The Sumatra-tractaat (1871) — the Sumatra Treaty of 1871 — was the Anglo-Dutch treaty by which England agreed that the whole of Sumatra — including the independent Atjeh sultanate — would fall within the Dutch sphere of influence, in exchange for the concession to British subjects of the same commercial rights throughout Sumatra as those enjoyed by Dutch subjects. The treaty is the diplomatic hinge on which the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]] turns; its conclusion is the proximate cause of the declaration of war on Atjeh of 1873.
The treaty
The Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] of 1871 between the Netherlands and England provided that “geheel Sumatra binnen de Nederlandse invloedssfeer zou vallen, terwijl de Engelse onderdanen in geheel Sumatra dezelfde rechten zouden gaan genieten als de Nederlanders” — the whole of Sumatra would fall within the Dutch sphere of influence, while British subjects in the whole of Sumatra would enjoy the same rights as the Dutch. The treaty was, the Dutch government later said, “welbewust om deze reden” — for this very reason — concluded: the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had increased the strategic and economic value of Straat Malakka as the shipping lane between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, and the Netherlands wished to secure its control of the whole Sumatran littoral that commanded the strait.
Ministerial reassurances
Minister Van Bosse delivered to the Tweede Kamer “zeer geruststellende verklaringen” — very reassuring statements — on the consequences of the instrument he had just signed. Some chambermembers had feared “moeilijkheden met Atjeh” — difficulties with Atjeh — but had been quieted by Van Bosse’s reassurances.
The 1897 retrospective
In the 1897 Tweede Kamer debate on credits for Nieuw Guinea, Van Welderen Rengers (lib.) recalled the Van Bosse assurances of 1871 as the type-specimen of the danger of “the first step” in colonial affairs. The first step, the signature of the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] in 1871, had been taken easily; the subsequent steps — the declaration of war on Atjeh in 1873 and the thirty-one-year Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]] that followed — were the steps that cost money and lives.
The “stel inbrekers” judgement
Troelstra (s.d.) later characterised the expression “afbakening van invloedssferen” — delimitation of spheres of influence — as “veel te opgepoetst voor een afspraak tussen een stel inbrekers, elkaar niet te hinderen bij hun bezigheden” — much too polished for an arrangement between a set of burglars, not hindering one another in their pursuits. The Troelstra judgement is the canonical socialist comment on the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]].
The parliamentary non-mention during the war
When the vijandelijkheden in Atjeh broke out in 1873, “kon het Sumatra-tractaat natuurlijk officieel niet vermeld worden” — the Sumatra-tractaat could not, of course, be officially mentioned. What corresponded most closely to reality was “vrees voor buitenlandse inmenging” — fear of foreign interference — which, however, was supposed to be diminished precisely by the conclusion of the Sumatra-tractaat. The contradiction is, in the Vermeulen retrospective, the measure of the official bad faith of the 1873 motivering.
Significance
The Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] of 1871 is the diplomatic instrument by which the Netherlands secured international recognition of its claim to Atjeh. Without the treaty, the declaration of war of 1873 would have risked British intervention; with the treaty, the war became a purely Dutch affair. The treaty is, accordingly, the indispensable diplomatic precondition of the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]].
Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)
The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.
The Sumatra-tractaat (1871) was the Anglo-Dutch treaty by which the Netherlands ceded its possessions on the coast of Guinea to Britain in exchange for a free Dutch hand on Sumatra. The treaty superseded the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824’s impossible double commitment to respect Atjehnese independence while suppressing Atjehnese piracy. Conquest of Atjeh was, the source insists, “nog niet gedacht” (not yet contemplated) in 1871; only the suppression of piracy was intended.
The treaty
The source records: “In 1871 werd door de Nederlandse Regering met Groot-Brittannië een tractaat gesloten, waarbij onze bezittingen aan de kust van Guinea aan Engeland werden afgestaan en dit land ons de vrije hand liet op Sumatra” (In 1871 a treaty was concluded between the Dutch government and Great Britain, by which our possessions on the coast of Guinea were ceded to England, and that country gave us a free hand on Sumatra). The Sumatra-tractaat of 1871 is the diplomatic instrument by which the Netherlands freed itself from the 1824 undertaking to respect Atjehnese independence.
The narrow framing
The source is explicit that, in 1871, conquest of Atjeh was not yet contemplated: “Aan verovering van Atjeh werd nog niet gedacht, alleen aan onderdrukking van zeeroof” (Conquest of Atjeh was not yet contemplated, only the suppression of piracy). The 1871 treaty was, on the Dutch reading, a narrowly anti-piracy instrument. The 1872 announcement of a Dutch envoy’s visit to the Sultan of Atjeh — to negotiate a new treaty — was consistent with this reading.
The slide to conquest
The slide from suppression to conquest was, however, already implicit in the 1871 treaty. The 1872 Atjehnese request for postponement, the Atjehnese chiefs’ visits to the Italian and American consuls in Singapore, and the unsatisfactory response of the Sultan of Atjeh to the Dutch demand for clarification together produced the declaration of war of 26 March 1873.
Significance
The Sumatra-tractaat of 1871 is the diplomatic instrument by which the Netherlands freed its hand on Sumatra and superseded the impossible double commitment of the 1824 undertaking. Without the 1871 treaty, the 1873 declaration of war would have risked British intervention; with the 1871 treaty, the war became a purely Dutch affair.
See Also
- P. P. van Bosse
- Declaration of war against the Sultan of Atjeh (1873)
- Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904)
- Great Britain
- Soezkanaal
- Straat Malakka
- Troelstra
- 1871
- H. B. van Kol
- Sumatra
- 1873
- Acheh
- 1897
- W. J. van Welderen Rengers
- 1872
- Sultan of Acheh
- Singapore
- Atjehoorlog
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824
- Nieuw Guinea
- 1824
- Tractaat van 1824 (Anglo-Dutch)
- Tractaat van 1857
- Siak-tractaat (1858)
- Tweede Kamer debate on Atjeh war origins (April 1874)
- Declaration of war on Atjeh (1873)
- Godefroi
- Van Zuylen van Nyevelt
- Cremers
- London Treaty (1824)
- Declaration of War on Aceh (1873)
- Aceh War (1873–1904)
- Dutch East Indies Government
- Gold Coast of Africa
Sources
Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 267-269, 276.
Nederlanders over de Zeeën: 350 Jaar geschiedenis van Nederland buitengaats, onder redactie van Dr. H. J. de Graaf, met medewerking van Prof. G. Gonggrijp, W. R. Menkman en Prof. Jhr Dr P. J. van Winter, 2e geheel herziene druk (Utrecht: W. de Haan N.V., MCMLV), pp. 209, 216. Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergaderingen der Tweede Kamer in comité-général van 16, 17, 18 en 20 April 1874: Oorlog met Atjeh, gedrukt ter Algemene Landsdrukkerij van het Koloniaal Instituut (1881), pp. 16–23, 28–30. 20260707_232246_DLP-55-De_geschiedenis_van_het_Nederlandsche_Korps_Mariniers_van_1665_1945_OCR.txt, p. 121.