Bahlmann was a Roman Catholic member of the Tweede Kamer who spoke on the Atjeh-oorlog in the Atjeh debate of 16 November 1897. Though he did not share the political and economic principles of the new Minister of Colonies J. T. Cremer — indeed stood “diametraal daartegenover” — he welcomed his appointment as a guarantee that there would be no change of system in Atjeh, and delivered the most detailed constitutional critique of the origins of the war given from the confessional benches.
On the instability of Dutch policy
Bahlmann held that of the many reasons named for the long duration of the war the chief had not been mentioned. From the mouth of every Acehnese, he said, one could hear that at the accession of every new Governor-General or new cabinet the system was changed each time. “Hoe dikwijls zijn wij in den Atjeh-oorlog niet van stelsel veranderd, en aan de instabiliteit wijt ik het, dat wij niet verder gekomen zijn.” — How often have we not changed system in the Atjeh war, and to that instability I ascribe it that we have got no further. It was for that reason that he confessed out of the fullness of his heart that the appointment of the former deputy from Amsterdam as Minister of Colonies was for him a great reassurance.
Asked whether the Dutch were at that moment walking the only possible and safest road to the pacificatie of the whole of Atjeh, he answered: no. A far better road could have been walked years earlier. Yet he gladly confessed that they were at that moment further than ever, “verder dan zelfs in de beste periode onder het bestuur van generaal van der Heyden” — further than even in the best period under the administration of general Van der Heyden; and that was for him a second reassurance.
Against military boastfulness
Under the heading Militaire overmoed Bahlmann deplored that the successes achieved gave occasion to “militaire uitspattingen en fanfaronnades der militaire bevelhebbers.” He regretted that kolonel Heutsz had not long before declared that the situation was at that moment so far advanced that in 1898, at the accession of the Queen, Atjeh could be laid pacified at her feet. He equally regretted that the newly retired army commander — Vetter — had declared, if he might rely on what he had read in the papers, that the army in Atjeh had now come into its own, that Atjeh was again the training school for the army, and that still greater sacrifices would be asked of it. That such words should have been spoken by so highly placed an official grieved him, and he hoped they would not be taken under protection from the government bench.
On the Voorloopig Verslag
Bahlmann read into the record the question of the Voorloopig Verslag on page 5 concerning the political and military objective attained, the consequences expected, and the sacrifices still needed for pacificatie, together with its suggestion that the information be given in a note reserved for members. He noted that from the debate it had not been possible to gather from which side the question came, and that as rapporteur he was bound to secrecy about what the reporters knew. He found the question clearly enough formulated, regretted that the government had in effect not answered it, said that what it had answered did not satisfy him at all, and observed that of a note not a word had been said.
The two founding errors
He then set out his historical thesis. Applying to the war the words he ascribed to the elder Cato of the Romans — “quod ab initio non valet, tractu temporis convalescere non potest” — he located the misfortune of the Atjeh war already in the first dispatch of the Minister Fransen van de Putte: “souvereiniteitserkenning of oorlog.” By that formula the statesmen and soldiers of the day could come to no other conviction than that the Dutch would establish in Atjeh not a state of affairs such as in Central Java, but direct Dutch administration.
The second great error was committed in the well-known proclamation of general Van Swieten. Another means, he said, had now been brought into application to reach the pacification of Atjeh. If he was not mistaken, the restoration of the sultanate was not to be expected from the government; it appeared that neither the Indies government nor this minister would hear of such a demand as a condition of pacification, and he would therefore press it no further. Since sovereignty over Groot-Atjeh was insisted on, let no half-measures be taken but the course adopted be consistently pursued.
Demands on the government
Bahlmann stated two immediate objects: first, that Toekoe Oemar ought long since to have been in Dutch hands living or dead; second, that the Dutch ought by then to have been sure of the submission of the so-called pretendent-sultan. He was convinced that when the pretendent-sultan recognised Dutch authority one of the greatest steps towards the pacification of Groot-Atjeh would have been taken.
Troelstra singled out this demand for attack, saying that from a fraction claiming the monopoly of Christianity the chamber had had to hear that Toekoe Oemar must come into Dutch hands living or dead — “Toekoe Oemar moet hangen, zooals de straatdeun luidt” — and that this was little in agreement with the first lesson of Christianity, particularly since it was tolerably certain that the so-called treason of Toekoe Oemar had been caused by Dutch fault and error.
Cremer replied that the requirements laid down by Bahlmann concerning the capture of Toekoe Oemar and the conclusion of an agreement with the sultan formed no necessary parts of the government’s programme; he would not dispute with him about the significance of the sultanate in Atjeh, which he could study in the work of Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, but it was certain that to come together one or both sides must approach, and that no such approach had so far been made from the sultan’s side, nor did a repetition of negotiations lie in the Dutch intention.
Bahlmann voted against Van Kol’s motion on 17 November 1897.
See Also
- Atjeh debate in the Tweede Kamer (16-17 November 1897)
- J. T. Cremer
- Isaac Dignus Fransen van de Putte
- Van Swieten’s proclamation on the sovereignty of Atjeh
- Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz
- General Vetter
- Pretendent-sultan van Atjeh
- Teuku Umar
- Voorloopig Verslag on the Indies budget for 1898
- Pieter Jelles Troelstra
- 1897
Source
Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 27–30, 42, 58.
Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898 (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.