters who allowed themselves to be shot down calmly, wrapped in white shrouds with arms crossed on the breast — true jahid’s, witnesses and martyrs of their love for religion and fatherland. The fanaticism that drove them, he said, the Dutch had themselves awakened, turning a manly resistance against foreign intruders into a heiligen strijd, a people’s war.
He closed with his gewetensvraag and the text of his motion.
The first sitting: the replies
Pijnacker Hordijk followed, quoting the Memorie van Antwoord on the fiscal weight of the war and asking the minister what precisely was meant by “consequent volhouden in de thans ingeslagen richting,” whether the pacification of the whole of Atjeh was thought possible without conquering a like position in the federations of Gighen and Pedir and in the southern settlements, and observing from the report on events in Groot-Atjeh of 11–24 September that the incursion of Toekoe Oemar into Lamtih had caused a flight of people from Lepong to the mountains and to the IV Moekims.
An unnamed minister-supporting speaker protested against the charge that nothing had been done for the welfare of the population of Java and the Buitenbezittingen. Verhey, a marine officer of the 1875–1876 campaign, conceded that from a historical point of view little could be brought against Van Kol’s account, but drew a contrary conclusion; he approved the mastery of the three sagi’s of Groot-Atjeh, compared the position to that reached when the victorious troops of general Van der Heyden could join hands at Selimoen from Lampenas and Indrapoeri in 1879, analysed the army’s capacity to sustain the occupation, and stated his objections of principle to a Staatscommissie — above all its paralysing effect and the impropriety of excluding military men. He closed with the figures of the berri-berri mortality set out at Beri-beri epidemic in the Atjeh garrison.
Kuyper then delivered the speech printed under the heading Een Christen aan het woord, arguing that the question of the war’s original justice was now a matter for the historian and not for parliamentary debate, that he took back no word of what he had said in 1874 and 1875, but that the vitium originis was not decisive for the present position. He illustrated his case with the parable of the boy in the neighbour’s apple tree, urged stelselvastheid in place of stelselloosheid, declared that Groot-Atjeh was “de sleutel van heel de positie” — the key to the whole position as a citadel is the key to a city, and pressed the minister to complete at once the number of recherchevaartuigen. He looked forward to bringing Atjeh the blessings of firm and orderly government, of higher civilisation, and above all of the Gospel.
Van der Zwaag answered Kuyper directly, holding that the debate on the justice of the war was more than ever timely, that whoever thought the war must end by force was morally bound to go and fight in Atjeh himself, and that the only means open to a member was to refuse the money — which he undertook to do so long as no end was made of the war. He supported Van Kol’s motion while declaring that it did not go far enough and rejecting its final clause on the volkenrechtelijke stelling.
Bahlmann welcomed the new minister as a guarantee that there would be no change of system, identified the instability of policy at each change of Governor-General or cabinet as the chief reason the war had lasted so long, deplored the fanfaronnades of colonel Heutsz and of the outgoing army commander, read the Voorloopig Verslag’s question into the record, and named the two founding errors of the war — Fransen van de Putte’s dispatch and Van Swieten’s proclamation. He demanded that Toekoe Oemar should long since have been in Dutch hands living or dead, and that the submission of the pretendent-sultan should be assured.
Van Karnebeek found no logical connection between Van Kol’s speech and his motion and feared the effect of the speech if its sound reached the Atjeh chiefs. Pyttersen welcomed the minister’s declaration of continuity and invoked the precedent of the commission of the Padri-oorlog and the capture of Bondjoe by Michiels. De Visser objected that the motion’s logic led to the surrender of the colonies either to foreign powers or to the power of Islam, citing Dr. Snouck Hurgronje’s Mekka. Van Vlijmen gave his adhesion to everything that had been and was being done in Atjeh, praised the three bivouacs of Tjot Mautjang, Indrapoeri and Loknga as commanding the whole valley, welcomed the lesson given to Segli, recalled that his own motion of the previous year had been withdrawn on Cremer’s advice, and asked for ten recherchevaartuigen rather than three, instancing the running of contraband at Simpang Anas.
Troelstra closed the opposition case with the speech summarised in the formula “de Kamer is radeloos, de partijen zijn redeloos en onze positie in Atjeh schijnt reddeloos te zijn” — the Chamber is at its wits’ end, the parties are unreasoning, and our position in Atjeh appears past saving. He analysed the economic interests of Deli, Tamiang and Perlak, the shares of the Koninklijke, and the former directorships of the minister; the argument is set out at Economic interests alleged behind the Atjeh-oorlog (1897).
Cremer’s reply
The Minister of Colonies J. T. Cremer answered at length. He declined to follow Van Kol’s historical exposition step by step, but defended the origin of the war by reference to the declaration annexed to the 1824 treaty and to the Nota over de betrekkingen van Nederland tot het Rijk van Atjeh sedert 1824; compared Acehnese piracy to that of the corsairs of Algiers and the Rif of Morocco, which had cost Algiers its independence to France; cited the British government’s complaints of ships plundered “by people in the neighbourhood of Atcheen”; and recalled the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gericke van Herwijnen in the comité-generaal that he had proofs of Acehnese approaches to Turkey, America and France.
He noted that fourteen successive Ministers of Colonies — thirteen predecessors and himself — had borne the responsibility, each for his own phase, and that he accepted responsibility only for what was now being done, as the continuator of a plan of action adopted under Royal authorisation on the proposal of his predecessor and in accordance with the proposals of the Governor-General. He denied being a Messiah or an adventurer.
On the economic charge he answered that the maintenance of quiet in and the development of the colonies was a very great economic interest of the Dutch people and that the pacificatie of Atjeh had become an inherent part of it. As former chairman of the Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij he observed that the Atjeh war had existed for years before that company was founded, that the chartering of ships for expeditions did indeed temporarily strengthen its treasury but far less than under its predecessor the Nederlandsch-Indische Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, and that troop transport imposed such heavy demands on the fleet that peaceful routes being won from foreign competitors were lost. As former co-director of a tobacco company he pointed out that Troelstra had himself quoted the profits made despite the war.
He then set out his defence of the present system — the abandonment of the geconcentreerde stelling, which had had a fair trial from 1884 and had produced only the actions at Kota Pohama and the échec of Kaloet; the reduction of posts from twenty-one under Van der Heyden plus eight added under civil government to seventeen, of which eight were to be abolished, leaving about nine; the concentration of strong mobile columns in a few well-placed kampementen; the improvement in health, with only two to four berri-berri patients a day entering hospital in the whole of Atjeh out of eight thousand men; the expansion of the Korps Marechaussee; and the tram to Indrapoeri soon to be extended to Selimoen. Asked whether he wished to conquer the whole of Atjeh, he answered no: the interior was unknown, there was no evidence that fighters from there joined the Acehnese bands, and when the coast was mastered the hinterland would come under Dutch influence of itself.
He explained the Segli expedition as directed not at taking Segli but at driving hostile bands out of the moekims Pakan Baroe and Pokan Soth; defended the speeches of colonel Van Heutsz and general Vetter against the charge of fanfaronnade; refused to name a date for the end of the war; and compared the Acehnese question to a chronic invalid whose bedside deliberations would be overheard by the patient. He denied cruelties in cold blood, and closed with a tribute to the Indies government and to the Governor-General.
The second sitting
On 17 November 1897 Cremer began by placing on record the declarations of the sixty-two coastal princes. Van Kol replied with the speech printed under the headings Nog eens de zeeroof, Onze volkenrechtelijke stelling, Ons prestige in Indië, Waarom niet uit Java?, Atjeh onneembaar, De belanghebbenden and De conclusie, in which he documented the atrocities in detail, expounded the doctrine of the kring van belang (sphere of interest), argued that Dutch prestige would be raised and not lowered by withdrawal, cited the prophecy of Toekoe Baid that if the men were killed the women would make war and after them the children, and named the contractors, suppliers, shipping companies and the merchants of Pinang who profited by the war.
Kuyper answered Van der Zwaag, Troelstra and Van Kol in a short reply invoking the impoverishment that the loss of the colonies would bring, the European war that their abandonment would provoke, the condition of Tripoli and Klein Azië as an image of non-European rule, the Russian legend of the two heavenly beings over the steppes, the botanist and the rose, and the answer of the Christus concerning the penny and the image of Caesar in Roman Palestine.
Ketelaar rose to withdraw the support he had given the motion. Troelstra replied to Cremer’s jest about Russian and Swiss professors, restated that he had named the minister’s former directorships not to cast a personal stain but to characterise the class in power, and was twice called to order by the President. Cremer answered briefly, associating himself with Kuyper on the question of cruelties and quoting Bergsma’s statement of 22 September 1896 on mutilation.
The general deliberation and the deliberation on the motion of order were then closed, and the motion was put and rejected by seventy-two votes to three.
See Also
- Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (1897)
- Van Kol’s motion of 16 November 1897
- Van Kol’s refutation of the causes of the Atjeh-oorlog (1897)
- Economic interests alleged behind the Atjeh-oorlog (1897)
- Atrocities in the Aceh War as alleged in the Tweede Kamer (1897)
- Post-1896 system in Atjeh
- H. van Kol
- Pieter Jelles Troelstra
- Abraham Kuyper
- J. T. Cremer
- 16 November
- 17 November
- 1897
Source
Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 3–80.
Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898 (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.