The kring van belang — the “sphere of interest” — was the doctrine of international law which H. van Kol invoked in the Tweede Kamer on 17 November 1897 to argue that the Netherlands could withdraw from Atjeh without any risk to its position on Sumatra under the law of nations.
The argument
Van Kol stated the doctrine thus. Whereas formerly colonial possession was respected only where authority was actually exercised, the partition of Africa had compelled the civilised nations to admit into international law the system of the so-called kringen van belang: even where no actual authority is exercised in a given territory, other powers nevertheless lose the right to stretch out their hand towards it.
He applied this to the Netherlands Indies: “wij Nederlanders hebben het oppergezag of imperium over alle eilanden en gedeelten van eilanden, gelegen tusschen 6 graden Noorder- en 11 graden Zuiderbreedte en de 95 graden tot 141 graden Oosterlengte. Dit alles is volkenrechtelijk een accessorium van den Staat Nederland.” — we Netherlanders have the supreme authority or imperium over all islands and parts of islands lying between 6 degrees North and 11 degrees South latitude and 95 to 141 degrees East longitude. All this is, in international law, an accessorium of the State of the Netherlands. The pamphlet glosses accessorium as aanhangsel. Whether that authority were exercised directly or mediately, actually or nominally, made nothing to the matter and had no influence on the exclusive right of international disposal.
The precedents
He cited the frontier settlements as evidence that the Dutch already relied on the doctrine elsewhere: on Borneo and Timor the mutual boundaries had been regulated by the treaties of 1891 and 1893, and on Nieuw-Guinea likewise, where Duitschland and England had respected the boundary the Dutch had chosen of their own authority. Nothing, he argued, prevented the Dutch from regulating the kring van belang — that is, the limit of their authority — on Sumatra also. For the English it had already been provided by the Sumatra treaty of 1871; from the other powers it could probably be easily obtained, “en dan ware onze suprematie (oppermacht) over Atjeh erkend en hadden wij geene inmenging van vreemden meer te vreezen.” — and then our supremacy over Atjeh would be recognised and we should have no further interference of foreigners to fear.
Should the powers, contrary to expectation, refuse to recognise the Dutch right to Atjeh, that would not be so terrible, since the Dutch would then have to renounce a strip of land forming not a thirty-fifth part of their possessions and not the most tempting patch of ground in their enormous overseas colonies.
The conclusion drawn
If, however, the European powers did recognise the Dutch right to supremacy over Atjeh, then all further bloodshed was criminal, the original object had been attained, “en kunnen wij de opslurping van het noordelijkst deel van Sumatra in ons Nederlandsch-Indische Rijk veilig aan de langzame werking van den tijd overlaten. In dat geval ware terugtrekken en onmiddellijk terugtrekken onze plicht.” — and we can safely leave the absorption of the northernmost part of Sumatra into our Netherlands-Indies Empire to the slow working of time. In that case withdrawal, and immediate withdrawal, would be our duty.
Van Kol added that he did not fear either the loss of prestige or a general rising, and proposed as his personal solution — which he would gladly submit to a commission — the occupation of Poeloe Bras or Poeloe Weh with some fast native-rigged vessels, by which piracy could be hindered far better than with the heavy and costly Dutch ships. If the Dutch left Atjeh, establishing themselves for instance on P. Bras, “dan is geene inmenging van vreemde Mogendheden te vreezen, en dat doel wordt beter bereikt zonder oorlog dan bij voortzetten daarvan.” — then no interference of foreign Powers is to be feared, and that object is better attained without war than by continuing it.
Reception
The doctrine was Van Kol’s answer to Van Karnebeek, who had argued that the closing clause of the motion — “met behoud onzer volkenrechtelijke stelling op Sumatra” — admitted of only one means, the subjection of Atjeh. Van Kol replied that this was what Van Karnebeek “niet schijnt te weten.” Van der Zwaag on the other hand rejected the clause from the opposite direction, holding that the Dutch were on Sumatra “niet krachtens een volkenrecht, maar krachtens het recht van den sterkste.” — not by virtue of any law of nations, but by virtue of the right of the stronger.
The Minister Cremer answered that the only thing in the motion that attracted him were those closing words, and that he agreed with Van Karnebeek that the sole answer to them was “onderwerp Atjeh.”
See Also
- H. van Kol
- Van Karnebeek
- Van der Zwaag
- Sumatra Tractaat (1871)
- Poeloe Bras
- Poeloe Weh
- Atjeh debate in the Tweede Kamer (16-17 November 1897)
- 1891
- 1893
- 1897
Source
Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898, uitgave van de Sociaaldemokratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br P95-178, pp. 64–67, 27, 31, 51.
Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Atjeh in de Tweede Kamer: Debatten bij de behandeling der begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indië voor 1898 (Amsterdam: J. A. Fortuijn, 1897). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.