The post-1896 system in Atjeh was the strategy of abandoning the geconcentreerde stelling, reducing the number of fixed posts and concentrating strong mobile columns in a few well-placed kampementen, which the Minister of Colonies J. T. Cremer defended at length in the Atjeh debate of 16 November 1897 as having been born “uit den drang der omstandigheden” and not adopted by way of choice.
Rejection of the concentration system
Cremer stated that of all the Indies advisers there was at that moment not one who was still in favour of the geconcentreerde stelling, not even those who had opposed the manner of acting then in force. The concentrated position, occupied from 1884 until shortly before, had in all those years been “een fair trial”: it had been tried, and all agreed that it had not yielded the fruits expected of it, that it had not brought the Dutch a step nearer to pacificatie, but had led to the actions at Kota Pohama and to the échec of Kaloet — later evacuated by the enemy, but only with the help of native auxiliary troops and of money. The great loss in dead by disease and in battle, and in wounded, suffered in the concentration period had yielded no fruits that could in the remotest degree outweigh it.
The principles of the new system
The system, Cremer said, permitted a distinction to be made between well- and ill-disposed Acehnese. “De landbouwer, die volgens Dr. Snouck Hurgronje ook naar Atjehsche begrippen de kracht der natie uitmaakt, wordt nu door ons beschermd en behoeft dus geene wapens te dragen. Wie vechten wil moet zich bij de benden aansluiten; een gevaarlijk bedrijf wegens het optreden onzer actieve colonnes.” — The husbandman, who according to Dr. Snouck Hurgronje constitutes, also on Acehnese conceptions, the strength of the nation, is now protected by us and therefore need bear no arms. Whoever wishes to fight must join the bands. It was not, as the previous Memorie van Antwoord had already said, a system aiming at the conquest of the whole of Atjeh, but one “dat dwingt tot bestendiging van de afgedwongen rust en tot eerbiediging van ons gezag.” — which compels the perpetuation of the enforced quiet and respect for our authority.
It did not exclude consultation with the chiefs: on the whole coast of Atjeh government was carried on in union with the chiefs, the pity being only that these could not exercise sufficient authority over their subjects. Beside the governor stood a resident who had earned his spurs as a knower of Acehnese conditions, and since the introduction of the scheepvaartregeling under Minister Van Dedem the best officials of the binnenlandsch bestuur had been posted at the points designated for Dutch establishment, with extra rewards.
Distinction from Van der Heyden’s system
Asked how the system could be maintained where that of general Van der Heyden had been abolished in 1884, Cremer answered that the system then in force was not wholly the same: “Het voorspel, ja, het stuk zelf neen.” Taught by experience, the Dutch would not again wish to pluck too early the fruits of what had been won; “niet consolideeren en pacificeeren, zoolang occupeeren en waken nog het wachtwoord moet zijn.” — not to consolidate and pacify, so long as occupying and watching must still be the watchword. The Dutch peaceable striving after Van der Heyden’s departure the Acehnese had taken for weakness, and as he acted more boldly the disadvantages of an extended line of posts came to the fore.
The reduction of posts
Cremer gave precise figures. In Groot-Atjeh there had been twenty-one posts at Van der Heyden’s departure; under the civil government eight more had been added. The Dutch now had, in their concentrated position and outside it in the three sagi’s, seventeen posts, of which eight were destined to be abolished, so that it appeared that only about nine would remain. “Men vervalt nu niet meer in de fout van vroeger, dat men het leger opsluit in verschillende kleine bentings en posten, die elk op zich zelf te zwak van bezetting zijn om het omliggende gebied werkelijk actief te beheerschen, maar vereenigt krachtige mobiele colonnes in enkele goed gelegen kampementen. Het is nu de tijd van het actief optreden in elk opzicht, niet van het passieve.” — One no longer falls into the error of former days, of shutting the army up in various small bentings and posts, each of which is in itself too weakly garrisoned to command the surrounding territory actively, but one unites strong mobile columns in a few well-placed camps.
Supporting means
He named three supports of the system: the health of the troops, “oneindig gunstiger dan in het stelsel van 1884,” — infinitely more favourable than under the system of 1884, with only two to four berri-berri patients a day entering hospital in the whole of Atjeh out of eight thousand men, against the ten thousand needed in Van der Heyden’s time — see Beri-beri epidemic in the Atjeh garrison; the korps marechaussee, which took much of the most fatiguing work off the troops and was being steadily expanded; and the tram to Indrapoeri, soon to be extended to Selimoen.
Limits of the system
Asked whether he wished to conquer the whole of Atjeh, Cremer answered no. “Het binnenland van Atjeh is onbekend. Er zijn hoegenaamd geen bewijzen, dat strijders van daar zich voegen bij de Atjehsche benden. Het zal dus volmaakt onnoodig zijn om daarheen te trekken. Wanneer wij de kust beheerschen zal van zelf het achterland onder onzen invloed komen.” — The interior of Atjeh is unknown. There are no proofs whatever that fighters from there join the Acehnese bands. It will therefore be perfectly unnecessary to march thither. When we command the coast the hinterland will come under our influence of itself. For the coastal federations he pointed to the precedent of the Segli expedition: not to take places but to clear them of hostile bands and then leave the local chief to administer, under daily supervision from a fixed post.
Contemporary assessments
Van Vlijmen approved the system, holding that the three bivouacs of Tjot Mautjang, Indrapoeri and Loknga commanded the whole Atjeh-vallei and held in awe the hostile chiefs withdrawn into the mountains. Verhey approved the mastery of the three sagi’s and compared the position reached to that of 1879, when Van der Heyden’s troops could join hands at Selimoen from Lampenas and Indrapoeri. Bahlmann held that a far better road might have been walked years earlier, but conceded that the Dutch were then further than ever, “verder dan zelfs in de beste periode onder het bestuur van generaal van der Heyden.” — further than even in the best period under the administration of general Van der Heyden. Pijnacker Hordijk doubted that the situation had improved, citing the report of 11–24 September on the incursion of Toekoe Oemar into Lamtih. Troelstra held the tactics to be aggressive tactics that would cost more in money and lives than any other, and pointed to the complete uncertainty about their object.
See Also
- Geconcentreerde linie
- J. T. Cremer
- Karel van der Heijden
- Scheepvaartregeling
- Korps Marechaussee
- Kota Pohama
- Kaloet
- Sigli expedition (August 1897)
- Beri-beri epidemic in the Atjeh garrison
- Atjeh debate in the Tweede Kamer (16-17 November 1897)
- 1884
- 1896
- 1897
Source
Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 53–57, 16–18, 28, 33–35.
Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898 (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.