J. B. Verhey

J. B. Verhey — born Johannes Bernardus Verhey — was a Dutch marine officer who rose from lieutenant in the mid-1870s to colonel-commandant of the Korps Mariniers in the early 1890s, and later served as a member of the 2nd Chamber of the States-General for the Rotterdam III district. As a junior officer he served under General Pel during the Aceh campaign of 1875–1876 and authored a detailed memorandum on marine operations on Sumatra (including the northern province of Aceh) between July 1874 and February 1876. He later received the Militaire Willems Orde (4th class) for his role in the Edi River expedition of 1890.

Early marine service and the 1875–1876 Aceh campaign

As a lieutenant of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, Verhey served under General Pel during the Aceh campaign of 1875–1876. He led the marine detachment that acted as protective guard for the general’s staff and participated in actions at Daroe, Bockit Daroe and the crossing of the Loëng Lemo river.

On 27 January 1876 Verhey received Pel’s directive to keep the marine corps at the coast. He commanded the marine peloton that covered artillery sections and later guarded the headquarters and prisoners after the capture of the IX Moekims. His unit was engaged in heavy fighting on 28 January 1876 at the enemy camp of Daroe, where the marines suffered one fatality and ten wounded. He also helped construct a bridge over the Loëng Lemo for the artillery on 30 January 1876.

Command of the marine company

Verhey succeeded Captain Cramer von Baumgarten as commander of the marine company after the latter’s evacuation on 5 January 1876. He retained command for the remainder of the expedition.

The Sumatra memorandum (1874–1876)

Verhey compiled the memorandum Rapport van den luitenant der mariniers J. B. Verhey betreffende de verrichtingen der mariniers op Sumatra van Juli 1874 tot Febr. 1876 (Report by the Marine Lieutenant J. B. Verhey concerning the operations of the marines on Sumatra from July 1874 to Feb. 1876). The report enumerates patrols, riverine assaults, and the establishment of coastal outposts, noting that “the mariniers were frequently engaged in skirmishes on the coast of Aceh and were tasked with protecting Dutch trade routes against local resistance.” The document, dated 1874, is a primary source for scholars studying Dutch marine operations during the later phase of the Aceh War and the broader strategy of integrating marine forces with the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army.

Military advancement and honours

Promoted through the ranks, Verhey became colonel-commandant of the Korps Mariniers in the early 1890s. In 1890 he was awarded the Militaire Willems Orde (4th class) for distinguished service during the Edi River expedition. A contemporary portrait of Verhey in his uniform, painted by J. Hoynck van Papendrecht, commemorates the award.

Political career

After his military service, Verhey entered politics, securing a seat in the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (the Dutch House of Representatives) for the Rotterdam III district. His experience in colonial military affairs informed his contributions to parliamentary debates on the Dutch East Indies, particularly regarding the conduct of the Aceh War and the administration of maritime security.

Significance

Verhey’s career bridges two pivotal aspects of Dutch colonial history: the operational evolution of the marine forces in Sumatra during the 1870s and the high-level command and diplomatic roles of senior officers in the 1890s. His memorandum provides granular insight into on-the-ground tactics, while his later honours and parliamentary service illustrate the pathways through which colonial military expertise influenced Dutch policy in the East Indies. His transition from colonial officer to national politician also illustrates the close ties between the Dutch colonial military elite and metropolitan political institutions.

Account from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (1897)

Verhey spoke in the Atjeh debate on 16 November 1897, immediately after Pijnacker Hordijk, bringing to the discussion the authority of an officer who had served in the Atjeh campaign under general Pel.

On the history of the war

He said he had heard H. van Kol’s exposition with interest and believed that “uit een historisch oogpunt tegen veel van hetgeen door hem gezegd is, weinig is in te brengen” — from a historical point of view little could be brought against much of what he had said. But this need not lead to the adoption of the same conclusion. Van der Zwaag afterwards fastened on this admission, saying that since a specialist had granted the historical case, it was shown that the waging of the war was a grievous injustice.

On the three sagi’s

Verhey stated that if by the government’s phrase “consequent volhouden” was meant the continued mastery of the three sagi’s of Groot-Atjeh as then practised, he could wholly associate himself with it. It had been shown that the vigorous and restless action, the energy with which operations had been conducted, the exertion demanded of the troops and the sacrifices made had not been in vain: “Er werd weder een toestand geschapen als toen de zegevierende troepen van generaal van der Heyden in 1879, elkander uit Lampenas en Indrapoeri te Selimoen de hand konden reiken.” — A condition was again created such as when the victorious troops of general Van der Heyden in 1879 could join hands at Selimoen from Lampenas and Indrapoeri.

He warned, however, against optimism about early pacificatie: those who expected that the principal chiefs of the resistance would soon submit might not be disappointed, but he did not think it probable — “de geschiedenis van den Atjeh-oorlog laat niet toe optimistisch te zijn.” — the history of the Atjeh war does not permit one to be optimistic.

On the capacity of the Indies army

He then examined whether the Indies army could maintain the occupation on such a footing that the valley of Groot-Atjeh could continue to be mastered until pacification set in, and concluded from the data of the Koloniaal Verslag that it could. He withheld the figures but pointed out that in the infantry, by far the most numerous arm, the number of available men was four times as great as the infantry garrison of Atjeh; that of those needed in the last five years to replenish the force in Atjeh, more than the whole garrison was required annually; and that taking it roughly that the garrison was renewed every year — which the Memorie van Antwoord confirmed for one company of Europeans — it might be assumed as a rule that those of the relieved who remained in service were for a considerable time not available for Atjeh, while meanwhile part of the unavailable, the recruits, became fit for active service.

The possibility therefore existed, so far as strength was concerned, of continuing to maintain a state of war such as then existed. But he doubted whether the manner of individual replacement of losses, the constant va et vient, could have a favourable influence on the coherence of the army: a company renewed as it were in the course of a year must of itself lose in inner strength and cohesion. The more the periodic relief of whole units could take place before they had to be evacuated, the more the interests of the army as a whole would be served, and against the great advantages of that for the personnel the costs of expanding the army ought not in his opinion to weigh.

He read with approval the minister’s declaration that he doubted whether a still more vigorous action than that then taken in Atjeh would lead to a speedier end of the struggle. Were there certainty that with one blow, supposing well-trained and well-officered detachments could be created, the struggle would be ended, much if not all might be said for such a plan; but no one could give that certainty, and when one had penetrated to the places where one wished to defeat the enemy, what then, if submission or pacification did not immediately follow? Was it to be assumed that the newly conquered territory too would have to be held down? In his opinion, no. “Eerst wegen, dan wagen. Er staat thans te veel op het spel.” — First weigh, then venture. Too much is now at stake. With the watchword of holding fast what they then had, acting vigorously where necessary for that object, a sharp application of the scheepvaartregeling, and humane conduct worthy of a civilised nation, he could very well agree.

Against a Staatscommissie

Against the idea of a Staatscommissie indicated in the Voorloopig Verslag, he declared he had objections of principle. Very probably it found its ground in a want of confidence in the policy after so many years without the desired result, and as such was certainly to be justified. But what was to be won by it now? If a state commission could make an end of the struggle, who would not applaud it? There was, however, no one who believed that, and the minister had rightly called such an expectation an illusion. In the given circumstances a commission would give evidence of great distrust in the policy and honesty of the Indies government, for which no acceptable reason existed or was adduced. If the Indies government were sacrificing lives and money aimlessly, without study, without care for the country’s interest, ins Blaue hinein, and if anything of that had appeared, there might be talk of a commission of enquiry; but not now.

He asked further how the state commission would arrive at its advice and how that advice could be a guideline for the government. Very seldom were commissions, and especially state commissions, unanimous; usually there was a minority that submitted to a sometimes very small majority, from which difference separate notes commonly followed. A commission would also exercise a paralysing influence on the course of affairs for a considerable time; its advice, resting on thorough and certainly also on personal investigation on the spot, depended on subjective appreciation of conditions in the light of Atjeh history; and while the commission deliberated one would not be free to act where action was needed, nor able to use favourable moments for the further confirmation of Dutch authority.

He protested at length against the wish to exclude military men from such a commission. That they should not be admitted because they were military could only find its ground in the opinion that soldiers were per se for aggressive action and that the desire for fame or honour would darken a clear insight into the nature of circumstances. Against such a conception a word of protest ought not to be withheld: those who knew war and had studied it, who had seen and experienced the disasters and privations it brings in its train, would certainly not drive without motive to aggression or to needless continuation or sharpening of the war. It was therefore to be assumed that not the desire for military fame, with which so many in the Indies army were already covered, but rather cool understanding would govern their advice.

It could not be assumed, he said, that the life and health of so many young men would be sacrificed and so much treasure spent if the necessity of it were not evident; nor that men of character, of knowledge, of ripe experience and of years could aim at anything other than the fulfilment of what the country’s interest prescribed to them as their inescapable duty. Were it indeed otherwise, were there reasons to doubt the purity of intentions and the good faith of the leaders in so weighty a matter, then confidence would be wholly shaken, and he would say that the sooner the Netherlands cut out that appalling evil the better, and that whoever demonstrated that evil on irrefutable grounds would deserve the thanks of the whole Dutch people.

On beri-beri

He closed with the figures of the berri-berri epidemic set out at Beri-beri epidemic in the Atjeh garrison, observing that if this disease could be driven out the strength of the Indies army would considerably increase.

Verhey voted against Van Kol’s motion.

Sources

De geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Korps Mariniers van 1665–1945, by C. J. O. Dorren, 1948, OCR transcription, p. 136 and p. 144; OCR text, p. 474.

Verslagen der Marine-Vereeniging III 1889–1890, by J. R. J. P. Cambier, pp. 229–233.

Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 16–20, 25, 35, 55.

Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897) and Een strijd in Atjeh (Rotterdam: N.V. Drukkerij Korteweg for the Vereeniging „SIMAVI”, 1934). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.

tags	person, military, marine, dutch, colonial, aceh, politician
aliases	J. B. Verhey, J.B. Verhey, J B Verhey, Johannes Bernardus Verhey, Lieutenant Verhey, Colonel J. B. Verhey, Colonel-Commandant Verhey, Verhey

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